237 S.E.2d 494 | S.C. | 1977
This is an appeal by George Summer and the County of Newberry from an order of the lower court granting respondent’s motion for a change of venue from Newberry County to Laurens County. The question presented on appeal is whether a person’s good name, position as a holder of public office, and family ties, without more, demonstrate local prejudice in favor of a party sufficient to justify a change of venue. We find the lower court did not apply the proper standard to the affidavits submitted in support of the motion for change of venue and thus abused its discretion.
This action arises from the collision of the vehicle occupied by respondent’s intestate and that driven by Mr. Summer while the latter was on an official call in his capacity as Newberry County Coroner. As a result of the collision Mary Ann Pitts and Minnie Lee Pitts died and Stewart Pitts received personal injuries. By stipulation, disposition of this appeal will control the cases of Minnie Lee Pitts and Stewart Pitts.
Counsel for respondent submitted his own affidavit and those of six residents of Newberry County in support of respondent’s motion. Although counsel’s affidavit does not bear that degree of neutrality expected to persuade a court of the necessity for a change of venue, Stevens v. Sun News, 267 S. C. 63, 226 S. E. (2d) 236 (1976), the remaining affidavits each state that “any jury selected in the County of Newberry would be subjected to foreign influence, and that prejudice would exist in favor of George Summer and it would be impossible to draw a jury on which there shall not be one or more persons who are affected so as to not give a fair and impartial verdict in these causes of actions.”
With the exception of counsel’s affidavit, only one of the affidavits presented on behalf of respondent sets forth any underlying facts upon which the trial judge could base a finding of local prejudice sufficient to justify a change of venue. The remaining five affidavits are conclusory only.
This Court’s review is limited to deciding whether the lower court made an error of law “so opposed to a sound discretion as to amount to a deprivation of the legal rights of [the party opposing the motion for change of venue].” O’Shields v. Caldwell, 208 S. C. 245, 37 S. E. (2d) 665, 666 (1946). We keep in mind two other rules of law: (1) the burden on the moving party is formidable; and (2) the right of a defendant in a civil trial to be tried in the county of his residence is a substantial one and should not be lightly ignored. Stevens, supra.
The standard to be employed by a court considering a motion for change of venue under Section 15-7-100(2), 1976 Code, is whether “there is reason to believe that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had.” A finding by the lower court that the jury would be unable “to lay aside the parties respective identities,” without more, is not sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute. The standard to be applied is strict and the burden on the moving party is formidable, for, as we stated in Stevens, supra: “[A] good name ordinarily is and rightfully should be a benefit rather than a burden to its bearer.”
The lower court’s decision to grant respondent’s motion was controlled by an error of law and thus constituted an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we reverse.
Reversed.