David C. Singleton v. Don Cecil

MAGILL, Circuit Judge. Following the analysis of our sister circuits and Supreme precedent, we affirm the district court’s1 holding that, in Missouri, an at-will employment state, a discharged municipal at-will does not have a section 1983 substantive due process occupational liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.

I.

A. Facts David Singleton City worked Advance, Missouri a police officer from 1990 until his termination in 1994. City of Advance did not have a written employment agreement with Officer Sin gleton. Singleton’s will, was terminable either the mayor approval of a simple majority of the council, city byor a two-thirds vote city council. See § Mo.Ann.Stat. 79.240 (1998); State ex rel. Lupo City Wentzville, (Mo.Ct. 886 S.W.2d 730-31 App.1994). Neither state nor local law limited the reasons for which Officer Sin gleton could be discharged nor afforded him the to a hearing in connection with his discharge. At the time of Officer 1. The Perry, Honorable Catherine D. United of Missouri. Judge States District for the Eastern District initiated this suit then Don Cecil discharge, defendant Singleton’s against § Chief Ce- under U.S.C. chief, and defendants Advance’s members, City cil, four council Tidwell, Parker, Kevin Ivan Harley Moyer, termi- alleged that He of Advance. of Ad- members were Price and Della his violated by the defendants nation Bradshaw, city council. William vance’s intimate speech, of free rights Advance, was not named mayor of the speech free association, His privacy. and defendant. that he the premise on allegation rested employment, his During period the him keep effort to discharged was an that concerned Singleton became pur- Officer car concerning Chief Cecil’s silent pro- an incentive had abused Chief Cecil the council members response, chase. government to facilitate designed they the termination gram divulged based his own bribe plot a car for by purchasing solely on decision Joann’s purchases granted De- court program.2 district under the Chief Cecil. and use benefit the defen- in favor of summary judgment en- had that Chief Cecil his belief spite claims. Singleton’s on all of Officer dants Singleton activity, Officer illegal gaged the court concluded Particularly, district offi- any law enforcement never notified on prevail Singleton could that Officer of his city the council cials, mayor, or he could not because speech free claim his 8, morning of March On concern. be- any causal connection demonstrate Joann, wife, called 1994, Singleton’s Officer his purchase and car Chief Cecil’s tween Sabrina, a cordless tele- on daughter, their Cecil, 955 v. Singleton See termination. conversation, be- During the phone. (E.D.Mo.1997). 1164, 1166-67 F.Supp. Cecil, said and Joann discussing Chief gan Officer also found that court The district by Chief Cecil up” to “set wanted she proce- on prevail could not him. to bribe Unbe- hiring someone because, an at- as claims dural due Sabrina, this and state- Joann knownst to proper- he no employee, had will David by George, recorded ment was id. at 1167. job. See in his ty interest happened to who investigator private local held that the district court Finally, frequencies at time.3 scanning radio he was claims that Singleton’s contacted Chief day, George Later that mari- and association rights of intimate his played Bradshaw and Mayor and Cecil defendants because “the failed privacy tal George for them. conversation recorded faith belief legitimate, good had a record- copy of the Cecil gave also Chief engaging family, his was plaintiff, the members then visited Cecil ing. Chief conspiring bribe by conduct improper record- played city council Id. of Police.” the Chief individually. Each council for them ing and Sabrina’s recognized Joann’s member Law Employment B. Missouri Atr-Will and, at a special recording voices on 1994, 11, they unani- March Process meeting “Due on Because Single- tradi supplant to terminate Officer mously purport voted does not City Harker They law,” did not include v. Collins employment. tional tort ton’s 503 U.S. discharging Heights, reason omit (quotations they pub- 117 L.Ed.2d Nor did letter. his termination pro- ted), property interests and because any reason for licly divulge between Joann targeling fact, city conversations coun- and the Mayor Bradshaw 2. throughout knowledge George vehi- testified prior Sabrina. cil members cle phone the car available purchase and considered cordless he monitored March city backup vehicle. by as a use radio City Advance with in the channels less” for entertainment “more or scanner appeal on 3. There is no contention App. Appellee’s purposes. George was illegal interception by employee may tected the Due Process Clause are not allege that his discharge Constitution, by created but rather public policy. violated Missouri See Shaw law, cross, mu- independent sources such state Single S.W.2d 343. Officer ordinance, contract, nicipal Bishop see attempted ton has not to assert state Wood, 344 & n. claims in law this case. (1976); L.Ed.2d Board of Roth, Regents Colleges State II. 564, 577-78, Warehouse, (1972); City Inc. v. appeal, panel Movers On divided this court Canada, Little 718 & n. 3 originally affirmed the district court in all Cir.1995), perti- Cecil, briefly Singleton we forth respects. set See v. 133 F.3d (8th Cir.), 631, vacated, nent law employment. 631, Missouri on at-will 635 133 F.3d (8th Cir.1998) I). law, In municipal this neither state (Singleton 636 After law, bargaining agreement, granting a collective or Singleton’s petition Officer for re- an employment hearing, contract afforded Officer panel, judge with one dissent- any Singleton property job. interest in his ing, affirmed most of the district court’s contrast, as an grant summary at-will Mis- of but judgment, reversed souri, discharged he could “for cause or on the sole ground that it believed the Tuell, without cause.” Lake v. 687 S.W.2d deprived Singleton defendants Officer of 191, (Mo.1985). Indeed, occupational liberty, 193 he could even his which was ostensi- discharged “for no reason or for an bly due process. Cecil, irrational reason.” Singleton 983, Shawcross See v. 155 F.3d 986- Prods., (8th Inc., 342, Pyro Cir.), vacated, v. 983, 916 S.W.2d 343 90 155 F.3d 992 omitted). (8th Cir.1998) II). (Mo.Ct.App.1995)(quotations (Singleton Notwithstanding grant the broad In the of reversing course the district court, employers power at-will fire the panel majority conceded that reason, employees or no Singleton Missouri Officer was not of any discharged life, law affords a at-will employee liberty, property interest Singleton ability such support procedural as Officer to would process 987, seek redress. Such an employee claim. See id. Eighth at 989. Under may law, assert cause of action for tortious Circuit this concession should have against interference with precluded Singleton proceed Officer i.e., third-parties, non-employers such as on a ing substantive due theory. Amen, George, 1400, inducing See Weimer See v. 870 F.2d 1405- (8th Cir.1989) (“to v. National Elec. Contractors 06 our extent cases Stanfield Inc., Ass’n, 199, (Mo.Ct. recognize 588 S.W.2d right 202 constitutional to substan Garrison, App.1979); see also Haddle v. right tive due no greater — U.S. -, -, 489, 492, 142 than the process”); (1998) (explaining 38, v. that “third- Buhr Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 509 Buffalo (8th party 1196, Cir.1974); interference with at-will employment F.2d 1202 accord ... relationships long compen- been a v. Clark 607 Whiting, F.2d 641-42 n. law”). (4th (absence injury Cir.1979) sable under tort also He a liberty may bring tortious claim interference interest with pro connection against supervisor his direct and employer cedural due claim fatal to the presents he eliminating any plaintiffs “evidence purported pro substantive due justification claim); business all for the termi v. Weathers West Yuma Eggleston Phillips, R-J-1, nation.” v. County Sch. S.W.2d Dist. addition, Cir.1976) (same); (Mo.Ct.App.1992). 1340-42 Jeffries despite Dist., typical Turkey prohibition against Run Sch. Consol. (7th Cir.1974) (same). claims, J.)

