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Daniel v. State
644 P.2d 172
Wyo.
1982
Check Treatment

*1 DANIEL, Jr., Appellant Alvah R.

(Defendant), Wyoming, Appellee

The STATE of

(Plaintiff).

No. 5553.

Supreme Wyoming. Court of

April *2 Honaker, Cheyenne,

Richard D. W. and Goody, Defender, Keith Asst. Public Jack- son, for appellant. Freudenthal, Gen., Atty.

Steven F. Ger- Stack, Deputy Gen., Div., ald Atty. A. Crim. Johnson, Sr., Gen., Allen Mi- Atty. C. Asst. Hubbard, Gen., Atty. Chey- chael L. Asst. enne, Ryckman, County Jere and Atty., Reese, Deputy Atty., Robert J. County River, for appellee. Green ROSE, J., RAPER, Before C. and THOM- AS, BROWN, and ROONEY JJ.

BROWN, Justice. jury A guilty found of involun- tary sen- manslaughter.1 judge district tenced to a term in the peniten- tiary years of not less than 19 and not more years. than 20 urged appeal The issues are: case, did “1. Under facts of this violate the fed- Appellant’s officers eral and state constitutional counsel, self-incrimination, against due of law process obtaining state- him ments from after he made several inquiries about to counsel ignored the police inquiries? those the facts of this 2. Under did discretion by trial court abuse its sentenc- of- years to 19-20 Appellant for the involuntary manslaughter, fense of sentence, does such a severe under case violate federal and facts of this state done, Appellant causing charged the same to be the information son or kills being, purposely with three alternate counts of in the murder human or whoever officer, degree 6-4-101(a), premeditated any peace first in violation of W.S. § malice kills employee acting 1977: or fireman corrections duty, guilty first of murder in the line of purposely premeditated “Whoever and with degree.” malice, of, perpetration attempt or in the or Appellant charged kidnapping in was also perpetrate assault, arson, any rape, sexual 6-4-201, robbery violation of W.S.1977. burglary, § by administering poi- said attorney present.” Appellant never punishment bans on cruel and unusual Wyoming unequivocally Art. Consti- wanted § discussion present. tution?” There was considerable Ap- attorney. to an about We will affirm. said, necessary, “If it’s that’s be- pellant Helen Bunning, an instructor at Western want to be taken advan- cause don’t Wyoming College, died from a stab wound tage anything of or like that.” Chief Hawk *3 college during early received at appellant told that he would not talk to him September Sep- afternoon of 1980. On willing further unless he was to waive his 19, 1980, appellant presented tember him- “Well, rights. appellant The said: I’d Springs self at the office of the Rock Chief get soon it taken care of. I waive the Police, Appellant Russell Hawk. told G. (Chief interrupted appel- Hawk right to—” secretary purpose Chief Hawk’s of his mid-sentence). juncture At this lant police department, visit to the and the sec- provided. Chief Hawk waiver form retary then told the Chief that there was an saying, prefaced reading of the waiver eyewitness individual who said he was an I’d rather have the information if “And stabbing college. at the Chief Hawk violating your rights.” Appellant it means individual, agreed talk and asked form copy was furnished a of the waiver secretary investigators to have some read the Grymes proceeded to and Officer appellant come into the office. The then follows: waiver as went his wife into Chief’s office with Okay, sir. These “POLICE OFFICER: responsi- and children and he was said that rights guaranteed under the your college. ble for the accident at the you any we ask Constitution. Before talking he was appellant asked the if questions, you your have to understand stabbed, appel- lady about the who was rights, okay? lant he was total- responded by saying that Okay. “MR. DANIEL: ly responsible for the accident. right You have the “POLICE OFFICER: Before any questioning by police, appel- to remain silent. Understand that? lant had already killing confessed to Helen Yes, “MR. DANIEL: sir. Bunning accidentally, the crime of which he And, in the “CHIEF HAWK: it’s 2:22 ap- convicted. The Chief then advised on September afternoon pellant of his rights Miranda and asked for Okay. Let’s see. “POLICE OFFICER: a recorder. There was no further conversa- go again. I’ll over that You have the Grymes tion until Officers Ellis and came right Anything you say to remain silent. into the Chief’s office with the recorder. against you in Do can be used Court. Conversations, questions and answers there- understand, that, sir? you ap- were recorded. The Chief asked Yes, “MR. DANIEL: sir. pellant preliminary questions, some such as You have the “POLICE OFFICER: address, correct name then complete lawyer to talk to a for advice before we appellant reviewed with and the other offi- him you any questions, ask and to have appellant cers what told previously you during questioning. you Do Appellant disagree him. did not with the that, sir? understand narration, Chief’s emphasized but that the stabbing Yes, was an accident. “MR. DANIEL: sir. you If cannot af- “POLICE OFFICER: beginning Near the of the interview lawyer, appointed one will be ford a Chief Hawk told that based on any questioning, you if wish. you before said, what he had initially appellant would you that, Do understand sir? be taken custody charged into Yes, “MR. DANIEL: sir.

