Daniels v. State

Waples, Richard A. Indianapolis, ap- for DANIELS, pellant. Appellant William Michael

(Petitioner Below), Pearson, Linley Atty. Gen., E. Arthur Perry, Deputy Gen., Thaddeus Atty. India- napolis, appellee. for Indiana, Appellee STATE of Below). (Respondant DICKSON, Justice. This cause is before us on remand from

No. 49S00-8601-PC-33. Supreme Court of the United States. Supreme Court of Indiana. 21, 1979, August On defendant convicted of four counts robbery, of class Oct. felonies; A one count of attempted rob

bery, felony; a class A and one count of felony murder. For the latter offense the jury recommended, and the trial court or dered, penalty. The convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. (1983), Ind., Daniels v. State N.E.2d 160. In subsequent proceeding, Daniels v. State 775, we affirmed the denial appellant's of petition post-conviction relief, but the Supreme granted certiorari, Court Daniels - v. Indiana 105 L.Ed.2d and remanded to light reconsideration in South Carolina Gathers 490 U.S. 104 L.Ed.2d 876. Both Gathers and the case involve whether a death impaired by sentence is penalty phase prosecutorial statements concerning personal characteristics of the victim. represented

Gathers an extension Maryland Booth v. which held constitutionally that it was impermissible in capital sentencing proceedings to allow a sentencing jury to impact consider "victim involving statements" factors of which a defendant was unaware at the time of the offense. The statements at issue in Booth descriptions included of the victims' charac impact ter and the emotional of the crime family. Recognizing on the victims' wholly information unrelated to a defendant's and that blameworthiness arbitrary capital sentencing it invites deci depending upon availability sions express grief upon witnesses sterling questionable character of the victim, that such Court held information was "inconsistent with the rea think about what's happening? Of soned decisionmaking course, we in capital we bring can't him in. cases." Record at 1140. In his concluding 96 L.Ed.2d at 452. remarks, prosecutor the asked, "[HJow it cheapen does the life of Gathers, Allen Streett In not the victim was a street min to take the life of the defendant? ... Is ister who carried prayer card and voter the rest of his in prison life the registration [Daniels'] billfold, certificate in his equivalent of Allen Streett's life?" Record prosecutor's sentencing phase argu at 1147. ment focused on the content of these cards. Citing Booth, Supreme Court held that If the standards Gathers, announced in allowing rely to on informa BootA, decided decided in tion "could result in imposing applicable were to sen- tencing procedure sentence because of factors about which utilized in defendant's trial in 1979 and the direct appeal unaware, which defendant was and that were irrelevant to the concluded in Gathers, decision to kill." would find a serious 2210, 2211, presented by prosecutor's issue state- ments. Before reaching L.Ed.2d at 883. question, however, we must first consider whether case, present appellant alleges rule is retroactively ap- during that penalty phase, the plicable present to the proceed- collateral prosecutor displayed a life-size photograph ing. We further note that our discussion victim, Streett, Allen a United States does not address the lack contempo- Army chaplain, in full military uniform, objection raneous at the time prose- spoke and then jury: cutor's remarks now claimed to improp- I wanted to part talk in this of the trial er, because the State does not assert law, about about the sanctity of life claim of waiver. grievous about the affront to human- Coleman v. State ity, grievous God, affront saying, approval cited with 'No, going God. I'm to take a life of the both Parker v. Dugger Fla., 550 chaplain.... people of the State of So.2d Dugger Jackson v. Indiana call the soul of Allen Streett to Fla., 547 So.2d in which the Florida Defendant, witness stand. defen- Supreme Court held Streett, Chaplain dant. ... how did it Booth/Gathers rule should be retro you feel in Vietnam when went in with- active appeal cases on direct weapon out a helped men who were in which an adequate objection lodged facing Streett, Chaplain death? how did at trial. appeal direct termi you My do it? wife would like to know nates and a conviction becomes final when it, you how you did never lost the availability appeal, including peti your temper twenty-two but once in certiorari, tion for expires. is exhausted or years marriage. Chaplain Streett, v. Kentucky what was it like to relationship have a Griffith Daniels' your with just son who was growing conviction became failure final with the you go where could out and throw snow- seek Supreme Court review of our decision balls and kid around. What was it like to cause, on appeal. direct relationship your have a with wife where sulting separate appeal from Daniels' fol you say going could "I'm go out and lowing petition post- the denial of his snow," "Well, says, shovel and she I'll relief, pro conviction review is a collateral you send roses." What was it like to ceeding initiated after his case became final relationship have a with a whole family appeal. with the of his direct conclusion good which pure was so and so and with country? God and with you Have ever Upon analysis of the issue of retroactivi- seen a man who was more all ty, Supreme recently there? Court held that a Chaplain Streett, your what does soul new constitutional proce- rule of criminal appeal Daniels' direct was concluded be generally applicable dure is to those review, is, fore the Booth, cases on collateral those decided on which have become final before the new which Gathers is based. The rule an nounced in prohibiting these cases consid rule was announced. v. Lane eration of victim impact information 1060, (1989), 288, 103 489 U.S. 109 S.Ct. penalty sentencing jury, qualifies as 334; (1989), Penry Lynaugh L.Ed.2d v. 492 a "new rule" under Teague Penry 256; -, 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d U.S. 109 S.Ct. ground because it "breaks imposes new (1990), -, 494 Butler v. McKellar U.S. obligation new on the States or the Fed 347; 1212, 110 108 L.Ed.2d v. S.Ct. Saffle Government," eral produces a result -, (1990), 1257, 110 Parks 494 U.S. S.Ct. "not precedent existing dictated 415; Sawyer 108 L.Ed.2d Smith time the defendant's conviction became fi -, 2822, 110 S.Ct. 497 U.S. 111 301, Teague, nal." 489 U.S. at 109 at S.Ct. 193. Daniels directs our L.Ed.2d attention 1070, 349; 103 L.Ed.2d at Penry, 492 U.S. Youngblood 497 U.S. Collins -, 2944, at 106 L.Ed.2d at 2715, 30, 111 110 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d in (emphasis original). 