bringing wrongful discharge (Stevens, such 4 arbitrary or supposedly for this Singleton majority elected Nevertheless, panel reason.4 irrational authority. Acknowl- this to follow Fourteenth Amendment that “the edging time, pause we to note At any generalized free-float- create does not involved Kelley nor Lowman neither someone depriving right against ing liberty in an at- employee’s abstract,” Singleton in the process’ ‘due state, were although both will majority II, panel F.3d at of substantive under the rubric decided general had a held dealt cases Both these process. “the to as liberty” “occupational constitutionality with the —referred oc- of the common engage right ‘to — n appearance addressing the regulations life’ ”—that entitled cupations governmen length the hair specifically —of Id. protection. asser employees’ and the employees tal Nebraska, Meyer U.S. (quoting “some regulations violated tions that (1923)). L.Ed. 1042 Four ‘liberty’ interest within sort majority then held that panel personal matters teenth Amendment occu- deprived of his Kelley, appearance.” (1) Lowman, on two different bases: liberty pational 1440; 704 F.2d see also S.Ct. reason for dis- (case by speculating alleged employee’s an 1045 involved might it known then him charging personal appear became one’s govern “freedom omitted)). Supreme him to secure The be difficult (quotations ance” elsewhere, by any and such questioned officer whether Court even liberty con- by due occupational holding protected that this was so willing to retain his to assume right him the but upon ferred Kelley, 425 appeal. See job City purposes of Advance. particular 244, 96 1440.5 such as U.S. at S.Ct. Relying on cases at 988. See id. 248, Johnson, 238, 96 425 v.