homicide. The Chief said that would be you arrested whether or not he made a If decide to “POLICE OFFICER: now, Early appel- statement. in the interview questions lawyer answer without a lant “probably present, you your right said he would like will still have to have an stop answering got time. You also “CHIEF HAWK: I’ve this one filled answering stop have the out a little bit for you, and while I am you lawyer. you time until talk to a Do out, filling one you would read me that, understand sir? rights that waiver of down here? Yes, “ME. DANIEL: sir. I “MR. DANIEL: have read this state- Now, HAWK: have answer- you “CHIEF rights, ment of I understand what ‘Yes, sir,’ ed questions. to all of these willing are. am to make a would Okay, you ask— questions. statement and answer I do Okay, “POLICE OFFICER: what lawyer not want a at this time. I under- would like to do now is ask for a waiver. doing. stand and know what I am No words, “CHIEF HAWK: In other promises or threats have been made to you waiver have read this (mispronounced)— me or coercion So, it you again statement. would read “CHIEF HAWK: Coercion. you now that all ques- answered *4 “MR. DANIEL: —coercion has been used reading tions with Mr. Grymes it? against me. you just “POLICE OFFICER: If would “CHIEF HAWK: That’s like a threat or you any read that waiver and if questions something along that line. with Okay, about it. mind, you sign would full your “MR. May DANIEL: I still —if I can’t I name here? lawyer may appointed afford a still be — lawyer? “Okay, any interruptions any- without Well, “CHIEF HAWK: we wouldn’t talk us, thing go else from would you back you point to at the that you want to have and start with about the time date and attorney. would discuss it started, go right this incident and you now. You do have to have through, you and we will not even ask now, time, representation at this any questions you get until finished. thing. just but later on in the That’s if Then, you questions we will ask what you going want an we’re not got concerning we’ve it.” talk you right just going now. We are put you things question in the bucket and shut There is no down. totally respon that he was initial confession stabbing Bun- Okay. “MR. DANIEL: sible for the death of Helen ning Appellant was not And, was admissible. “CHIEF HAWK: that’s whether statement, you custody. make a statement or not. Before volunteered knew was that only thing Chief Hawk Okay, “POLICE you OFFICER: that — don’t, waiver, eyewitness claimed to be an by signing you don’t Alvah Daniel your rights. waive He did not know that Mr. to the incident. Bunning, any had killed Mrs. right. “MR. DANIEL: Daniel waive ap suggestion that Chief Hawk tricked “POLICE OFFICER: While we are talk- now, pellant confessing supported by into is not it, But, you agree okay? if if Furthermore, Hawk had any point, you get want to the record. attor- ney; you stop talking if want to obligation stop no the confession —what- ever you you are the man who of his constitutional appellant advise the want — decisions, makes the not us. That’s what caution, rights. Out of an abundance of it comes down to. to termi upon Chief Hawk took it himself Well, “MR. I’d like to talk. DANIEL: of the the first volunteered confession nate explain story I’d like to side of the choosing protect appellant, thereby right now. Un from further incrimination. appellant here, “CHIEF HAWK: Yes. the initial der view of the facts of the was admissible. if confession Okay, you “POLICE OFFICER: State, Okla., (1966). Lung would— 420 P.2d “ * * * ‘Interrogation,’ conceptualized his initial confes- After made sion, opinion, in the Miranda must reflect a express ques- conducted no compulsion beyond measure of above and tioning regarding the incident until custody that inherent in itself. of his appellant had been advised twice until after he read and the Miranda safe- “We conclude however, signed Appellant, a waiver form. person guards play come into whenever a although had been taken into custody, custody subjected express to either formally placed he had not been under ar- equivalent. or its questioning functional rest, he was told he be arrested for say, ‘interrogation’ would That is to the term homicide. He therefore knew that he was express under Miranda refers not not free to leave the station. but also to words or questioning, part police (other on the of the

actions normally than those attendant to arrest that the know custody) police should The genesis large body of law reasonably likely to elicit an incrimi- developed years the last fifteen nating response suspect. from the regard to custodial is Miranda portion latter of this definition focuses 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. primarily upon perceptions of the sus- L.Ed.2d 694 cert. denied 396 U.S. pect, police. rather than the intent of the Miranda set forth proscriptions and limita- »ft * [*] >1 tions mandated by the Fifth and Sixth present In the con Amendments to the United States Constitu- express questioning regarding ducted no *5 tion regarding interrogation. custodial The reading the incident until after the second Supreme held Court Miranda the warnings appel of the Miranda and after * * * that, Constitution mandates “no person signed lant had read and the waiver form. compelled shall be in any criminal case to be Furthermore, reading of before the second himself,” a witness against and that “the warnings, police the Miranda the did not * * * accused have the assistance of coun- say anything they or do which should have Court, however, sel.” Supreme also reasonably likely known was to elicit an said: incriminating response. Appellant admit “ * * * import The fundamental pressured ted that no one him to talk at

privilege while an individual is in custody time. Consistent the rule in Rhode is not whether he is allowed to talk to the Innis, supra, Island v. here warnings without the benefit of subjected “interrogation” was not to until counsel, and but whether he can be inter- warnings given after Miranda had been rogated. requirement There is no he signed twice and had the waiver. police stop person who enters a Because of desires re- unclear station and states that he to wishes con- garding an there was considerable crime, fess person to a or a who calls the right discussion about his to an police to offer a confession or any other right. and the waiver After con- ” * * * statement he to desires make. context, sidering the entire conversation Arizona, supra, Miranda v. 384 U.S. at including tapes transcript, and the we 86 S.Ct. at at believe that initiated conversation

