William DANSON and Edith, his wife, Stanford Martin, Sr., and Susie, his wife, Samuel Williams and Janice, his wife, Hirsh Segal and Ruth, his wife, Lloyd Westfield and Nancy, his wife, Cruz Quinones and Maria, his wife, and School District of Philadelphia, Appellants, v. Robert E. CASEY, State Treasurer, and Caryl M. Kline, Secretary of Education.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
March 14, 1979
Rehearing Denied April 13, 1979
399 A.2d 360 | 484 Pa. 415
Argued May 23, 1978.
ROBERTS and NIX, JJ., concur concluding that there were no exigent circumstances to permit a warrantless arrest of the suspect in her home.
LARSEN, J., dissents concluding that probable cause existed for the arrest.
Allen C. Warshaw, Deputy Atty. Gen., Harrisburg, for appellees.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROBERTS, Justice.
Appellants allege that because the Philadelphia School District has and can expect to have inadequate revenues, the statutory system by which the School District of Philadelphia is funded violates Article III, section 321 and Article
Appellants seek a decree enjoining and restraining appellees, the State Treasurer and State Secretary of Education, from making payments of state funds to any school district other than Philadelphia until (a) “sufficient funds are made available to the School District of Philadelphia to enable it to furnish the children of Philadelphia in the 1977-78 school year and thereafter with a normal program of full educational services, or (b) the funds subject to defendants’ disposition are so distributed that the programs of educational services furnished the children of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in the 1977-78 school year and thereafter are substantially uniform throughout all the school districts of the state.”3
In reviewing Commonwealth Court‘s determination we must accept as true every well and clearly pleaded fact and all reasonable inferences therefrom. Gekas v. Shapp, 469 Pa. 1, 364 A.2d 691 (1976); Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 457 Pa. 135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974). We need not accept as true, however, the conclusions drawn from those facts or the averments of law contained in the pleadings. Borden v. Baldwin, 444 Pa. 577, 281 A.2d 892 (1971). When viewed in this light it is clear that appellants have failed to state a justiciable cause of action. We therefore affirm the decree of Commonwealth Court dismissing the action.4
I
Appellants’ constitutional challenge to the state financing system is broad and general. They do not purport to challenge any particular portion of either the state subsidy or local taxation aspects of the scheme. Instead, appellants’ basic constitutional claim is that, viewed as a whole, the Pennsylvania system of school financing fails to provide Philadelphia‘s public school children with a thorough and efficient education and denies them equal educational opportunity solely because of their residence in the School District of Philadelphia.
The statutory scheme by which Pennsylvania‘s public schools are financed creates two primary sources of fund4ing—state subsidies and local taxation.5 State subsidies are
For each child enrolled in school, districts are eligible to receive a percentage of the median statewide actual instructional expense per student.6 This percentage is computed by dividing the market value of the district‘s real estate and its personal income tax bases by the number of the district‘s students and comparing it to the state average real estate and income tax bases per student.7 If the district and state tax base are equal, the district receives fifty percent of actual or median student cost, whichever is lower.8 If the district‘s tax base is higher than the average state tax base, state support is lower.
This basic instructional subsidy is supplemented by dollar payments for each poverty-level or welfare student. “Density” and “sparsity” payments are made to districts with certain levels of either high or low population per square mile. In addition to the instructional subsidy, each school district also receives state funds earmarked to help defray the cost of specific services incidental to instruction such as, inter alia, health care, transportation, drivers education, and technical and special education.
Local tax revenues, however, are the major source of school financing in Pennsylvania. Generally, the power to
Philadelphia is Pennsylvania‘s only school district of the first class. See
The Educational Supplement to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter grants the Board of Education indirect power to levy local taxes to provide funds for current operation of the Philadelphia public schools. “At least sixty (60) days prior to adoption of the annual operating budget, the Board shall adopt and submit to the Mayor and Council a lump sum statement of anticipated receipts and expenditures for the next fiscal year and a request for authority to levy taxes to
By statute, City Council is empowered to authorize the School Board to levy taxes sufficient to balance the school district‘s annual operating budget on “any persons, transactions, occupations, privileges, subjects, and real and personal property” which are taxable by the city.
