These are two petitions for payment of deposits standing in the name of the judge of probate, in the first case for the benefit of Elizabeth Danilovich and in the second case for the benefit of “Cristina” Danilovich. The cases come before us on the appeal in each case from the decree entered by the judge dismissing the petition.
At the request of the appellants the judge made a report of material facts as follows: “On December 15, 1939, War-vara Revnoff and Annie Usinsky both of Stoughton in our county of Norfolk were appointed administrators of the estate of their deceased brother, Simon Danilovich, who
In the power of attorney in question the petitioners recited in substance that they were residing at the village of “Pod-beréshty,” and that they were sisters of Simon Danilovich and entitled to a distributive share of his estate “from the . . . administrator of . . . [his] estate ... or from any other person . . . The power of attorney was executed
General Laws (Ter. Ed.) c. 206, § 27, provides as follows: “If an executor, administrator, guardian, conservator or trustee has money which he considers it advisable to deposit in a savings bank in the name of the judge of probate for the benefit of any person, he may apply to the probate court by which he was appointed for leave so to do, and the court may in its discretion, without notice, direct such money to be so deposited. When the deposit is made the deposit book of the bank shall be filed in said court. When the person entitled to such money satisfies the court of his right to receive it, the court shall by decree direct it to be transferred to him.” The only question, therefore, is whether on the facts found by the judge the relief sought must be granted.. Since the evidence before the judge was wholly documentary, we may reach our own conclusion as to this issue unaffected by the conclusion of the probate judge. However, we arrive at the same conclusion as that reached by him. The recitals in the power of attorney and in the petitions before us are but self-serving statements which, without more, do not entitle the petitioners to the relief presently sought. Although the intestate Simon was a
There is nothing in the record to sustain the assertions of the substitute attorney in fact in his brief that the judge "seems to take the position that the petitioners can never become entitled to receive their deposits, because they live in the Soviet Union.” Nor is there any merit in his contention that the judge was bound to be satisfied by the recitals in the power of attorney without more. The petitioners, of course, upon sufficient proof of their identity as the persons for whose benefit the deposits were made, would become entitled to the relief they now seek, but not otherwise. This being so, we think that the decree entered by the judge in each case should be modified by inserting after the word "dismissed” in the last line of the decree the following: "but without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to satisfy the court by additional evidence in any subsequent petition she may bring for the payment of the deposit that she is the person entitled thereto.” As so modified the decree entered by the judge in each case is
Affirmed.