Defendant appeals by leave granted the order denying his motion to stay the proceedings or dismiss this divorce action filed by plaintiff. We reverse.
Plaintiff and defendant were married in 1980 and were residents of Okemos, Michigan, until 1993, when they moved to England. The parties had two children, William Charles Dart, bom January 23, 1983, and Arianna Constance Dart, bom November 12, 1985. Defendant is the son of the founder of Dart Container *148 Corporation, one of the largest family-controlled businesses in the United States. The move to England made possible a September 1993 transfer of several hundred million dollars to defendant from family trusts. For the transfer to occur, defendant had to renounce his United States citizenship.
The parties jointly purchased a house near London and enrolled the children in school. The marriage eventually foundered, and defendant filed for divorce in England on February 3, 1995. Plaintiff, through her attorneys, filed a similar suit in Michigan in the Ingham Circuit Court four days later. 1 The parties remained in England until a consent order was entered in the English court on June 9, 1995, allowing plaintiff to return with the two children to Michigan.
On March 21, 1995, defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(4) and (6) in the Ingham Circuit Court on the bases of lack of jurisdiction and pendency of a prior proceeding. Following a hearing on the matter, the circuit court determined that jurisdiction was proper in Michigan and assumed jurisdiction over the two children and the divorce proceeding. The court reserved the issue of jurisdiction over the parties’ property.
Plaintiff also brought a jurisdictional challenge in the English court. The English court determined that jurisdiction was proper in England in a judgment entered on June 13, 1995. Following entry of this order, defendant moved in the Ingham Circuit Court to defer jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens. After a hearing on August 8, 1995, the circuit *149 court denied the motion and assumed jurisdiction over the parties’ property.
Both suits proceeded. On October 27, 1995, a “decree absolute” of divorce was entered in the English court. This was followed by a seven-day trial in March 1996 in which plaintiff filed an answer claiming the “full range of financial ancillary relief available to a wife under the Matrimonial Causes Act [of] 1973.” Both sides presented expert witnesses who testified regarding the parties’ assets and plaintiff’s reasonable needs. On March 21, 1996, the English court issued a lengthy opinion in which it determined defendant’s total net worth to be “about £400 million.” 2 The court awarded plaintiff approximately $14.3 million and the house in Okemos and its contents, which the parties agreed were worth approximately $1.5 million. Plaintiff was also awarded four paintings and her jewelry. The court also awarded child support in the amount of $95,400 a year for both children. Defendant was awarded four automobiles and the balance of the marital estate.
On March 29, 1996, defendant moved to stay or dismiss the Ingham Circuit Court proceedings, arguing that the English judgment was entitled to enforcement under the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act (ufmjra), MCL 691.1151 et seq.-, MSA 27.955(1) et seq., and the principle of comity. Defendant also argued at the hearing on April 8, 1996, that the English judgment was entitled to res judicata effect. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the English judgment was not entitled to recognition under the ufmjra or the principle of comity *150 because the English system of law was repugnant to the public policy of Michigan and because the English decision violated plaintiffs “right to have a fair and equitable distribution of property.” Defendant’s application for leave to appeal the circuit court decision was granted by this Court on April 10, 1996.
i
Defendant first claims that the Ingham Circuit Court erred in determining that the provisions of the English judgment were not enforceable under the ufmjra, which states that, except as provided in MCL 691.1154; MSA 27.955(4), “a foreign judgment ... is conclusive between the parties
to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money.
The foreign judgment is enforceable in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full faith and credit.” (Emphasis added.) MCL 691.1153; MSA 27.955(3). In 1987, the definition of “foreign judgment” in the act was amended to expressly include judgments for support in divorce or child custody matters.
To the extent that the English judgment awarded sums certain to plaintiff, specifically the lump-sum *151 award and child support, the judgment is conclusive under § 3 regardless of whether the lump sum was part of the property division. Therefore, the provisions of the English judgment relating to payment of sums certain are enforceable under the UFMJRA and the trial court erred in refusing to recognize the applicability of the statute. 4
Plaintiff argues that the Ingham Circuit Court correctly held that the judgment need not be recognized under the UFMJRA because the English system is repugnant to the public policy of this state because of its treatment of women as “second-class citizens,” its provision for only limited discovery, its failure to take the wife’s contribution to the family into account, and its failure to try the issue of fault. MCL 691.1154(1)(a); MSA 27.955(4)(1)(a). A foreign judgment is not conclusive if it was rendered under a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law. Here, however, it cannot reasonably be argued that plaintiff was denied due process because she was represented by counsel, given an opportunity to be heard, and presented evidence on her own behalf. Although the circuit court opined that the English judge was not impartial, a review of the lengthy opinion of the English judge fails to support a finding of bias. Further, had the issue of fault been raised, it would not have benefited plaintiff, who admitted that her continuing infidelity was the cause of the marital breakdown. Consequently, no evidence that plaintiff was *152 prejudiced by an unfair tribunal or proceeding is present.
