2 Woods 306 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Texas | 1876
This is a libel for salvage. The libellants state that on the
I cannot regard this case as any other than the extinguishment of a fire in a ship lying at the wharf of Galveston by the aid of the fire department of that city. The question is, whether it is a case for salvage. In iny opinion, it is not. The firemen were merely engaged in the line of their duty. They only did what it was their duty to do. If they did more, it was services that were not necessary, and not required, but expressly declined. ■
It is said, however, that there is no duty imposed on the'fire department of Galveston at all; that there was once an ordinance declaring such duty, but it had been repealed. No duty iriiposed on a man who unites with a municipal organization, whose only object is to extinguish fires; who wears the uniform of the department; who is supplied with engines, and ladders, and hose, anl horses and all the apparatus for extinguishing fires? Do the citizens of Galveston, who furnish this apparatus, understand that the firemen are subject to no duty? The idea is preposterous. Duty does not always arise from express commands It often arises from implied obligations quite as strong as those which are most clearly expressed. It needs no law nor ordinance to make it the duty of firemen to put out fires. Is there any express law that declares it to be the duty of a soldier to kill or capture his enemy in battle? His very • profession makes it his duty. So does the profession of a fireman make it his duty to do his utmost to extinguish a fire anywhere in the city. The attempt to make the performance of this duty a ground of salvage, when it is a ship that takes fire, is against wise policy. Are ships going to frequent a port where they are subject to salvage if they take fire and are aided in its suppression by the local fire department—the origin of the fire due, perhaps to a fire in the city itself? The city