Daniela TAYLOR, Appellant, v. QHG OF SPRINGDALE, INC., successor to Northwest Health Systems, Inc. doing business as Northwest Medical Center; CommunityCare Foundation, Inc., formerly known as Northwest Health Systems, Inc., Appellee.
No. 99-4207
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
July 18, 2000
218 F.3d 898
Submitted: June 15, 2000.
The defendant asserts, and we agree, that we would have the authority to review a refusal to depart downward if, for example, such an action were based upon a defendant‘s race or sex. In that event, the sentence would have been imposed in violation of law, see
Defendant also contends that the decision is reviewable because it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact. The District Court stated that the defendant‘s deportation would enable him to avoid the three years of supervised release, a benefit that, in the opinion of the Court, outweighed the detriment of having to leave this country. In our view, this comparison of two states of being is not properly characterized as a finding of fact. It is simply the District Court‘s discretionary weighing of the circumstances of defendant‘s case. Defendant says that if he ever returns he would have to serve the three years of supervised release, and no doubt this is true, but we do not see what difference this circumstance would make. If the defendant does return, his return would almost certainly be a separate crime in itself. That he would suffer the consequences of his earlier sentence, plus, in all likelihood, the consequences of his new crime, is no just cause for complaint.
In sum, the District Court in this case recognized its authority to depart downward and then chose, for permissible reasons, not to do so. Its exercise of discretion in making this choice is not reviewable.
The appeal is dismissed.
Stephen Lee Wood, Rogers, AR, argued, for appellant.
Charles L. Harwell, Springdale, AR, argued, for appellee.
Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and BYE, Circuit Judges.
BEAM, Circuit Judge.
Daniela Taylor managed the Cardiac Diagnostic Lab at Northwest Medical Center. The Cardiac Diagnostic Lab was the main location in the hospital where electrocardiograms (EKGs) were performed on patients. As lab manager, Taylor supervised five employees, none of whom worked full-time. In 1998, the hospital incurred severe financial losses, and the chief executive officer asked each department head to recommend jobs that could be eliminated. The head of Taylor‘s department recommended the elimination of Taylor‘s position, and soon after, the hospital terminated Taylor and about forty-five other employees in a reduction-in-force. Taylor was 51-years-old at the time of her termination.
Taylor then brought this claim of age discrimination. See
To survive summary judgment on an age discrimination claim made in the context of a reduction-in-force, Taylor must establish a prima facie case by showing she was over 40-years-old and her
We review the district court‘s grant of summary judgment de novo. See Doerhoff v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 171 F.3d 1177, 1179 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is only appropriate if, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Taylor, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.
Although we doubt Taylor established a prima facie case, we, like the district court, will assume she did. See Brown v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 113 F.3d 139, 141 (8th Cir. 1997) (no need to discuss prima facie case if district court assumed it was established). The hospital articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason (severe financial losses) for the reduction-in-force. Thus, we consider whether Taylor presented sufficient evidence of pretext to support her ultimate burden of proving unlawful discrimination.
Taylor‘s pretext evidence is as follows: (1) her job did not fall within the hospital‘s objective criteria for determining which positions would be eliminated in the reduction-in-force; (2) her managerial duties 2 were subsumed in a new position that combined supervision of the Cardiac Diagnostic Lab and the Cardiac Catheterization Lab, and she was not considered for this new position; and (3) after her termination, she was not notified of an opening in the Cardiac Diagnostic Lab for an entry-level EKG technician—an opening later filled by a 27-year-old. Taylor contends this evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to demonstrate pretext.
We disagree. The hospital‘s objective criteria was to eliminate jobs that would not directly affect patient care (i.e., administrative positions). Although Taylor was involved in patient care, she also spent about a quarter of her time performing administrative duties. In addition, the undisputed evidence shows Taylor was not qualified for the new position that combined supervision of the Cardiac Diagnostic Lab and Cardiac Catheterization Lab. Finally, it was reasonable for the hospital not to inform Taylor of the entry-level position because it was unlikely she would have applied for it. In fact, Taylor admitted in her deposition she was unsure whether she would have accepted an EKG technician position that paid about half what she had previously made. Thus, we find Taylor‘s evidence is insufficient to establish pretext.
At oral argument, Taylor‘s counsel argued for reversal of the district court based on the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in Reeves. In that case, the Court held that when a terminated employee establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination and presents sufficient evidence to reject the employer‘s legitimate explanation, the employee need not always introduce additional independent evidence of discrimination to defeat summary judgment. See Reeves, 120 S.Ct. at 2109. But, Reeves only helps Taylor if she has produced sufficient evidence to reject the le-
The district court judgment is affirmed.