DATA AXLE, INC. v. CFM DATA NETWORK, LLC; ANDREW NOLTING; and JOHN and JANE DOES
Case No. 23-cv-3255 (LMP/DLM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA
June 23, 2025
ORDER DENYING STAY PENDING APPEAL
Nathan M. Hansen, Hansen Law Office, Willernie, MN, for Defendant Andrew Nolting.
On April 12, 2024, the Court entered an order (the “April 2024 Order“) granting default judgment against Defendant CFM Data Network, LLC d/b/a DataSourceOne.com (“DSO“). See ECF No. 37. Plaintiff Data Axle, Inc. (“Data Axle“) later sought contempt sanctions against DSO and Defendant Andrew Nolting (“Nolting“), arguing that DSO and Nolting had violated the Order. See ECF No. 57. The Court granted in part and denied in part Data Axle‘s motion for sanctions, holding that DSO violated several portions of the April 2024 Order. ECF No. 79 (“May 2025 Order“). The Court imposed a $1,000-per-day sanction on Nolting (DSO‘s sole owner and shareholder) until DSO complied with its obligations under the April 2024 Order. Id. at 20. Those sanctions were set to begin on May 31, 2025. Id. On May 22, 2025, Nolting moved the Court to stay imposition of the
ANALYSIS1
A stay pending appeal is an “intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,” and consequently “is not a matter of right” but instead is “an exercise of judicial discretion.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 427, 433 (2008) (citation omitted). The party requesting a stay “bears the burden of showing that the circumstances justify an exercise of that discretion.” Id. at 433-34. In exercising its discretion, the Court considers the following factors:
- whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;
- whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
- whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceeding; and
- where the public interest lies.
Id. at 434 (citation omitted). “The first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.” Kansas v. United States, 124 F.4th 529, 533 (8th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted).
I. Strong Showing of Success on the Merits
Nolting is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his appeal because he fails to show that the Eighth Circuit has jurisdiction over his appeal of the May 2025 Order in the first place. See In re Application of Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“In evaluating a litigant‘s likelihood of success on appeal, a court is obliged to consider the likelihood that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the order appealed from . . . .“); United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1069 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (same). The Courts of Appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.”
Nolting—who remains a party in this action—is attempting to appeal the “imposition of sanctions for civil contempt during the course of a pending action,” an approach that is entirely foreclosed by Purdy. Perhaps recognizing this dispositive case law, Nolting suggests that this action is functionally no longer pending because the May 2025 Order made Nolting “personally liable for the debt of DSO” and essentially granted all of the relief requested by Data Axle in its complaint against Nolting. See ECF No. 86 at 2.
The Court did no such thing. The May 2025 Order clearly recognizes that judgment from the April 2024 Order was entered against DSO, not Nolting personally. See ECF No. 79 at 9 (“[T]he Court observes that Nolting was not personally ordered to pay the judgment for DSO; rather, the Court only entered judgment for money damages against DSO.“); id. at 10 (recognizing that Nolting was subject to one portion of the April 2024 Order, “unlike other parts of the [April 2024] Order“). Judgment has not been entered against Nolting personally, and the Court has not “disassociate[d] itself” from considering Nolting‘s liability to Data Axle. Carpenter, 558 U.S. at 106. The merits of that question are still under consideration by the Court, meaning that the May 2025 Order did not “end[] the litigation on the merits.” Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 204.
First, an order does not “conclusively determine the disputed question” if the order is “tentative” or “subject to revision in the District Court.” Swint, 514 U.S. at 42 (citation omitted). Here, the Court explained in the May 2025 Order that it would consider revising sanctions against Nolting if DSO or Nolting explained in briefing why, under Chicago Truck Drivers, DSO could not comply with the May 2025 Order. ECF No. 79 at 20. Neither DSO nor Nolting have provided any such briefing. But the May 2025 Order by its terms is “subject to revision” if DSO or Nolting demonstrate an inability to comply. Swint, 514 U.S. at 42.