Kelley III. (1976) and 1440, 708 47 L.Ed.2d Davies, initially chal Singleton v. Lowman Officer conclusion (8th Cir.1983), majority also court’s panel district lenges the violate his substan de- did not employer’s government “if a defendants held in his privacy right may process tive irrational that due policy is so cision or First Amend relationship and his marital may employee an arbitrary, branded be With intimate association. right ment denied has been that he assert plausibly affirm the challenges, we respect to rights under process due his substantive expressed in the reasons court for district Singleton Amendment.” Fourteenth I, opinion. panel See omitted). the first II, (quotations F.3d at 986 II, 634-35; see also 133 F.3d de- majority, the panel According to the at 986. 155 F.3d Singleton of deprived Officer fendants discharging him liberty by IY. and the notion plot, because of Joann’s al defendants’ hold barred We absolutely process substantive due firing capricious and arbitrary leged discharging Officer from defendants undisputed 1986), employee an Cir. that the majority also concluded panel 4. The employment. right Sin- in his continued property defendants' decision discharged during arbitrary See Sin- (employee and irrational. gleton was at 326 See id. II, F.3d at 987. Moore gleton employment). of contractual term considered addressed nor panel neither concluding only Eighth’Circuit case In the "occupational liber employee’s claim that due public employee has a substantive that a process ty” afford a substantive would arbitrary and right process be free capricious arbitrary and free from be discharge, v. Warwick capricious see Moore (8th 322, 329 794 F.2d Sch. Dist. No. Pub. 1713, 140 an at-will un- Singleton, (1998). “Analysis be discharged der Missouri law who could of either or cause,” Dake, process begin “for cause without claim must with an alleg examination of the interest S.W.2d at or “for no reason or for an violated,” edly reason,” Dover Shawcross, Elevator Co. v. Ar arbitrary irrational Univ., kansas State 64 F.3d 445-46 (quotations omitted), at 343 S.W.2d (8th Cir.1995), possession and “[t]he because of the conversation between his life, protected liberty, interest daughter wife and did not violate his sub- is ... a precedent” condition process rights. stantive due To hold oth- Warehouse, claim. Movers disregard Supreme erwise would 718; City F.3d at see also Nunez Los precedent and the decisions of our (9th Cir.1998) Angeles, 147 F.3d circuits, which an employ- sister hold that (“a must, matter, plaintiff as a threshold occupational liberty ee’s government life, show a deprivation of lib by substantive due when the em- erty, or property”). no such in “[W]here ployee discharged by governmental exists, terest there can no employer. would be abusing We also Moore, Dobrovolny violation.” § upon 1983 to intrude second-guess — denied, Cir.1997), cert. at-will employment decisions made U.S. -, 140 L.Ed.2d 319 actors, state notwithstanding (1998). Merely labeling Court’s “[t]he admonishment that federal capricious, action as appropriate court is not forum which life, deprivation absence of the liberty, to review the multitude personnel deci- or property, support will not a substantive daily by public sions are made agen- due process Regents claim. See Univ. cies” and United States “[t]he Constitution 214, 226, Ewing, Mich. v. 474 U.S. 106 cannot feasibly require construed to (1985) (“the 507, S.Ct. 88 L.Ed.2d 523 every federal review for such er- legisla- has no license to invalidate 349-50, ror.” Bishop, 426 U.S. at 96 S.Ct. merely tion which it arbitrary thinks (footnote omitted). Furthermore, 2074 we omitted)); (quotations unreasonable” see distorting would be the Constitution to (“There Nunez, also 147 F.3d at 873 no supplant Missouri state law and create a general liberty being interest in free from regulating employment federal tort state action.”); capricious government Valot v. Collins, 128, decisions. 503 U.S. 112 Cf. Educ., Southeast Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of law, (explaining S.Ct. 1061 that “state (6th Cir.1997) 1220, 107 (Ryan, F.3d 1233 Constitution, rather than the Federal gen- J., concurring) (“merely state that the erally governs the substance the em- Due Process was ‘intended to se- ployment relationship” “Due and the Pro- cure the arbitrary individual from the ex- purport Clause does not to supplant powers ercise of government’ ... traditional tort law laying down rules of does nothing to state a claim under the injuries conduct regulate liability component substantive of the Due Process living together attend in society” Clause”); (Ste- Jeffries, 492 at 4 n. F.2d 8 omitted)). (quotations J.) (no vens, general liberty interest being capricious free from and arbitrary The Due Process Clause of the action). “Thus, in the ab- Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state life, liberty sence of a interest governments “any person from depriving Singleton] [Officer could be terminated for life, liberty, property, without due capricious Const, and reasons.” Zorzi process of law....” U.S. amend. Putnam, 885, v. County 895 XIV, § components: clause This has two (7th Cir.1994). procedural process due and the sub stantive process components. due only See is whether question here Offi- Lewis, County Sacramento v. cer U.S. been of a “lib- respondent clearly appears is that proc by erty” protected year at one universi not rehired for one of “the component The substantive ess.6 Bar v. Board ty”), with Schware protects specially Process Clause Due 232, 246-47, Exam’rs, and liberties rights fundamental those 752, re (government 1 L.Ed.2d 796 are, ‘deeply rooted objectively, which lawyer, tradition,’ plaintiff as thus fused to license history and Nation’s this law working as a preventing plaintiff from liberty,’ concept of ordered ‘implicit in the state). Rather, this yer anywhere justice would liberty nor that ‘neither such ” employer’s a governmental case involves Washing sacrificed.’ were exist employee. an at-will 702, decision to 117 S.Ct. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. ton (1997) (cita Thus, government dealing we are L.Ed.2d 772 manag that was omitted).7 acting proprietor” “as [a] articulated Powell Justice tions affairs” rather than own internal rights ing are “its process “substantive attempting “to Constitution,” as a “lawmaker” that was unlike only by created ... an entire trade or regulate or license which can rights an entire branch or to control profession, law or the Con created either state & Restau private business.” 106 of Ewing, stitution. Cafeteria Union, v. McEl Local (Powell, J., For rant Workers concurring). 5.Ct. roy, 367 U.S. reason, of substan protections “[t]he (1961). is crucial to “[I]t part the most have for tive due ‘legislative’ the distinction between to mar note relating matters accorded to regulations “and such as laws and right to acts” family, procreation, riage, Oliver, acts” such as ‘non-legislative’ or ‘executive’ Albright v. bodily integrity.” analyzing when terminations 127 L.Ed.2d claims. McKin (1994). Pate, 1550, 1557 n. 9 ney v. the de- Singleton suggests banc). Cir.1994) (en fendants, employ- him from by discharging suggestion that There is no ment, occupation- deprived him of have particular with a continued upon confers liberty, supposedly which al re “anything has employer as employment right to continued him the freedom of sembling ‘the individual’s City of Advance with the a officer mat certain basic respect choice with nonarbitrary and rational rea- absent some family marriage, procreation, ters of Notably, this is not for his son ” Dist. v. Mar Indep. Sch. life.’ Harrah regu- government, the where situation 1062, 194, 198, tin, 99 S.Ct. 59 440 au- U.S. lator, regulatory its somehow used has (citation curiam) (1979) (per L.Ed.2d 248 opportunity the thority deny person omitted). the contrary, the To Compare profession. pursue chosen employ public suggested that 575, (noting Court has Roth, at 92 S.Ct. with us, interest continued all that ee’s “on the record before government action com establish that dispute 6. There is no irrational,’ is, 'some plained ‘truly proper- of is either life or not has arbitrary, capricious, or thing ... more than ty- ” Purkett, Weiler v. state in violation of law.' (en banc) 1047, 1998) (8th Cir. bring way a substantive 7. An alternative omitted). Singleton (quotations and citations govern that the process claim is to assert however, not, prevail under sought to this has the con “either actions ment’s 'shock! 