Special procedural safeguards provoked inquiry regarding are further required suspect simply waiving right where the is his attorney. to an said, taken into custody, you but rather where a sus Hawk “But we won’t talk to about pect in custody subjected interroga to thing you willing unless to waive said, “Well, tion. In the rights.” recent case of Rhode Island v. your Appellant I’d like Innis, 291, 300-301, get U.S. it taken of you S.Ct. care know.” Chief 1689-1690, said, (1980), L.Ed.2d 307-308 going try Hawk “I’m not or want the Court advantage you.” Appellant mandated: take inter- said, “Well, rights, as thé accused rupted get may validly I’d soon himself right rights it taken I waive to—.” waive his and respond interroga- care of. * * * tion, Court has strongly indi- no real here of question There is safeguards cated that additional are nec- mind; appellant changing his he never counsel; when accused essary asks for said, made up his mind until he “I’d like to we now hold that when accused explain right story side now.” right has invoked his counsel to have With that he statement indicated had present during interrogation, custodial up right made his mind to waive his to an right valid waiver of that be es- cannot Zerbst, attorney. In Johnson v. 304 U.S. by showing tablished he re- only that 458, 464, 1019, 1023, L.Ed.2d sponded police-initiated to further custo- 1461, 1466, A.L.R. 357 Court dial interrogation even if he has been maintained: rights. advised his hold further ***** ordinarily A waiver is an inten- accused, Edwards, that an such having as tional relinquishment or abandonment of expressed po- desire to deal with privilege. a known The determi- only through counsel, lice subject is not nation of whether there been an in- has further by the authorities * * * telligent depend, waiver must until counsel has been made available case, each upon particular facts and him, unless the accused initiates himself surrounding circumstances in- communication, exchanges, further cluding background, experience, and police.” conversations Edwards conduct of the accused.” 484-485, supra, old, Appellant years here was 25 1884,68 101 S.Ct. at L.Ed. at 386. equivalent high obtained the aof school If it is difficult for the offi education. He was a member of the iron suspect cer determine whether a indeed workers union and competent felt himself intends to invoke to have an attor to enter apprenticeship. He was fully ney present, may the officer clarifica seek advised of his twice least before desires, long of the suspect’s tion as he police questioning acknowledged disguise does not as a sub clarification he understood each of *6 rights. the individual terfuge for coercion intimidation. Giaco- He was and he coherent aware of what was Alaska, State, (1981). mazzi v. 633 P.2d 218 doing. voluntarily His waiver was is We see no That what occurred here. knowingly made. trickery subterfuge, appellant ad Appellant states in his the reso- brief that under pressure mits that he was no presented lution of the issue here will turn not think did police. do upon the recent case of “remarkable” Ed- anything proscribed by in case at bar Arizona, wards v. Edwards. There factual distinctions (1981). speaks 68 L.Ed.2d 378 He also was the two cases. In Edwards the accused of bold, “the holding new of the court.” said, unequivocal; “I want an he adjectives We would eliminate the “remark- Again, appel I make deal.” here before able” adjective and “bold.” The “recent” is that he say unequivocally lant never did sufficiently descriptive Edwards of the justifica lawyer. wanted a This alone was holding case. v. Edwards inquire con tion further supra, provoked appellant that ecstasy cerning his desires. po- reference a distinction between Dryden seeks Appellant also solace in v. lice-initiated and defendant-initiated con- State, Wyo., Dryden 535 P.2d 483 taking place versation after an accused has held that after a defendant indicated invoked his constitutional to counsel. county wanted an “the authori-

The Court said: enter into other ties could not thereafter ***** AitlKMgh interrogation we have held and until defend- unless reopened subject.” initially advised of his Miranda ant had himself report From the also addressed the court. State, This case supra, Dryden 493.2 judge trial was thor- hearing, here, however, Dry- distinguishable is from concerning oughly advised den No fur- particulars. least three any mitigat- aware of background and was place appellant ther took until ap- The court sentenced ing considerations. waiver; say never did signed appellant less than 19 nor pellant to a term of not an that he wanted qualification without years Wyoming than 20 in the State more pro- appellant initiated and attorney; Appellant asserts Penitentiary. time he waived inquiry voked further at the because was an abuse of discretion sentence attorney. to an judge did not follow sentenc- the trial contending Appellant seems to be and did not state reasons standards stop ques that because the did not for the sentence. tioning him after he mentioned the word we have been asked years In recent everything he said after that “lawyer," that in numerous cases. review sentences should have been excluded. It must be State, 636 P.2d 1107 Scheikofsky Wyo., charged remembered that said, abiding reluc- we “We have murder, degree with first but convicted judge’s trial determina- tance to review a involuntary manslaughter. of The ini is a of sentence. The determination tion confession, together profusion tial with a of judge decision which no trial burdensome evidence, other of a including the results lightly make which we will not could test,3 polygraph was more than sufficient to lightly overturn.” uphold jury’s involuntary conviction of State, Wyo., 602 P.2d In Jones v. manslaughter. The evidence that (1979), we said: objects mostly exculpatory. Ironically, to is sentenc- Wyoming “The law in is that the largely appel it is the same evidence ing judge given wide discretion in de- lant relied on at trial in his successful at termining length and conditions tempt to avoid conviction of murder. This imprisonment imposed to be the term trial, evidence was to his benefit at but now upon conviction and that such determina- he claims it should not have been ad limits, tion, will statutory if within the disagree. mitted. We abuse of not be disturbed absent a clear discretion.” II Following jury’s finding ap- verdict of indetermi Wyoming system has a pellant manslaughter, guilty involuntary sentencing,4 which carries with it an nate Department the Probation and con- Parole indi implicit adoption philosophy investigation ducted extensive and sub- sentencing. system This of indeter vidual report mitted a detailed to the district granting sentencing minate necessitates the sentencing hearing appellant court. At the judge, to the trial who of broad discretion *7 produced two sentencing witnesses and addressed alterna must choose from parties range permissible penalties. court personally. Counsel both tives and opinion “When a convict is sentenced to the state 2. We said earlier in this that we did not life, necessarily agree penitentiary, than for for an that Edwards otherwise case,” crime, supra, imposing v. was a “remarkable the court the sen- offense holding.” impris- nor did it new articulate a “bold This shall fix a definite term of tence onment, State, Dryden years supra, court in fore be- v. six shall establish a maximum and but Edwards, anticipated holding. the Edwards for which said convict shall minimum term Edwards, supra, Supreme In Court did not prison. The term be held in said maximum quote Dryden. they Perhaps have. should longest longer term shall not be than by punishment the of- fixed law for the appellant stipulated 3. In advance of trial convicted, fense of which he was polygraph results test be admitted be less than the minimum term shall not Appellant personally signed stip- evidence. punish- for the shortest term fixed ment of the offense of which he was convict- law ulation. ed.” 7-13-201, 4. Section W.S.1977:

179 State, Sanchez v. In Wyo., ing 592 P.2d 1130 sentence of not less than 19 years nor (1979), this Court vacated the sentence and than years. more 20 We cannot improve on remanded the matter for further sentencing what Justice Roberts said in Common proceedings. That decision was based on Riggins, wealth v. 115, 377 140, 474 Pa. A.2d judge’s trial failure to proba- consider (1977), 147 regarding why judges trial decision, tion before sentencing. In that explain should their reasons for sen this Court directed that the American Bar imposed. tence Justice, Association Standards for Criminal “The requiring benefits of the trial court Probation, and other sources “be given to state its reasons imposition for the proper probation consideration where First, its sentence are requir- manifold: considered as an alternative to incarcera- ing the trial court to articulate its reasons 5 tion.” Here appellant strong plea made a for selecting a sentence will promote for probation and his petition was denied. thoughtful more consideration of relevant

