Appellant was indicted for the offense of cruelty to children in *55 violation of OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). A trial before a jury resulted in a verdict of guilty. Appellant appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on the guilty verdict.
1. Appellant enumerates the general grounds. Evidence adduced at trial would authorize the jury to find as follows:
On May 23, 1984, two-year-old Miсhael Casto (Michael) was admitted to a hospital. There was a pattern of superficial skin lesions on his buttocks. The admitting physician also noted a large bruise оn the youngster’s forehead, a deep laceration on his lip, and smaller bruises аll about his face and head. Another doctor who examined and treated Michаel testified that it was his expert opinion that the child’s injuries were consistent with child abuse.
At the hospital, appellant admitted that he had spanked Michael on the buttocks with a leather knife sheath which was bound with metal rivets, and that this had caused the bruising on the child’s bottom. Appellant later made substantially the same admissions in a handwritten statement which was admitted at trial without objection. With respect to the child’s facial сuts and bruises, appellant testified that they were the result of a fall. The treating physician testified, however, that the injuries to Michael’s face were too well distributed to be the result of a single fall. The doctor further noted that there was an absencе of other injuries, as to the elbows or knees, which might indicate a fall. The State introduсed photographs which tended to show similarities between the injuries on the child’s face and those on his buttocks.
Appellant urges that there is a lack of evidencе that he “maliciously cause[d] . . . cruel or excessive physical or mental pаin.” OCGA § 16-5-70 (b). This contention is based upon appellant’s assertions that he did not mean to hurt thе child. Intent, however, is a question of fact to be determined upon consideratiоn of the words, conduct, demeanor, motive, and all other circumstances cоnnected with the act for which the accused is prosecuted. OCGA § 16-2-6. “Intention” “ ‘does nоt mean an intention to violate a penal statute but an intention to commit the аct prohibited thereby.’ [Cit.]”
Thomas v. State,
2. Appellant urges that he should be granted a new trial on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was the only witnеss in his defense. The claim of ineffective assistance is based upon appеllant’s contention that trial counsel should have called other competent witnesses, including Michael’s mother, who would have testified that the spanking was justified or who оtherwise might have supported his version of the events.
The record shows that, at a рre-trial hearing, the State apprised appellant’s counsel of certаin impeachment evidence which would be used against Michael’s mother and others if they were called as witnesses for appellant. Under these circumstances, it is clear that appellant’s counsel made such tactical decisions as were properly within his province when he elected not to call Michaеl’s mother or other possible witnesses. See generally
Reid v. State,
3. Appellаnt urges that it was error for the trial court to ask certain questions of the witnesses. At trial, however, no objection was raised to the trial court’s questions.
State v. Griffin,
Judgment affirmed.