86 Pa. 512 | Pa. | 1878
delivered the opinion of the court,
An act or contract, though not originating in any evil design or contrivance to injure another, yet tending to deceive and mislead, or violate private confidence, is a constructive fraud, equally reprehensible with actual fraud, and prohibited by law. Constructive fraud often exists where the parties to the contract have a special confidential or fiduciary relation, Avhich affords the poAver and means to one to take undue advantage of, or exercise undue influence over the other. Wherever, from such relation, considerable authority or influence necessarily exists on the one side, and a corresponding reliance and confidence is placed on the other, a party will not be suffered to abuse this authority or influence by extracting any advantage to himself. A transaction betAveen persons so situated is watched with extreme jealousy and solicitude, and if there be found the slightest trace of undue influence or unfair advantage, redress Avill be given to the injured party. Owing to the near connection between the parties, in many relations, the transaction in itself is considered so suspicious as to cast the burden of proof upon the person Avho seeks to support it, to shoAv that he has taken no advantage of his influence or knoAvledge, and that the arrangement is fair and conscientious. Eor instance, the relation betAveen attorney and client gives rise to great confidence and to very strong influences by the attorney over the actions, rights and interests of his client. Tho attorney is presumed to have the power to gain by the necessities,
The foregoing principles are too familiar for citation of text-book or report. It is equally unnecessary to show by authority that the most dominant influence of all relations is that of the husband over his wife. From the proud and untutored savage to the cultured and refined Anglo-American, the wife is affectionately anxious to please her husband. This is first in her heart, whether she be in the menial service of a rude hut, or in daily toil for support of her family, or in charge of an elegant mansion. When he commands, she obeys; when he persuades, she yields; when he gently hints a wish, she grants. When treated almost as a servant — when governed and corrected as a child, as did our sturdy ancestors — or when confided in as a companion and equal, her will is subdued to her lord. True, there are exceptional women, whose nature is unaffected by marriage, who cannot yield or bend, and, as wives, would not be happy, save with effeminate husbands; but these are not so numerous as to cloud perception of the mental and moral differences of the sexes. The common-law rights and disabilities, consequent on marriage, grew out of these differences, and the husband’s power and influence distinctly appear. “.By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
In Weeks v. Haas, 3 W. & S. 520, Gibson, C. J., said, in speaking of husband and wife: “Her dependence on him is more entire than the dependence incident to any other of the domestic relations; and the law relaxes its grasp on no means within its power to prevent him from misusing it. When it is her purpose to give him her land, the accomplishment of it by means of a conveyance to a convenient friend cannot be prevented, yet the step is so obviously the consequence of the husband’s avarice, that it is seldom to be commended.” When it is truly her purpose to give him her land it ought not to be prevented. But in determining if that ivas her purpose, when the step is obviously the consequence of her husband’s avarice, will a rule of
The same great judge said, in Watson v. Mercer, 6 S. & R. 49: “ The subordinate and dependent condition of the wife, opens to the husband such an unbounded field to practice on her natural timidity, or to abuse a confidence, never sparingly reposed in return for even occasional and insidious kindness, that there is nothing, however unreasonable or unjust, to which he cannot procure her consent. The policy of the law should be, as far as possible, to narrow, rather than to widen the field of this controlling influence. * * * Where the conveyance is to a trustee, for the purpose of an immediate -reconveyance to the husband, what honest mind would feel regret, that in the hurry of accomplishment, some circumstance, merely formal, was omitted, by which the wife and her family were rescued from his rapacity ? The very circumstances of a reconveyance ought to be satisfactory evidence of fraud by undue influence; and although I do not know that a chancellor would set aside the wife’s deed on the same ground on which he interferes to defeat an advantage gained by a parent or guardian, while their influence over the child or ward is supposed to continue, still it ought to induce a court to lay hold of the slightest extrinsic circumstance to effect the same purpose.” This dictum, uttered half a century ago in an ejectment, where the parties stood in like relation as in the pending case, and where the deed was held void for defective certificate of the wife’s acknowledgment, shows that the judicial mind, observing the fruits of the act of 1770, was aroused to the importance of applying the rules relative to persons holding confidential relations, to transactions between husband and wife. So long as their common-law rights and disabilities were unaffected by statute, there could hardly have been occasion for application of those rules to them; but when statutes secure to married women their property, with right of its enjoyment and disposal, occasions arise when they need and ought to have the full benefit of rules established for the protection of persons, whose relations to others give the latter the power and means of exerting an undue influence over, the former. The conveyance of a wife’s estate for her husband’s use will be held void, unless it affirmatively appears, from the attending circumstances, or otherwise, that it was her voluntary act and not induced by his undue influence.
