49 W. Va. 554 | W. Va. | 1901
Lead Opinion
At tlie election, held in Fayette County, November 6, 1900, N. Daniel was the candidate on the Eepnbliean ticket for the office of sheriff and P. M. Snyder the candidate on the Democratic ticket for the same office. The face of the returns, as laid before the board of canvassers, showed that Daniel had received four thousand one hundred and sixteen votes and Snyder four thousand three hundred and ninety-six. Daniel demanded, a recount. Such recount was had, and, as the result thereof, it was found that Daniel had received four thousand one hundred and thirty-seven votes and Snyder four thousand four hundred and fifty. During the recount, Daniel objected to the counting for Snyder of more than four hundred votes, and his objections being overruled and the vote counted for Snyder, he objected, at the conclusion of the recount, to the granting of a certificate of election to Snyder, and his objection was overruled, the result declared and said certificate granted. Then, upon the petition of Daniel, the judge of the circuit court of said county issued an alternative writ of mandamus, commanding the board of canvassers to reconvene and recount the ballots and reject the ballots, to the counting of which for Snyder, Daniel had objected, and then to declare the result according to the facts. On the 27th day of December, 1900, two of the members of the board of canvassers and Snyder appeared and moved to quash the alternative writ. The petitioner then amended the petition, with leave of the. court, by making Snyder a party thereto. This was objected to by the defendants, but their objection was overruled and they then renewed their motion to quash the writ. On the 31st day of December, 1900, the cause came on for hearing, the motion to quash was overruled, the ballots in question, having been brought into court, were examined, and the court, being of opinion that they should not have been counted for Snyder, but should have been rejected and not counted at all, awarded a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding the board of examiners to reconvene as such and recount the original ballots and absolutely reject and
It is conceded in the argument that enough of these ballots to change the result, shown on the face of the returns, are in the same condition as were those rejected, under the mandate of this Court, in the case of Morris v. Board of Canvassers, 48 W. Va. 251, (38 S. E. 500). The ballot sheet contained five ballots, columns or tickets. The first or left-hand column was the Democratic ballot. Next to it was the Prohibition Party ballot. Next to this was the People’s Party ballot. After that was the Social Democratic Party ballot. The last or right-hand column was the Republican ballot. In each of these columns appeared, first, the names of candidates for presidential' electors; second, candidates for State offices; third, candidates for representatives in congress; fourth, candidates for State senator; fifth, candidates for county offices, under the designation of “County Ticket;” sixth, candidates for district offices. The rejected ballots were marked in the following manner: All the columns, except the Republican and Democratic, were completely defaced by lines drawn clear down through them from the top to the bottom. A line was drawn through the Democratic ballot from the top clown to the words “County.Ticket,” the balance of it remaining undefaced. ■ Then a line was drawn from the words “County Ticket” on the Republican ballot down, to the bottom, leaving the National, State, Congressional and Senatorial tickets undefaced.
Although it was clearly the intention of the persons depositing these ballot sheets to vote the Republican National, State, Congressional and Senatorial tickets and the Democratic county and district tickets, the votes so intended for Snyder were properly ordered by the circuit court to be rejected, for the reason that that intention is not expressed in the manner prescribed by law. The reasons assigned in the opinion in Morris v. Board of Canvassers, prepared by Judge BhaNNON, are sufficient, conclusive and based upon the undoubted weight of authority. But in view of the thorough argument of this case, and of the criticism and argument found in Judge DeNt’s dissenting opinion in that case, further discussion of the principles involved is deemed appropriate.
Section 66; “If two or more ballots be found folded or rolled together and the names thereon be the same, one of them only shall be counted; but if the names thereon be different, in any particular, neither of them shall be counted except as herein-before provided; and, in either case, the commissioners of election shall, in writing in ink, place a common number on said ballots and state thereon that they were folded or rolled to-, gether when voted. If any ballot be found to contain more than the proper number of names for any office such ballot shall not be counted as to such office. In any election for senator, if a person be voted for on any ballot who is not a resident of the proper county, as required by the fourth section of the sixth article of the Constitution, such ballot shall not be counted, for said office. Any ballot which is not endorsed with the names of the poll clerks, as provided in this chapter, shall be void and shall not be counted; and any ballot, or part of a ballot, from which it is impossible to determine the elector’s choice of candidates, shall not be counted as to the candidate or candidates affected thereby. On completing the count, and recording the same on tally sheets, the commissioners of election shall immediately make a memorandum of the total vote cast for each candidate, deliver a copy thereof to each member of such board, and post a copy thereof on the front door of the polling room, and transmit a copy thereof to the clerk of the county court, who shall post the same in his office for public inspection.”
