224 P. 646 | Or. | 1924
The testimony as to Little’s exact status in the company is very contradictory. A written contract between the defendant company and Little was introduced, which upon the face of it shows that he was employed to sell cars upon a commission; the company being under obligation to furnish him with gasoline and such things as he required, but not obligating the company, so far as it appears, to furnish him with a car. The testimony indicates that he was not to receive any compensation excepting on the condition of making a sale. There is further testimony to the effect that the company did not profess to direct his movements while he was
The objection that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law, while plausible, cannot be sustained. Section 19, Chapter 371, of the General Laws of Oregon for 1921, at page 712, contains the following clause:
“ * * No vehicle shall be parked upon the main-traveled portion of the highways of this state; provided, that this shall not apply to any vehicle so disabled as to prohibit the moving of the same.”
We find no definition in the statute of the word “park,” but we take it that it means something more than a mere temporary or momentary stoppage on the road for a necessary purpose. Neither do we understand this statute to require a person to incur any chances of any serious injury by removal of a disabled car; but in such case, if the testimony indicates that such removal would incur danger to the
But there is one proposition that makes it necessary to reverse this case, and that is the fact that the jury, in effect, has found Pridgeon, who was driving the car by permission of Little, not guilty of negligence in crashing into plaintiff’s car, or at least has failed to find on that subject. There could be no negligence except that imputed from the relationship of the parties and, unless Pridgeon was negligent, no negligence could, under any circumstances, be imputed to the defendant company. That is to say, if the collision was without negligence on the part of the driver of the car, it could not be negligence on the part of anyone else. To say that Pridgeon was not negligent is to say that nobody in charge of the car was negligent, because it was his hand steering the car, and whatever injury occurred, if any, for which anybody was liable must have been through his agency; and this is sustained by all of the authori
For this reason the judgment of tbe Circuit Court is reversed and a new trial is directed.
Reversed and Remanded. Rehearing Denied.