After an altercation that took place at a public school, Glynn Daniels was charged by accusation with loitering on school property; disrupting a public school; upbraiding, insulting, or abusing public school teachers; and simple assault. He was found guilty by a jury of simple assault and was acquitted of the other charges. His motion for new trial was denied, and he appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
On appellate review of a criminal conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable, to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence. 1 We do not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine only if the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find the defendant guilty of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt. 2
So viewed, the record reflects that Daniels accompanied his daughter to a meeting at Oakland Elementary School in Henry County, where his granddaughter attended fourth grade. The school principal had set up the conference in order to address concerns
Another teacher, Laura Wise, who did not take part in the conference, testified at trial that she saw Daniels standing “[mjaybe less” than a foot away from Harrell’s face for five to ten minutes, while Harrell repeatedly asked him, “Sir, please leave”; and that Daniels told Harrell that he was not finished with her and that he was going to be back. Because Daniels “seemed so agitated and angry,” as shown by the volume of his voice and his physical position in relation to Harrell, Wise became concerned for Harrell’s safety, and she called 911 as well.
A person commits the offense of simple assault when he or she “[cjommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” 3 This offense “is complete if there is a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent present ability to inflict injury so as to cause the person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear that he will receive an immediate violent injury unless he retreats to secure his safety.” 4 Moreover, “assault is an attempted battery, so the state must show that the defendant made a ‘substantial step’ toward committing the battery.” 5 Daniels challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial to support his conviction for simple assault on Harrell, contending that the evidence does not show any threat of immediate harm against Harrell; that it does not show a “substantial step” toward the commission of a battery against Harrell; and that it does not show any offer of violence against Harrell.
Contrary to Daniels’s contention, the offense of simple assault does not require that the defendant make a statement specifically threatening immediate harm; such a threat can be conveyed, and was conveyed in the case at hand, by the defendant’s actions.
6
Here, Daniels shouted at Harrell in an agitated and angry manner, while standing in close proximity to her and blocking her movement in a narrow hall. These actions constituted a “demonstration of violence” sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Daniels had
committed a “substantial step” toward the commission of a battery upon Harrell.
7
Further, clearly Daniels had “an apparent present ability to inflict injury,” in light of the fact that he was standing only
The focus of a reasonable apprehension of harm under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), is on the apprehension of the victim. There is no specific intent requirement in the statute, which would indicate that only an intent to commit the act which in fact places another in reasonable apprehension of injury is required, not a specific intent to cause such apprehension. 11
The testimony adduced at trial was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Harrell feared she would receive an “immediate violent injury” and that her fear was reasonable. 12
Daniels’s reliance on In the Interest of C. S. 13 and Johnson v. State 14 is misplaced. In In the Interest of C. S., the evidence showed that the defendant did not “commit an act” within the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). 15 In Johnson, the element of “present ability to inflict harm” was lacking, because the victim was in an automobile driving slowly past the defendant, who was five feet away from the victim’s vehicle. 16 Both these elements are, however, present in the case at bar.
We conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that a substantial step had been taken toward harming Harrell, that the victim had a reasonable apprehension of receiving immediate physical injury, and that a reasonable person would have felt the need to retreat in order to avoid receiving such injury. 17 We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
Al-Amin v. State,
Id., citing
Jackson v. Virginia,
OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2).
(Punctuation and footnote omitted.)
In the Interest of D. B.,
(Footnote omitted.) Id.
See
Wroge v. State,
See In the Interest of D. B., supra at 447-448 (1) (defendant removed outer clothing and squared off against victim in confined office space).
See
Bostic v. State,
See Wroge, supra.
See
Hurt v. State,
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wroge, supra.
See Bearden, supra.
In the Interest of C. S., supra at 411, 413 (defendant remained motionless, while holding knife down at her side).
Johnson,
supra,
See Lewis, supra.