OPINION
Opinion by
This is аn accelerated interlocutory appeal in which Dass, Inc. complains of the trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction enjoining it from evicting Falcon Transit, Inc. from real property located at 523 Pontiac Avenue in Dallas. Dass argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the injunction, Benjie Smith lacked standing to seek an injunction, and the trial court abused its discretion by granting the injunction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Falcon Transit, a corporation owned by Benjie Smith, leased property located at 528 Pontiac Avenue in Dallаs from Dass, a corporation owned by Steve McFalls, for thirty months beginning February 1, 1999 and expiring on or about August 1, 2001, for the operation of a scrap metal business called Oak Cliff Metals. The lease terms provided that when the lease expired, Falcon Transit would becоme a month-to-month tenant.
By letter dated October 26, 2005, Dass notified Falcon Transit it was terminating its lease and that Falcon Transit should vacate the property by December 1, 2005. On January 24, 2006, Smith filed this lawsuit seeking, among other things, a temporary injunction to prevent Dass from evicting Falcon Transit. Smith alleged that when the lease term expired in 2001, he purchased the property located at 523 Pontiac from McFalls and has the right to possession and title to the property.
At the temporary injunction hearing, Smith testified McFalls approached him when the lease expired in 2001 about buying the property and the equipment Smith had leased from Texas Industrial Recycling, a company also owned by McFalls. Smith agreed to purchase the property and the equipment. Smith introduced into evidence a document еntitled “Pending Sale of Land,” which was purportedly signed on August 31, 2001 by Smith and McFalls and purported to sell the property to Smith individually. Smith also introduced into evidence a canceled check dated August 2, 2001, from Smith to McFalls in the amount of $175,000, which Smith said was a down payment on the purchаse price of the land and equipment. Smith testified the amount of the monthly payments due under the sale agreement was $1450 (down from $2000 per month under the lease). Smith introduced into evidence canceled checks from Oak Cliff Metals to Dass for $1450 or multiples thereof, which he testified fully paid, if not overpaid, the amount due under the sale agreement.
McFalls also testified at the hearing. He said he did not sign the “pending sale of land” agreement and that his signature was forged. He said Dass did not sell the property to Smith. He explained that Smith asked if he could purchase the equipment and if he could reduce his monthly lease payment for the property *200 from $2000 to $1450. McFalls agreed to sell him the equipment for $200,000 and testified the check for $175,000 was in partial payment of that purchase. He also agreed temрorarily to accept a reduced lease payment of $1450.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court granted the temporary injunction. The order states:
Defendants Steve McFalls, Texas Industrial Recycling Company and Dass, Inc. intend to evict and/or removе Benjie Smith and/or Falcon Transit, Inc. from the real property located at 523 Pontiac Avenue, Dallas, Texas before the Court can render judgment in this cause; that if Defendants carry out that intention, Benjie Smith will suffer loss or disruption of his business; and that unless Defendants are detеrred from carrying out that intention, Plaintiff Benjie Smith will be without any adequate remedy at law, the loss or disruption of Plaintiff’s business will be an irreparable harm, and Plaintiff and/or Falcon Transit, Inc. will be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the real property at 523 Pontiac Avenue, Dallas, Texas.
Discussion
Jurisdiction
In its first issue, Dass argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a temporary injunction because exclusive jurisdiction in forcible detainer actions lies with the justice court. It argues the justice court is deprived of jurisdiction only if the right to immediate possession nеcessarily requires resolution of a title dispute, citing our opinion in
Rice v. Pinney,
The justice court has original jurisdiction of cases of forcible entry and detainer. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 27.031(a)(2) (Vernon 2004); Tex. PROP. Code Ann. § 24.004 (Vernon 2000);
Rice,
Dass argues that because the “pending sale of land” document is silent about the right to possess the property, the only document to support the right to possession is the commercial lease between Dass and Falcon Transit. Dass further argues that because the lease shows that only Dass has an immediate right to possession of the property, Dass should be allowed to file its forcible detainer action in justice court while Smith maintains a parallel proceeding in district court to resolve the title dispute. We disagree.
In
Rice,
we concluded a landlord-tenant relationship existed and that the landlord could pursue a forcible detainer action in
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justice court while the tenant pursued a title dispute in district court.
