Case Information
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA DARWIN ANTONIO AREVALO Case No. 5:25-cv-01207-JWH-PDx MILLAN, on his own and on behalf of others similarly situated, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER- PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE Petitioner-Plaintiff, APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS v. CORPUS [ECF No. 30] DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as President of the United States; PAMELA BONDI, Attorney General of the United States, in her official capacity; KRISTI NOEM, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in her official capacity; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; 2 0 PETE HEGSETH, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Defense, in his official capacity; 21 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; MARCO RUBIO, Secretary of State, in 22 his official capacity; 23
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE; TODD LYONS, Acting Director of 24 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, in his official capacity; 25 U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT; 26 DAVID MARIN, in his official capacity as Director of the Los Angeles Field Office Director for U.S. Immigration 27 and Customs Enforcement; 2 FERETI SEMAIA, in his official 1
capacity as Warden of the GEO Group Adelanto ICE Processing Center and Desert View Annex; and
DOES 1-10,
Respondents-Defendants. 2 0 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 2
Before the Court is the ex parte application of Petitioner-Plaintiff Darwin
Antonio Arevalo Millan (“Arevalo”) for a writ of habeas corpus and writ of mandamus. [1] The Court concludes that this matter is appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons explained below, Arevalo’s instant Application is DENIED .
I.
BACKGROUND The parties are familiar with the history of this case. As relevant here, Arevalo is a Venezuelan citizen currently detained at the Desert View Annex or Desert View Modified Community Correctional Facility, which is associated with the Adelanto Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Processing Center. [2] Arevalo applied for asylum in the United States, and he was previously granted parole, which allowed him to work and reside in the United States pending the resolution of removal proceedings and his asylum application. [3] During a scheduled ICE check-in, however, Arevalo was arrested and placed in detention. [4] The Government did not provide Arevalo with prior notice of his arrest nor serve him with a warrant or other documentation regarding the basis for his arrest. [5]
Arevalo suspected that he may have been detained pursuant to Proclamation No. 10903 (the “Proclamation”), which authorized the immediate detention and removal of certain Venezuelan citizens. [6] Thus, on Saturday, 2 0 21 May 17, 2025, Arevalo filed a petition on behalf of himself and a putative class of
Venezuelan citizens, [7] though which Arevalo sought injunctive relief preventing the Government from removing Arevalo or other Venezuelan nationals pursuant to the Alien Enemies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq. , without prior adequate notice and process. [8] On the same day that Arevalo filed his Petition, he also filed ex parte applications for a temporary restraining order and for class certification. [9]
The Court granted both of those Applications in part on Monday, May 19, 2025, by issuing a temporary restraining order. [10] In the TRO, the Court also directed the Government to respond to the Applications and set a hearing on Arevalo’s request for a preliminary injunction for Friday, May 30, 2025. [11] In its Opposition and during the hearing, the Government argued that Arevalo was not entitled to injunctive relief because he was being detained pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (the “INA”), not the Proclamation, and because Arevalo was scheduled to appear at an asylum and removal hearing a few days later—on June 9, 2025. [12]
On June 2, 2025, the Court certified the proposed class of Venezuelan nationals and enjoined the Government, on a preliminary basis, from removing Arevalo or any member of the putative class pursuant to the Proclamation and from transferring Arevalo or any member of the putative class out of this judicial
2 0 21 [7] See id. 22 [8] See generally id. [9] 23 See Pet.-Pl.’s Emergency Appl. for a Temporary Restraining Order (the
“TRO Application”) [ECF No. 2]; Pet.-Pl.’s Mot. for Class Certification (the 24 “Class Certification Application”) [ECF No. 3]. 25 [10] See Order re the TRO Application (the “TRO”) [ECF No. 6]. 26 [11] See id. 27 [12] See generally Resps.-Defs.’ Opp’n to the Class Certification Application [ECF No. 11]. district. [13] In its Preliminary Injunction Order, the Court also expressed its 1 concern that Arevalo may not be detained solely pursuant to the INA, in part because the Government represented to the Court that immigration detainees are generally released from ICE custody if they are granted asylum, but the Government was unsure whether Arevalo would be released from ICE custody if he received asylum at the then-upcoming June 9, 2025, hearing. [14]
It appears that Arevalo was granted asylum during his June 9, 2025, hearing. [15] Five days later, Arevalo filed the instant Application, in which he informed the Court that he remains in ICE custody. [16] Arevalo seeks an order requiring the Government to release him immediately, based upon Arevalo’s status as an asylee. [17]
II.