We have also factors and help said that in the will imposition rationalize the sen- sentence, of a tencing process. criminal judge It safeguard exercis- will ing judicial against give discretion should arbitrary con- decisions prevent sideration to circumstances, all aggravating consideration of improper and irrelevant State, as Cavanagh v. mitigating. well as factors. It will minimize the risk of re- Wyo., 505 (1973). P.2d 312 The trial upon liance inaccurate information con- court here weighed and considered all the tained in the presentence report. A circumstances very carefully. statement of reasons aid may correction authorities if the sentence results in a jurisdictions other a number of cases commitment, and may therapeutic have been remanded for sentencing further value if the sentencing judge explains his proceedings under circumstances not found or her reasons to the defendant. Requir- here. example: For “ * * * provide a trial court a reasoned where a sentence imposed basis for the sentence imposed may en- upon (1) the basis of misinformation of hance the court’s legitimacy perceived constitutional magnitude, such as an inac- judges themselves participants record, curate Townsend v. criminal justice criminal system. It will aid Burke, 736, 741, U.S. 68 S.Ct. in attaining courts their institutional (2) com- ob- (1948), a record 92 L.Ed. jective of dispensing equal convictions, impartial prising prior unconstitutional justice and will Tucker, society demonstrate to v. e.g., United States goals these met. Rea- L.Ed.2d 592 sentencing soned may decisions encour- sentence (3) of a simultaneous the effect age development of sentencing crite- a more serious count upon and conviction ria and reduce disparity in sentences —de- indictment, invali- of the which was later creasing the States, unusually number of lenient McGee v. United dated, 462 F.2d unusually as well as harsh Fi- sentences. (4) (2d 1972), failure Cir. nally, a statement of reasons will be in- mitigating and consider court to receive aiding valuable in Malcolm, appellate courts as- circumstances, United States v. certain whether imposed sentence United (2d 1970).” 432 F.2d Cir. upon accurate, was based Brown, sufficient and (2d States 479 F.2d proper information.” 1973). Cir. also complains Watkins, Colo., also, People the tri See 613 P.2d judge

al did not give 633, 637, his reasons for impos n. 14 *8 “ * * * suggest State, We do not Wyo., these are the incarceration.” Sanchez v. sources district (1979). courts look for should P.2d guidance they or that should consider See them- Bar Association American Standards for thereby. selves bound they We direct Sentencing Criminal Justice Procedures, Alternatives and given proper be 1980). (2nd consideration where §§ 18-1.1—18.8.2 Ed. probation is considered as an alternative seen with his wife except when he is about to

We recommend strongly apparently deny judge for The trial their reasons be sentenced. judges explain trial they by a profit the factors would ing probation and indicate felt that sentence. imposing considered in rehabilitation environment. structured disagree. not do sen that his Appellant asserts to the proportion out of greatly tence here. The sentence We see no abuse involuntary man average sentence for law. The provided limits for within the com in We are not slaughter Wyoming. sen- sentencing judge agonized over this sentencing. uniformity mitted to absolute consideration giving careful tence “ * * * insistence that We note counsel’s was not matters. This sentence mitigating from differently treated defendant was thought and without careful imposed charged with the same of persons other facts. volume of marshaling great of a the record does place, fense. In the first Affirmed. so, Even neither the not bear this out. of the United

Fourteenth Amendment concurring. ROSE, Justice, specially 1, 2, Wyo. nor Art. Constitution § States Const., equality. Only ar requires exact majority Although agree with the discrimination are bitrary and invidious be sentence must conviction and appellant’s condemned, present which neither of affirmed, completely different I do so for Cavanagh, supra, in this case.” State majori expressed in the reasons than those at 312. First, record review of the ty opinion. of each crime are differ- The circumstances court erred me that the trial convinces per- background ent. The of each convicted by ap made statements failing suppress son is and his rehabilitative needs different view, were, according my pellant which Also, of each potential are different. rights.1 his Miranda in violation of obtained productive be member of socie- convict to so, that I will later and for reasons Even require uni- ty is different. Were we to the admis conclude that explain, cannot sentencing guided by and be formity him. prejudiced sion of those statements effect, statistics, would, mandate sen- we sen inordinately severe respect With not substi- tencing by computer. We will I concur imposed appellant, tence judgment our own for that of tute applicable majority only because has clear- sentencing judge unless the latter concurring, gives law me no alternative. ly abused his discretion. I took in Scheikof position I reiterate the judge

In the case here the trial 1107, State, Wyo., 636 P.2d sky comprehensive presentence the benefit of a court to concerning the need for this report testimony and the of witnesses aspect of criminal sentencing review hearing. He knew much sentencing carefully. proceedings more background more about the judge ordinarily than a would know. It QUESTION THE MIRANDA anything opinion would add to this conclusion quarrel no with the I have positive negative aspects detail the concerning pro- majority reached say it appellant’s background; suffice admissibility priety negative outweighed positive. Ap When to the authorities. initial statement sentencing that he pellant emphasized at chief’s entered the appellant Daniel We do not find it family oriented. he was re- informed him that for who is to be office and unusual a defendant about of Helen the accidental death family. sponsible sentenced to concerned about his for be volun- rarely thereby made a Bunning, To A man is Mr. Daniel paraphrase proverb:6 rarely except 1. Miranda v. 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. 6. “A man is seen with his wife running 10 A.L.R.3d when he is or is about to be indicted public office.”

