Roland v. St. Louis City Board of Election CommissionersRoland v. St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Laura Denvir Stith (en banc)
The St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners and its members and officers (collectively, the election board) appeal the circuit court‘s judgment that they violated the sunshine law,
The portion of the circuit court‘s judgment holding the election board violated the sunshine law because absentee ballot applications and ballot envelopes are open public records is affirmed. The circuit court‘s taxation of certain court costs against Mr. Roland and in favor of the election board is reversed because the latter was not entitled to costs under either the sunshine law or the general law governing the award of costs.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Mr. Roland represented a candidate taking part in the City of St. Louis’ August 2016 primary election. As part of that representation, Mr. Roland made a sunshine law request to the custodian of records for the election board for certain election materials relating to elections held in the City from 2012 through 2016. The election board complied with much of Mr. Roland‘s request, but its in-house attorney informed Mr. Roland he had advised the election board that the sunshine law did not permit it to grant the portion of Mr. Roland‘s request seeking absentee ballot applications and ballot envelopes connected to those elections. When Mr. Roland continued to pursue the matter, the election board sought a legal opinion from the Missouri Secretary of State‘s Office. Its counsel advised that the ballot applications were confidential pursuant to
Mr. Roland sought a declaratory judgment that the election board violated the sunshine law by refusing to produce the
The circuit court first tried the issue of whether the election board violated the election laws. It ruled in favor of Mr. Roland, declaring the election board had violated the sunshine law by withholding the absentee ballot applications and ballot envelopes. Subsequently, the election board released those records to Mr. Roland.3
The circuit court then addressed Mr. Roland‘s claim of entitlement to attorney fees, costs and a penalty for this violation of the sunshine law. It found the election board‘s violation had been neither knowing nor purposeful because it had taken reasonable steps by consulting its in-house counsel and attorneys for the Secretary of State‘s office, and accepting their advice that Mr. Roland‘s interpretation of the law was incorrect. The clerk taxed the election board‘s costs to Mr. Roland in defending against the claim its violation was knowing or purposeful.4
On appeal, the election board claims the circuit court erred in finding that it violated the sunshine law because, it argues, the ballot applications and envelopes are confidential pursuant to
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“A judgment in a court-tried case will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence to support it, it is not against the weight of the evidence, and it does not erroneously declare or apply the law.” Gateway Foam Insulators, Inc. v. Jokerst Paving & Contracting, Inc., 279 S.W.3d 179, 184 (Mo. banc 2009). “An issue of statutory interpretation is a question of law, not fact.” Laut v. City of Arnold, 491 S.W.3d 191, 196 (Mo. banc 2016). Accordingly, the meaning and application of
Legislative intent with respect to public records is clear. The sunshine law expressly states, “It is the public policy of this state that meetings, records, votes, actions, and deliberations of public governmental bodies be open to the public unless otherwise provided by law.”
III. ST. LOUIS ABSENTEE BALLOT APPLICATIONS HAVE CEASED BEING PROTECTED FROM DISCLOSURE BY LAW
The sunshine law protects the public‘s right of access to public records except, as relevant here, “[r]ecords which are protected from disclosure by law.”
[A]ll lists of applications for absentee ballots shall be kept confidential to the extent that such lists of applications shall not be posted or displayed in any area open to the general public, nor shall such lists of applications be shown to any person who is not entitled to see such lists of applications ... Persons entitled to see such lists shall include a candidate or a duly authorized representative of a campaign committee as defined in section 130.011 or any person with written authorization from a candidate, or any person who has applied for an absentee ballot.
Prior to 8:00 a.m. on the Friday before an election all absentee ballot applications, lists of absentee ballot applications, or any information contained on the absentee ballot applications shall be kept confidential. Use of the applications, lists, or information contained thereon by the election authority prior to 8:00 a.m. on the Friday before an election for purposes other than processing the absentee ballots shall be deemed a class on election offense. After 8:00 a.m. on the Friday before an election any person authorized under subsection 4 of this section may copy the list, and the election authority may make copies of the list available to such persons for a reasonable fee determined by the election authority.
(Emphasis added).
The election board argues that by expressly allowing authorized persons to obtain the list of ballot applications after 8:00 a.m. on the Friday before an election while remaining silent as to ballot applications themselves after that time, the legislature necessarily meant the absentee ballot applications and any information applications contain would continue to be confidential after 8:00 a.m. on the Friday before the election. Mr. Roland argues this ignores the fact that
Exceptions to the sunshine law must be strictly construed in favor of open records.
The election board argues this interpretation of the statutes is illogical because allowing the absentee ballot applications and information they contain to become open records after 8:00 a.m. on the Friday before an election affords the public access to greater information than that contained on the list, which contains only the names and addresses of absentee voters, yet the list retains some restrictions on disclosure. It argues no real purpose, therefore, is served by protecting ballot application lists in St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and Jackson County if the applications themselves become public. And allowing revelation of the ballot applications themselves raises serious privacy concerns.