II
Appellees, the State Treasurer and State Secretary of Education, have not breached any duty owed to any of the appellants. They have distributed those state funds earmarked for public education pursuant to the legislatively enacted formula. Nonetheless, appellants claim the state statutory formula is unconstitutional and that appellees
It is obvious, however, that appellant School District of Philadelphia has failed to allege that it has suffered any legal harm from its projected financial deficit. The School District argues that it has a duty to provide a certain level of educational services which it cannot fulfill because of the effect of the statutory funding scheme. This argument must fail. The School District has no greater duty to provide education for the children of Philadelphia than the Legislature has delegated to it. Cf. Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, supra. It would be unreasonable to conclude that a greater duty has been delegated than that which the Legislature, through the statutory funding scheme, has provided the school district the means to fulfill.
Moreover, the Amended Petition for Review does not allege that either the Legislature or School District has failed to fulfill any duty to appellant parents and school children. Nowhere do appellants allege that any Philadelphia public school student is, has, or will, suffer any legal injury as a result of the operation of the state financing scheme. And the Amended Petition for Review does not allege that the children of Philadelphia are being denied an “adequate,” “minimum,” or “basic” education. Rather, appellants only allege that they are being denied a “normal program of educational services” available to all other children in Pennsylvania and that in its place they will be offered only a “truncated and uniquely limited program of educational services.” As a result the children of Philadelphia are allegedly “rendered less able to make their contribution to their own well-being and prosperity and to the well-being and prosperity of their city.”10
The allegations are insufficient to support a cause of action unless appellant school children are entitled to “a
More than forty years ago, this Court recognized that because educational philosophy and needs change constantly, the words “thorough and efficient” must not be narrowly construed. In Teachers’ Tenure Act Cases, 329 Pa. 213, 224, 197 A. 344, 352 (1938), this Court characterized Article III, section 14 as a “positive mandate” that the Legislature “provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools.” The Court then explained the substance and effect of the Constitutional “mandate“:
“In considering laws relating to the public school system, courts will not inquire into the reason, wisdom, or expediency of the legislative policy with regard to education, but whether the legislation has a reasonable relation to the purpose expressed in Article X, Section 1 [the predecessor provision to Article III, section 14], and whether the fruits or effects of such legislation impinge the Article by circumscribing it, or abridging its exercise by future legislatures within the field of ‘a thorough and efficient system of public schools.’ So implanted is this section of the Constitution in the life of the people as to make it impossible for a legislature to set up an educational policy which future legislatures cannot change. The very essence of this section is to enable successive legislatures to adopt a changing program to keep abreast of educational advances. The people have directed that the cause of public education cannot be fettered, but must evolute or retrograde with succeeding generations as the times prescribe. Therefore, all matters, whether they be contracts bearing upon education, or legislative determinations of school policy or the scope of educational activity, everything directly related to the maintenance of a ‘thorough and efficient system of public schools,’ must at all times be subject to future legislative control. One legislature cannot bind the hands of a subsequent one; otherwise we will not have a thorough and efficient system of public schools.”
329 Pa. at 224-25, 197 A. at 352.
The Constitution “makes it impossible for a legislature to set up an educational policy which future legislatures cannot change” because “the very essence of this section is to enable successive legislatures to adopt a changing program to keep abreast of educational advances.” It would be no less contrary to the “essence” of the Constitutional provision for this Court to bind future Legislatures and school boards to a present judicial view of a constitutionally required “normal” program of educational services. It is only through free experimentation that the best possible educational services can be achieved.