1 rely theory, instead the conscience” “shocks judicial notions of fair 'offend[ ] science' ” de supposed existence and ing solely on Riley dignity.’ v. St. ... ... human ness privation 627, "fundamental” Cir. County, 153 F.3d Louis Accordingly, we need not denied, - U.S. liberty interest. omitted), 1998) (citations cert. theory to the applicability of 1113, (1999). address the -, S.Ct. present facts of the case. plaintiff’s "burden is to such a a governmental employer is not so “funda- Court explained law, has that “state rather protected by mental” as to be than Constitution, the Federal generally 195-99, due process.8 See id. at governs substance of the Harrah, 1062. In a school Collins, board voted relationship.” not 128, 112 U.S. to renew a tenured teacher’s contract be- S.Ct. 1061. The Court also asserted cause comply she refused to that “[t]he Due Process Clause of the board’s continuing requirements. education Fourteenth Amendment is not a guarantee 195-96, See id. at 99 S.Ct. 1062. against incorrect or personnel ill-advised teacher claimed that she had a liberty decisions” and “[t]he United States Consti being interest not discharged pursuant tution cannot feasibly be construed to re 198, to that rule. See id. at 99 S.Ct. 1062. quire federal every” review for While acknowledging that the Due Process allegedly erroneous Bishop, decision. “protects aspects of lib- U.S. at 96 S.Ct. 2074. The Court has erty against impermissible governmental further exclaimed that “[t]he federal court restrictions,” id. at 99 S.Ct. is not the appropriate forum in which to explained Court pro- teacher’s review the personnel multitude of deci liberty fessed interest completely un- sions that daily are made by public agen related to “the individual’s freedom of cies.” Id. at 96 S.Ct. 2074. respect choice with to certain basic mat- Roth, a University president in- ters procreation, marriage, and family formed a non-tenured 'teacher that he life.” Id. at (quotations would not be rehired for the next academic that, omitted). In addition to its conclusion year but give any did not reason for the the board’s action was arbitrary, decision. See 408 Court held that the teacher “neither as- 2701. specifically While recognizing that serted nor established ... the deprivation the term “liberty” included “the ... any fundamental right.” constitutional to engage occupa- common Id. at 99 S.Ct. 1062. life,” tions of id. at 92 S.Ct. 2701 Although the Court has not otherwise (quotations omitted), the Court went on to ruled on applicability of occupational hold that University’s decision did not liberty and substantive process in implicate interest. See id. at context of governmental employer’s deci 92 S.Ct. 2701. The explained sion an employee, the Court’s that “in declining re-employ the [teach- er], suggest decisions University] [the imposed on him [no] Singleton’s alleged occupation stigma or disability other that foreclosed al liberty is not by substantive his freedom to take advantage of other process. Roth, See 408 U.S. at 572- employment opportunities.” Id. According 2701; 92 S.Ct. McElroy, 367 Court, U.S. at to the “[i]t stretches concept too 895-96, 81 S.Ct. 1743. example, For far to suggest that person dissent, Nebraska, 8. quoting Meyer v. "brief[ly] 262 interrupt[s],'' person engag- from 390, 399, U.S. 43 S.Ct. ing Moreover, L.Ed. 1042 in his desired field. Id. (1923), ignoring asserts that we are the Su- emphasized the Court that this preme “liberty Court's assertion that “right includes is simply infringed by the inevitable engage any 'to in interruptions common daily of our routine as a result " occupations of life....' legal process Post at 432. The may which experi- all of us recently explained liberty right Here, that this ence from time time.” Id. Officer engage occupation in an per- extends to a Singleton, employee, at-will an has been dis- ability engage son's private in a "field charged by governmental employer his from - Gabbert, employment.” Conn v. U.S. specific job. one experience This is an suf- -, 1292, 1296, 119 S.Ct. by 143 L.Ed.2d 399 persons, fered multitudes of and there is (1999). The Court then clear made that this no evidence that Officer Singleton has been right has been afforded pro- stigmatized due by his or that he has protection cess only government when the completely prohibited working as a prohibits],” "complete[ly] rather than officer in the future. Amendment interest continued discharged from] one when he ‘liberty’ [is as before to seek the ex- adequacy as free even job employment, but remains 575, 92 S.Ct. 2701. Id. at him failing another.” istence of reasons for to rehire presents question. no federal constitutional a cook who plaintiff was McElroy, Only employer if creates and dissemi- employer on the private for a worked defamatory impression nates a false and a naval base and lost her premises of employee about the connection his the naval officer in employment when procedural] hearing [con- termination is [a base, giving any without charge of the (footnote stitutionally] required.” omit- reasons, security clearance. withdrew her ted)); 348-50, 887-88, at Bishop, 81 S.Ct. 1743. See 367 U.S. (even claim, ex analyzing employer’s her the Court reason dis- When false, consistently recognized that it “has was em- plained charging employee at-will government ... of a em that the interest ployee still could not state due job[ claim). can be sum ployee retaining ] that undisputed marily denied.” Id. at 81 S.Ct. publicize the defendants did not rea- Court, to the has become According “[i]t until discharging son for government employ that principle settled in this defending were themselves ment, can legislation, in the absence no in the litigation and there is evidence ... will.” Id.9 revoked at record that Officer has been when the stigmatized. Regardless, even In further contrast to assertion divulges stigmatizing in- public employer Singleton’s alleged occupational lib employee an in connection formation about as to be erty is so fundamental discharge, the Court employee’s with that Supreme by occupa- only employee’s held that the find a steadfastly refused to Court has liberty tional is afforded Process Clause when violation of the Due neither discharges protection. The Court has employer public reason, reason, a false oc- employee’s a bad or even intimated that the for no held nor employer’s publication liberty reason absent is entitled to substantive cupational the em information about stigmatizing protection. with the ployee connection on this Court case Based Loudermill, Bd. Educ. See Cleveland law, circuits have of our sister several 547 n. employ discharged public to allow refused (1985) (summarily rejecting pro proceed ees to with substantive [plaintiff] uncon “argu[ment] against employ claims their former because of stitutionally deprived ers, rights are holding “employment hung dishonesty accusation of created rights not ‘fundamental’ plain ground head” on the over his McKinney, 20 F.3d Constitution.” allege that the reasons for tiffs “failure to 895; Zorzi, 1560; F.3d at Sutton accord dooms this published dismissal were [his] Educ., Bd. v. Cleveland 624, 628, claim”); Velger, Codd (6th Cir.1992); Lum v. Jen see also (per 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (9th Cir.1989) sen, curiam) (“Since found the District Court (“no right clearly constitutional no Fourteenth established [the Plaintiff] suggestion employee would be able to that an Although "assume[d] the Court also 9. liberty” a sub- constitutionally rely "occupational to assert plaintiff] have on could not [the McKinney process job] stantive due claim. if the announced [her been excluded from Cf. Cir.1994) (en Pate, (11th patently grounds 20 F.3d for her exclusions had been banc) ("Supreme precedent demon- discriminatory,” McElroy, Court arbitrary property right employee with a strates that an U.S. at the Court made only by proce- protected