275 in If constitution which the Court noted that during require al considerations do not retroactive argument the State of expressly oral Texas application of a "new rule" to cases on rely" stated that it "had chosen not to on review, federal appli collateral retroactive rule, Teague and held that the rule is cation of such rules is likewise not constitu in "not the sense that a 'Jurisdictional'" tionally compelled in cases on state collat reviewing court "must raise and decide the eral review. sponte." 2718, 110 issue sua S.Ct. at 111 regarding retroactivity Our state rule in 38, (emphasis original). L.Ed.2d at proceedings, collateral discussed extensive contrast, present case does not contain ly Rowley v. State 483 any express waiver of the issue was influenced then-exist State, and, through its submission of Saw precedent. federal The reevaluation of yer authority, as additional the State has suggests in Teague Penry this issue retroactivity. addressed the issue of analogous appropriate that an revision is purposes for Indiana Because the principle of new rule non-retroactivi ty remedy affords capital sentencings was first extended to which this Court of post-conviction substantially relief are sim in Penry. Penry Because was decided af ilar to those for which the federal writ of us,1 present ter the case was remanded to available, corpus habeus is made we elect perceive responsibilities our approach to follow Pen- quire, notwithstanding the remand "for addressing retroactivity ry of new Gathers, light further consideration" in peti pursuant law to cases on review possible appli that our review include the post-conviction tions relief under cability Penry holding. of the Retroactivi procedure. Indiana necessarily question threshold to be application present Since the case is before us on decided first before of constitu the facts at Teag tional doctrine to issue. review, new collateral we, Booth rule will not be retro- /Gathers L.Ed.2d 334.2 application active unless it falls into one of light specified deci 1. This cause was remanded on June could stand" in the of such Penry June was decided on at sion. U.S. at Yates, unlike is unlike 2. The case situation Supreme Court observed that which the presented in Yates v. Aiken failed whether the state court had to consider wherein the Su might apply specified retroac federal decision remanding preme Court stated that its order retroactivity tively, as we address issue light spe case for further consideration in of a propri upon issue which rests the threshold intervening "contemplated cific federal decision ety of further consideration of whether, court would consider as the state rule. law, petitioner's conviction a matter of federal recognized necessary primacy exceptions. Teague noted centrality to fit the exceptions two to the non-retroactivity of exception, upon which we express 1) new rules: place rules which "certain opinion, that, no we conclude as to the primary, kinds of private individual conduct remaining aspects exception, the ab beyond power of the criminal law-mak sence of the rule seriously does not under ing authority proscribe," mine the likelihood of an accurate death 358; 103 L.Ed.2d at and penalty determination under the distinctive 2) those which the observance of statutory Indiana "procedures that 'implicit ... are in the scheme. concept (included liberty,'" of ordered Id. procedure signifi differs omitted), citations and "without which the cantly from both that in Maryland which likelihood of an accurate conviction is seri applied in Booth and that in South Carolina ously 313, diminished." 489 U.S. at 109 applied which in pen Gathers. death 1077, S.Ct. at 103 L.Ed.2d at 358. The first alty sentences of Booth and Gathers each exception expanded was Penry permit resulted directly jury from a sentence det retroactive "pro for new rules contrast, ermination.5 In it is the trial hibiting category a certain punishment judge, jury, not the that determines the for a class of defendants because of their death sentence under Indiana law. Indiana status -, or offense." 492 U.S. at 35-50-2-9(e) Code provides in § relevant 2953, S.Ct. at 106 L.Ed.2d at 285. The part: exception second subsequently was de (e) If the hearing by jury, is jury applicable scribed only as to "watershed shall recommend to the court whether necessary rules" to the fundamental fair the death penalty imposed. should be ness of a proceeding criminal and which jury may recommend the pen- only "must improve accuracy, but also | alty only if it finds: 'alter our understanding of the bedrock (1) procedural That the proved beyond state has a elements' essential to the fair ness proceeding." of a Sawyer, 497 U.S. (1) reasonable doubt that at least one -, at 111 L.Ed.2d at of the aggravating circumstances ex- (emphasis 211. original).3 ists; and (2) any That mitigating circumstances The new rule established Booth and that exist are outweighed by expanded in clearly quali ag- Gathers does not fy gravating exception under the first to non-retroac- circumstance cireum- tivity. Less stances. applicability obvious is the exception, precise "the The court con shall make the final determina- "may tours" of which sentence, difficult