Affirmеd in part and reversed and remanded in part by published opinion. Judge MOTZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge GREGORY and Judge FLOYD joined.
OPINION
After Detecon, Inc., a small wireless telecommunications consulting company, discharged one of its officers, Larry Dar-veau, he brought this action, alleging that Detecon had not paid him overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA” or the “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2000). Fifteen days later, Detecon filed a fraud suit in state court against Darveau. Darveau then amended his complаint in this case to allege that Detecon’s lawsuit constituted an illegal retaliatory action under 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2000) of the FLSA. The district court dismissed Darveau’s retaliation claim for failure to state a cause of action, and the court granted summary judgment to Detecon on Darveau’s remaining claims. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I.
Larry Darveau initially worked as an independent contractor for Detecon. On
On December 27, 2004, Detecon notified Darveau that it was eliminating his position and terminating his employment agreement effective January 31, 2005. A month later, Detecon and Darveau entered into a “Commission Settlement and Release Agreement,” which provided that Detecon would pay Darveau $50,000 in return for Darveau’s agreement not to sue Detecon regarding “commission claims.” The agreement did not, however, specify any release from possible claims under the FLSA, and no party contends on appeal that the agreement bars any of the claims at issue in this case.
On August 1, 2005, Darveau filed a complaint against Detecon in federal district court, seeking, inter alia, compensation for unpaid overtime under the FLSA. Two weeks later, Detecon filed an action in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County, Virginia, against Darveau, alleging fraud and fraudulent сoncealment arising out of a sales contract whose termination Darveau as-sertedly hid in order to meet his annual bonus of $50,000. Detecon later amended its complaint in state court to substitute claims for breach of contract and constructive fraud related to these same incidents. In response, Darveau amended his own federal complaint to include both a breach of contract and retaliation claim, contending that Detecon’s action cоnstituted retaliation under the FLSA in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Darveau then removed Detecon’s state court action to federal court; that action was consolidated with Darveau’s suit and treated as a counterclaim.
The district court granted Detecon’s motion to dismiss Darveau’s retaliation claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The court granted summary judgment to Detecon on the overtime compensation and breach of contract claims, and to Darveau on Detecon’s counterсlaims for constructive fraud and breach of contract claims. Only Darveau appeals.
II.
Darveau initially argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Detecon on his FLSA overtime compensation claim. We disagree.
The FLSA establishes the general rule that employers must compensate each employee “at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” for all overtime hours that an employee works. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). The Act defines overtime as employment in excess of forty hours in a single workweek,
id.,
but exempts from the general rule “any employee employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity,”
id.
§ 213(a)(1) (2000). An employer bears the burden of proving that a particular employee’s job falls within such an exemption.
Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co.,
The Secretary of Labor, as directed by statute, has adopted regulations defining a bona fide administrative employee, as that term is used in 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2006). Although the Secretary amended these regulations effective August 23, 2004 — in the middle of Darveau’s tenure at Detecon — the amendments do not significantly change the criteria for the administrative exemption in Darveau’s case. Compare 29 C.F.R. §§ 541.2, 541.214(a) (2003) with 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a) (2006); see also Dep’t of Labor, Op. Ltr., FLSA2006-11 at 3 (Sept. 8, 2006), available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/ whd/opinion/FLSA/2007/2007_02_08_06_ FLSA.pdf. An employee qualifies for the administrative exemption under both sets of regulations if (1) the employee is compensated on a salary or fee basis (as defined in the regulations) at a rate not less than $250 per week under the former regulations and not less than $455 per week under the revised regulations; (2) thе employee’s primary duty is “the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers”; and (3) the employee’s “primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 541.214 (2003).
Indisputably, Darveau’s annual compensation of $150,000 satisfies the salary requirement. Although salary alone is not dispositive under the FLSA, wе note that the “FLSA was meant to protect low paid rank and file employees” and that “[hjigher earning employees ... are more likely to be bona fide managerial employees.”
Counts v. S.C. Elec. & Gas Co.,
First, relying on
Martin v. Cooper Elec. Supply Co.,
In fact, a review of the evidence unquestionably reveals that Darveau does fall within the administrative exemption. Unlike the wholesale salespersons in
Martin,
Numerous other undisputed facts demonstrate thаt Darveau’s duties involved the performance of “office ... work directly related to the ... general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers,” which required the “exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.” See 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 541.214 (2003). As a member of Detecon’s Executive Team, Darveau helped to shape Detecon’s general business policies, for instance, by proposing revisions to Detecon’s travel and expense policy. He worked closely with CEO Eckart Pech in hiring two additional directors of sales. In the company’s unsuccessful bid to assist T-Mobile in its assumption of the Cingular GSM Network in California, Darveau’s own emails describe his role as the “overall project manager” for the proposal, acting, in his words, as the “gate keeper” who “coordinate[d] ... that effort to make sure it got done.” Finally, in June of 2007 and 2008, Darveau presented sales status reports that recommended strategies to develop additional business in the telecommunications market, identifying major accounts and proposing specific steps for advancing Detecon’s share in those industry segments.
Darveau’s significant role in conducting both specific sales and shaping Detecon’s more general market strategy, as well his participation in the company’s overall management and hiring policy, was thus wholly unlike the “routine selling efforts focused simply on particular sales transactions” at issue in
Martin.
Given the full range of Darveau’s employment duties, Darveau falls within the requisites of the administrative exemption. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Detecon on Darveau’s FLSA overtime compensation claim.
III.
