Darrell Grayson v. Richard AllenDarrell Grayson v. Richard Allen
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Hull
Plaintiff Darrell Grayson, an Alabama death row inmate scheduled for execution on July 26, 2007, appeals the district court’s order dismissing his
I. BACKGROUND
A J December 1980-30 June 2002
The details of Grayson’s crimes are set forth in our 2001 opinion affirming the
In June 1982, a jury convicted Grayson of capital murder during a burglary of an inhabited dwelling, pursuant to
In 1986, Grayson sought post-conviction habeas relief in Alabama’s state courts based, inter alia, on his counsel’s alleged failure to present evidence of Grayson’s alcoholism and abusive, impoverished upbringing. See Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d at 1208-09. After an evidentiary hearing was held in April 1992, the state habeas court denied Grayson’s petition for post-conviction relief. See id. at 1214. In December 1995, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of Grayson’s state habeas petition. Grayson v. State, 675 So.2d 516, 531 (Ala.Crim.App.1995), ce rt. denied, 519 U.S. 934, 117 S.Ct. 309, 136 L.Ed.2d 225 (1996).
In April 1996, Grayson filed a
B. Grayson’s first
On July 1, 2002, the State of Alabama changed its primary method of execution from electrocution to lethal injection and gave death row inmates thirty days from the Alabama Supreme Court’s affirmance of their death sentences to elect electrocution instead.
See
On August 12, 2002, the State first requested an execution date from the Alabama Supreme Court. On September 23, 2002, Grayson filed a motion in the state trial court to obtain the biological evidence presented at trial so that he could conduct DNA testing on the evidence. See Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328, 1335 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 1005, 166 L.Ed.2d 712 (2007). On October 10, 2002, the state trial court denied Grayson’s motion for lack of jurisdiction. See id.
On November 15, 2002, three months after the State first requested an execution date, Grayson filed a
In September 2005, the district court dismissed Grayson’s
C. Grayson’s second
On November 17, 2006, twenty-four years
after
his conviction for capital murder, four years
after
Alabama adopted lethal injection for death row inmates, and four years
after
filing his first
In his second
On May 17, 2007, the district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss Grayson’s
II. DISCUSSION
Grayson’s now second
Additionally, the equitable principles at issue when inmates facing imminent execution delay in raising their
On appeal, Grayson contends that the district court clearly erred in its fact-finding that he unreasonably delayed in filing his
First, Grayson argues that the district court wrongly faulted him for failing to file a second or successive habeas petition or his
Moreover, Grayson did not file his
Second, contrary to Grayson’s arguments, the confidentiality of Alabama’s lethal injection protocol did not impede Grayson from filing this claim earlier. As this Court noted in dismissing a similar argument in Jones v. Allen, 485 F.3d 635 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 2160, 167 L.Ed.2d 887 (2007):
[t]he crux of [such] challenge^] to the lethal injection protocol — despite other general allegations about the training of the prison staff, etc. — is that the first of the three drugs (sodium thiopental) . . . will not induce a sufficiently deep plane of anesthesia [before] . . . the third, excruciatingly painful and death-inducing drug (potassium chloride) is administered. Regardless of the confidentiality of the State’s protocol, [plaintiff Aaron Lee] Jones cannot assert that he was unaware of the fact that [Alabama] (like almost every other state that carries out executions using lethal injection) employs this three-drug cocktail. Any such assertion is belied by his complaint, which alleges “upon information and belief’ that the State uses “Thiopental, Pavulon, and Potassium Chloride . . . to achieve first anesthesia, then paralysis, and finally . . . cardiac arrest.” Thus, Jones knew of the basis of his claim before he filed his complaint.
Id.
at 640 n. 3. Grayson’s second
Grayson claims that he had no knowledge about the execution team’s training and the procedure for preparing the drugs and syringes, administering the drugs, and monitoring the execution. However, Gray-son makes no claim that he had any such knowledge when he filed his second
Furthermore, as the district court noted, Grayson’s “technical knowledge of lethal injection matters is based upon the expert opinion of Dr. Mark Heath.” This circuit noted recently in Jones that death row inmate Jones should have known about substantially similar lethal injection challenges because “the expert upon whom Jones relies . . . has been opining on the alleged risks associated with this particular three-drug cocktail since at least 2003.” Jones, 485 F.3d at 640 n. 3. Similarly, Dr. Heath has been opining upon the alleged risks of lethal injection in numerous challenges across the country since at least 2002. Grayson thus should have been aware of the basis of his claim well before November 2006. See id.
Additionally, Grayson’s counsel Stephen Bright, who has ably represented Grayson through more than fifteen years of state and federal post-conviction proceedings,
see Grayson v. King,
460 F.3d at 1335, also served as counsel in 2002 in a
Finally, Grayson’s claim that the factual and legal landscape surrounding lethal injection has changed recently is meritless. The district court correctly noted that Alabama’s lethal injection protocol had been in place for over four years when Grayson filed his second
For all the foregoing reasons, the district court did not clearly err in finding
Furthermore, given that Grayson has unreasonably delayed in filing this second
This reasoning applies with equal force to Grayson. Here, Grayson delayed filing his method-of-execution
Furthermore, as in
Rutherford II,
Alabama had adopted lethal injection as its
As emphasized earlier, Grayson did not file this second
The Supreme Court has recognized that “ ‘[bjoth the State and the victims of crime have an important interest in the timely enforcement of a sentence,’ ” and that federal courts considering equitable relief “must be ‘sensitive to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal judgments without undue interference from the federal courts.’ ”
Rutherford II,
466 F.3d at 974 (quoting
Hill,
126 S.Ct. at 2104). Both the State and Mrs. Orr’s family have strong interests in seeing Grayson’s punishment carried out after waiting twenty-five years since Grayson received a death sentence. After a quarter century of delay, Grayson is not entitled to another reprieve.
See Thompson v. Wainwright,
714 F.2d 1495, 1506 (11th Cir.1983) (“Each delay, for its span, is a commutation of a death sentence to one of imprisonment.”). Given the strong presumption against the grant of dilatory equitable relief, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Grayson’s
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Capital offenses are now set forth in Alabama Code § 13A-5-40.
. We review the district court’s denial of equitable relief for abuse of discretion.
See SEC v. Ginsburg,
362 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir.2004). We review any factual findings made by the district court in support of its denial of an injunction for clear error and underlying questions of law
de novo. See Preferred Sites, LLC
v.
Troup County,
296 F.3d 1210, 1220 (11th Cir.2002). Therefore, in this case, we review the district court’s dismissal of a
. Specifically, Grayson asserted “upon information and belief that Alabama uses drugs to achieve first anesthesia, then paralysis, and finally execution by cardiac arrest. The chemicals used include Thiopental, Pavulon, and potassium chloride.”
. Given that Grayson’s execution became imminent again in August 2006, we also reject Grayson’s argument that the district court clearly erred in finding that the late filing of his
. Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Grayson’s