to discern." tion of the considering after fie, , Saf 494 U.S. at jury's recommendation, and the sen- 108 L.Ed.2d at 429.4 Aside from tence shall be based on the same stan- whether the rule has the dards that jury required was to con- categorical exceptions may 3. prove These inade cited Wainwright Gideon v. quate in future individual cases which demon holding 792, 9 that a defen compelling probability strate a of innocence. It right dant has represented to be counsel possible exceptional that such cases in all criminal trials for serious offenses. Saf adoption particularized excep sult in the of a fle, applied procedural tion akin to that to avoid L.Ed.2d at 429. Murray default v. Carrier 91 L.Ed.2d 397. See Hoff law, Maryland 5. Under Booth could have elect- mann, Refroactivity and the Great Writ How ed to have his sentence determined either a Congress Lane, Respond Should Md.Ann.Code, 413(b) jury. or a Art. § 1990 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 183, 213-217; Note, Resolv (1982). jury. He In chose accordance with Lane, ing Retroactivity Teague v. 65 Ind. After law, South Carolina Gathers was sentenced to (1990) (authored by L.J. 670-672 Ellen E. following recommendation which Boshkoff). the instant case does not statutorily binding judge. on the trial S.C. qualify for such consideration. Code Ann. § 16-3-20. type coming To illustrate the of rule within exception usually Court has sentencing judge to state the reasons for court is not bound sider. The jury's [emphasis particular imposing recommendation. sentence has a dual added]. First, purpose. it insures con- only proper impos- sidered matters when judicially imposed limitation has been One safeguards sentence and thus provision upon the against imposition of sentences which jury's recommen court is not bound Second, arbitrary capricious. are it dation. v. State Martinez-Chaver Ind., denied, reh'g. appellate enables the court to determine im- trial reasonableness of the sentence required 539 N.E.2d posed. [citations omitted]. court deference to a all against penalty except "when Hommons v. 493 N.E.2d State so point the facts available to the court denied, 1250 at reh'g. 496 N.E.2d penal clearly imposition of the death jury's recommendation is unreasonable." Thus, sentencing judge must make a at We do not 53 fully de novo review and articulate his or trial court adherence to her reasons whenever the death sentence is recommending imposition of the decision ordered. A recommendation of death penalty. jury recommends death When the opaque reviewing is and cannot de courts sentence, way judge is no whether, extent, termine and to what the by such recommendation. bound jury may improp have been affected when recommendation, jury In contrast to a er victim character and im Booth/Gathers fully explain judge the Indiana trial must pact presented. But considerations are be sentencing reasoning capital his in a order. procedure requires cause Indiana the actu 35-38-1-3; v. Ind.Code Schiro State § decision-maker, sentencing al the trial (1983), Ind., denied, 451 N.E.2d cert. judge, fully the rea court to memorialize U.S. decision, leading sentencing to the sons Judy v. 416 N.E.2d State judge the review to determine whether 95; Ind., 499 N.E.2d Hill State by any improper victim in was influenced requirement specifici Our sentencing arriving formation in dec ty is clear. 1059; Coleman, ision.6 See trial statement of reasons court's Post, (1987) 32 Ohio St.3d State three ele- following must include the denied, cert. (1) identify it all of the ments: must 98 L.Ed.2d 1023. aggravating significant mitigating and independent that the We are satisfied circumstances, (2) spe- the it must state the en sentencing judge role of the why is cific reason each circumstance meaningful review opportunity hanced mitigating aggravat- considered to be pos the preclude procedure under Indiana (8) ing, it must articulate the violation sibility that a mitigat- evaluated and balanced the court detri phase could the against aggravat- recommendation ing circumstances accuracy of probable mentally implicate if the ing circumstances to determine sentencing determin capital ag- judge's offset the final mitigating circumstances exception to the Requiring circumstances. ation.7 Thus the gravating sentencing hearing fails to ing the court's final case, satisfied by impermissi influenced any has not been of such disclose consideration any impermissible considera Bootk/Gathers ble evidence. Findings Judge written Of Fact tions. Gifford's Imposing Judgment And Of The Court Death Indiana sentenc- discussion Our 1865, 1866) (Record p. Penalty reflect the trial only applicabili- to the ing procedure is directed aggravat of both court's careful consideration exception rule. of the second relating mitigating circumstances judge's proper imply 'that a trial We not nothing suggesting and contain death sentence necessarily ren- determination death sentence by imper judge's decision was affected in a errors which occur harmless ders evidence. Further missible Booth/Gathers proceeding. more, judge's dur comments our review Teague rule of non-retroactivity does not any aggravator mitigator. They were apply, and the Booth/Gathers "new rule" irrelevant to determining Daniel's nature is not retroactive to or the nature of his They crime. had no penalty hearings on collateral review. As legal relevance to the determination of his in Teague, 489 103 blameworthiness. Yet there is no doubt in my mind that jury, determination of new rule by any unrestricted non-retroactivity precludes our considera admonition upon the call of court, tion of the question presented, federal here prosecutor, considered these irrelevant the application of Gathers to the circum characteristics of the victim in arriving at petitioner's stances of the 1979 sentencing is, its all, decision. It after an aspect of proceeding. daily life that crime reports are made in the media and that characteristics of the vice-

