10 Pa. Super. 47 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1899
Opinion by
The plaintiff shipped a lot of pineapples and ten barrels of cabbage over the line of the defendant company from Philadelphia to Altoona. The goods were shipped in the afternoon of Saturday, June 11, 1892, and arrived at their destination on Monday morning following, when the consignees refused to receive them because of their decaying condition. The shipping receipt contained a clause exempting the carrier from liability for loss or damage by causes beyond its reasonable control, “ or by any of the causes incident to transportation such as chafing, heating, freezing, .... or any other reason not directly traceable to the negligence of the carrier’s servants.” The plaintiff brought this action against the carrier to recover for the loss resulting from the goods having, while in the care of the carrier, become heated, rotted and unmarketable. At the trial the plaintiff produced evidence tending to establish
In view of the fact that the Supreme Court has passed upon and sustained the clause, limiting the liability of the defendant in the shipping receipt which was the contract of the'parties to this controversy; in a former action growing out of the same transaction, Davenport v. Pennsylvania It. R., 173 Pa. 398, it is unnecessary to discuss the power of a common carrier to limit his liability by the terms of a special contract, which power has been recognized in numerous cases, a few among the number being Beckman & Johnson v. Shouse, 5 Rawle, 179, Farnham v. Camden & Amboy R. R., 55 Pa. 53, Grogan & Merz v. Adams Express Co., 114 Pa. 523, Pennsylvania R. R. v. Raiordon, 119 Pa. 577, Ruppel v. Allegheny Valley R. R., 167 Pa. 166, and Willock v. Pennsylvania R. R., 166 Pa. 184.
If the defendant is to be held liable under this shipping contract it must be upon the ground of negligence; and the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove negligence in fact, or circumstances from which negligence might reasonably be inferred.
When machinery or castings are broken during transportation by a carrier, under a special contract, that fact is evidence of negligence, but it is evidence only and must be considered by the jury along with all the other evidence in the case: Buck v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 170. Where the injury to the property carried indicates violent, careless or improper transportation that fact is evidence of negligence and the case is for the jury. Where the loss or deterioration in value results from some element inherent in the property transported, and not shown to have some connection with the manner of transportation; such as the melting of ice or the rotting of fruit in very hot weather, such operation of a natural law is no evidence of negligence. When property of such nature is shipped, under a special contract of the character of that under consideration, it is not sufficient, in order to sustain a verdict, that the plaintiff prove that the fruit became rotten before it was delivered at its destination. He must prove a failure to forward with reasonable dispatch or other facts justifying a finding of negligence, and that the negligence caused the damage complained of.
In the case of Ruppel v. Allegheny Valley Ry., 167 Pa. 166, the plaintiff had shipped a carload of potatoes from Pittsburg
In the present case there is no evidence of delay, accident or lack of care during the course of transportation. The statement filed by plaintiff alleges that the employees of defendant “allowed the car in which said cabbage and pineapples were contained, and in which they were shipped, to stand on its track at Altoona for more than four hours after its arrival in said place.” The only evidence of delay to tender the goods to the consignees promptly after the arrival of the car at the point of destination, is what the freight agent is alleged to have said to plaintiff’s agent, viz: “He said the car arrived early Monday morning, but stood there until some time between 10 and 11 o’clock, waiting for a manifest.” If the car had stood thus an unreasonable length of time that fact would have been evidence of negligence proper for submission to the jury. In this case, however, the plaintiff offered no evidence as to the time when the car did or ought to have arrived at its
Upon the evidence submitted, no man could reach any intelligent conclusion as to whether holding the car for the short time on Monday morning resulted in any injury to its contents. As there was no evidence to sustain a verdict in favor of plaintiff, the learned judge very properly directed the jury, to find in favor of defendant.
Judgment affirmed.