Third, the requirement that a collateral order be “effectively unreviewable” upon final judgment means that without immediate review, an important right or interest with a “particular value of a high order” would be “effectively lost.” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 351-52 (2006). The loss of this important right or interest must “imperil a substantial public interest.” Id. at 353. Here, the only thing that Nolting stands to lose from waiting until final judgment to appeal the May 2025 Order is $1,000 per day. That loss alone, while perhaps financially significant to Nolting, is not “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” Coleman v. Sherwood Med. Indus., 746 F.2d 445, 446-47 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding order awarding attorneys’ fees not appealable under collateral-order doctrine). After all, if the Eighth Circuit determines on appeal from final judgment in this case that the May 2025 Order is erroneous, Nolting will not have to pay the sanction or would be entitled to a refund of the sanction he had paid to date.3 See Saber v. FinanceAmerica Credit Corp., 843 F.2d 697, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding order to pay money was not appealable under collateral-order doctrine because there was no showing “that the money
Nolting is therefore unlikely to show that the collateral-order doctrine applies to the May 2025 Order. Consequently, given that the Eighth Circuit likely will not have jurisdiction over Nolting‘s appeal of the May 2025 Order, Nolting has failed to make a “strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits” of his appeal. Nken, 556 U.S. at 434. As such, he does not meet the critical first factor to warrant a stay.
II. Irreparable Harm
Nolting also fails to show irreparable harm absent a stay, which further requires denial of Nolting‘s motion. See Brakebill, 905 F.3d at 557. As noted above, absent a stay, the only thing Nolting stands to lose is $1,000 per day. But “economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Narrow exceptions to this general rule may apply if the party ordered to pay “is insolvent or facing imminent bankruptcy, or is in a perilous financial state,” S.D. Network, LLC v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 4:16-cv-04031-KES, 2017 WL 11575316, at *3 (D.S.D. Dec. 21, 2017) (quoting Centauri Shipping Ltd. v. W. Bulk Carriers KS, 528 F. Supp. 2d 186, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)), or if the monetary loss is “unrecoverable,” Iowa Utils. Bd., 109 F.3d at 426.; see also GLG Farms LLC v. Brandt Agric. Prods. LTD, No. 4:14-cv-153, 2017 WL 11704771, at *2 (D.N.D. Oct. 3, 2017) (quoting Mann v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 185 F. Supp. 3d 189, 195 (D.D.C. 2016))
Neither of those conditions apply. Nolting has provided no evidence that paying the sanction will leave him insolvent or on the brink of bankruptcy.4 Nor will the monetary loss to Nolting be unrecoverable; if the Eighth Circuit agrees that the May 2025 Order is erroneous, Nolting would be entitled to a refund of the sanctions that he paid. See Lubow v. U.S. Dep‘t of State, 934 F. Supp. 2d 311, 313 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding a monetary payment was not an irreparable harm to the movant because the other party would “simply refund the money it collected” if the movant prevailed on appeal). And although Nolting suggests that the Court could order incarceration as a contempt sanction, ECF No. 84 at 4, the Court has not done so, ECF No. 79 at 16, rendering any harm from Nolting‘s hypothetical incarceration purely speculative. See Packard Elevator v. ICC, 782 F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that “theoretical” harms are not irreparable). Indeed, at the evidentiary hearing, the Court made clear that it would focus on financial sanctions, rather than incarceration. See ECF No. 100 at 5:20–23. Because Nolting fails to demonstrate irreparable harm—a necessary prerequisite for a stay—his motion must be denied.
III. The Court Is Inclined To Amend the May 2025 Order, But Cannot Do So
Although the Court could stop here, the Court observes that Nolting argues on the merits that a contempt sanction cannot be used to coerce compliance with a money
Nonetheless, the Court has an independent obligation to get the law right. And after considering Nolting‘s additional cited authority, the Court agrees that it would be inappropriate to impose a contempt sanction on Nolting for DSO‘s failure to pay the money judgment against it.