MCL 691.1154(2)(c); MSA 27.955(4)(2)(c) provides that a foreign judgment need not be recognized if the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state, which is fixed by constitution, statute, and case law.
Martino v Cottman Transmission Systems, Inc,
Lastly, plaintiff argues that the English judgment is not a final judgment because under English law, “all orders made in matrimonial proceedings concerning financial provision are interlocutory and not final.” However, MCL 691.1152; MSA 27.955(2) disposes of this argument because it expressly states that the ufmjra applies to “any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal.” The language cited by plaintiff refers only to “orders . . . concerning financial support”; it undoubtedly means that the orders for child support and alimony are subject to subsequent modification, just as they are in this country. See MCL 552.603; MSA 25.164(3). The fact that such judgments are subject to modification does not affect their finality for purposes of the ufmjra. See MCL 552.603(2); MSA 25.164(3)(2);
Langford v
Langford,
n
Defendant next contends that the Ingham Circuit Court erred in failing to dismiss this action on the basis of the principle of comity. The circuit court determined that the rudiments of due process had not been met and that the result reached in the English judgment was contrary to the public policy of this state. A trial court’s ruling on a motion for dismissal is reviewed for clear error.
Hoffman v Garden City Hosp,
Comity is the recognition of a judicial or legislative act of another nation that permits foreign judgments to be recognized in this country.
Bang v Park,
Faced as we are with a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction which lies but the breadth of a river from the instant court, closer, indeed, than most of the remaining 49 states, and a court which draws its concepts of law from *155 the same roots as ours, comity supplies a rational and well-founded reason for affording relief to this plaintiff. Any appellate court faced with the compelling elements this Court finds before it would be derelict if it did not examine minutely this burgeoning concept of jurisprudence. [Id. at 32; see also Bang, supra at 38-39.]
In
Growe,
this Court indicated that the factors to be considered in determining whether a foreign judgment should be accorded comity were “whether or not the basic rudiments of due process were followed, whether the parties were present in court, [and] whether a hearing on the merits was held.”
Contrary to the Ingham Circuit Court’s findings, it is evident from the judgment rendered in England that plaintiff had a fair hearing on the merits and that she was present, was represented by counsel, and actively participated in the proceeding. Therefore, to the extent that the property distribution provisions of the English judgment are not encompassed by the ufmjra, the decision is entitled to enforcement under the principle of comity because there is no evidence that it is contrary to the public policy of this state. 7
Plaintiff also contends, once again, that “under English law all orders made in matrimonial proceedings concerning financial provision are interlocutory and not final.” For the reasons above, we reject this argument with respect to comity as well.
*156 in
Defendant lastly contends that plaintiffs suit is barred by res judicata. Res judicata bars a subsequent action between the same parties when the evidence or essential facts are identical.
Eaton Co Bd, of Rd Comm’rs v Schultz,
Here, the Michigan action involves a divorce between the same parties with the same assets and the same children. Therefore, res judicata applies if the judgment is final and enforceable. Plaintiff raises two arguments: first, that the judgment was not entitled to be pleaded as res judicata because it was not final and, second, that the judgment is not preclusive because it does not address issues such as custody, visitation, pension rights, dower rights, or insurance or tax liabilities.
We have already determined that the English judgment is a final order. Further, the fact that the judgment. does not address custody or visitation is not fatal to its preclusive effect. The Ingham Circuit Court
*157
has jurisdiction over custody and visitation pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, MCL 600.653; MSA 27A.653. See
Braden v Braden,
Reversed.
Notes
Jurisdiction based on domicile and residence in Michigan is not an issue raised in this appeal.
The exchange rate is approximately $1.59 to SI.
Before this amendment, foreign judgments providing for alimony or child support could be enforced under the principle of comity. See discussion of issue n.
With regard to the property distribution provisions of the judgment, see issue n.
Pursuant to Sparks, these factors include the duration of the marriage, the contributions of the parties to the marital estate, the age and health of the parties, the life status of the parties, including their respective necessities and circumstances, the parties’ respective earning abilities, their past relations and conduct, and general principles of equity. Under the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, § 25(2), the court is directed to consider the parties’ income, earning capacity, and financial resources, financial needs and obligations, standard of living, age and duration of the marriage, physical or mental disabilities, contributions to the welfare of the family, and conduct.
This is consistent with Michigan law, which provides that property settlement provisions of a divorce judgment are final and, as a general rule, cannot be modified.
Colestock v Colestock,
See issue i.
That is, pension rights, dower rights, or insurance or tax liabilities.