Nonetheless, appellants argue that it is proper for courts to order that educational offerings be uniform. Indeed, they claim that the Pennsylvania Constitution demands such uniformity. In originally adopting the “thorough and efficient” amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1873, the framers considered and rejected the possibility of specifically requiring the Commonwealth‘s system of education be uniform. II Debates of the Convention to Amend the Constitution of Pennsylvania, 422-26 (1873). Instead, the framers endorsed the concept of local control to meet diverse local needs and took notice of the right of local communities to utilize local tax revenues to expand educational programs subsidized by the state.
Nor is uniformity required by Article III, section 14. As long as the legislative scheme for financing public education “has a reasonable relation” to “[providing] for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public schools,” Teachers Tenure Act Cases, 329 Pa. at 224, 197 A. at 352, the General Assembly has fulfilled its constitutional duty to the public school students of Philadelphia. The Legislature has enacted a financing scheme reasonably related to maintenance and support of a system of public education in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The framework is neutral with regard to the School District
III
Thus, the Commonwealth has not failed to fulfill any duty it may have to the School District of Philadelphia to provide state subsidies to help finance public school education. To the extent appellants complain of inadequate local revenues, appellees, the State Treasurer and State Secretary of Education, cannot provide relief. Those two named officials of the executive branch of state government lack constitutional, statutory, or administrative authority to increase local Philadelphia school revenues.
We must reject any contention that because the Philadelphia School Board does not have power directly to levy taxes, Article III, section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution has been violated. Commonwealth v. Gilligan, 195 Pa. 504, 46 A. 124 (1900). See also English v. Robinson Twp. Sch. Dist., 358 Pa. 45, 53-54, 55 A.2d 803, 808 (1947) (“The school boards of districts of the same class may tax at different rates without infringing the provision against local or special legislation“). Indeed, Philadelphia arguably benefits from the operation of the school financing scheme for more sources of taxation are made available to Philadelphia than to any other category of school district. See, e. g.,
Decree of the Commonwealth Court affirmed. Each party pay own costs.
POMEROY, former J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which NIX, J., joins.
MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting.
Unfortunately, the majority has failed to grasp the significance and meaning of appellant‘s position in this appeal. As a result, the majority addresses itself to issues that are not even raised by appellants, denies relief as to claims that appellants do not make, applies the wrong constitutional analysis, and reaches the wrong result. I therefore dissent.
Initially, the majority accurately identifies the problem presented by appellants:
“. . . appellants’ basic constitutional claim is that, viewed as a whole, the Pennsylvania system of school financing fails to provide Philadelphia‘s public school children with a thorough and efficient education and denies them equal educational opportunity solely because of their residence in the School District of Philadelphia.” (Emphasis added.)
At p. 363.
Clearly, appellants’ attack is upon the statutory scheme of school financing, and not upon the actions taken by appellees pursuant to that scheme. The majority‘s assertion that “[a]ppellees . . . have not breached any duty owed to any of the appellants” (p. 365) is therefore irrelevant.
This appeal comes before us on the pleadings, hence we accept as true every well-pleaded material fact set forth in appellants’ complaint, as well as all reasonable inferences deducible from those facts. Gekas v. Shapp, 469 Pa. 1, 5, 364 A.2d 691, 693 (1976); Buchanan v. Brentwood Federal Savings and Loan Assn., supra.
Pennsylvania, like many other states, has enacted a statutory system of public school financing whereby the two primary sources of funds for public schools are local taxation and state subsidy. The state subsidy payable to each school district is computed by means of a complex formula in which student enrollment, district spending per student, and the district‘s relative wealth are taken into account. Like every other school district in the state, Philadelphia receives state funds which pay part of the cost of the public school program. Appellants do not challenge the state subsidy portion of the financing system, nor do they claim that the subsidy formula is insufficient to compensate for imbalances in local tax bases, or that Philadelphia is discriminated against in any way in the implementation of the subsidy program. Indeed, nowhere do appellants allege that the subsidy portion of the system provides less money for education in Philadelphia, either in total or per child, than any other district in the Commonwealth. Rather, appellants’
Under Pennsylvania‘s education financing system, the Philadelphia School District is unique in that it alone among all the school districts in the Commonwealth is denied independent power to levy and collect the local taxes necessary to insure that its children receive a thorough education. Only the Philadelphia School District needs to have specific enabling ordinances passed by the municipal governing body, Philadelphia City Council, before it can levy and collect the local taxes its School District considers necessary to provide a minimum level of education. Unlike other school districts in the state, if the total amount of the state subsidy, plus the local taxation, is not sufficient to provide a full educational program, the Philadelphia School District is without a statutory mechanism for raising the additional needed funds, on its own. It needs the approval of another body. No other school district in the state is thus handicapped.
