169 Mo. App. 565 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1913
Plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant for the sum of $3445, and it is alleged in his petition in substance that the defendant was incorporated under the laws of the State
Incorporated under the law of the State of Missouri.
No. 194 Shares 250
Newell-Morse Royalty Company Carthage, Missiouri.
Capital Stock $250,000.00 Fully paid and Non-assessable. .
This Certifies that J. P. Newell is the owner of Two Hundred and Fifty Shares of the Capital Stock of
Newell-Morse Royalty Company
transferable only on the books of the corporation by the holder hereof in person or by attorney upon surrender of this certificate properly indorsed.
In Witness Whereof, the said corporation has caused this certificate to be signed by its duly authorized officers and to be sealed with the seal of the corporation.
J. P. Newell, S. P. B. Morse,
Secretary. . President.
(Newell-Morse' Royalty Company Seal Carthage, Mo.)
Shares $100.00 each.
Indorsed on back as follows:
Certificate
for
250
Shares
of the
Capital Stock
Newell-Morse Royalty Company Issued to J. P Newell dated
Jany. 23, 1909.
and with the following indorsements thereon, to-wit:
For value received ......... hereby sell, assign and transfer unto .................. shares of the capital stock represented by the within certificate, and do hereby irrevocably constitute and appoint........ to transfer the said stock on the books of the within named corporation with full power of substitution in the premises.
Dated....................190........
In the presence of.....................
J. P. Newell/
And the plaintiff further alleged that by reason of the negligent and careless acts and conduct of said corporation, its.directors and officers, and the fraudulent conduct of Newell in issuing said false and fraudulent certificate of stock in excess of its authorized capital stock, it did falsely represent and state under
To plaintiff’s petition defendant answered substantially that the certificate of stock was spurious and was never issued by authority of the defendant, and that if Newell put the same in circulation it was done by him in his individual capacity for his sole personal benefit and not in the line of his duty.as an officer of defendant; that long prior to the issuance of this certificate the full amount of the capital stock had been duly issued and that no officer or agent of the defend
To this answer the plaintiff replied by .a general denial.
A jury was waived and the cause tried before the court. No declarations of law were requested or given in behalf of the plaintiff but the defendant requested declarations of law, presenting its theory of the case as contained in its answer, all of which were refused, and judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff for $3130. Defendant filed its motion for new trial and in arrest of judgment in due time, which being overruled, it obtained leave to file its bill of exceptions, and after-wards sued out in the Supreme Court a writ of error, upon the evident theory that the allegations in its answer as to the violation of section 8, article 12, of the Constitution of Missouri conferred jurisdiction upon that court. The plaintiff, as defendant in error, filed in that court a motion to transfer the cause to this court. The Supreme Court sustained plaintiff’s motion and the cause is here for determination.
The undisputed testimony discloses that defendant was incorporated as alleged in the plaintiff’s peti
It appears that the capital stock of the corporation was paid by the transfer of 160 acres of mining
Tbe office of tbe company was in tbe office of Newell at Carthage. All of tbe bona fide certificates of stock were signed by tbe president, Morse, at Carthage. There were no stock books kept as required by law. There were never any inquiries made by tbe president in signing certificates of stock presented to him by Newell; neither did tbe officers or any of tbe board of directors examine tbe books of tbe corporation to ascertain in regard to tbe issuance of stock prior to tbe date plaintiff made bis loan to Newell, and tbe directors met only once a year.
It will be observed in reference to tbe certificate of stock in controversy that it was issued January 23, 1909, and tbe loan to plaintiff made March 4, 1909. Newell filled out tbe certificate of stock, placed tbe seal thereon, tore it out of tbe stock certificate book and took it to New York, where be obtained tbe signature of tbe president thereto on or about tbe date tbe certificate bears.
After tbe incorooration of tbe defendant company, Newell and Morse interested a Mr. Tipton of New York City in tbe corporation and tbe sale of its stock, whereupon a stock syndicate or pool was formed by them and others in which Newell placed 255 shares of bis stock. About the middle of tbe year 1908 New-ell was endeavoring to make a loan on bis stock in this syndicate and was endeavoring to obtain permission of Mr. Tipton, who was one of tbe trustees in tbat
At the time plaintiff made the loan to Newell he was in Newell’s office and he testified that he saw New-ell writing something on a stub of a stock book but there is nothing to indicate what he was writing and the plaintiff may well have surmised that he was making a notation of the pledge of this particular certificate of stock to thim.
Upon these facts the defendant contends that the plaintiff should suffer the loss occasioned by New-ell’s misconduct and the negligence of the other officers and directors of the defendant corporation.
In Watson v. Printing Co., 56 Mo. App. 145, 153, it is held that a lender who “gives value on the faith of a certificate of stock, authenticated by the seal of the corporation and the signature of the proper officers, acquires an equitable title and may require the corporation to transfer the stock to him or respond in damages for the default.”