181 tary rights, statement which him the which implicated and, in he voluntarily, pre- did crime. by sumably, As noted the such ad- with a majority, understanding full proscriptions consequences missions fall outside of the of of the waivers. synopsis This of Arizona, 436, suspect the facts a willing Miranda v. 384 U.S. 86 describes S.Ct. and to ready proper talk guidance after and L.Ed.2d 10 A.L.R.3d given by assistance are the in police ex- (1966), in subsequent and are admissible a plaining the rights constitutional which he criminal prosecution. is to entitled or waive assert and which My majority with the dispute focuses rights does in fact a waive with full their of affirmance the trial court’s decision understanding of consequences. the to admit to later declarations record, however, of My review the con- the in the statement-taking process. vinces me in picture painted that the the view, In the majority these be utterances majority opinion glosses impor- over several they came admissible because were obtain tant details that a poignantly suggest situa- ed appellant had knowingly and intel tion involving suspect who asserts his ligently his rights waived constitutional to counsel to be later persuaded these rights guaranteed by the and 5th i.e., argued po- out of it the by otherwise — 6th Amendments to the United States Con lice officers involved. This is what oc- stitution Art. of and the Wyoming § at ap- curred the station before the disagree Constitution. this conclu pellant gave his statement to the officers. sion challenged because the statements were, in my judgment, in obtained violation September 19, appellant volun- On of appellant’s rights as identified Miran tarily went to office of the Police Chief Arizona, da v. supra, Edwards v. Springs Russell Hawk of the Rock Police to Department L.Ed.2d order turn himself State, Dryden Wyo., and the which Run- 535 P.2d incident resulted in Helen ning’s was death. Chief Hawk informed secretary that an individual wanted to of support my position respect, Bunning case, to speak him about the necessary it is for me clarify enlarge to Daniel, whereupon together Mr. with his upon the statement of the facts surround- children, wife was to the admitted taking the of appellant’s statement. Upon entering, Chief’s office. Daniel said do this because I believe majority opin- the responsible that he was for the “accident” ion fails capture the all relevant college. that occurred at the The Chief to capture facts—fails flavor and the clarification, requested a it be- after which tenor of the place— conversations that took referring came was appellant clear fails perceive what accurately Mr. Daniel Bunning As majority homicide. in fact said The police. result is that note, responsibility for appellant confessed opinion reader of the majority given is time the victim’s death while at the same an impression inexact really as to what claiming junc- it was an accident. At this transpired station. ture, Hawk Miran- gave majority suggests that appellant thereafter, warning. Immediately Dan- da spoke first to the De- Springs Rock Police to have “probably iel that he would like said partment implicated himself in the added.) (Emphasis attorney present." Then, death of the is victim—which true. absolutely ig- request This demand or upon realizing probable cause for except Chief then ordered nored that the existed, arrest appel- Chief read tape so produce two officers to recorder lant rights all Miranda conversation could interview be recorded. ceased until two other officers arrived ap- contrary majority’s view— Thus— order begin tape-recorded interview. pellant demanded an or assistance suggested It then taped be- before the interview counsel again explained read and gan. sequence his Miranda events is confirmed This given portion: taped opportunity beginning waive those *10 cers, to waive continually pressed appellant

“CHIEF HAWK: for whose services he right to counsel you 2:15 and told me that “Yes —about short, In expressed a need. had earlier to the for the accident responsible were of it. This is substan- talked him out clarify acci- you woman. I asked what which following interchange by tiated dent, said, the woman you ‘Where had read of the officers knife.’ Is that cor- occurred after one was killed with the rights: appellant rect? his DANIEL: “MR. HAWK: “CHIEF “Accidentally. ‘Yes, sir,’ to “Now, have answered you Okay, you “CHIEF would questions. HAWK: of these all “Well, ask— yes. only were the you That