Coming to'the facts of this case: In 1841, Joshua Darlington, aged forty-four years, a widower with five children, married Martha T. Haines, aged thirty-six years. Her father died in 1811, leaving no widow and no other child. From him she inherited the lands described in the bill, except a small lot she purchased before her marriage. She had considerable personalty when married, and her
Here there are no innocent purchasers. The plaintiff is the heir of Martha T. Darlington. The defendants stand in the shoes of their ancestor. They have the bare legal title, but the equitable title is in the plaintiff.
Samuel Dixon and Hannah J., his wife, are parties to the bill. They repudiate the award, as is their right. They objected to inquiry into such matters of dispute, as were left unsettled, by reason of the invalidity of the award as to her. The master took the testimony and the parties were fully heard upon the merits. The learned judge was of opinion that the case as presented by the bill is on the award alone. In this we think .there was error. The bill is not so artistic and complete as is desirable, yet has substance by which to amend; and, if need be, amendment would be allowed here. The learned counsel for defendants waived that formality, if the court were of opinion the bill has substance as against Dixon and wife. The second paragraph, after describing the lands, adds: “ which two tracts of land the said Martha was induced by the persuasions and influence of her husband to convey to him.” And the fourth- avers: “ That the said Martha was of weak mind, easily influenced, unacquainted with the forms of business, had little intercourse with society, and little knowledge of her rights of property, and during her whole life infirm in health.” In case of refusal to decree a specific performance of the award, there is a prayer.for decree that the defendants, including Dixon and wife, convey to the plaintiff the said farm, and pay the said $1000, received by Joshua Darlington for the lot he sold, with interest; and prayer for further relief. The plaintiff is entitled to a decree against all the defendants.
This cause having been argued by counsel, upon consideration the judgment is reversed, and it is adjudged and decreed as follows :—
1. That the defendants, Job Darlington, Franklin Darlington, Hoopes Darlington, Sidney D. Pennock, and Samuel Dixon and Hannah J., his wife, within thirty days after notice of this decree, release and convey unto Jacob IT. Darlington and his heirs, all their title and estate in the tract of land, containing about seventy-eight acres, described in the bill, free from encumbrance created by them or any of them.
2. That the said defendants assign and transfer to said plaintiff their respective claims of and in the estate of Joshua Darlington, deceased, to amount of $1000 and interest thereon, from October 1st 1872, being amount of money received by said Joshua on sale of wood-lot described in the bill, in such manner that the administrators of the estate of said Joshua may pay said $1000 and inter
. 3. That the said plaintiff retain for his own use, and shall in no manner be required to account for or pay for any moneys, securities or other things given or handed to him by said Joshua in his lifetime, as respects the said Job, Franklin, Hoopes and Sidney D., and, as against them, the plaintiff’s right and title thereto shall be absolute.
4. That said plaintiff, within thirty days after notice of this decree, assign and transfer all his legal and equitable title and interest of and in the four-fifths part of the other real and personal estate of said Joshua Darlington, deceased, to said Job, Franklin, Hoopes and Sidney D., and their heirs.
5. That said Job, Franklin, Hoopes and Sidney D., within thirty days, pay to the plaintiff four-fifths of one-half the rent of said farm for the year ending April 1st 1873, with interest from that date; and, if the parties do not agree upon the amount, a master be appointed to ascertain the same.
6. That the costs of this action, including costs of appeal, be paid by the defendants.
7. That the record be remitted for the execution of this decree.