Danilo Augusto Feliciano v. Susan Hutson, in Her Official Capacity as Orleans Parish Sheriff and Nancy Ruth Landry, in Her Official Capacity as Louisiana Secretary of State
2025-CA-0335
La. Ct. App.Jun 4, 2025Check Treatment RECORRECTED COPY
DANILO AUGUSTO * NO. 2025-CA-0335
FELICIANO
* COURT OF APPEAL
VERSUS
* FOURTH CIRCUIT
SUSAN HUTSON, IN HER
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS * STATE OF LOUISIANA
ORLEANS PARISH SHERIFF
AND NANCY RUTH LANDRY, *
IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS LOUISIANA SECRETARY *
OF STATE *******
JCL LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the district
court’s dismissal of this election contest.
In Sens v. Plaisance, 365 So.3d 17 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2020), and Plaquemines
Parish Council v. Petrovich, 662 So.2d 542 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1995), we reaffirmed
that election statutes are to be construed strictly and the procedure expedited.
While the majority draws analogical support from Brooks v. Tradesmen Intern.,
Inc., 03-1871 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/04), 883 So.2d 444, that case is procedurally and
legally distinguishable. Brooks involved the discretionary application of La. C.C.P.
art. 1672(A) in a general civil context and not an election contest governed by a
rigid statutory scheme. The court in Brooks was not constrained by La. R.S.
18:1409, which expressly bars rehearing or reconsideration under subsection (I).
To adopt such reasoning would risk undermining the finality and uniformity that
the election code seeks to preserve.
Nevertheless, I must also acknowledge a concern that implicates the risk of
both procedural fairness and access to justice. The record in this case does not
reveal a willful failure to appear, nor a disregard for process. Instead, it reflects
documented procedural confusion, stemming from a pro se litigant’s efforts or the
difficulties posed by navigating an accelerated and complex legal process without
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counsel. The absence of a statutory mechanism for rehearing under La. R.S.
18:1409(I) leaves little room for correction once judgment is entered. As such,
despite the equitable concerns, I must conclude that the law compels us to affirm
the district court’s dismissal.
I therefore dissent from the majority’s reversal of the district court’s ruling
and would affirm the dismissal of the election contest.
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