That part of section 34, which is here involved, is directed to the voter mahdy, and prescribes the manner of preparing his ballot or ticket. Section ^66 is directed to the precinct election officers and tells them how they shall proceed in ascertaining the result of the election at the precinct. The meaning of the word “ballot” as used in each of these sections is of vital importance. As found in some parts of section 34, it undoubtedly means the whole sheet of paper on which all the columns are
Now, it is contended, presumably for two reasons, that the word “ballot” .here means the separate offices and candidates to be voted for, and not either the sheet or the column. The first reason is, that the word is plural, in some places, and the second, that a ballot has been defined as “A piece of paper, or suitable material with the name written or printed upon it, of the person to be voted for.” Cush. Leg. Assemb., s. 103; Cooley’s Cons. Lim., 760. Why the word is here made plural does not appear and no satisfactory reason can be assigned for it. That it does not mean the separate offices and candidates to be voted for, a large number of imaginary ballots all in one column under the designation of “Republican Ticket” or “Democrtaic ticket,” is clear from the language of the section as well as from the context.
This statute contemplates and means that the voter shall cast one ballot. The first thing the voter shall do, after obtaining the ballot sheet from the clerk, is to select “the ballot he intends to vote,” noL Ihe ballots he intends to vote; for it says, “A voter desiring to erase the name of any candidate from the ballot ho intends to vote.” That the word “ballot” here means the whole column is apparent from this language. If it only meant that part of the column sufficient to contain the name of one candidate, the statute, instead of saying “erase the name of any candidate from the ballot” would say erase the name of the candidate from the ballot. If the word ballot in this section means
To reach the conclusion that the word ballot used in this direction to the voter means a single name on a ballot sheet, and the words “Democratic ballots” and “Republican ballots” mean the several names appearing respectively, in the Democratic and Republican columns on the sheet, not only requires an analysis of the language too intricate and refined to have been intended, by the legislature, to be unraveled by the ordinary citizen, but is found also to be illogical and contradictory of the-terms of the statute itself. Ballot means what the legislature, the people, and the courts of this State understood it to mean, at the time of the passage of the act, and had understood it to mean, for more than twenty-eight years prior thereto — a single
Section 34 is not ambiguous, but, if it were, the application of the familiar rules of interpretation and construction brings us irresistibly to the same conclusion. Under the law as found in the Code of 1860, the mode of voting in the state of Virginia, of which this State was then a part, was viva voce; although it was provided that “In an election for electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, the officer shall receive from each voter a paper or ticket containing the names of as many persons for electors as the state may be entitled to for the time being. The name of the voter shall be written on the back of the paper, and he shall also declare viva voce for whom he votes as electors, either by repeating the name of each person voted for, or by any other distinct designation of them collectively; provided, that if he be dumb, he may vote by ballot.” In 1863, under the old constitution, the legislature, in section 18 of chapter 3 of the acts, provided that “Every person offering to ■vote at an election shall present to one of the inspectors a single ballot, written or printed upon white paper, which shall be folded or rolled so that its contents cannot' be seen, and if there be any mark, color, or device visible on the same, intended to distinguish it from other ballots voted at the election, it shall not be received. The ballot shall contain the names of the persons for whom he wishes to vote, and designate the office he desires each mi them to" fill.” From that time until the passage of the act of 1891, this portion of the law, prescribing the mode of voting and defining a ballot, underwent some slight changes but remained substantially the same. Under the new constitution, that portion of the act which required the ballot to be folded or rolled so that its contents could not be seen, could not be retained and was stricken out, for the reason that the present constitution guarantees to the citizen the right to vote an open ballot. Immediately before the passage of the act of 1891, providing for the present system of voting, section 13 of chapter 3 of the Code provided that “Every person offering to vote at an election
The present Constitution of this State was adopted in 1872, nearly twenty years prior to the passage of the act of 1891, and section 2 of article IV of that instrument reads: “In all elections by the people, the mode of voting shall be by ballot; but the voter shall be left free to vote either an open, sealed or secret ballot as ho may elect.” What did the people, in adopting this Constitution, understand the word “ballot” to mean? Having used as a ballot, in all their elections for ten years, at least, a piece of white paper containing all the names of all the persons and propositions for whom and which they had voted in any one election, can it be possible that they understood it to mean only one name on that paper ? It is within the power of the legislature, of course, to change the form and definition of the ballot, and this is only referred to in connection with what precedes it, to show what ballot was understood to mean. The people of this State, for at least twenty-eight years, having used and recognized in all their eletcions, a piece of white paper, containing all the names of all the persons for whom any person intended to vote in any election, as the ballot and the legislature, and the courts having so recognized and understood it,> can it be possible that the legislature in section 34 of the act of 1891, giving to the voter directions for the preparation of his ballot, contemplated or intended a sort of ruing that the most vivid imagination would never detect or discover, except in the exigency of some particular case, and with the aid of learned and astute counsel ?