LEGAL STANDARD “The opportunities for legitimate ex parte applications are extremely limited.” Lum v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC , 2012 WL 13012454, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2012). To justify ex parte relief, the moving party must make two showings: (1) “the evidence must show that the moving party’s cause will be irreparably prejudiced if the underlying motion is heard according to regular noticed motion procedures”; and (2) “it must be established that the moving party is without fault in creating the crisis that requires ex parte relief, or that the
2 0 crisis occurred as a result of excusable neglect.” Mission Power Engineering Co. v. 21 Continental Cas. Co. , 883 F. Supp. 488, 492 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 22 III. ANALYSIS
1 Arevalo argues that he is entitled to ex parte relief because, in view of the Immigration Order, the Government no longer has any legal basis to support Arevalo’s detention. [18] In response, the Government asserts that it intends to appeal the Immigration Order in Arevalo’s case and that Arevalo is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) pending the resolution of that appeal.
Under that statute, “an alien who is an applicant for admission,” and for whom the Attorney General has commenced removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, must remain detained “until removal proceedings have concluded.” Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U.S. 281, 299 (2018). And, because “[t]he Immigration Judge’s grant of relief in removal proceedings is not final [if] it has been appealed,” a removal proceeding has not concluded until such appeal has been decided. Matter of E-Y-F-G- , 29 I.&N. Dec. 103, 105 (BIA 2025). Thus, an applicant may remain in custody pending any such appeal. See Matter of M-S- , 27 I.&N. Dec. 509, 517 (BIA 2019).
Arevalo does not appear to dispute that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) authorizes the Government to detain an asylee pending the resolution of removal proceedings, and Arevalo does not contest the Government’s ability to appeal the Immigration Order. [19] Nevertheless, Arevalo maintains that the
2 0 Government’s authority to detain him ceased when the Immigration Order was 21 entered for several reasons. First, Arevalo asserts that the Immigration Judge 22 “decided that he is ‘clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted’ by granting asylum” and that such decision is conclusive. [20] But the Immigration 23 24 25 Order contains no such finding, and Arevalo provides no authority to support
the proposition that an appealable decision is somehow also a conclusive decision for the purpose of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). [21] Similarly, although Arevalo urges the Court to disregard the BIA’s precedents regarding the non- finality of asylum decisions, Arevalo provides no alternative authorities on which this Court could rely. [22]
Next, Arevalo argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jennings has been limited by other Supreme Court cases, including Biden v. Texas , 597 U.S. 785 (2022), and Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez , 596 U.S. 573 (2022). But it is unclear why Arevalo believes that either of those cases limits the Government’s authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225. In Biden , the Supreme Court addressed whether the Government was permitted, under a different provision of the INA, to terminate a program through which certain noncitizens were returned to Mexico. See Biden , 597 U.S. at 790-91. And in Johnson , the Supreme Court held that the Government is not required “to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention.” Johnson , 596 U.S. at 576. Neither decision limited or undermined Jennings or the Government’s authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Finally, Arevalo contends that the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush , 523 U.S. 723 (2008), controls this case. [23] But that position 2 0 21 appears to arise out of Arevalo’s belief that the Government seeks a “functional 22 suspension of the writ” of habeas corpus because the Government’s application 23 of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) “would allow indefinite detention of immigrants 24 25 26 [21] See Immigration Order. [22] 27 See Reply 9:12-20. [23] See id. at 7:10.
NOTES
[1] See Pet.-Pl.’s Emergency Ex Parte Appl. for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (the 22 “Application”) [ECF No. 30]. 23
[2] Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Class Action Compl. for Decl. and 24 Inj. Relief (the “Petition”) [ECF No. 1] ¶ 2. 25
[3] Id. at ¶ 3. 26
[4] Id. at ¶ 5.
[5] 27 Id. at ¶ 6.
[6] See generally id.
[13] See Am. Order re the TRO Application and the Class Certification 23 Application Pet.-Pl.’s Ex Parte Appl. for a Temporary Restraining Order (the 24 “Preliminary Injunction Order”) [ECF No. 29]. 25
[14] See id. at 10. 26
[15] See Application, Ex. A (the “Immigration Order”) [ECF No. 30-4].
[16] 27 See Application.
[17] See id.
[18] See generally id. 26
[19] See Application; Pl.’s Reply in Support of the Application (the “Reply”) 27 [ECF No. 39].
[20] Reply 9:2-4 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)).