But, granting greater protection to lists than to the applications themselves is not peculiar to
The election board argues the enactment of special protections for applications and lists in the three largest urban jurisdictions shows there is a greater need for privacy protection for residents of those jurisdictions. But assuming this to be true, how long such greater protections are needed is an issue for determination by the legislature, not this Court. This Court will not second-guess how the legislature struck the delicate balance between the competing interests of privacy and transparency. State ex rel. Goodman v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Comm‘r‘s, 181 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Mo. App. 2005). This Court‘s obligation is to apply the election statutes and sunshine law as written, not as the election board may believe it could be better written.
In sum, the sunshine law provides that public records, which the parties agree include absentee ballot applications, are open records unless otherwise provided by law. This Court is not free to fashion additional exceptions to the sunshine law. Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 263 (Mo. App. 1982). No exception applies here after 8:00 a.m. the Friday before an election as to ballot applications and the information they contain. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in declaring the ballot applications were subject to disclosure.
IV. BALLOT ENVELOPES ARE OPEN TO THE PUBLIC AFTER THE VOTED BALLOT IS REMOVED
The parties agree voted ballots are protected from disclosure.
The election board argues the envelopes in which the ballots were placed must continue to be protected from disclosure after an election because
To process absentee ballots in envelopes, one member of each team, closely observed by another member of the team from a different political party, shall open each envelope and call the voter‘s name in a clear voice. Without unfolding the ballot, two team members, one from each major political party,
shall initial the ballot, and an election judge shall place the ballot, still folded, in a ballot box. ... After the votes on all ballots assigned to a team have been counted, the ballots and ballot envelopes shall be ... enclosed in sealed containers marked “voted absentee ballots and ballot envelopes from the election held ____, 20___“. All rejected absentee ballots and envelopes shall be enclosed and sealed in a separate container marked “rejected absentee ballots and envelopes from the election held ____, 20 ____“. ...
Even were this Court to agree it might be preferable not to store the envelopes and ballots together when one is an open record and the other a closed record, this is not a decision for this Court to make. The election board has not pointed to any statute that expressly exempts ballot envelopes from sunshine law disclosure after they have been opened and the voted ballots removed.6 Mere physical proximity of closed public records (the voted ballots) to other public records (the ballot envelopes) does not make the other public records closed by implication. There has been no showing the election board is unable to remove the ballot envelopes from the shared container without also revealing the voted ballots simply because of their shared storage. Any problems with this arrangement can be addressed by the legislature. In the absence of a provision making the envelopes
confidential, this Court will not imply an exception to disclosure not enacted by the legislature. See, e.g., Templemire, 433 S.W.3d at 381. The circuit court did not err in rejecting the election board‘s argument in regard to the ballot envelopes.
V. COSTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ASSESSED AGAINST MR. ROLAND
The election board argues it is entitled to costs it incurred in defending against Mr. Roland‘s assertion that its violation was knowing or purposeful because it prevailed in that defense. “Costs are a creature of statute, and courts have no inherent power to award costs, which can only be granted by virtue of express statutory authority.” State ex rel. Merrell v. Carter, 518 S.W. 798, 800 (Mo. banc 2017) (quotations omitted). “Statutes allowing taxation of costs are strictly construed.” Id.
In support of its claim to costs, the election board relies on
The sunshine law is just such a case “in which a different provision is made by law.” Cost awards, along with attorney fees and civil penalties, are among the available remedies for sunshine law violations under
Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a public governmental body or a member of a public governmental body has knowingly violated sections 610.010 to 610.026, the public governmental body or the member shall be subject to a civil penalty in an amount up to one thousand dollars.
If the court finds that there is a knowing violation of sections 610.010 to 610.026, the court may order the payment by such
body or member of all costs and reasonable attorney fees to any party successfully establishing a violation.
(Emphasis added). Similarly,
“[T]he portions of the sunshine law that allow for imposition of a civil penalty and an award of attorney fees and costs are penal in nature and must be strictly construed.” Laut, 491 S.W.3d 196. As relevant here, the language in the sunshine law limits such an award of costs to a plaintiff, as only a plaintiff (on either a claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim) would be able to “establish a violation” against a public body or member. The defending public body or member is the one defending against the claim of a violation, not the one establishing a violation.
The election board, nonetheless, argues that because subsections 3 and 4 of
The election board‘s premise for this argument is faulty, however. First, when construing statutes, this Court may not “add or subtract words from a statute or ignore the plain meaning of the words that are there.” Dickemann v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 550 S.W.3d 65, 68 n.5 (Mo. banc 2018). The statute is explicit in stating who can receive costs –only those who are successful in establishing a violation, that is, plaintiffs. It is also explicit as against whom such costs can be awarded – only the public body.
Second, the sunshine law must be read as a whole, and other sections are not silent as to the right of governmental bodies to costs.
Finally, even under the general costs statute,
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the circuit court‘s judgment is affirmed in its holding that the election board violated the sunshine law in refusing to produce the ballot applications and envelopes. The judgment of the circuit court is reversed insofar as it awarded costs to the election board in defending against the allegation its violation was knowing or purposeful.
LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE
All concur.