Under this old system of voting, which was not peculiar to this State but obtained practically throughout all the states, the door was wide open to fraud, and every election precinct was a scene of confusion and uproar. The ballots were not furnished by the officials but by individuals, generally by the executive committees of the contending political parties. Anybody could have printed and distributed among the people such ballots or
To show that the legislature recognized, in this act, that the voting in this State, as elsewhere, was directed and controlled by political organization, and that each political party nominated and presented to the people its “Ticket,” and desired the names of all of its candidates, its entire ticket u¡3on its own ballot, and that the legislature so provided, it is only necessary to examine the act generally. Section 18 defines a convention and says it “is an organised assembly of voters or delegates of any political party” for the purpose of nominating candidates. Section 19 defines a primary election and says it “is an election held by voters who are members of any political party” for the purpose of nominating cairdi dates. Section 21 provides for certifying the names of candidates nominated by a convention, by the presiding officer and secretary of the convention. Section-22 provides for certifying nominations made by primary elections. Section 23 prescribes the. form of the certificate, and contains a blank for the name of the political party. Section 24 provides for the nomination of candidates otherwise than by conventions
The practice under the election system then in existence was for the vast majority of the voters of the State to identify themselves with the two political organizations named in the statute. They then went to the polls and each selected, on the grounds on the outside of the election room or in the election room, or had selected before he reached the voting place, a ticket or ballot, obtaining it from whomsoever he might be able to get it. This ballot ordinarily contained the names of the candidates of the political party to which he belonged. Until he made changes in it, it contained no other names. It contained exactly what the legislature, in the act of 1891, requires to be put in the column at the head of which stands the name of the political organization to which the voter belongs. When the voter now looks upon that column he sees exactly what would be the old ballot, which he had been accustomed to vote, in that portion of the paper on which it is printed, if it were cut off from the balance of the sheet. The legislature has provided that all the ballots, to be used in an election now, shall be printed on one piece of paper side by side, that they cannot be handled by any person outside of the election room on election day, that they shall be printed and prepared by officers appointed for that purpose who shall keep them in their custody and control until required for the use of the voter at the very moment he proposes to vote, that the voter, upon obtaining one of these sheets shall first select, from all of those on the sheet instead of from the hand of a neighbor, the ballot he intends to vote and then permits him to make such changes in it as he desires to make, in substantially
How are statutes to be construed? How is the meaning of words in a statute to be ascertained ? How far is it permissible to inquire into the conditions existing at the time of the passage of the act? From what sources, and by what rules is the legislative intent to be ascertained ? Are the matters of history and legislation, above detailed, entitled to any weight or consideration in the solution of this question? The answers come from the highest court in the land.
