Appellant was indicted for the possession, with intent to distribute, of both cocaine and marijuana. He was tried before a jury and a verdict of guilty as to both counts was returned. Appellant appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial and from the judgment entered on the jury’s verdict.
1. At appellant’s trial, several police officers were called as witnesses for the State. Apparently, at no point did appellant ever raise a hearsay objection to any portion of any officer’s testimony or make a contemporaneous request that the jury be instructed that any portion of any officer’s testimony was being admitted solely for the limited purpose of explaining the officer’s conduct. Instead, after the close of all of the evidence, appellant merely submitted to the trial court the *690 following written request to charge: “The Police Officer in this case having been allowed to testify as to what someone else told him in order to explain his (the Police Officer’s) conduct you are instructed that ‘such evidence is not admitted for the truth of what it asserts but only to explain the conduct of the Officer who heard them.” Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s refusal to give this requested charge.
Some portions of the testimony given by some of the officers who testified in this case may have been admissible solely for the limited purpose of explaining the respective officér’s conduct. At the conclusion of the evidence, however, there having been neither a contemporaneous objection nor a contemporaneous request for instructions, no portion of any officer’s testimony had ever actually been ruled by the trial court as evidence which was being admitted solely for that limited purpose. Compare
Harrell v. State,
2. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court’s refusal to give a requested charge on the principle of equal access. Although the trial court did not give the specific charge requested by appellant, an instruction on the principle of equal access was given to the jury. “ ‘(I)t is no longer necessary to give the exact language of requests to charge when the same principles are fairly given to the jury in the general charge of the court. [Cit.]’ [Cit.]”
Shirley v. State,
*691 3. Appellant called two witnesses who testified to his general good character. On cross-examination, appellant’s arrest record was used by the State to test these witnesses’ knowledge of appellant’s character. After this cross-examination of appellant’s character witnesses, the State presented testimony, through a custodian of the records of the Atlanta Police Department, concerning appellant’s prior arrests. At the conclusion of this testimony, the trial court “admitted” a copy of appellant’s record of arrests “for the purpose of going into the record but not to go out to the jury.” Appellant enumerates as error the admission of his arrest record into evidence, urging that specific acts cannot be used as evidence of his bad character.
This enumeration is controlled by
Kittles v. State,
4. Appellant enumerates as error the admission of testimony concerning the “hierarchy of drug transactions.” At trial, appellant objected on the grounds that the testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. “Relevancy is determined by answering the following questions: ‘[D]oes the evidence offered render the desired inference more probable than it would be without the evidence.’ [Cits.] Where an issue is raised, as to whether the probative value of evidence is outweighed by its tendency to ‘unduly arouse the jury’s emotions of prejudice, hostility or sympathy’ the trial judge has a discretion to be exercised in determining admissibility. [Cits.]”
Smith v. State,
5. A review of the entire record reveals that, from the evidence adduced at trial, a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found proof of appellant’s guilt of the respective charges beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia,
Judgment affirmed.