There is an apparent conflict in the authorities cited by the plaintiff and defendant in support of their respective contentions, but the opinion in Cincinnati, N. O. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Citizens’ Natl. Bank, 56 Ohio, 351, 43 L. R. A. 777, cited and relied upon by the plaintiff, contains many instructive suggestions applicable to a case of this character. This is a well-considered opinion and reviews the authorities at length. In that case the certificate was fraudulently issued as in this case and it is there said that “the fact that the certificate appears on its face to have been issued to the secretary as the owner of it cannot be regarded as a suspicious circumstances where, as in this case, he was not forbidden to hold stock, and, as found, 650 valid shares had been issued to him.”
It appears in the case now under consideration that the greater majority of the stock in the defendant corporation was originally issued to and held by New-ell and at the time that the particular certificate in controversy was presented to the president of the defendant company to sign that the president then knew or supposed that the particular shares of stock were in the pool, and that he signed the certificate on the
There are distinguishing features between the case at bar and many of the cases upon which the defendant company relies in support of its contention here. The case of Farrington v. South Boston R. R. Co., 150 Mass. 406, 5 L. R. A. 849, involves a certificate of stock newly issued in the name of the pledgee. In that opinion reference is made to a decision in which that court held “that the purchaser of stock owes no positive duty to the corporation to see to it that the seller surrenders the old certificate and makes assignment of the stock on the books of the company, but that it is the duty of the corporation which requires these things to be done to see that they are done before a new certificate is issued to the purchaser,” and then resolved the case against the pledgee on the assumption that he was not in the attitude of a bona fide purchaser of stock for value. In Missouri a bona fide pledgee of stock for a present consideration stands in the same attitude as a purchaser so that the Farrington case argumentatively sustains the contentions of the plaintiff.
The defendant company also relies upon the case of Moores v. Citizens’ Natl. Bank, 111 U. S. 156, 28 L. Ed. 385, but in that case the certificate of stock was issued directly to the pledgee and on a reference to the petition in that case ■ (found in a prior report when the case was in the Supreme Court on a question of pleadings) it will be seen that the action was not based upon the ground of the alleged negligence of the defendant and its officers. Also, throughout that opinion the fact is emphasized repeatedly that the certificate was issued in the name of the pledgee and showed upon its face that no certificate could be lawfully issued without the surrender of a former certificate and that “the very form of the certificate was such as to put her
The defendant also relies upon the opinion in the case of St. Charles Sav. Bank v. Edwards, 243 Mo. 553, 147 S. W. 978, wherein it is held by the Supreme Court of this State that where a bank cashier drew checks on the bank’s account which he deposited with his broker to the credit of a speculative account, the burden is on the broker, in an action by the bank to recover the proceeds of the checks, to prove that the cashier was either authorized to draw them or that the bank had received the full value thereof. There are features in that case which distinguish it from this case. There the broker was dealing directly with the cashier who was acting alone and without the concurrence or mediation of any other officer of the corporation, but in the present case the plaintiff not only had the signature and assurance of the secretary of the defendant corporation as to the genuineness of the certificate but he further had the evidence of the corporate seal of the corporation and the signature of the executive and presumably the managing officer of the corporation, not personally interested in the transaction with plaintiff, certifying that Newell was the owner of so many shares of the capital stock of the defendant corporation. Also, in the Edwards case the cashier did not have any funds in the bank with
The case of Lee v. Smith, 84 Mo. 304, cited by the defendant as an authority in its behalf, is distinguishable from the present case upon the same principles as is the Edwards case, supra.
The defendant alleges in its answer, as above stated, that its genuine certificates were, numbered consecutively from 1 to 120 inclusive and that an examination of its books by the plaintiff would have disclose that the certificate pledged to bim, numbered 194, was a fabrication, but this suggests a rebuke of the president of defendant corporation for culpable carelessness, under the suspicious circumstances surrounding his authentication of the certificate, in not examining the books, which should have been of ready access to him, and discovering this break in the continuity of the certificate numbers. Plaintiff in this case had the right to presume that the books showed what defendant alleges in its answer they contained, and he was further justified in relying on the president’s signature and the seal of the corporation as a declaration that an examination thereof had been made by the president and no irregularity discovered.
The stockholders of the corporation selected their board of directors and the board of directors selected the officers. If the directors and officers had performed their duties no fraud would have been perpetrated by Newell upon this plaintiff, and if by reason
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed, but upon condition that the plaintiff surrender to the defendant the certificate of stock held by him as collateral security for his loan, and if within thirty days from this date satisfactory evidence is produced to this court of such surrender the judgment will be affirmed.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION.
PER CURIAM. The plaintiff having submitted to this court satisfactory evidence of the surrender and delivery of the certificate referred to in the above opinion, the judgment of the circuit court is unconditionally affirmed.