DANIEL KEITH SINGLETON A/K/A DANIEL K. SINGLETON A/K/A DANIEL SINGLETON v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2015-CP-01419-COA
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
10/04/2016
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/31/2015 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. WILLIAM E. CHAPMAN III COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DANIEL KEITH SINGLETON (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA HOGAN TEDDER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF TRIAL COURT DISPOSITION: MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISMISSED
BEFORE LEE, C.J., WILSON AND GREENLEE, JJ.
¶1. Daniel Keith Singleton pled guilty to the charge of possession of a weapon—a dirk knife—by a convicted felon and was sentenced to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). Singleton filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) in Rankin County Circuit Court. The circuit court dismissed his motion and Singleton appeals. His two basic arguments, stated a variety of ways, are that his knife was a “survival knife,” not a dirk knife, and that the stop and search that led to his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. Singleton‘s arguments are without merit, so we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. On November 22, 2013, Singleton was indicted on one count of possession of a weapon (“a dirk knife“) by a convicted felon in violation of
¶3. On August 14, 2015, Singleton filed a PCR motion in which he raised several related claims for relief. The circuit court ordered that Singleton‘s plea hearing be transcribed and included in the record. After reviewing the transcript and file, the court summarily dismissed Singleton‘s motion pursuant to
DISCUSSION
¶4. On appeal, although Singleton specifies a number of issues and sub-issues, all of his claims derive from two basic arguments: that the search and the investigatory stop that led to his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment and that the knife was really a “survival knife,” not a dirk knife.2
¶5. Singleton‘s first argument fails because it is well settled that “[a] valid guilty plea waives the defendant‘s right to make certain constitutional challenges, including those under the Fourth
¶6. Singleton‘s second argument fails because he pled guilty and expressly admitted under oath that he possessed a dirk knife. “[A] voluntary guilty plea waives the requirement that the prosecution prove each element of the offense.” Swift v. State, 815 So. 2d 1230, 1233 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). Had Singleton insisted on a trial, the State would have been required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Singleton‘s knife was a dirk knife. See generally Summerall v. State, 41 So. 3d 729 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). However, when Singleton pled guilty and admitted that he possessed a dirk knife, he waived the right to put the State to its proof. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.
¶7. Singleton makes a related argument that his attorney misinformed him that his “survival knife” was a dirk knife, which allegedly constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and also rendered his plea invalid. Singleton also argues that his realization that his knife was not a dirk knife constitutes “evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of [his] conviction . . . in the interest of justice.”
¶8. Singleton stated under oath at his plea hearing that he had no complaints about his lawyer and was satisfied with his advice and assistance. Singleton‘s present claim of ineffective assistance is based entirely on his own allegations. “A defendant‘s declarations during the plea colloquy that he was satisfied with the services of his lawyer are presumptively true. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Pierce v. State, 115 So. 3d 869, 873 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, our Supreme Court has held that if the movant in a PCR proceeding “offers only his affidavit, then his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.” Lindsay v. State, 720 So. 2d 182, 184 (¶6) (Miss. 1998) (quoting Vielee v. State, 653 So. 2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1995)). Accordingly, Singleton‘s ineffective assistance claim is without merit.
¶9. The transcript of Singleton‘s plea hearing also clearly reflects that he was informed of the essential elements and nature of the charge against him, the various rights that he would waive by pleading guilty, and the applicable minimum and maximum sentences. Therefore, Singleton‘s claim that his plea was involuntary is also without merit. See Smith v. State, 636 So. 2d 1220, 1224-26 (Miss. 1994).
¶10. Finally, Singleton‘s “newly discovered evidence” claim also fails. Indeed, Singleton does not identify any “newly discovered evidence” but simply claims that the evidence that has always been the basis of the charge (his knife) does not support his conviction. In any event, as this Court has explained,
Newly discovered evidence is relevant only in situations where a defendant went to trial and was convicted. If, following the trial, a defendant discovers relevant and material evidence which could not have reasonably been discovered prior to trial, the defendant may seek to have his conviction set aside based on the newly discovered evidence. When a defendant pleads guilty, he is admitting that he committed the offense. Therefore, by definition, a plea of guilty negates any notion that there is some undiscovered evidence which could prove his innocence.
Townes v. State, 88 So. 3d 812, 815 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Jenkins v. State, 986 So. 2d 1031, 1034 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Jones v. State, 915 So. 2d 511, 514 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005))). Accordingly, Singleton‘s post hoc claim that his knife was not a dirk knife is not a basis for post-conviction relief.
¶11. For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court correctly denied Singleton‘s PCR motion, and we affirm.
¶12. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY DISMISSING THE MOTION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS AFFIRMED. ALL COSTS OF THIS APPEAL ARE ASSESSED TO RANKIN COUNTY.
LEE, C.J., IRVING AND GRIFFIS, P.JJ., BARNES, ISHEE, CARLTON, FAIR, JAMES AND GREENLEE, JJ., CONCUR.