“Where the language of a statute is in any manner ambiguous, or the meaning doubtful, resort may be had to the surrounding circumstances, the history of the times, and the defect or mischief which the statute was intended to remedy.” Smith v. Townsend, 148 U. S. 490; 23 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law 336. Our statute requires the board of ballot commissioners to distribute to the election precinct cards of instruction and sample ballots. These are to be posted up around the polling places and in the boothes, the sample ballots marked according to the instructions, printed on the cards. It is a well known fact, which is not denied, that these sample ballots in the election of 1900, and all former elections, held under the present law, were marked by the election officers at the precincts so as to show that the names of all candidates for whom the voter desired to vote should be in one column. That such were the instructions and the mode of voting in Fayette county is apparent from the fact that of the more than eight thousand ballots there used less than five hundred were prepared in a different way. Moreover, such were the instructions and sample ballots, sent out to the public by the executive committees of the leading political organizations. The election officers, therefore, so construed the statute as to require all the names to be in one column, and thus construed the word ballot to mean the column. “The construction, given to a statute by those charged with the duty of executing
It was not contended in the argument of this case, nor seriously in the Morris-Wertz Case that section 34 means anything else than a direction to the voter to place the names of all persons for whom he desires to vote in one column. It was, and is, insisted, by those who claim that the ballots in question here are legal, that the provisions of section 34 are directory and not mandatory; and, therefore, that the preparation of the ballot in a manner different from that directed by the law does not invalidate the vote of the person depositing the ballot so prepared. On the other hand, counsel for Daniel insist that these provisions are mandatory and that any departure from them invalidates the votes. This question is so thoroughly discussed in the opinion in the Morris-Wertz Case that it is deemed unnecessary to devote much time to it here. If the word ballot means a column, as is here hold, the rules by which to determine whether the provisions of the -statute are mandatory or directory show that in this instance they are mandatory and must be observed. Lord Mansfield’s rule is that the question depends upon whether that which was directed to be done was or was not of the essence of the thing required. Rex v. Locksdale, 1 Burr. 447. The supreme court of New York, in People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 290, has held that “Statutes directing the mode of proceeding by public officers are driectory, and are not regarded as essential to the validity of the proceedings themselves, unless it be so declared in the statute.” Judge Cooley says “This rule strikes us as very general, and is likely to include within its scope in many cases, things which are of the very essence of the proceeding.” Cooley’s Cons. Lim. 89. In People v. Schermerhorn, 19 Barb. 540, the same court holds “Statutory- requisitions are deemed directory only when they relate to -some immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter of convenience rather than of substance.” After considering this and other cases Judge Cooley lays down this rule: “Those directions which are not of the essence of the thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business, and.by a failure to obey which the rights of those inter
In the construction of this statute, the qualification of the-general rule must be applied, for there are words in the statute which “by necessary implication forbid the doing of the act in any other manner than as directed.”- After directing the voter how to prepare his ballot, the statute provides that “every other ballot on the same sheet shall be defaced by drawing one or more lines with pen and ink or indelible pencil from the top to the bottom thereof, or across the heading thereof, or in any other way indicating that the same has not been voted by the voter.” The statute also contains an express prohibition of the preparation of the ballot in any manner other,than that directed, as well as denounces a fatal consequence of disobedience,- in the clause: “But if more than one of said ballots have nothing on them to indicate which of them was not so voted then neither of them shall be counted.” Thus, by the highest test known to the courts and the law writers, the provisions of the statute in question are shown to be mandatory. It is not always necessary that a negative clause be used, to make it mandatory. Judge Cooley says, “There are cases where, whether a statute was to be regarded as merely directory or not, was made to depend upon the employing or failing to employ negative words, plainly importing that the act should be done in a particular manner or time, and not otherwise. The use of such words is often conclusive of an intent to impose a limitation; but their absence is
The legislature having so expressed its will, it is unnecessary to inquire why it compels the voter to put the names of all persons for whom he desires to vote on one ticket or ballot. It may be 'to 'preserve the secrecy of the ballot and to prevent fraud, intimidation or bribery, by requiring all ballots to be in the same form. That the legislature designed and intended that the ballots shall not be so distinguishable from on.e another as to make it possible for any voter to disclose, by the form of his ballot, or by any marie or device on it, how he voted, is perfectly clear. Section 79 of the statute makes it a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one or more than two years, for any voter to place any mark upon his ballot, or to suffer or permit any other person to do so, by which it may be afterwards identified as the ballot voted by him. It has been seen that under the former legislation of this State, no ballot was
