18 Conn. App. 40 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1989
The plaintiffs appeal
Sections 90-1 through 90-19 of the Stamford Code of Ordinances provide for a scheme pursuant to which hazardous buildings within the city may be ordered demolished. We summarize the pertinent provisions as follows. A “hazardous building” is defined as “[a]ny building, vacant or occupied . . . which is unsafe, unsanitary or lacks adequate exit facilities, or which constitutes a fire hazard or is otherwise dangerous to human life or public welfare, or which by reason of illegal use, occupancy or maintenance has become hazardous and dangerous.” Stamford Code of Ordinances § 90-1. The defendant board is composed of six members, consisting of two private citizens, the city building official, the fire marshal, the director of health and the municipal engineer, who inspect and determine whether hazardous buildings should be demolished. Stamford Code of Ordinances §§ 90-2, 90-3 and 90-4. Upon such a determination, the board may order a property owner to demolish his building. Stamford Code of Ordinances § 90-6. The property owner may appeal that order to the board and request a hearing. Stamford Code of Ordinances § 90-7. At the hearing, the board must consider all evidence presented to it regarding whether the building is hazardous and should be demolished, and the property owner may submit a
The defendant had issued a preliminary order to the plaintiffs to demolish two tenement buildings owned by them because the buildings, which had been unused since 1976 and had been damaged by fire, were a threat to public health and safety. At a hearing held pursuant to §§ 90-7 and 90-8 of the code and during several weeks of extensions granted by the defendant, the plaintiffs indicated that they were selling the properties to another individual who planned to renovate them, but that the sales contract was conditioned on a variance being obtained from the zoning board of appeals. Although the plaintiffs presented a proposal for better security of the building against access by intruders, they offered no plan for restoration or rehabilitation that did not depend on the zoning variance; nor did the plaintiffs establish that the proposed purchaser had any specific plan for restoration or any specific timetable
The plaintiffs filed this administrative appeal in the Superior Court, claiming that the defendant’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, discriminatory and without right,” that they had not received proper notice, and that the defendant’s decision would remove much needed residential rental property from Stamford’s rental market. The plaintiffs did not specify the jurisdictional basis of their appeal, and neither the defendant nor the trial court questioned whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ appeal. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal on its merits.
The plaintiffs appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court erred (1) by failing to conclude that the defendant denied them due process of law, and (2) by not considering certain facts outside the administrative record. In their brief in this court, the plaintiffs claim that their appeal to the Superior Court was an administrative appeal brought pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183, which is part of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA). When we suggested at oral argument that the UAPA did not apply to the action of the defendant because it is not a state agency, the plaintiffs relied, for the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, on § 90-11 of the Stamford Code which, as noted above, provides for an appeal to the court by any person aggrieved by an order of the defendant. We conclude, however, that neither the UAPA nor § 90-11 of the Stamford Code of Ordinances conferred subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ administrative appeal. We are not aware of any other statutory basis for the appeal, and therefore the appeal should have been dismissed, not on its merits, but for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We turn, therefore, to the question of whether there are any other statutory bases, albeit not suggested by the plaintiffs, for this appeal. We find none.
We have located three statutes that, it might be argued, could serve as such a basis. Analysis of each, however, discloses that it does not pass muster.
General Statutes §§ 29-401 through 29-415 constitute the State Demolition Code. This code regulates, in general, the business of demolishing buildings and the issuing of permits for that purpose. Unlike the Stamford ordinance involved in this case, however, it does not provide for the mandatory demolition of hazardous buildings. General Statutes (Rev. to 1985)§ 29-405, in effect at the time of the administrative proceedings in this case, provided in pertinent part that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any order or decision of an adminis
General Statutes § 29-393 provides, inter alia, that a local building inspector may order the “removal” of any building that “is in such condition as to be a hazard to any person or persons” if such removal “is necessary in the interests of public safety.’’Even if we were to equate the defendant in this case with the Stamford building inspector — an equation of doubtful validity— this section does not apply to this case because General Statutes § 29-393 does not provide for an administrative appeal to the courts from such an order. Rather, General Statutes § 29-394 provides for criminal penalties for any person who fails to comply with such an order.
Finally, General Statutes §§ 29-251 through 29-282 constitute the State Building Code. General Statutes § 29-266 (d) provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any ruling of the codes and standards committee may appeal to the superior court for the judicial district where such building or structure has been or is being erected.” (Emphasis added.) This section does not apply because the defendant is not the codes and standards committee, which is a committee “within the [state] department of public safety”; General Statutes § 29-251; and because the building code concerns, in general, construction or alteration of buildings; see, e.g., General Statutes § 29-263; not their demolition.
There is error in the form of the judgment, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
This opinion replaces our earlier opinion in the same case, Danziger v. Demolition Board, 17 Conn. App. 429 (1989).
Subsequent sections of the Stamford Code of Ordinances provide for a lien in favor of the city for the costs of demolition; § 90-12; for relocation of tenants; § 90.-13; for a declaration that the building is a nuisance and for a civil action to abate such nuisance; § 90-14; for a revolving fund to be used for tenant relocation and for demolition costs; § 90-15; and for a public list of all parties contracting with the city to perform such demolition work. § 90-16.
The plaintiffs’ prayer for relief did request that the trial court enjoin the defendant from demolishing the building and order the defendant to permit them to proceed with their plan for its rehabilitation. This request, however, was simply incidental to their principal claim, which was in essence an appeal from the order of the defendant and a petition to the court to vacate and set aside the order. It is clear, moreover, from the plaintiffs’ complaint in the trial court, from the way the case was tried, and from the way it was briefed and argued in this court, that the plaintiffs’ action was not a plenary action for an injunction but was an administrative appeal. We therefore consider it as such.