person responsible that was involved OFFICER: “POLICE for that? like to do now is I would “Okay, what “MR. DANIEL: for a waiver. ask “Yes, sir. “CHIEF HAWK: “CHIEF HAWK: words, being that “In the waiver other legal rights “I advised you your So, would have read this statement. you you’d told me that point you you have again it now you read attorney an probably like to have with Mr. questions all answered (Emphasis added.) present.” reading it? Grymes appellant stated to Following colloquy, this OFFICER: “POLICE Hawk, necessary, Chief “if it’s because waiver just would read that you “If just advantage want to be taken don’t about it. any questions you and if that,” like and he received anything DANIEL: “MR. Hawk: following response from Chief afford a law- “May I still —if I can’t “CHIEF HAWK: ? appointed lawyer be a yer may still — “Well, and like I’ve necessary, it’s not HAWK: “CHIEF rights of you, you your told if do waive “Well, at the you we wouldn’t talk to and I’ve told having attorney present, an attorney. to have an you want point your thing, wife the same that we would now. You you would discuss it with willing you just be to discuss—and let tell right representation to have do have the your story happened. you as to what If time, now, but later on not at this accident, attorney saying it’s an if want an thing. you That’s you self-serving will tell that’s a declara- you going not to talk to attorney, we’re to, again, you you tion. It’s —but if want just going put you now. We are right down, know, got your to have you’ve sit things down.” in the bucket and shut going if present you’re here added.) (Emphasis you make a I would tell statement. time, this that with what information Here, once appellant inquired when even us, you’ve given necessary it will be right appointed his again concerning you custody, you us to take into whether counsel, ignored and the question (Emphasis make the statement not.” rights dissertation of through chief went a added.) did not under- appellant obviously which this, appellant waived Shortly after convinces me stand. sequence The above of events the offi- by he was assured after assisting appellant, rather than Police, prejudice him.2 along with the other offi- that a waiver would cers knowingly any finding 2. This clear misstatement was recited Thus, rights. intelligently interrogating “Okay, notwith- waived officer follows: that— don’t, waiver, you my by signing you standing conclusions that the violat- don’t failing ques- your rights." added.) appellant’s rights to cease (Emphasis In ed waive lawyer, tioning I am opinion, preclude he had “asked” for must this statement alone may be him, used as my opinion, against outlined above evidence facts presence lead that he has conclusion that assert- appointed. either retained or ed his to counsel and later *11 The may defendant waive This, effectuation of that at right waived insistence. rights, provided these the waiver is made according views, to constituted a viola- voluntarily, knowingly intelligently. tion of the constitutional If, however, he any indicates in manner under the authorities discussed below. any stage and at the process of th&t he notes, majority opinion ably As the the attorney wishes to consult with an before cornerstone authority questions con- speaking questioning. there can be no the cerning of admissibility confessions re- Likewise, if the individual is alone and from sulting police interrogation is Miranda any indicates in manner he that does not Arizona, opinion the supra. that Unit- interrogated, police may wish to be the ed set the Supreme proce- States Court out question not him. The mere fact he required dures which the fol- may questions have answered some or low subject before an individual can be volunteered some statements his own interrogation. In describing custodial the deprive right does not him of the re- Warren, holding Chief Justice answering any inquir- frain from further court, writing for the stated: ies until he has consulted attor- holding spelled “Our will be out with ney and thereafter to be ques- consents specificity some pages the which follow (Emphasis added.) tioned.” at U.S. but briefly prosecu- stated it is this: the 444-445, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. may statements, tion not use whether Later in the opinion the Court further clari- exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming holding by stating: fied the interrogation from custodial the de- the any “If individual indicates in man- fendant it unless demonstrates the use of ner, at time any prior during ques- to or procedural safeguards to secure effective tioning, silent, that he wishes to remain against the privilege self-incrimination. the must At cease. this By custodial we mean interrogation, point he has shown that he intends questioning initiated lawby enforcement privilege; exercise his Fifth Amendment person officers after a has been taken person after in- any statement taken the into custody deprived or otherwise of his privilege vokes his cannot be other than any significant freedom of action in way. product compulsion, or oth- the subtle procedural safeguards As for the to be right to cut off erwise. Without the employed, fully unless other effective setting the in- questioning, in-custody per- means are devised to inform accused terrogation operates on the individual right sons of their of silence and to assure free a producing overcome choice it, a opportunity continuous to exercise has privilege statement after the been the following measures are required. once If the individual states invoked. Prior to questioning, person must he interroga- that wants an be warned that he has remain cease until an attorney tion must silent, time, statement he make individual present. does At case, including background, experience, also convinced that the State also failed to prove knowingly intelligently that he and conduct of the accused.’ Zerbst, Johnson right. waived that In Edwards v. su- 304 U.S. S.Ct. [58 pra, 451 U.S. at (1938).” 101 S.Ct. at 1466] Court D.C.Cir., stated rule Hinckley, as follows: 672 F.2d See also: U. S. v. rule, anyone reasonably how I cannot see “It is 115. Given this clear under our cases that appellant knowingly that the waivers of can conclude counsel must not be volun- tary, especially intelligently relinquished any rights knowing but must also constitute a intelligent relinquishment signing being told abandonment privilege, waiving a known depends a matter which waiver he not be form would ‘upon particular in each case rights. surrounding facts and circumstances remarks as interpret defendant’s to confer opportunity must have an and did noth- present request him for counsel and to have attorney attorney county If during any subsequent questioning. ing except to inform likewise county attorney individual cannot obtain thereof. that he wants one before request and he indicates and did deaf ear to turned a respect his speaking police, they must obtaining the it until after nothing about (Emphasis decision to remain silent.” when he told de- he wanted information 473-474, 86 added.) 384 he an attor- thought needed fendant it. It something would do about . ney and conversation, and following clear that in decid- The Court also made it brought though defendant had been only reiterating even they the case were *12 peace on another justice to an individual a of the rights guaranteed those before 19th, county and 6th Amendments that the attor- charge under the 5th on the complaint United States Constitution. 23rd caused ney on the to be filed and on the warrant for arrest opportunity We had an to discuss jus- a defendant before brought 24th the 1, rationale to Art. 11 apply the Miranda § 5(a), required by Rule peace tice of the Dryden v. Wyoming of the Constitution in W.R.Cr.P. State, (1975). P.2d 483 In that Wyo., 535 case, inter- the accused had twice informed respond failure to “We hold that this of his desire to obtain rogating officers defendant statements of the repeated counsel, Spe- requests ignored. which were violation of counsel was a that he desired suspect of his arrest the cifically, day the rights as set constitutional defendant’s “ that T arresting had informed the officer 535 P.2d at 492. in Miranda.” forth ” get when I into town’ get lawyer will a previously the upon we relied Dryden, In “ T following day and on the he stated Miranda, supra, in language from quoted ” Id. at attorney.’ think should have constitutional determining response, In we not held that 487-488. unequiv- since Miranda rights were violated challenged the confessions should have been to cease once required questioning all ocally had received suppressed appellant because right to counsel. asserted his that, improper warnings, but we also held the opinion, long after the Miranda Not Miranda, interrogation under all should a Supreme considered Court United States provided have ceased until counsel had been challenged the petitioner which the case in for in- effectively since he had confession because he be- admission of his formed the officers that he desired a law- lieved, Miranda, rights had been his under yer. discussing aspect In this latter the 731, Cupp, In Frazier v. 394 U.S. violated. case we said: (1969), 684 89 S.Ct. in the in engaging “Without exercise during portion a accused had stated indulged by county semantics sher- get “I I had better interrogation that think iff, we think it is established reject- In anymore.” before I talk lawyer appropriate time the possible earliest that, claim, since found ing his the Court have the defendant indicated his desire to the Miran- had been tried before petitioner assistance and advice of counsel. Instead decided, holding of case had been da proceeding of then determine whether retroactively applied could not be that case position defendant was in a financial considered petitioner’s claim so require obtain such or would counsel Illinois, decision in Escobedo light appointment county of an L.Ed.2d 977 S.Ct. U.S. the statement ignored authorities However, dicta, the noted Court proceeded interrogation with continued might decision Miranda their that under highly damaging that resulted in admis- been different: have by Having again sions the defendant. statement that his argues “Petitioner