Having rejected Darveau’s FLSA overtimе compensation claim, we now consider
The retaliation provision of the FLSA is a central component of the Act’s complaint-based enforcement meсhanism. “To secure [employer] compliance with the substantive provisions of the FLSA, Congress ‘chose to rely on information and complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed to have been denied.’ ”
Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co.,
The retaliation provision renders it unlawful “to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or rеlated to this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). The provision therefore effectuates enforcement of the Act’s substantive provisions by removing “fear of economic retaliation” so that employees need not “quietly ... accept substandard conditions.”
Mitchell,
A plaintiff asserting a prima facie claim of retaliation under the FLSA must show that (1) he еngaged in an activity protected by the FLSA; (2) he suffered adverse action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with such protected activity; and (3) a causal connection exists between the employee’s activity and the employer’s adverse action.
Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co.,
A.
As to the first prong, Detecon conceded before the district court that Darveau not only alleged but actually engaged in protected activity in filing his complaint for overtime pay under the FLSA. 1 On appeal, however, Detecon argues to the contrary. In the interest of judicial economy, we address the contention, even though nоt raised below.
Relying on
Burnette v. Northside Hosp.,
Detecon maintains that Darveau must not only show that “he subjectively (that is, in good faith) believed that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices, but also that his belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record
Assuming, without deciding, that a FLSA retaliation plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that he had an objectively reasonable belief that his employer violated the FLSA, we believe that Darveau met this burden. Although we have rejected his overtime claim, it was an “objectively reasonable” claim when considered “in light of the facts and record presented.” Several features of Detecon—its extremely small size, its project-driven management structure, and its focus on on-site consulting—complicate the application of the key terms of the FLSA’s wage and hours exemptions to Darveau. Although Darveau’s overtime compensation claim ultimately fails, Darveau did not allege an objectively unreasonable claim in light of these facts.
B.
Detecon’s principal argument, and the basis for the district court’s dismissal of Darveau’s retaliation claim, rests on the second prong of the prima facie case-the employee must havе suffered an adverse action by the employer subsequent to or contemporaneous with the protected activity.
Wolf,
Darveau notes that the Supreme Court has expressly held that a lawsuit filed by an employer against an employee can constitute an act of unlawful retaliation under another federal statute governing employment rights when the lawsuit is filed with a retaliatory motive and lacking a reasonable basis in fact or law.
See Bill Johnson’s Rests. v. NLRB,
Nevertheless, the district court held, relying on older Title VII cases (which Detecon had cited to the court), that in order to establish an FLSA retaliation claim, Darveau had to demonstrate that he suffered a materially adverse employment actiоn involving an ultimate employment decision related to hiring, leave, discharge, promotion, or compensation. The court reasoned that because Darveau had left Detecon’s employment six months pri- or to filing his FLSA suit, he could not possibly have suffered any employment action, adverse or otherwise, from Dete-con. Requiring a FLSA retaliation plaintiff to allege and prove a materially adverse employment action would of course have the practical effect of declaring that the FLSA’s prohibition applies to retaliation exclusively against current, and not former, employees.
This rationale rests on outdated Title VII precedent. The Supreme Court has now clearly rejected this view. In
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,
Although throughout this litigation Detecon has relied on Title VII cases, it now insists that we should not give weight to
Robinson
and
Burlington Northern
in construing the FLSA. In so arguing, Detecon not only ignores its own reliance on Title VII cases, but also the almost uniform practice of courts in considering the authoritative body of Title VII case law when interpreting the comparable provisions of other federal statutes.
See, e.g., McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g. Co.,
But we find no significant differences in either the language or intent of the two statutes regarding the type of adverse action their retaliation provisions prohibit. The FLSA and Title VII contain identical general definitions of “employee.”
Compare
29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2000) (FLSA)
with
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000) (Title VII);
see also United States v. Rosenwasser,
Although the two statutes seek to combat separate workplace problems, the purpose of their retaliation provisions is one and the same — namely, to secure their substantive protections “by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”
Burlington Northern,
Somewhat surprisingly, Detecon contends that looking to the Supreme Court’s Title VII jurisprudence in this FLSA case will generate the “anomalous result” of extending protection from retaliation to former employees who no longer enjoy the substantive protections of the FLSA. Br. of Appellee at 50. Yet in
Burlington Northern,
the Court rejected this very argument in the Title VII context, observing that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision serves a different purpose than its substantive provisions and that such “differences in ... purpose ... remove any perceived ‘anomaly.’ ”
Our conclusion accords with that reached by our sister circuits. The Tenth Circuit has held that an employer’s third-party complaint for indemnity against four former employers could, as a matter of law, qualify as unlawful retaliation under the FLSA.
Martin v. Gingerbread House, Inc.,
For all these reasons, we hold that the district court clearly erred in requiring Darveau to allege that his employer retaliated against him with a “materially adverse employment action.” Rather, a plaintiff asserting a retaliation claim under the FLSA need only аllege that his employer retaliated against him by engaging in an action “that would have been materially adverse to a reasonable employee” because the “employer’s actions ... could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”
Burlington Northern,
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART.
Notes
. In its Motion to Dismiss before the district court, Detecon stated: "While Detecon does not dispute that Darveau engaged in a statutorily protected activity when he filed the present action against Detecon, Detecon asserts that its state law action against Detecon [siс] does not constitute an 'adverse action by the employer’ as that prong has been interpreted by the courts.” R. on Appeal, Doc. No. 36, at 4.
. Detecon has also moved for judicial notice of a subsequent age discrimination charge brought by Darveau against Detecon, alleging unlawful retaliation under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000). We grant Detecon’s motion and take judicial notice of this fact. That Darveau has filed an ADEA retaliation claim does not, however, invalidate his FLSA retaliation complaint. We deny as moot, Dar-veau's motion for leave to respond.