assumption only an is in the context of Clause, component ability procedural of the Due Process employee's demand a dural to component”). hearing. not its substantive process Id. The Court made no due to process substantive due protection of tional claim and seek redress in federal public continued employment.”); San Indeed, court.10 if we were to hold that an cf. tiago Medina, de Castro Morales 943 employee’s occupational liberty is afforded (1st Cir.1991) (plaintiffs al process protection substantive due in this leged “right pursue her employment liberty should also be afforded free from emotional health risks resulting procedural process due protection.11 Pub supervisor’s from her verbal harassment lic employees at-will would then have the [does not] ] substantive pro due warrant! right to a hearing connection with all protection under the United States discharge decisions so that may as Constitution”). agree We cir certain whether the reasons for cuits that the “[ojccupational so-called lib arbitrary were or irrational. directly This erty ... by contradicts, vitiates, if not outright the Su Rather, process. due any cause of action preme repeated Court’s assertions that an deprivation for the employee can be discharged reason, for no [is] confined to a claim procedural under reason, a bad or a false reason without a process; due there is no such cause of hearing, and that an employee has no action under process.” substantive due right hearing in the absence of a Zorzi, (citation omitted); F.3d at 895 property right job to his or unless his (“Su see also McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1560 employer publicly divulged a stigmatizing preme precedent demonstrates than reason the dismissal. This also essen with a property right in em tially abrogates the concept of at-will em ployment protected only by proce ployment. This require would also us to component dural of the Due Process formulate, basis, on a case-by-case stan Clause, not its substantive component.”); dards distinguishing bad and false rea Antle, Roe v. F.Supp. 1531-33 sons, for which an public employee at-will (D.N.M.1997); Reinhart v. City Mary can discharged, arbitrary or irra Heights, land F.Supp. 93 413 tional Indeed, reasons.12 “every time a (E.D.Mo.1996); Rowe v. Board Educ. of [governmental employee] [was] affected by Chattanooga, 938 S.W.2d n. 1 governmental action, he would have a fed (Tenn.1996). right eral Nunez, review.” An at-will public employee’s “occupa omitted). F.3d at 874 (quotations We tional liberty” should not be utilized as a would be forced to assume role that we vehicle for a federal court to interfere with usually resist —that of “super-personnel employment decisions under the department! rubric of second-guessing ] the wisdom here, especially personnel of ... decisions,” Hill v. St. where the discharged employee Univ., no Louis Cir. right 1997) protection. (quotations omitted), notwithstand A contrary conclusion every would ing enable the Court’s admonishment that “[t]he discharged public at-will employee who federal court is not the appropriate forum has no recognized heretofore pro in which to review the per multitude of cedural to assert a constitu sonnel decisions that daily are made 10. every discharge decision, Because necessarily would occupational liberty would also deprivation constitute the of an em- at-will protected by procedural process. ployee’s occupational liberty, each such em- ployee could assert viable substantive due option 12.The other juries would be to allow by merely alleging claim that his dis- employer's decide whether an decision to charge was effected for or irrational discharge an at-will employee arbitrary. reasons. However, this would further eviscerate the concept of at-will by allowing occupational liberty If is so fundamental as discharged employee each peer to seek review to in of the decision. public the context employer's of discharge ability to bly Singleton’s inhibit Officer at Bishop, 426 U.S. agencies.” public in the future as a employment secure 2074. 96 S.Ct. officer, pub- never this reason was that were to assume Even we com- until defendants licly divulged the funda sufficiently liberty is during Singleton it to municated Officer pro for substantive qualify mental to the “communica- this lawsuit. Because accept the we cannot protection, course of a tion was made the deprived the defendants that proposition not commence until which did proceeding In the liberty. of that Singleton Officer injury for the [he] after suffered deci employer’s of a context redress, cannot surely it which he seeks the Su discharge employee, to sion his support provide retroactive Court, in a preme at Bishop, claim.” “occupational the has defined term Moreover, there is no evi- 2074. S.Ct. advantage “freedom to take liberty” as the suggest to that the dence in the record opportunities.” other of Singleton’s discharge reason for Officer Roth, 2701. Ac at 92 S.Ct. 408 U.S. public outside of has ever been made Court, stretches cording “[i]t to the impact- it has proceedings or is suggest person that a too far to concept employ- other ability his ed secure dis ‘liberty’ [is he when ment. as free job but remains charged one from] at Id. before to seek another.” y. applies conclusion 2701. “This same public employee discharge reasons, we AFFIRM foregoing For will of at the position is terminable whose court. judgment of the district dis public there is no employer when discharge.” of the reasons for closure ARNOLD, SHEPPARD MORRIS 2074. at 96 S.Ct. Bishop, 426 U.S. Judge, concurring. Circuit Indeed, a chosen trade “the to follow Arnold’s Judge Richard S. agree I constitutionally de profession” applicable admirably lucid statement notwithstanding an plaintiff, when a prived distilled, law, which, person that a has a action, en “remain[s] adverse govern- free from right to be constitutional or “to employment” tirely free to obtain arbitrary that it is so ment action trade. job” in his chosen any other get me, therefore, For shocks conscience. 895-96, McElroy, Mr. reduces itself whether question 1743. in the circumstances treatment Singleton’s the defen- suggested It shocking to the conscience this case is stigma upon Officer imposed a dants I conclude constitutional sense. him.13 discharged when is not. was dis- fact that he Certainly, the mere act considera- have been an him It would make “might while it charged, Singleton’s part disloyalty on Mr. other ble to some less attractive somewhat scheme, try or fail to wife’s connive hardly establish employers[,] would would, It more- from it. to dissuade her opportunities foreclosure kind ” to sus- over, unreasonable ‘liberty.’ not have been amounting deprivation to a guilty of one Mr. Roth, pect that n. acts, con- and I cannot of these or both Although the reason actual 2701. be irrational take clude that it would discharge possi- could Singleton’s (1) he was dis- prevail on the specif- bases Singleton has not made this charged substan- decision was with his contention connection ic the record is bereft tive due claim and and irrational. stigma. seeks evidence of He instead against action someone however, who was reason- they are not unconstitutional, and ably suspected disloyalty. I stress the the present serve, case can as Mr. Justice point that proper inquiry is whether put Thomas it in a similar as “a Mr. Singleton’s employment could rational- reminder the Federal Constitution ly terminated, have been prohibit not whether does not everything that is in tensely defendants proved could have that he was undesirable.” See Bennis v. Mich igan, disloyal. fact If a suspicion U.S. reasonable act, motivates an the act cannot (concurring opinion). be irra- tional; and it is not unreasonable to sup- I therefore concur in judgment pose that a man or a woman knows what the court. his or her spouse up fact, to. Supreme pointed Court has out that a ARNOLD, RICHARD S. Judge, Circuit governmental act similar the one com- with whom MCMILLIAN and plained of here was reasonable it because WOLLMAN, Judges, join, Circuit “precludes evasions dispensing dissenting. necessity as to inquiry collusion Officer Singleton did not have a fixed between the wrongdoer and alleged term of employment. He was an at-will