been advised of defendant’s desire for was sufficient getting lawyer counsel on the 18th the sheriff chose to about officers, bring play implicated Escobedo into tence several himself immediately stopped should concerning in the same crime had which he questioning and obtained counsel for previously refused to discuss. After might agree ap- him. We were Miranda counsel, first peti- assertion of his desire for plicable to this this Miranda Later, tioner placed had been in a cell. court held ... indi- suspect] several had requested ‘[i]f [a detectives come and stage cates in manner and at to interview Edwards. Edwards told process that he wishes consult with guard speak he did not desire but an attorney before there can be speaking guard responded that he had to. At that U.S., no questioning.’ 384 at 444-445 petitioner [86 point was taken to the room 1612], S.Ct. at But Miranda does and, waiting where the detectives were af- added.) apply (Emphasis case.” rights, gave ter read Miranda at 1424. U.S. S.Ct. re- inculpatory statement. Court grounds versed conviction on In Michigan Mosley, its 1975 decision in petitioner’s constitutional to silence 46 L.Ed.2d 313 violated the second Supreme the United Court States and all statements derived therefrom petitioner’s held consti- that no violation of suppressed. should have been so hold- petitioner tutional occurred where ing, the stated: Court asserted his to remain silent dur- *13 “Second, an interrogation regarding although initial some have that we held honored, robberies that had initially being wish been after of advised his Miran- but he later implicated had himself an da rights, may validly the accused himself being questioned by unrelated murder after rights interroga- waive his respond a fully different who had ad- tion, officer Butler, supra, see North Carolina v. vised of a him his second time. It 1755, at U.S. 372-376 S.Ct. [441 369] [99 case, was important majority, to the in that 1756-59, 286], at 60 L.Ed.2d the has Court elapsed some four hours had between strongly indicated that additional safe- interviews, the first and second and also guards necessary when the accused questioning the second session involved counsel; asks for and we now hold that a crime that was first. In unrelated the right when an accused invoked his has distinguishing the case from other situa- present during have in- counsel custodial Miranda, tions of violative the Court stated: terrogation, right a of valid waiver therefore, case,

“This is not a where by showing only cannot be established the police failed to honor a decision of a responded police-initia- that he to further person cut custody questioning, off interrogation ted even if he has custodial either by refusing to discontinue the in- been of his rights. advised further terrogation upon request by persisting Edwards, accused, hold that an such in repeated efforts to wear down his re- having expressed his to deal with desire change sistance and make him mind.” counsel, not police only through the is 105-106, 423 at 96 at U.S. S.Ct. 327. subject interrogation by to further the until counsel has been made authorities supra, If v. Michigan Mosley, any caused him, the him- available to unless accused confusion do as what the can after communication, self further ex- initiates suspect a of rights recog- invokes one the changes, police. conversations with the Miranda, nized in the United Su- States as- “Miranda itself indicated that preme doubts, recently Court removed any a right sertion of the to counsel was supra. Edwards v. There the justices significant faced a event and that once exercised challenge were accused, interrogation by of ‘the must admissibility statements made petitioner present.’ is attorney he cease until had first invoked his right then, U.S., and had after insis- at at Our later counsel3 S.Ct. [86 1627]. attorney during making “I interview: want an before a deal.” Petitioner stated initial time the to silence because at right that view. have not abandoned

cases invoked, was the officers Mosley, v. S.Ct. to counsel Michigan right U.S. [96 any was 321, interrogation the Court nor 46 L.Ed.2d not cease the did 313] be- distinguished Miranda had by appellant noted that conversation initiated further trig- procedural safeguards tween question of If such is the himself. and a gered request a to remain silent voluntary waiv- knowing, intelligent, and required attorney and had request for an following discussion As the er never arises. attorney interrogation cease until an that, show, in and I can conclude will present if individual stated ex- then and there under the circumstances U.S., that he wanted counsel. at Police, offices of the Chief isting in the S.Ct., 10]; n. 10 n. see [96 proba- that he “would statement id., S.Ct., also at 109-111 at 329- [96 attorney present,” have an bly like to (White, J., concurring). In Fare 330] his desire sufficient to inform C., supra at 719 Michael U.S. [442 707] [99 questioning attorney and that all to have an 197], S.Ct. The failure of stopped. should ‘rigid Miranda’s rule Court referred to required the interrogation police to cease attorney request that an accused’s suppress appellant’s later court to district of his Fifth per se an invocation error to do so. It was statement. that all in- rights, requiring Amendment course, appel- of whether question Of Term, last terrogation cease.’ And to counsel actually invoked lant custody had suspect in a case where a previ- depends interpretation on an counsel, invoked his Miranda from Miranda v. Ari- ously quoted language ‘undisputed referred to the again Court zona, supra: silent and right’ under Miranda to remain free of ‘until he had to be however, “If, indicates in manner he Rhode Island lawyer.’ consulted with stage process and at Innis, [100 with an before wishes to consult *14 1688, recon- 297] questioning.” be no speaking there can and, firm views to lend them sub- these 444-445, added.) 384 (Emphasis U.S. stance, emphasize that it is inconsistent at 1612. 86 S.Ct. progeny with and its for the Miranda one that has been dealt question This is authorities, instance, at their to reinterro- other courts. comprehensively by has clear- gate custody an accused in if he Harris, 191 example, People For (Em- ly right asserted his to counsel.” 234, (1976) accused 552 P.2d 10 the Colo. 485, added.) phasis 451 101 484— get lawyer?” can I a inquired, “When at 1884. get one police responded that he could the is import holding The of in Edwards Saturday it a when Monday since was right has invoked his that once an accused questioned. was the defendant counsel, required to cease to holding subsequent that statement further interrogation, all efforts at appellant was taken in violation made occur discussion between the two can Supreme Court rights, his Miranda the ac- provided when counsel is or when stated: Colorado of further cused himself is the initiator conversation. request for an “The defendant made were officers attorney, and

