In this habeas corpus case, the evidence presented against petitioner at his state trial for first degree murder shows that he participated in the murder of an individual who had been strangled to death, weighted with cement blocks and thrown into a lake. The Respondent Warden appeals from the District Court’s judgment granting the writ. The District Court held — we believe, incorrectly — that the state trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included homicide offense in addition to first degree murder violated defendant’s constitutional right to due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Hopper v. Evans,
We do not find evidence in the record below which “warrants” an instruction on a lesser offense. The evidence supports the conviction of the petitioner for first degree murder and does not support the commission of the crime with less culpable intent or diminished capacity.
Hopper v. Evans,
Petitioner also makes an additional argument that the Michigan Supreme Court’s failure to apply the rule of
People v. Jones,
We thus conclude that neither due process nor equal protection requires an instruction on a lesser included offense in a *969 ease — such as the instant one — where the evidence so clearly demonstrates that the petitioner is guilty of first degree murder, that is, murder with premeditation and deliberation. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court. 1
Notes
. On respondent’s argument that we need not reach the merits because of the petitioner’s failure to exhaust, we agree with petitioner that it is now futile for petitioner to return to the state courts which have indicated that they will not consider further petitions for post-conviction relief based on issues which could have been but were not raised in post-conviction actions.
See Keener v. Ridenour,
Respondent also argues that neither the District Court nor this Court should hear the claim on the merits because an adequate and independent state ground exists: namely, that the Michigan Supreme Court’s refusal to apply retroactively to petitioner's case the rule in
People v. Jones,