innocent” Kansas, party. Van Oster v. employee. fired, heWhen was city did 465, 467-68, 71 not, until litigation commenced, after had (1926). L.Ed. 354 give any reason for its action. According-

Since terminating Mr. Singleton’s ly, em- Singleton Mr. had neither a “property ployment objectively irrational, was not “liberty interest” nor interest” as those passes constitutional Suppose, phrases muster. have come to be understood in though, fired Mr. defendants Sin- due-process jurisprudence. He has no gleton, not they because suspected him of procedural-due-process claim. He is not level, collusion on some but simply because entitled kind of a hearing with did; of what his wife and suppose that I respect to his today The Court am wrong assuming that the constitu- therefore, holds that Mr. Singleton tional inquiry objective one, is, is an automatically, has no substantive-due-pro- one that does focus on claim, the defendants’ no matter what city reason the subjective actual motive. would I still not gave for firing him. He could be find that the defendants illegally. acted fired for his daughter what wife and said For thing, one firing Mr. for his to each other. He could be fired because rationally wife’s acts the legitimate serves his name starts with an “S.” He could be purpose of ensuring that officers conscien- fired because the color of his hair. tiously monitor and spouses’ their none of these instances would the Due rational, moreover, actions. It is to fire Process the Fourteenth Amend- Mr. Singleton in order to punish his wife pose any ment obstacle. and discourage further unwanted behavior view, In my holding is based on a on her part. Finally, it is rational to ter- fundamental misunderstanding of the Due Singleton’s minate Mr. employment as a Process Clause as it has interpreted wife, kind of against retribution even if century by over a Court. it did not discourage further unwanted I respectfully therefore I dissent. have conduct. may favor, Retribution out of already attempted, at some length, to ex- but it hardly Indeed, irrational. whole plain my reasoning, Cecil, see Singleton v. organized societies have sys- their legal (8th Cir.1998) 155 F.3d (opinion for the

