(After stating the foregoing facts.) The plaintiff in error in his affidavit of illegality, and in the first amended ground of his motion for new trial, attackеd the amendment to the “Unemployment Compensation Law,” approved March 20,1943 (Ga. L. 1943, pp. 610-612), contending that it is in violation of art. 1, sec. 3, par. 2 of the Constitution (Code, Ann. Supp., § 2-302), being retroactive in effect, and the execution issued thereundеr being therefore null and void. '
Prior to the amendment above referred to, and under attack here, it was provided by seс. 14 (b) of the “Unemployment Compensation Law” (Code, Ann. Supp., § 54-648) in part as follows: “If, after due notice, any employer dеfaults in any payment of contributions or interest thereon, the amount shall be collected by civil *310 action in the name оf the commissioner, and' the employer adjudged in default shall pay the costs of such action.” The amendment approved March 20, 1943, deals solely with the method of collection of contributions from employers in default. Section 1 of the amendment (Code, Ann. Supp., § 54-650a) provides in part as follows : “Any contribution in default for thirty days or more may be collected as other delinquent taxes under authority contained in § 92-3306 of the Civil Code of Georgia, and by the Commissioner of Revenue of Georgia.” The Code, § 92-3306 provides fully the procedure to be followed in the issuance of tax executions, and that the taxpayer may contest any such execution by filing an affidavit of illegality. It thus appears that the amendment approved March 20, 1943, is purely remedial, that the State acting through its proper officials may follow a procedure for thе collection of delinquent contributions from employers different from the one previously followed. It does not aрpear that such employer is deprived of any right to contest the amount of the tax claimed to be due. His procedure is likewise changed, but he still may urge every valid reason available to show that the tax claimed is not due.
In
Searcy
v.
Stubbs,
12
Ga.
439, on a likе constitutional question, it was held: “Remedial statutes are not inoperative, although of a retrospective naturе, provided they do not impair contracts,
and only go to confirm rights already existing, and in furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations."
In the present case, the tax had already accrued. Only the means of enforcing payment was changed by the amendment. In
Knight
v.
Lasseter,
16
Ga.
153, it was held: “In such a point of view, and for the purposе of operating on the remedy only, the legislature may, undoubtedly, pass retrospective acts; and for such purpоses they are not unconstitutional.” In this connection see also:
Aycock
v.
Martin,
37
Ga.
177;
Cutts
v.
Hardee,
38
Ga.
350;
Sparger
v.
Cumpton,
54
Ga.
359;
Pritchard
v.
Savannah R. Co.,
87
Ga.
297 (
In Bullard v. Holman, supra, Chief Justice Russell said that the case of Pritchard v. Savannah Railroad Co., supra, was perhaps the leading case in this State. In the latter, Justice Lumpkin, for the court, quoted from many authorities with approval, notably Rich *311 v. Flanders, 39 N H. 304, where it was said: “Any statute which changes or affects the remedy merely, and dоes not destroy or impair vested rights, is not unconstitutional, though it be retrospective, and although in changing or affecting the remedy the rights of parties may be incidentally affected.” From Endlich on Interp. of Stat., § 285, Justice Lumpkin quoted as follows: “A law which mеrely alters the procedure may, with perfect propriety, be made applicable to past as well аs future transactions. . . No person has a vested right in any course of procedure, nor in the power of delaying justicе, nor of deriving benefit from technical and formal matters of pleading.”
In
Bullard
v. Holman, supra, Chief Justice Russell stated the rule to bе: “Our Constitution forbids the passage of only those retroactive, or rather retrospective, laws which injuriously affect the vested rights of citizensand quoted with approval from Danforth
v.
Groton Water Co.,
Error is assigned on the overruling of the motion for new trial. Ground 2 of the amended motion recites necessary facts to show that the verdict returned was directed by the trial court, the assignment of error being: “The court erred in directing the verdict beсause it was contrary to law and contrary to the evidence and without evidence to support it.” Such assignment doеs not raise the question as to whether there were issues of fact which should have been submitted to the jury, and this question is not, therefore, before us for determination. The only testimony in the trial was that of the plaintiff in error. He admitted ownership and operation of the businesses named in the execution. His de *312 fense was that he had paid taxes on the business operatеd as J. F. Darby Lumber Company, and he contended further that he did not have as many as eight employees in any one of the оther businesses. This defense was not sufficient under the law. Subsection (f) of sec. 19 of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Code, Ann. Supp., § 54-657) provides in part as follows: “‘Employing unit’ means any individual or type of organization . . which has . . in its employ one or more individuals performing services for it within this State. All individuals performing services within this State for any employing unit, which maintains two or more sеparate establishments within this State, shall be deemed to be employed by a single employing unit for all' the purposes of this act.” Applying the above section to the testimony of the plaintiff in error, we find that the evidence not only suppоrts the verdict, but that the evidence and all inferences properly drawn therefrom demanded a verdict for the plaintiff in execution.
Judgment affirmed.