Dare v. StateDare v. State
This is an appeal from a determination of the New Jersеy Racing Commission suspending appellant‘s license as a horse trainer for a period of ten days.
Appellant does not dispute the facts which were found by the Executive Director of the Racing Commission who acted as a hearing officer. He found, pursuant to a stipulation, that after a race the horse Mighty Marval was found by urinalysis to have been administered a drug known as phenylbutazonе. He further found that the trainer had no direct knowledge that the horse had been administered medication and that he had made an attempt to protect the horse by hiring a groom to oversee the horse while he was stabled. Nevertheless, the hearing officer concluded that the trainer violated Racing Commission Rules 14:19 and 20:07, N.J.A.C. 13:70-14.19(a) and N.J.A.C. 13:70-20.7, and recommended suspension. The Racing Commission subsequently adoрted the hearing officer‘s findings of fact and his recommendation.
Appellant argues that the hearing officer misinterpreted the rеgulation; that his finding was arbitrary and capricious; that the rule of strict liability is unreasonable and if applied as interpreted, it would deprive him of a property right without due process of law. Amicus curiae argues that before any trainer may be suspended for a violation of the rules, it must be found that the trainer either directly administered the drug, knew of the drug‘s administration or
Racing Commission Rule 14:19, found in
The owner, trainer, grоom or any other person who is charged with the custody, care and responsibility of a horse, are all obligated to protect and guard the horse against the administration, or attempted administration, either internally or externally, of any stimulant, depressant, lоcal anesthetic, analgesic, tranquilizer, anti-inflammatory chemical or drug of any kind or description.
Racing Commission Rule 20:07,
The language employed indicates that the Commission did indeed intend, by adopting the above rules, to place absolute responsibility upon the trainer in situations in which a horse has been administered a drug. That such was the intention of the Commission becomes even more clear from a reading of a companion rule,
(a) A trainer shall not enter or start a horse that:
* * * * * * * *
3. Has been given in any manner whatsoever, internally or externаlly, any stimulant, depressant, local anesthetic, tranquilizer, anti-inflammatory or chemical of any kind or description, prior to the race.
The danger of clandestine and dishonest activity inherent in the business of horse racing has been well recognized. Garifine v. Monmouth Park Jockey Club, 29 N.J. 47, 55 (1959). The business itself and the legalized gambling
The Legislature has vested the Commission with broad powers “necessary or proрer to enable it to carry out fully and effectually all the provisions and purposes of this act.”
Our examination of the rules adopted by the Commission must be done with due regard to the legislative policy expressed in the entire statutory enactment. In re Gastman, 147 N.J. Super. 101 (App. Div. 1977). Throughout the statute,
It has long been held that the State may make the dоing of an act criminal or penal regardless of a corrupt or criminal purpose. State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 149 (1951); Halsted v. State, 41 N.J.L. 552 (E. & A. 1879).
Regulations imposing strict liability regardless of individual knowledge or fault have been upheld in a variety of situations. In United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 64 S.Ct. 134, 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943), reh‘g den. 320 U.S. 815, 64 S.Ct. 367, 88 L.Ed. 492 (1943), it was held that conscious fraud was not a necessary elemеnt in a prosecution for shipping misbranded or adulterated articles in interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. In a prosecution for selling adulterated milk it was not necessary to show that the seller had knowledge that the milk was below standard. Vandegrift v. Meihle, 66 N.J.L. 92 (Sup. Ct. 1901). Other examples of strict liability imposed without fault include the discharge of deleterious substances into waterways, State v. Kinsley, 103 N.J. Super. 190 (Cty. Ct. 1968), aff‘d 105 N.J. Super. 347 (App. Div. 1969); emitting dark smoke in violation of the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Code, Health Dept. v. Concrete Specialties, Inc., 112 N.J. Super. 407 (App. Div. 1970); statute imposing the cost of cleaning up an oil spill, Lansco, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Dept., 138 N.J. Super. 275 (Ch. Div. 1975), aff‘d 145 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 1976), certif. den. 73 N.J. 57 (1977), and a municipal ordinance requiring heat in apartments, State v. Elmwood Terrace, Inc., 85 N.J. Super. 240, 246 (App. Div. 1964). In the field of liquor control, a rule which permits proof of a violation by a licensee to be made by showing that an employee committed the prohibited act even if done without the permission or knowledge of the licensee has been held not to deprive the licensee of due process.
Against the background of the cases we have discussed, it clearly aрpears that the regulations are reasonable because of the nature of the subject matter regulated and that their еnforcement does not deprive the licensee of due process. We are not persuaded that the decisions of other courts in other jurisdictions cited to us by appellant and the amicus curiae require a contrary result.
Affirmed.