170 Ky. 693 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1916
OPINION op th;b Court by
Reversing.
In May, 1915, Will- Clardy, a colored man, was assassinated, in Todd county, and the appellant, Cephas Daniel, was accused of being the perpetrator of the crime, and an- indictment for murder was returned against him, accusing him of the crime. Thereafter he was tried and found guilty by the jury, which, by its verdict, fixed his penalty at imprisonment for life and the court rendered judgment in accordance therewith. His motion for a new trial being overruled, he has appealed to this court and seeks a reversal of the judgment upon the ground that there was not any evidence heard against him, upon his trial, which conduced to prove his' guilt of the crime, or to support the Verdict of the jury and that the court' below was, in error, in overruling his motion for a peremptory instruction to the jury, directing, his acquittal and- his motion for anew trial.
The appellant'was a colored man and a laborer upon the farm of one, Mr. - Watts, where - he' had-lived for something -over a year preceding the perpetration of- the crime for which he was indicted, and a-woman, whose name .was- Lula Jefferson, and- one of his sisters,- resided with-him. He and the Jefferson woman had never been married, but seemed to have-lived together as husband and wife. The deceased, Will Clardy, during the-year-1915, preceding his death, was a hired laborer upon-the . farm of one Brockman, whose residence was from a mile and one-half to two miles distant from the residence of the appellant. Seven or eight months previous to his death,- the deceased and the appellant had an altercation at a' negro1 barbebue and 'dance at a place called Hatcher’s Springs, which grew out of the fact that the appellant discovered the deceased and Lula Jefferson engaged in a conversation.
In the yard which surrounded the dwelling house of Brockman there was- situated a-small house, which- was occupied by a colored man, Walker'Ferguson, and-his wife- and three children. The fence which- surrounded
It will be observed that the only evidence which, in any way, could connect the appellant with the death of deceased, was the threats which the Jefferson woman proved that he had made to do violence to deceased in the event that deceased should interfere with the relations between him and the woman. There is an entire absence of any other fact or circumstance, which in any
At the close of the evidence offered by the Commonwealth, the appellant moved the court to peremptorily instruct the jury to find a verdict for him, but this motion was. overruled, to which he excepted.
The question presented for determination by this court is, whether or not there is any evidence, which connected the .accused with the commission of the crime for which he was convicted, and, further, whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict of the jury. The well known rule to which this court adheres in the trial of criminal prosecutions is, that where there is any evidence which connects the accused with the crime and tends to prove his guilt, the issue of his guilt or innocence should be submitted to the jury for its decision. Commonwealth v. Boaz, 140 Ky. 715; Commonwealth v. Murphy, 109 S. W. 353; Spouse v. Commonwealth, 132 Ky. 269. It has, also, been held, that where no evidence is offered which tends to support the charge, that it is within the province of the trial court to' take the case from the jury and to direct its dismissal for want of proof ur to direct a verdict for the accused. Commonwealth v. Boaz, supra; Wilkerson v. Commonwealth, 25 R. 780; Commonwealth v. Murphy, supra; Scott v. Commonwealth, 28 R. 911; Abbott v. Commonwealth, 20 R. 727; Phillips v. Commonwealth, 12 R. 410; 14 S. W. 378.
The question to be considered and determined is, whether the proof of a threat by an accused to take the life of another, which is not supported by any fact or circumstance, which would tend to prove the guilt of the accused or to prove any attempt upon his part to carry his threat into execution or any opportunity to do so, is sufficient evidence of the guilt of the accused of the murder of the threatened person, to. submit the issue of his guilt or innocence to the determination of the jury. In the prosecution of one accused of a homicide, it is always competent to prove any threat of vio
Hence the judgment of conviction is reversed, and the cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.