Thus, me, presented for only question defend- on notice that the thereby placed whether or not the in this case concerns constitutional to exercise his ant intended actually appellant did in fact and in law not the demand was rights. Admittedly, present right assert his to have counsel proper sophisticated legally or in the most during the initial conversation with form, point, At did, adequate. but it was that it clear from Police. If he is until should have ceased the above authorities that his statement all was made available attorney of his an was violation constitutional taken in 187 counsel); People Lewis, accused. The fact that the accused did 47 Mich.App. per- (1973) not ‘demand’ an does not 209 N.W.2d 450 (inquiry by ac- cused exercising getting suade us that he was not as to possibility an attor- rights.” ney right).6 552 12. was sufficient invoke P.2d at Likewise, Nicholson, above-quoted clearly cases stand for Or.App. in State v. proposition is it not (1974), necessary P.2d 140 the court cited outright, accused to state “I approval holding earlier case law want an “ attorney,” right when in order for the ‘Maybe accused to have says, should see an present Rather, counsel to be invoked. they or I talk should with an attor- ” stand for the well-considered rule ney,’ this is express request a sufficient where an gives police any accused indi- invoking present counsel cation, manner,” “in that he desires an before questioning. opinion, In that attorney all questioning inquiry on their court further stated that Miranda does not part terminated, and, must be under Ed- allow inquiry into the accused’s reason for wards v. supra, questioning cannot requesting clearly counsel but rather man- resume until provided counsel the ac- dates that stop until an questioning attor- cused himself instigates further contact. ney is present. P.2d Id. 527 at 142. Final- ly, the court noted: Applying the rule I have discussed to “The required defendant is not to make the facts of this can reach but one counsel; repeated requests for one is suf- conclusion, which is that did in ficient.” 527 P.2d at fact and law invoke his to counsel when he “probably stated he would want to Similarly, Ireland, in People v. 70 Cal.2d have counsel At present.” point it was 75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 40 A.L.R.3d upon incumbent cease all con- P.2d Supreme the California tact with provided until Court asserted that even where an accused lawyer. they Since did not cease contact makes an indirect that he indication desires but, instead, undertook convince Daniel counsel, the presence of such a statement lawyer he did not need a and that a requires an immediate cessation of any rights, waiver would prejudice questioning.5 For similar statements of the pro- statement obtained subsequently State, Alaska, rule see: Giacomazzi v. cured in violation of Daniel’s constitutional P.2d (1981) (no particular form of rights. Therefore, trial court erred in words are necessary for accused to in failing suppress statement. voke his right counsel); U. v. Presti S. giacomo, 504 F.Supp. (1981) (state above, As I have I am indicated neverthe- “ ment *15 ‘maybe be good it would to have a appel- less convinced admission of ” lawyer’ to was sufficient invoke prejudice lant’s statement not him or did counsel); Stroh, People 1000, v. 48 N.Y.2d affect the trial jury outcome of his since the 425 548, (1980) N.Y.S.2d 401 N.E.2d 906 convicted Mr. Daniel of the crime to which (statement wanted to talk accused he had originally confessed —that “a priest attorney” or an was sufficient causing of the accidental death Helen Bun- Nash, invoke right counsel); State v. 119 ning. merely a more statement 728, N.H. (1979) (statement 407 by A.2d 365 detailed which was version of his confession “ accused ‘he thought he had better talk to story consistent with his previous ” an attorney’ was sufficient to invoke right by victim’s death occurred accident. The Ayers, Or.App. attempts 4.See: State not v. make further extract a waiver 518 P.2d (1974). once is to counsel invoked. People Enriquez, confirming 5.In v. 19 Cal.3d 6.For the rule similar statements Cal.Rptr. 171, Finkbeiner, (7th (1977) 561 P.2d see: White v. 611 F.2d 186 Cir. that, 1979); (6th Maglio Jago, court cited the v. Cir. Ireland case reiterated F.2d Miranda, Clark, 1978); (4th under it and the of rules S. 499 F.2d 802 U. v. Cir. questioning 1974). must cease but also the can- compelled my position I feel to italicize to affect the out nothing added details did because, bar, in the case at Jacobson, subject 63 on this People come of his trial. v. his conviction sentence for appellant’s 405 P.2d 555 46 Cal.Rptr. Cal.2d homicide is severe indeed. negligent of I in this reason alone concur For in its brief admits that Even the State majority. the result reached by the imposed sentence 19-year-minimum than judge years longer some 12 trial is THE ASPECT SENTENCING involuntary imposed minimum sentence Likewise, I concur in the result reached Wyo- in manslaughter recent case respect to the sentenc- by majority majority that we ming. agree I with the case, but, in the ing aspect of uniformity, should not demand cannot and breath, I ex- position same reiterate the crimi- purpose that the of but it is also true State, supra, pressed Scheikofsky is to aid in sentencing nal in this state develop regard to the need for this court to help and to socie- defendant’s rehabilitation against which trial-court sentenc- standards prevention of crime ty attaining goal its ing may be tested. whether the sen- deterrence. I wonder specifically imposed in this case tence urged adoption of Scheikofsky, purposes. accomplish these calculated standards that appropriate sentence-review join on the court me in my brothers Until sentencing compatible would be with the that I meaningful concepts into the inquiry 15 of the purposes expressed in Art. § sentencing stan- expressed, appellate way of reitera- Wyoming By Constitution. In the mean- adopted. will not be dards tion, provision says: this constitutional time, majority opinion in the must concur be framed on the penal “The code shall past authority since under our the sentence principles humane of reformation and statutory within the clearly in this case falls prevention.” this parameters legislature set —and mandate, Scheikofsky, Under I said in this standard that this court now is the still, past am that our opinion and I recognizes. history refusing of to review á sentence meaning- develop when we Until the time falling statutory parameters within is not ex- against which to test the ful standards citizenry of of the best interests discretion, I will be sentencing ercise Wyoming. having position to remain in the forced encourages ap- Today’s trend in the law holds opinions where the court to concur in pellate enlightened courts take a more long as that discretion has not been abused regard sentencing stance with statutory param- sentencing falls within Conceding that sen- criminal offenders. eters. tencing within the discretion authority lies reluctantly. I therefore concur—but court, in the important aspect of a trial thereby be judicial process should not scruti-

placed beyond pale appellate Messer, Iowa,

ny. 306 N.W.2d State Jones, La.,

(1981); v. State So.2d Watkins, Colo., 613 P.2d

(1981); People v. Dillon, (1980); 100 Idaho State (1979). Sentencing inquiry

604 P.2d 737 guided by be the reason-

and review should Chaney, adopted

able standards in State v.

Alaska, (1970), which 477 P.2d 443-44 concurring opin-

standards I set out in State, supra. Scheikofsky

ion in

Case Details

Case Name: Daniel v. State
Court Name: Wyoming Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 28, 1982
Citation: 644 P.2d 172
Docket Number: 5553
Court Abbreviation: Wyo.
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