The opinion, so distributed, was founded, in part at least) upon the decision of this Court in the' case of Dunlevy v. County Court, 47 W. Va. 513, (33 S. E. 956). Point 1 of the syllabus of that case is quoted at length in it. It was requested,' in the argument, that the record, -briefs and opinion in the Dunlevy Case, be carefully considered in the decision of this case. An examination of them fails to disclose that the question presented here and in the Morris-Wertz Case was raised there. Not a word of discussion of it appears in the briefs. The original ballots were not before this Court, but there are samples of them in the record. Exhibit No. 20 is marked with a cross above the headings of all the columns except the Reupbncan column, and Dun-levy’s name is transferred to the Republican column, and his competitor’s name striekep out of it. No. 21 is marked with a cross above the heading of each of the columns except the Democratic column. No. 40 is marked with two large crosses in each of the columns except the Republican column, and Davis’ name is stricken out in that and Dunlevy’s inserted, and the crosses are large enough to cover all the names except one in every column. No. 41 is marked with lines drawn through all the columns except the Republican, and Dunlevy’s name is transferred to that column and Davis’ stricken out, but the defacing lines do not reach throughout the entire length of the columns, the names of the congressional candidates only being not covered by the lines. No. 42 shows all the columns defaced except the Prohi
Is it covered by the principle laid down in the Dunlevy Case ? If, in reading the syllabus of that case, it is borne in mind that the word ballot means column, and does not mean ballot sheet, it will be seen that there is no conflict between it and the principles laid down here or the law as announced in the Morris-Wertz Case. It relates to the counting of the ballots by the voter. It is or should have been a construction of section 66 of the act of 1891 and not of section 34, the provisions of the latter section, here involved, having been obeyed by the voters in preparing their ballots. It simply reiterates what section 66 means, namely, that if it is possible to ascertain from the ballot what
But it is claimed that, if the statute is mandatory, then it abridges, or unreasonably impedes, the constitutional right of the citizen to vote, and is, therefore, unconstitutional. To what JudgeG Brannon has said on this subject, nothing need be added. To the same effect the following is quoted, however, from Cooley’s Cons. Lim. 757: “All such reasonable regulations of the constitutional right which seem to the legislature important to the preservation of order in elections, to guard against fraud, undue influence, and oppression and to preserve the purity of the ballot-box, are not only within the constitutional power of the legislature, but are commendable, and at least some of them absolutely essential.” What is unreasonable in this regulation? It is one of the most easily understood systems of voting known. It is, as has been shown, the old system under which we have voted ever since the organization of the State, worked over, modified, and, in fact, simplified.
The next question is whether the petitioner has mistaken his remedy. This Court has decided in numerous cases that mandamus does not lie, at common law, except in purely ministerial matters. Board v. Minturn, 4 W. Va. 300; State v. County Court, 33 W. Va. 389, (11 S. E. 72); Miller v. County Court, 34 W. Va. 285; State v. Herrald, 36 W. Va. 721; Marcum v. Ballot Com., 42 W. Va. 263; Saterlee v. Strider, 31 W. Va. 781. But it was held in Marcum v. Ballot Commissioners, cited, that, “Section 89 of chapter 3 of the Code, as re-enacted in chapter
Whether, at common law, the ascertainment and declaration of the result from the returns, including the ballots, upon a recount, is judicial or ministerial, it seems to have been the intention of the legislature to render that duty ministerial only, or to change the nature of the writ of - mandamus and make it applicable to all the duties of election officers, whether judicial or ministerial, and to enlarge the scope of the writ of mandamus' and, as to the latter duties, make it operate as a certiorari, and thus summarily review the action of such officers. This is undoubtedly true as to the duty of a board of canvassers in respect to some offices, if certain portions of the section are to have any meaning. Section 89 proceeds thus: “If a circuit court or a judge thereof in vacation, shall proceed against any board of canvassers by mandamus, or otherwise, to control, in any manner, the action of said board in the performance of Us duty, under the provisions of section 68 of this chapter, in any case concerning the election of a member of the house of delegates, or a State senator, and shall fail to enter a final order in such proceedings, settling all questions presented therein, within fifteen days from the commencement of such proceedings, unless delayed by proceedings of the Supreme Court of Appeals, or a judge thereof in vacation, the same shall be dismissed.” In another place this section reads “A mandamus shall lie from the ^Supreme Court of Appeals, or any one of the judges thereof in
