39 S.E.2d 665 | Ga. | 1946
1. The act approved March 20, 1943 (Ga. L. 1943, pp. 610-612), amending the "Unemployment Compensation Law," is not unconstitutional as violative of art. 1, sec. 3, par. 2 of the Constitution. Retrospective statutes which confirm existing rights, and are in furtherance of the remedy for enforcing existing obligations, are clearly valid.
2. The evidence demanded the verdict for the plaintiff in execution, and the trial court properly overruled the motion for new trial.
Prior to the amendment above referred to, and under attack here, it was provided by sec. 14 (b) of the "Unemployment Compensation Law" (Code, Ann. Supp., § 54-648) in part as follows: "If, after due notice, any employer defaults in any payment of contributions or interest thereon, the amount shall be collected by civil *310 action in the name of the commissioner, and the employer adjudged in default shall pay the costs of such action." The amendment approved March 20, 1943, deals solely with the method of collection of contributions from employers in default. Section 1 of the amendment (Code, Ann. Supp., § 54-650a) provides in part as follows: "Any contribution in default for thirty days or more may be collected as other delinquent taxes under authority contained in § 92-3306 of the Civil Code of Georgia, and by the Commissioner of Revenue of Georgia." The Code, § 92-3306 provides fully the procedure to be followed in the issuance of tax executions, and that the taxpayer may contest any such execution by filing an affidavit of illegality. It thus appears that the amendment approved March 20, 1943, is purely remedial, that the State acting through its proper officials may follow a procedure for the collection of delinquent contributions from employers different from the one previously followed. It does not appear that such employer is deprived of any right to contest the amount of the tax claimed to be due. His procedure is likewise changed, but he still may urge every valid reason available to show that the tax claimed is not due.
In Searcy v. Stubbs,
In Bullard v. Holman, supra, Chief Justice Russell said that the case of Pritchard v. Savannah Railroad Co., supra, was perhaps the leading case in this State. In the latter, Justice Lumpkin, for the court, quoted from many authorities with approval, notably Rich *311 v. Flanders,
In Bullard v. Holman, supra, Chief Justice Russell stated the rule to be: "Our Constitution forbids the passage of only those retroactive, or rather retrospective, laws which injuriously affect the vested rights of citizens;" and quoted with approval from Danforth v. Groton Water Co.,
2. Error is assigned on the overruling of the motion for new trial. Ground 2 of the amended motion recites necessary facts to show that the verdict returned was directed by the trial court, the assignment of error being: "The court erred in directing the verdict because it was contrary to law and contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it." Such assignment does not raise the question as to whether there were issues of fact which should have been submitted to the jury, and this question is not, therefore, before us for determination. The only testimony in the trial was that of the plaintiff in error. He admitted ownership and operation of the businesses named in the execution. His defense *312 was that he had paid taxes on the business operated as J. F. Darby Lumber Company, and he contended further that he did not have as many as eight employees in any one of the other businesses. This defense was not sufficient under the law. Subsection (f) of sec. 19 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Code, Ann. Supp., § 54-657) provides in part as follows: "`Employing unit' means any individual or type of organization . . which has . . in its employ one or more individuals performing services within it within this State. All individuals performing services within this State for any employing unit, which maintains two or more separate establishments within this State, shall be deemed to be employed by a single employing unit for all the purposes of this act." Applying the above section to the testimony of the plaintiff in error, we find that the evidence not only supports the verdict, but that the evidence and all inferences properly drawn therefrom demanded a verdict for the plaintiff in execution.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.