The judgment of the trial court is af- tims are great detail and received firmed. interest, with they stimulate feel- ings sympathy for victims and outrage SHEPARD, C.J., and GIVAN and against offenders. PIVARNIK, JJ., concur. Furthermore, pros- statements of the DeBRULER, J., dissents with separate ecutor were only irrelevant, but like the opinion. statements made prosecutor DeBRULER, Justice, dissenting. Gathers, had that stimulating quality which in society can I create an respectfully unac dissent. judgment ceptable risk of arbitrary an and capricious the court denying below post-conviction re- decision recommend lief affirmed in Damiels v. State give death. I am Ind., 528 N.E.2d 775. appeal say, unable to beyond a doubt, reasonable judgment, from that appellant was success- ful having prosecutor's improper this Court reach the merits of remarks did not influence and the judge his Booth claim. He was then successful having decide in favor of penalty United States this case. Consequently, I would reverse the same, and we now know that judgment denying post-conviction Booth claim rejected for an erroneous relief order post-conviction granted relief be reason. Under circumstances, these I am to include new unable to conclude as does the majority, hearings or the imposition of a jurisdictional question threshold term of years. of whether we should reach the merits of the claim anis issue now before us for

decision. The remand order calls for con-

sideration of the merits of the claim light opinion in South Carolina v. Gath- ers,

L.Ed.2d 876 and I would do that. prosecutor, in his summation to the Jury Matter of Paul B. HUEBNER. stage of this case, in persuade order to to rec- No. 45S00-8903-DI-198. ommend to that the death sen- Supreme Court of Indiana. tence imposed, informed or reminded victim clergyman, was a Oct. army officer, an man, a brave a defender of country, good and a father and hus- band. Daniels knowledge had no of these

matters kill, when he chose to rob and

therefore the matters were not relevant process determining weight

Case Details

Case Name: Daniels v. State

Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court

Date Published: Oct 19, 1990

Citation: 561 N.E.2d 487

Docket Number: 49S00-8601-PC-33

Court Abbreviation: Ind.