7 Minn. 374 | Minn. | 1862
By the Court
A number of notes and chattel mortgages, and a suit with matters involved therein pending in the United States District Court, were submitted to the arbitrators selected by the parties, for their final determination thereon. The arbitrators made and filed their award. The Plaintiff in Error moved to vacate and set aside the award, upon certain grounds specified in the notice of motion. The motion was overruled, and judgment was entered in the District Court upon the award, and in pursuance of the terms thereof, in favor of Willis. Daniels thereupon sued out a writ oí error.
1st. That the arbitrators exceeded their powers.
2d. That the arbitrators so imperfectly executed their powers as arbitrators, that a mutual, final and definite award on the subject matters submitted was not made.
The arbitrators determined that "Willis was entitled to the possession of certain personal property described in the chattel mortgages, which formed a part of the subject of the submission, and also awarded that the same -.be sold at public auction, and the proceeds be applied toward paying the expense of keeping the same, the expenses of the arbitration, and the balance apply toward the liquidation of the amount found due from Daniels to Willis. It is claimed that the arbitrators had no authority to order such sale, and appropriate the proceeds.
The provision on this behalf in the submission papers, is as follows, viz: ■
“And it is hereby further agreed by and between the parties hereto, that the-property taken by the United States Marshal, or any of his deputies or agents, or by the said Plaintiff or any of his agents, either by virtue of the said writ of replevin, or in any other manner, or upon any other process or upon any pretension whatever, shall be and remain in the hands of W. B. Gere, the said United States Marshal, subject to all the rights of either party in said action, and subject to the award of said arbitrators, the same as though the rights of said parties herein were determined by said Court, with the exception only, that in no case either party shall have the possession of said property, except by the award of said arbitrators.”
It appears from this that the property was to remain in the hands of the Marshal, subject to all the rights of either party in said action, and subject to the awards the same as though the rights of said parties herein were determined by said Court. ' If the finding of the Court had been that Willis was entitled to the possession of the property, a sale, perhaps, could not properly have been ordered. But "Willis would I have been the only party entitled to object to the same. It
Upon the second ground of objection it is urged, that the arbitrators made no award whatever in relation to the replevin suit pending in the United States District Court, or the matters involved therein. It would be a sufficient answer to this objection, that this Court has no proper means of judging whether this specification is well founded or not, since tlio pleadings in that action are not before the Court, and it can at best only surmise what the issue or some part of the issue in that action was. So far, however, as the papers in this suit do throw any light on the subject, the objection appears to be without foundation. It may be inferred that the action, of replevin was brought to recover possession, of the property, or some of it, described in the chattel mortgages, which formed a part of the subject of submission. With reference to this property, the arbitrators have awarded that Willis was entitled to possession of a part, and in regard to another part, that. neither party were entitled to possession. They have thus considered the matter, and made an award upon it, and
It is further objected that the arbitrators made no award whatever as to the two thousand dollar note made by Freeborn, Moss and Daniels, dated October 3,1866.
In regard to this note, the statement of the award is as follows, viz:
“That the title to the promissory note of $2,000, dated October 3d, 1856, made by ¥m. Freeborn, H. L. Moss, and Joseph Daniels, payable one year from date, being the note first mentioned and described in said articles of agreement and submission, has not been sufficiently proven to b.e in the said Ira "Willis, and all questions arising upon said note have not been passed upon by us.”
It appears from the above that the arbitrators did take the note into consideration, and heard some evidence in regard to the same, sufficient, at least, to determine that Willis (who probably claimed to be the owner) had not proved title in himself. They further say that all questions arising upon said note have not been passed upon by them. What these questions were does not appear, nor whether the Plaintiff in Error had any interest in their determination. The arbitrators did certainly act upon and consider the note, and, so far as this Court can judge, sufficiently to release Daniels from any obligation to Willis thereupon. ■ It does not appear that it would have been competent or pertinent for the arbitrators to have gone farther and decided in whom the title of the note was, as none but the parties to the arbitration could be bound by the award. Nor, even were it competent for the arbitrators to decide such question, does it appear there was any evidence before them upon which they could properly act. There is no error apparent in this specification upon which the award should be set aside.
It is further objected, that the arbitrators made no award whatever as between these parties, as to the promissory note and chattel mortgage made by Ara Barton, bearing date February 21,1860.
It appears from the submission papers that three other persons besides Willis and Daniels, viz: Grant, Barton, and Wheat, joined in the submission, and agreed that their inter-ésts should be subject to and determined by the decision of the arbitrators between the principal parties. What their interests were does not appear, nor is it material to the determination of this question. It is sufficient here to say, that it does appear from the award that the arbitrators fully considered the note in question, decided in whom was the title, as well as other questions pertaining to the note and mortgage, and no error is shown in their decision in regard thereto. It does not indeed appear that the Plaintiff in Error was in any way connected with this note and mortgage, save as it is mentioned in the submission between him and Willis, and he shows no prejudice whatever resulting from the decision of the arbitrators upon the note.
The arbitrators farther decided that two gray colts, which were in the hands of the United States Marshal, were not included or embraced in any or either of the chattel mortgages given by said Daniels to Linus Porter in said article of agreement specified, and that neither the said Willis nor the said Daniels, have a right to the possession of the same. It is claimed that this finding is erroneous, and that under the articles oí submission, title should have been found iu the one party or the other. We fail to discover anything in the terms of the submission papers justifying such a construction. The parties agree to submit “ all demands, rights and equities growing out of a suit, &c., as well as the notes and chattel mortgages hereinafter specified,” and also agree “ that in no case either party shall have the possession of said property,”
We are thus led to the conclusion that the specifications of error upon the second ground, upon which the motion to set aside the award was made, are not well taken in fact. But if it were admitted that the arbitrators had neglected or refused to pass upon any of the matters specified, the Plaintiff1 in Error would still have failed to make a case entitling him to have the award set aside, under the principle laid down in the TtJo of Cranch,, above cited. He shows no injury or prejudice which he has suffered from the alleged failure of the arbitrators to exercise the powers conferred upon them. This may now be considered a well settled principle in both legal and equitable cases, and is especially applicable to arbitra-tions, awards in which, Courts have always shown a great unwillingness to disturb. The cases are very numerous in which it has been held that awards are not to be set aside, but for corruption or misbehavior, or for some great or palpable error, or gross mistake. None of those grounds appear in the case at bar; on the contrary, so far as the papers before this Court show, the arbitrators have fully and conscientiously discharged their duty.
There is still another objection to sustaining the writ of error in this case, or rather the objections urged to the decision of the Court below in refusing to set aside the award. The parties in the submission papers have stipulated and agreed “ that the award of the said arbitrators or the greater part of them, shall be final in all the premises described herein, and that no appeal or writ of error, or other.proceed
The judgment below is affirmed»