163 Pa. 175 | Pa. | 1894
Opinion by
The plaintiff was constituted by an act passed March 27,'
By the twelfth section of the first of these acts it was enacted, “ That the several constituted authorities, having care and charge of the poor in the respective counties, districts and townships of this commonwealth,-shall have authority to send to the asylum such insane paupers under their charge as they may deem -proper subjects ; and they shall be severally chargeable with the expenses of the care and maintenance, and removal to and from the asylum, of such paupers.
■ It cannot be doubted that, under the provisions of this section, it was entirely competent for the overseers of a poor district to send to the asylum such insane paupers under their charge as they might deem proper subjects, and that the district would be responsible for the expenses of the care and maintenance of such paupers. The 13th section of the act provided that if the overseers or directors did not pay the expenses of the care and maintenance of the paupers, the trustees of.the asylum .might recover the same as debts of like nature are collected.
It is contended for the appellee that the fourth section of the act of 1861 gave a different remedy for such care and maintenance, and therefore the remedy given by the twelfth and thirteenth sections of the act of 1845 was no longer in force, and there could be no right of action against the poor district..
The fourth section of the act of 1861 is in these words: “That whenever-an indigent insane person shall hereafter be sent to said hospital, the city or county from which he or she was sent shall be liable to the trustees of the hospital for his or. her maintenance, and shall have remedy over against the proper township, where by existing laws the township is liable for the support oE such pauper, and the overseers of the poor of such township shall'have remedy over against the property of the pauper, or against any relative required by law to main
It is argued for the appellant that this remedy is exclusive and no other remedy can be pursued. We cannot assent to this contention, for several reasons. It will be observed that the same act of 1873, which gives the remedy against the poor district by the twelfth section of the act of 1845, creates also a liability on the part of the city or county from which the pauper was sent. It cannot be said therefore that the legislature intended to give two inconsistent remedies by one and the same act, and that one of the said' remedies being given operates as -a repeal .of the other. While it is true the act of 1861 was passed after the act of 1845, neither of them was applicable to this plaintiff except by the act of 1873, and by that act both remedies were given at the same instant, and by the same legislative breath. "So far as this plaintiff is concerned it never had either remedy prior to the passage of the act of 1873 and it acquired them both at the same' moment. It is impossible to say therefore that either one was intended to be repealed or substituted by the other. The consequence is that we must conclude that it was the legislative intent to confer both remedies at the same moment and by the same enactment, and that they should be regarded as concurrent and cumulative and not as conflicting, or the one as exclusive of the other.
That this is the proper construction of the act of. 1873 is manifest from other considerations. It will be observed that the fourth section of the act of 1861 merely providés that the city or county shall be liable to the trustees of the hospital, but immediatel3r adds that the city or county shall have remedy over against the township. ' It is certain therefore that it was not intended to take away the liability of the township, and to substitute that of the city or county,, because it is especially provided that.the liabihiy of the township shall remain, and may be enforced by the city or county. The legal effect of this is that there is no ultimate liability of the city or county, but only of the township. The whole effect of .the legislation therefore is, that, so far as the trustees of the asylum are concerned, they have a remedy against the city or county, as well as against the township. The township is liable in any event, for the city or county, paying the asylum’s claim for care and
The cases of Danville, etc., Poor District v. Montour, 75 Pa. 35, and Wimer v. The Overseers of North Twp., 104 Pa. 817, are cited as in hostility with the foregoing principles, but it is a mistake; they do not contain any such doctrine. No such question was raised in either of them. The first of these cases arose under other provisions of the acts of 1845 and 1861, regarding the commitment of persons found to be insane, upon trials in the criminal courts, as to whom there is only the special remedy provided by the acts, which of course must be strictly followed. The second case aróse upon a contract made by the overseers with another person, who agreed to pay a specific sum for the support of a pauper, and who actually did pay all the expenses, but the overseers sought to compel him to pay the whole amount of the contract, which was in excess of the amount actually required, and this court held that the contract was ultra vires as to. the excess, and could not be enforced.
The case was decided by the learned court below upon the ground that it was not affirmative^ proved that the insane paupers in question were under the charge of the overseers by virtue of an order of relief, or a subsequent order of approval,
The direct question does not appear to have been before this court heretofore, but we think there is a manifest difference between the cases cited by the learned judge of the common pleas in his opinion, and this case. Those decisions were all instances in which there was no action, official or otherwise, by the overseers, but were claims by individuals for services rendered, or necessaries furnished, without any action by the overseers and without any previous order of relief, In some of them the pauper died before any order of approval was obtained, and yet the district was held liable, as in Directors of the Poor v. Wallace, 8 W. & S. 94, where we held that the directors were liable to pay the funeral expenses of the pauper, though no order of relief was issued, and only a certificate by two magistrates was granted after the death of the pauper stating his destitute condition and approving the plaintiff’s expenditure.
In Poor Directors v. Worthington, 88 Pa. 160, the claim was by a physician for services in amputating the arm of a person who was injured in a railroad accident. He was held entitled to recover, upon proving that he was a poor person, 'though he never was in charge of the overseers, no order of relief had been obtained, and no order of approval was granted until more than two years after the accident. In these and similar cases the liability of the district was placed upon the ground of emergency, and also upon the general ground that the district is subject to a legal duty to provide for the care and maintenance of its poor persons and for the payment of .their funeral expenses.
In Com’th v. Slifer, supra, Lewis, C. J., said: “ But the acts of public officers, where the rights of the public require it, should be construed with liberality. There is always a pre- . sumption that they are in accordance with the law. The presumption can be repelled only by clear evidence of illegality. ” But here there was no illegality as between the defendant poor district and the plaintiff insane hospital. As to. the plaintiff the overseers of the district had the lawful right to place with the plaintiff such insane paupers as they might deem proper subjects. In the exercise of that right the .overseers placed these three insane paupers in charge of the plaintiff, and in at least two of the cases they gave bonds for the payment of specific weekly sums for their maintenance and support. There was no serious question on the trial as to the fact of insanity, or the fact of pauperism, and no question whatever as to the correctness of the amount claimed. The verdict of the jury must be taken to have settled the facts of poverty and insanity, and the only question reserved by the court below was as to the necessity of there being proof in the case of an order of relief or an order of approval. But that question could af- ■ feet only the regularity of the preliminary proceedings, and we are of opinion that as against this plaintiff, the district was bound by the act of its overseers, and cannot now, after having received all the benefit of the relief and support furnished
The judgment of the court below is reversed and judgment is now entered on the verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of eight hundred and forty-three y8^ dollars as of December 9, 1898, with costs. '