Another contention is that, as the board of canvassers, at the time of the issuance of the writ, had completed the recount, declared the result, issued a certificate of election and finally adjourned, such writ, even if proper during the progress of the recount or before the completion thereof, was then improper because the board -was then functus officio. TJpon this question Judge, Cooley says: “Though as these boards are created for a single purpose only, and are dissolved by an adjournment without day, it has been held that, after such adjournment, mandamus would be inapplicable inasmuch as there is no longer any board which can act. But we should think the better doctrine to be, that if the board adjourn before a legal and complete performance of their duty, mandamus -would lie to compel them to meet and perform it.” Cooley’s Cons. Lim. 784. The case of Rosenthal v. Board of Commissioners, 19 L. R. A. 157, is cited by counsel for plaintiffs in error in support of this contention. In that case, the clerk of the'County court, in transmitting the returns to the State hoard of canvassers, by accident, mistake or design, transposed the totals of the votes received by two opposing candidates for the house of representatives, and thereby certified that the man, who had not been elected, had been. Before this mistake was discovered, the State board of canvassers met and canvassed the returns, including this wrong abstract, declared the result and' finally adjourned. About three weeks after the adjournment, the clerk of the county court sent
These views result in the conclusion that the provisions of section 34 of chapter 3 of the Code, requiring the names of all persons, for'whom the voter desires to vote, to-be in one of the columns on the ballot sheet, are mandatory, that any departure therefrom invalidates the ballot, that the writ of mandamus, from a circuit court or a judge thereof in vacation, lies to compel a board of canvassers to perform legally its duties, and that, by such writ they may be reconvened, after -adjournment, and compelled to correct errors committed by them in the discharge of their duties. The judgment and order of the circuit court
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting) :
I cannot concur in defeating the plainly expressed will of the people, unless in submission to a positive unequivocal enactment of the legislature, as to the meaning of which reasonable minds learned in the law cannot differ. In cases where the legislative enactment is evidently susceptible of two constructions, depending on the political bias of the construing mind, the will of the people should solve all doubts in their favor.
This is a ease strictly of this character.
The legislative enactment being uncertain and 'silent wherein it could easily have been made certain and positive the people took the advice of those learned in the law and followed it. The returns of the precinct commissioners and the ascertainment of the canvassing board, on recount demanded, showed the election of the Democratic candidate by a fair majority over the Bepub-lican. The will of the people was plain. The circuit judge,'however, proceeded to overthrow it, not because from the face of certain ballots the choice for sheriff was not plain, but because the voter had permitted the names of certain candidates for offices, in nowise affecting the sheriffalty, to remain in the Be-publican column, unerased. Thereby holding, that because the voters did not erase all the names of the candidates for all the officers in the Bepublican column their votes could not be counted for sheriff, although they did erase the name of the Bepublican candidate and plainly indicated their intention to vote for the Democratic candidate.
The judge then proceeds to reject a sufficient number of votes to change the result of the election.
Thus is the will of the people nullified and the will of the circuit judge substituted therefor.
This Court sustains the finding of the circuit judge rather than that of the election officers.
No reasoning however learned, specious or often repeated, can make wrong right or right wrong, although because of the tern-
It is conceded in the court’s opinion that the construction of the law by the election officers, charged with the duty of executing it, should not be overruled except for cogent reasons.
The word cogent here used may be made to mean just, that is consistent with abstract justice; or merely plausible, justified by political expediency.
The latter meaning is often confounded with the former by him whose mental bias is such that he is unable to discriminate between them. This may result from a defect of judgment rather than an error of the heart and be the outcome of pure or selfish motives.
Some persons are totally incapable of administering abstract justice when they have any interest at stake however remote. They are to be pitied, with a fellow-feeling pity, rather than condemned, for they labor under a natural mental blindness which prevents a clear conception of the truth.
For this cause the uniform decisions of the courts of all lands, from the highest to the lowest, have tacitly established a rule of practice as firmly as any rule of law and this is that in all political eases a political conclusion if plausible will prevail over abstract justice.
There have been notable exceptions to this rule sufficient in number to prove it, but they are not so numerous as the stars in the heavens or the sands on the seashore.
Whether this ease comes under the rule or the exception is for the people to decide. Ordinary courts cannot be expected to arise to such sublime heights of justice. To do so is to court political martyrdom at the hands of political associates. Occasionally an exalted attempt is made to overthrow the rule only to result in wormwood and gall. The people act on it presumptively, yet when an opportunity affords they sometimes administer a wholesome rebuke to its too strict adherents, while lesser offenders may go -unpunished or apparently receive a rich reward for party fealty. Such is human justice. And as such it must be accepted and submitted to until the time of the restitution of all things when the crooked shall be made straight, for to overcome it is a superhuman task. When men learn that to do
It is better than that confusion should continue to prevail in our elections, that the questions here raised should be settled according to precedent, though settled unjustly, although it is better still if they are settled justly.