Courts have generally held that “when a party fails to satisfy a court-imposed money judgment the appropriate remedy is a writ of execution, not a finding of contempt.” Combs v. Ryan‘s Coal Co., 785 F.2d 970, 980 (11th Cir. 1986); see Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Markarian, 114 F.3d 346, 349 (1st Cir. 1997); Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 1983); Sehlstrom v. Sehlstrom, 925 N.W.2d 233, 239-40 (Minn. 2019); Olson v. Desserts on the Boulevard, LLC, No. 4:12-CV-1629 CAS, 2014 WL 307144, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2014); see also 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3011 (3d ed., May 2025 update).
In ordering contempt sanctions against Nolting for DSO‘s failure to pay the money judgment against it, the Court relied on the Eighth Circuit‘s decision in Chicago Truck Drivers. See ECF No. 79 at 9. In that case, a pension fund brought suit against corporations for interim payments of withdrawal liability under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA“). Chi. Truck Drivers, 207 F.3d at 503. The district court granted the pension fund‘s motion for summary judgment and ordered the corporations to begin making interim payments within sixty days. Id. When the corporations failed to make
At first blush, the facts of Chicago Truck Drivers seem on all fours with this case, because in both cases, a corporation‘s sole owner and shareholder was held in contempt for the corporation‘s failure to render payment to the plaintiff. But Nolting persuasively suggests that Chicago Truck Drivers may be a narrow exception to the general rule that “when a party fails to satisfy a court-imposed money judgment the appropriate remedy is a writ of execution, not a finding of contempt.” Combs, 785 F.2d at 980. As one court has observed, in cases where contempt is appropriately imposed for the violation of an order to render payment, the types of relief are usually the kinds that are “traditionally available in equity” or “those arising under a statutory scheme that implements an important national policy,” such as ERISA. Ecopetrol S.A. v. Offshore Expl. & Prod. LLC, 172 F. Supp. 3d 691, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (collecting cases, including an ERISA case). Use of the contempt power is also “an appropriate way to enforce a sanction for misconduct, which is not an ordinary money judgment.” Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 106 F.3d 165, 166 (7th Cir. 1997) (contempt for failure to pay monetary sanctions for attorney misconduct).
The Court agrees that a distinction between using the contempt power in these delineated circumstances and using the contempt power to enforce an ordinary money judgment is “warranted in light of public policy.” Loftus v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 8 F. Supp. 2d 464, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Specifically, “holding a debtor in contempt for failing
Data Axle has not argued that the payment ordered in the April 2024 Order is anything other than an ordinary money judgment. Accordingly, the Court believes that it should amend the May 2025 Order to remove contempt sanctions associated with DSO‘s failure to pay the money judgment, while leaving all other aspects of the May 2025 Order in full effect. Specifically, Nolting and DSO would still be held in contempt, and the $1,000-per-day sanction on Nolting would remain until two conditions are met: (1) DSO or its representative provides the accounting of records required by the April 2024 Order, and (2) DSO or its representative impounds, produces, and destroys Data Axle‘s copyrighted databases, in accordance with the April 2024 Order. See ECF No. 79 at 18.
But there‘s a problem. Nolting has filed a notice of appeal of the Court‘s May 2025 Order. ECF No. 90. “The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of
Therefore, even though the Court is inclined to amend the May 2025 Order favorable to Nolting, it lacks jurisdiction to do so. Instead, all the Court can do is deny Nolting‘s motion for a stay and allow the May 2025 Order to go into effect.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, and all the files, records, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
- Nolting‘s Motion for Stay Pending Appeal (ECF No. 83) is DENIED.
- The temporary stay of imposition of sanctions previously entered by the Court (ECF No. 87) is LIFTED. Sanctions will begin accruing against Nolting on June 26, 2025.
Dated: June 23, 2025
s/Laura M. Provinzino
Laura M. Provinzino
United States District Judge