Danovitz v. PortnoyDanovitz v. Portnoy
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Jones
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Benjamin R. Jones,On October 13, 1959 Anna Danovitz, through her counsel, petitioned Court of Common Pleas No. 1 of Philadelphia County for leave to enter a judgment in the amount of $10,000, with interest, against A. Portnoy, her brother, upon a judgment note admittedly executed by Portnoy which contained a warrant of attorney authorizing confession of judgment. Although undated, the note was executed in May, 1931, approximately 28 years prior to the presentation of this petition. Attached to the petition, in addition to the note, was an affidavit by Mrs. Danovitz that Portnoy had executed the note, that, notwithstanding previous demands, no part of the note had been paid, that the note was in default and that the entire balance, with interest, was due.
Portnoy’s contentions are three-fold: (1) that Mrs. Danovitz is guilty of laches and her right to enter judgment is barred by her unexplained failure to proceed upon the note during the twenty-eight year period; (2) that Mrs. Danovitz failed to sustain her burden of proof to overcome the presumption that this note containing a warrant of attorney more than twenty years old has been paid; (3) that the court below was unwarranted in finding that the testimony of one party was worthy of belief, despite its contradiction by the testimony of the other party, when such testimony was taken by depositions outside the presence of the hearing judge.
The defense of laches — an affirmative defense — was not raised in the pleadings nor at any time in the court below. Laches, not having been raised in the court below, cannot now be considered by this Court. In Gross v. Belmont Laboratories, Inc., 308 Pa. 358, 162 A. 818, we stated: “if appellant had any confidence in it [that is the contention as to laches], he should have raised it in the court below so that both sides might have presented such evidence as was then available on the subject.” See also: Kweller, to use v. Becker, 338 Pa. 169, 172, 12 A. 2d 567; Coral Gables v. Jones, 323 Pa. 425, 187 A. 434; Maguire v. Wheeler, 317 Pa. 193, 176 A. 441.
Judge Hagan of the court below stated: “On the basis of the above quoted language it is clear that if plaintiff made out a prima facie case of a demand of payment by the plaintiff and an acknowledgment of the debt by defendant, plaintiff was entitled to have her
“Again, at page 28 of tbe notes of testimony, plaintiff was asked: ‘Q. When was tbe last time, prior to tbe start of this suit, that you demanded payment of that $10,000 from your brother, Abe? A. I have been asking him all tbe time, but be never made any effort to pay. I figured I would wait a while because be gave me tbe other money, and I figured I would wait. Q. When did you last ask him before this suit began? A. I have been asking him a long time. I don’t know what you mean. Q. You mean that since 1931, at tbe •time you delivered this money to your brother, from then up to tbe present time, you have been asking him all along for this money? A. Yes, be made promises and promises, but be never kept bis promises and so I started this suit.’
“Since plaintiff in her own case made out a prima facie case sufficient to rebut tbe presumption of payment, she was entitled to have her rule made absolute and it is not necessary to examine defendant’s testimony. When we do so, however, we find that defendant’s testimony was quite confused and confusing. Defendant appeared at times to be contending that be received no consideration for tbe note in question. At other points in bis testimony defendant appeared to be relying upon a compromise settlement of all of plaintiff’s claims against him, including tbe claim upon
“From a review of the testimony of both parties, we think it clear that plaintiff made out a prima facie case of non-payment sufficient to rebut the presumption of payment, that any substantial dispute as to payment should be determined upon a rule to open the judgment, and that plaintiff’s rule for leave to enter judgment was properly made absolute.”
Our own independent review of the testimony taken by way of depositions makes evident that Mrs. Danovitz did make out a prima facie case of non-payment sufficient in quantity and quality to rebut the presumption of payment and to justify the grant of leave by the court to enter a judgment upon this note.
Lastly, while it is true that Judge Hagan neither saw nor heard the witnesses who testified upon depositions, it was clearly within his authority to pass upon such testimony. Appellant urges
Gaston Estate,
361 Pa. 105, 112, 62 A. 2d 904 dictates an opposite conclusion. In
Gaston
we said: “We said in Kirshon et ux. v. Friedman, 349 Pa. 171, 181, 36 A. 2d 647: ‘It is an elementary principle that in considering the credibility of witnesses, their manner of testifying, their apparent candor, intelligence, personal interest and bias or lack of it, are to be considered in determining what weight
Our ruling does not determine the essential validity of this judgment. Portnoy will have the opportunity upon a rule to open judgment, if he so chooses, to have the validity of the judgment, the fact of its payment -or non-payment, etc., established. Mrs. Danovitz, by her testimony, has satisfied the requirement of Rule 907 under which this proceeding was instituted.
Judgment affirmed.