Thus appellants’ amended complaint sought to present two narrowly-stated causes of action: first, it alleged that the statutory classification which distinguishes between the Philadelphia School District and all other state school districts by preventing the Philadelphia School District from levying taxes it considers necessary to finance public education in Philadelphia violates the equal protection clause, Article III, Section 32, of the Pennsylvania Constitution; and second, that the Philadelphia School District‘s unique inability to levy taxes deprives Philadelphia School District of the same opportunity to determine locally what funds are necessary to provide a “thorough and efficient” education for Philadelphia school children as is enjoyed by other school districts throughout the state, in violation of Article III, Section 14.
Appellants’ complaint does not ask this court to define “the specific components of a ‘thorough and efficient education‘” as contended by the majority (p. 366), nor does it ask
School districts, like municipal corporations, have no inherent power to tax. Such power can be delegated by the General Assembly, however, and section 507 of the Public School Code,
The Philadelphia School District‘s taxing ability emanates from section 17 of the First Class City Home Rule Act (
We do not know from the pleadings in this case why Philadelphia City Council will not, or cannot, levy the taxes needed to generate sufficient funds to satisfy appellants’ alleged needs. The pleadings allege that Philadelphia City Council has not provided the funds considered necessary by the School District, and that the School District has exhausted its power to levy additional taxes of any kind.
Based on these alleged facts, appellants assert that Pennsylvania‘s statutorily prescribed system of school financing—containing, as it does, both state subsidy and local taxation elements—fails to comply with the mandate of Article III, § 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and that that system of financing public education denied Philadelphia children equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and under Article III, Section 32 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
The content of the Equal Protection Clause of the Federal Constitution, and of Article III, Section 32 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, have been said to be the same, and the tasks of the court, when asked to rule on the constitutionality of a statute challenged under either clause are identical. Baltimore and O. R. Co. v. Department of Labor and Industry, 461 Pa. 68, 334 A.2d 636 (1975). Normally, legislative enactments are presumed valid, and will be declared unconstitutional by the courts only upon a showing that they clearly violate constitutional prohibitions. School Districts of Deer Lakes and Allegheny Valley v. Kane, 463 Pa. 554,
“[The Court] must decide, first, whether the Texas system of financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. If so, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id.
In upholding the educational financing system used by the state of Texas, the United States Supreme Court, in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, said,
“. . . the key to discovering whether education is ‘fundamental’ is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942).
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.” (Footnotes omitted.)
411 U.S. at 33-34, 93 S.Ct. at 1297, 36 L.Ed.2d at 43-44.
Implicit in this conclusion is its converse—that had the right to a public education been afforded explicit or implicit
“[S]trict scrutiny means that the State‘s system is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a ‘heavy burden of justification,’ that the State must demonstrate that its educational system has been structured with ‘precision,’ and is ‘tailored’ narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected the ‘less drastic means’ for effectuating its objectives, . . .” (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 16-17, 93 S.Ct. at 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d at 33.
The Pennsylvania system of financing public education impinges upon Philadelphia‘s children‘s constitutionally mandated right to a “thorough” public education, a right explicitly recognized and protected by
As has already been pointed out,
“The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth.”
As has also been noted earlier in this opinion, the analysis to be applied to an alleged violation of the equal protection
The order of the Commonwealth Court, affirming the trial court‘s dismissal of appellants’ complaint, should be vacated, and the matter should be remanded for further proceedings.
NIX, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.