tems around idea. panel); Cecil, perhaps

One or Cir.1998) all of these motivations (opinion dissenting from may many strike mean-spirited decision), or even panel the first and will try not to immoral. irrational, Since are not repeat myself here. Okely, Wheat. Bank Columbia e.g., that declares Due Process The of (1819): life, 235, 244, 4 of L.Ed. any person deprive

no state shall of the individual to secure without due is “intended liberty, property powers of entirely procedural sound exercise The words the law. that interpreted have been the estab- could well unrestrained government, and course of the has not been right and dis- way, private but that of principles lished tradi- has Supreme Court The gener- the law. a concept The is justice.” tributive due-pro- kinds of two tionally recognized susceptible of detailed It is not al one. procedural. and claims, substantive cess limiting all It across cuts formulation. are claims what Procedural-due-process not of the idea is The categories. core has plaintiff that a like—claims they sound the deprive me of can government that the something without of been certain if it follows question only thing in is not The claim proper procedure. government rather but procedures, thing keep the right to has a plaintiff the me cannot, given, deprive the reasons events, but rather all question in at all. “Substan- thing question of him of it without deprive the state cannot controversial, certainly is process” tive due or after hearing, either before of sort some academically, the idea but historically and interest” “property The deprivation. jurisprudence. in our is fixed firmly concepts were devel- interest” “liberty and sure, doctrine, wholly not context, is they make sense. to be and The in this oped relation- of Four- words employment case of the from the In the disembodied a Fifth, out of (or arises as the interest” “property a Amendment ship, teenth right I be). have provides free-floating contract that is no may case There time, period job for certain keep my right, There is a process. right to due of misconduct the absence at least in what- without instead, deprived, not The “liber- circumstances. specified other “life, due, liberty, or is ever to the interest concept refers ty interest” not at are Life and property.” the' and embodies reputation, my own posi- The Liberty is. Court’s issue here. at the time stigmatized not is employee who an at-will tion is that proce- of fair sort discharge, unless some sim- stigmatizing reason discharged for appro- is stigma dure establishes claim, ar- however due-process no has ply priate. con- oppressive bitrary, egregious, or the other on may have been. employer Substantive of his duct procedures, hand, nothing do wholly are cases Court’s Supreme The contracts hearings, “Liberty,” as conclusion. with this at odds for dis- reasons stigmatizing periods, fixed substantive-due-pro is used for that term kind of missal, particularized any other tightly has never purposes, concept is The conduct. governmental concept. As analytical controlled As general. more much Sharpe, Bolling Court said recently explained, substan- Court has L.Ed. 884 499-500, 74 S.Ct. place when violation takes tive-due-process (1954), law extends “[ljiberty under arbitrari- power exercised governmental which the individual conduct range full County Sacramen- ly oppressively. and restrict it cannot be pursue, free to Lewis, 118 S.Ct. 523 U.S. to v. objec proper for a except ed (1998). “[T]he 140 L.Ed.2d liberty includes particularly, More tive.” pro- process guarantee any of the common engage in right “to arbitrarily power against government tects ” v. Nebras ..;" Meyer of life occupations The Ibid. oppressively exercised.... 625, 67 390, 399, ka, all the cites cases Lewis opinion Court’s (1923). Supreme Court’s L.Ed. 1042 interpre- support this way back to 1819 clear. See, cases make meaning process. tation of the Cafe- teria & Restaurant Workers Union v. contract employment, was not men- McElroy, 6 tioned at all in the course of the substan- (1961), good is a example. tive-due-process analysis. Instead, The plaintiff was a short-order cook who Court squarely confronted and decided the job lost her security question when her clearance whether the discharge had been was deprived arbitrary withdrawn. She was not irrational. anything beyond job, that particular all but If there is any doubt as to my reading of nine members the Court were neverthe- Harrah, it should dispelled by Judge