See generally Rice,
Smith testified that when the lease expired in August 2001, McFalls agreed to sell the property and Smith agreed to buy it. Smith offered evidence that he made payments in consideration of that agreement. According to Smith, the relationship that existed with appellant after August 2001 was one of seller-buyer, not landlord-tenant. On the other hand, McFalls testified he did not agree to sell the property to Smith and claimed the signature on the sale agreement was forged. According to McFalls, there was no seller-buyer relationship but only a landlord-tenant relationship.
We conclude the determination of the right to immediate possession of the property necessarily requires a resolution of the title dispute and jurisdiction properly lies with the district court.
See Rice,
Standing
In its second issue, Dass argues that Smith did not have standing to apply for a temporary injunction against Dass because Smith did not individually operate a business from the property and that Falcon Transit, the only party with standing, did not join in seeldng the temporary injunction.
Generally, unless standing is conferred by statute, a plaintiff must demonstrate he possesses an interest in the controversy distinct from that of the general public, such that the defendant’s actions have caused the plaintiff some particular injury.
Williams v. Lara,
Dass argues any injury suffered as a result of Dass’s eviction of Falcon Transit belongs solely to Falcon Trаnsit and, because Smith individually has no basis to assert a right to possession of the property, he lacks standing to obtain a temporary injunction against Dass. Dass also argues Smith is not a party to the controversy that will be decided by the forcible detain-er suit because Smith wаs not a party to the lease and no other document speaks to the right of possession of the property.
Construing the pleadings and evidence in favor of Smith, we assume, without deciding, that McFalls and Smith, after the lease between Dass and Falcon Transit expirеd, entered into an agreement for Smith’s purchase of the property and that
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Smith fully performed all of his obligations under the agreement. This evidence could support a reasonable inference that Smith has a right to possession of the property.
See Guyer,
Under these facts, Smith alleged a distinct injury and a real controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the lawsuit. As a result, we conclude Smith had standing to seek an injunction against Dass to prevent Dass from evicting Falcon Transit. We overrule Dass’s second issue.
Temporary Injunction
We now turn to Dass’s third issue, whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordеring a temporary injunction against Dass. The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s subject matter pending a trial on the merits.
Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,
We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an application for a temporary injunction for abuse of discretion.
Butnaru,
Dass contends the trial court erred by finding that Smith will suffer imminent harm if the temporary injunction is not granted and that he has no adequate remedy at law. The trial court stated in its order that if the temporary injunction was not granted, “Plaintiff Benjie Smith will be without any adequate remedy at law, the loss or disruption of Plaintiffs business will be an irreparable harm, and Plaintiff and/or Falcon Transit, Inc. will be deprived of the use and enjoyment of the real property at 523 Pontiac Avenue, Dallas, Texas.”
As it did with its standing argumеnt, Dass argues the harm associated with the eviction of Falcon Transit belongs solely to Falcon Transit and not to Smith. It contends the loss or disruption of business will be to Falcon Transit’s business, not a loss to Smith individually. Dass further contends Smith has an adequate remedy at law because hе can maintain a title suit in *203 district court while Dass maintains its forcible detainer suit against Falcon Transit in justice court. It argues that Dass’s desire to evict Falcon Transit from the property has nothing to do with Smith’s claim to title to the property.
The evidence is undisputed that Smith owns Falcon Transit. The evidence is also undisputed that Falcon Transit has been in exclusive possession of 523 Pontiac since 1999 and has operated a scrap metal business under the name of Oak Cliff Metals from that location since 1999. Smith testified he makes his living in part from that business. He said if Falcon Transit was evicted from the property, it would interrupt his possession and enjoyment of the property. Smith testified that physically moving the business would take at least two to three months, additional time would be required to obtain the appropriate permits and certificates from the government to operate a scrap metal business in another location, and the business would suffer a loss of cash flow during the time required to relocate the business. Although the loss of cash flow would be Falcon Transit’s loss, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that Smith established a probable distinct injury if Dass evicted Falcon Transit because the business is a source of Smith’s personal income and that Smith proved a probable right that Falcon Transit was not Dass’s tenant but, instead, was Smith’s tenant.
Wе conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding Smith established a probable right to the relief sought and probable irreparable harm for which he had no adequate remedy at law unless the temporary injunction was granted. We overrule Dass’s third point.
We affirm the trial court’s order.