less agreed protected, that she was in the Bowman’s in opinion Moore Warwick sense, substantive from conduct that was Public School District No. 794 F.2d patently arbitrary. Id. at (8th Cir.1986). Moore was also a case 1743. mainly The case was proce- about brought by of a school dis- dural due and the plaintiff lost her trict. He alleged first, two things: case, but not because the thought Court because he one-year had a contract of em- she had not been of “liberty.” ployment, he was entitled to some sort of Rather, view, in the Court’s plaintiff had pre-termination process; second, and as a received all the process was due. The substantive-due-process claim, that he had reason given for her discharge, the with- been discharged for arbitrary and capri- clearance, drawal of a security was certain- cious reasons. We held that the latter ly and, arbitrary, not under all the circum- theory stated claim under the substan- stances, the Court felt no hearing tive aspects of the Due Process Clause. special other procedure was necessary. Harrah, we thought, was controlling on point. Supreme When Court Another for- good example is Harrah Inde- mulated a pendent Martin, rational-basis School standard and District v. reached the claim, merits of Harrah’s we S.Ct. 59 L.Ed.2d 248 said, “the curiam). necessarily recognized Court (per today This Court process right cites authority Harrah as be free its posi- for own arbitrary tion, capricious and 426, but, state see at action say ante and I this in particular this context.” respectfully, at simply Court is wrong. 329. in Nothing our Harrah discussion of the brought by was case sub- public- claim stantive-due-process school indicated teacher. that it She had been discharged turned on plaintiff the fact that had a comply failure to with certain continu- job. interest in ing-education That fact was requirements. alleged She simply irrelevant. the application of requirements to her and in capricious, concerned, The Court is with good and Supreme constitutional sense. The reason, about breadth this concept. disagreed, explaining that the giv- reasons If due process interpreted en were not at all arbitrary. Plaintiff as- without a high degree of discretion and serted both and substantive restraint, it in due engulf will course theories under Due Process Clause. whole world of the law. reason, For Because teacher, she was tenured and both the Supreme Court and this Court could be only specified dismissed rea- have emphasized the necessity of great sons, she was entitled to a hearing to judicial restraint. In order to violate the determine whether such reasons exist- Clause, Due Process governmental action ed, and she had received that hearing. must be than merely more “arbitrary” Her procedural claim was reject- therefore general some logical sense, more than ed. Her substantive-due-process claim merely “arbitrary capricious” and in the was then treated and separately also re- commonly accepted administrative-law jected, on ground policy being sense phrase. of that The action must be applied to her was not irrational. The fact “arbitrary sense,” in the constitutional plaintiff that the “tenure,” or a fixed Heights, Collins Harker (1992) choking on its own verbal 1061, 117L.Ed.2d 261 formulations. 129, 112 S.Ct. fact, But, only century- They are not. are half a supplied). “[F]or (emphasis restating thing, using level the same cognizable ways spoken we have now which As power slightly legal as that different abuse formulations. of executive County substan [T]he Court observed the conscience.... shocks Sacramento, passage already of the Due Process in a component quoted, tive only action when arbitrary, executive in the is violated an action which is consti- which, therefore, as arbi sense, characterized properly ‘can vio- tutional shocking, a consti Clause, trary, something or conscience lates the Due Process ” Sacramento, County tutional sense.’ Arbi- that shocks the conscience. Collins, 1717, quoting supra, 118 S.Ct. conscience-shocking trariness are supra, things. implies The Court two different his alleged that if Mr. point the same has made This Court conscience, discharge shocked the context, for zoning In the times. several irrational, truly might he have a or was distinguished between example, we have case, of a despite property the absence ordinary called might what administra- liberty If this is a real distinc- interest. govern- that a certain allegations tive-law tion, truly said that the banc it can en capricious, mental action is brought labored and forth mountain has truly that are irrational: and decisions fact, nor plaintiff mouse. neither the should [S]ubstantive-due-process claims previous opinions taking his side “truly govern- irrational” be limited in have used the term “funda- this case would be example actions. An mental interest,” liberty nor occupational mental ordinance apply zoning attempting All mattered if had. would have begin names with only persons whose admittedly impre- these formulations are alphabet. first half of a letter (because way being cise there is no Corp. City Chester- Chesterfield, Dev. subject) ways saying precise about (8th Cir.1992), F.2d field, 963 action thing: governmental the same Nebraska, County, Lemke v. Cass quoting upon grievous the citizen which inflicts Cir.1987) (en banc) (8th 469, 472 F.2d under the Due wrong is unconstitutional (Richard J., Arnold, concurring, in an S. Amend- of the Fourteenth Process Clause joined by half of the ten-member opinion utterly lacking rational ment it is Court). to what The solution en banc fundamentally unfair for some basis substantive-due-process might be called other reason. , close the door sprawl is not to instead, is, entirely. It to be today courthouse does the Court defend At no time about the circumstances very city careful for Mr. Sin- given the reason opened. door is rejects which the his simply It gleton’s discharge. not fit job does either suit because attempt, perhaps, to soften “liberty interest” “property interest” blow, en banc today’s opinion for the Court which, as I tried categories, concepts have what it a distinction between tries to draw show, only respect sense make pro- kinds of sees as two “ claims. “[T]he procedural-due-process of a ‘fundamental’ cess: the existence interest,” liberty interests theory concepts of solely in the context of ... which, says, plaintiff are useful advances Gunter, hand, claim Meis v. process.” and the on the one Cir.1990). action shocks the con- fair- judicial notions of science or offends dissent. respectfully I or, another dignity, or human ness use formulation, irrational, truly the oth- on Ante, If are at 425 n. 7.

er hand. distinctions, to be appears the law

true

Case Details

Case Name: David C. Singleton v. Don Cecil

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Apr 27, 1999

Citation: 176 F.3d 419

Docket Number: 97-1726

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.