Daniel K. Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company, an Illinois CorporationDaniel K. Graf v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company, an Illinois Corporation
Lead Opinion
This case, before us for the second time, see
Graf appealed. We affirmed the dismissal of Count II. Although the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., has been held to give railroad workers an enforceable right to fair representation by their unions in grievance proceedings, we held in our previous opinion (and subsequent cases have reinforced our holding, see, e.g., Camacho v. Ritz-Carlton Water Tower,
Clearly the judge erred if Count I was not within the jurisdiction of the federal district court, but it may seem obvious that it was within the court’s pendent jurisdiction. This is correct but not obvious. Recall that Count II, which presented a federal claim, named only the union as a defendant. If Count I (directed against the railroad) raised no federal claim, it could be brought under the jurisdiction of the district court only by appealing to “pendent party” jurisdiction, an unsettled extension of the more conventional pendent claim jurisdiction. Although we have rejected the use of pendent party jurisdiction to get around the statutory limits on diversity jurisdiction, see Hixon v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
Nevertheless the district court’s pendent claim jurisdiction does not provide a completely secure basis for the court’s action, because of the directive in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
Although Count I alleges that Graf was fired for exercising his rights under the Federal Employers Liability Act, it appears that neither that Act nor any other source of federal law creates a federal right against retaliatory discharge. See, e.g., Landfried v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n,
But maybe the Railway Labor Act so pervasively occupies the field of railroad labor disputes that a railroad worker’s claim of wrongful discharge necessarily invokes federal law. This may seem to be just a fancy way of saying that a state law claim is preempted by federal law, and we know from Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,
The question, then, is whether the plaintiff seeks to base his claim on a body of state law that cannot be applied to his case without violating federal law, or on a body of federal law whose provenance he coyly refuses to acknowledge. In the first situation the case is really a state case, blocked by a federal defense; in the second it is a federal case in state wrapping paper. A federal statute could bring about either situation. A statute that merely created a defense to a state claim would bring about the first, so the case to which it applied would not be within the federal-question jurisdiction, which depends on the legal basis of the claim, not the defense. But a statute that took over the whole field, with the result that the claim necessarily arose under federal rather than state law, would
The present case would clearly be of the second type if in Illinois, as in some states (see, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet,
But should the federal character of Grafs complaint really turn on whether state law characterizes wrongful discharge as a tort or a breach of contract? Can it be that if wrongful discharge is a tort, the state court decides the issue of preemption subject only to review by the Supreme Court, while if it is a breach of contract, the federal court decides the issue, provided only that the defendant elects to remove the case from state court to federal court, as of course he can do if the case is deemed to arise under federal law? The procedural difference seems too great to allow it to depend on whether state law describes the same conduct — retaliatory discharge — as a tort or as a breach of contract. The state cannot be allowed, merely by the label it attaches to the cause of action, to interfere with the administration of a federal statute. So the remedies provided by federal laws governing disputes over collective bargaining contracts could be exclusive of tort as well as contract remedies. The worker covered by such a contract who brings a tort suit to rectify the consequences of his discharge may be appealing, albeit involuntarily, to federal law, because federal law may provide the sole measure of his rights.
Thus, the simplicity of a test that makes federal jurisdiction depend on whether the complaint is based on state or federal law is illusory in a case where the application of the test depends on first deciding whether federal law merely provides a defense or occupies the field; for deciding whether it is one or the other is not straightforward. Indeed, asking whether federal law provides a defense or occupies the field may just be another way of asking whether the issue of federal preemption shall be decided by a state or a federal court, and perhaps that question should be asked directly, without taking the essentially question-begging step of asking whether the federal statute occupies the field. If the federal statute is deemed merely to create a defense, the state court decides whether it is a good defense; if it is deemed to occupy the field, the federal court decides whether the plaintiff has a cause of action.
Despite these points, there is overwhelming support in the case law for complete preemption in collective bargaining cases; illustrative is our recent decision in Oglesby v. RCA Corp., supra, a case virtually indistinguishable from this one except that it arose under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act rather than under the Railway Labor Act. Naturally in an area of such heavy litigation the course of decision does not run entirely true; in particular a very recent Ninth Circuit decision contains an analysis superficially at variance with the approach taken in Oglesby and most other cases. See Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra. But that case is far different from the present one. The plaintiffs in Williams had brought suit for breach of contracts allegedly made during a period when they were not part of the bargaining unit and hence were not covered by their employer’s collective bargaining contract; as such contracts would not be within the scope of section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act (or the Railway Labor Act, had that been the applicable statute), the plaintiffs would not have had a federal cause of action, so there was no issue of the exclusivity of the federal remedy. Where the worker is covered by a collective bargaining contract and therefore has a potential federal remedy, judicial or arbitrable, the cases hold that that remedy is exclusive; the worker has no state remedies. The explanation is the traditional mistrust — a steady theme in federal labor legislation— of state judicial intervention in disputes arising out of collective bargaining activities. But whether soundly based on the history and practicalities of the labor field or not, the principle of complete preemption in collective bargaining matters is too well settled to be disturbed by us; and the force of the principle is no less when the state happens to call wrongful discharge a tort rather than a breach of contract.
Hence Count I, even interpreted to charge that Graf’s discharge violated state tort law, was within the district court’s statutory jurisdiction; in any event, despite the doubts we expressed earlier, we think that court was entitled to decide the case rather than remand it even if the only basis of federal jurisdiction was pendent jurisdiction. That doctrine is the point of balance between two competing considerations. One is judicial economy: factually related claims between the same parties should be decided in the same court at the same time. The other is state prerogative: a state’s own courts should be allowed to decide issues of state law arising in suits between citizens of that state. Normally, if the federal issues fall out of a case before trial, remanding the state issues to the state court will not result in duplicate trials and the anomaly of having a federal court deciding a pure state case becomes the dominant consideration. But like almost all legal generalizations this one has exceptions. Suppose as in this case that a potentially dispositive issue in the pendent claim is an issue of federal law raised by way of defense. Since the federal court is as competent as the state court to decide a question of federal law, why not let the federal court retain the claim, at least for the limited purpose of deciding whether the case should be dismissed on federal grounds? If the federal court decides the question for the defendant and therefore dismisses the case on the merits, the case is over, without requiring either a time-consuming remand to the state courts or a decision by a federal judge of issues purely of state law. Judicial economy is served, state prerogatives protected.
This is not to suggest that the federal court should decide any and all federal
So if it appears either that the federal defense lacks merit or that the underlying state law claim more clearly lacks merit than the federal defense has merit, the district judge normally should relinquish pendent jurisdiction and let the whole case be decided in state court. But if as in this case the district court can tell at a glance that the defendant has a complete and meritorious federal defense, the court has and can exercise the power to retain pendent jurisdiction, adjudicate the defense, and dismiss the case. The Supreme Court said in Gibbs that there might be “situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to questions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particularly strong,”
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary, and the discretion runs both ways: discretion (almost unreviewable) to relinquish the jurisdiction, but also discretion to assert it (provided of course that the pendent claim really is the pendant of some colorable federal claim) in appropriate cases even when the federal claims have fallen out before trial. This principle is well recognized in cases where pendent jurisdiction is retained because the statute of limitations would prevent the plaintiff from refiling his pendent claim in state court. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Franzen,
These decisions are not evasions of the statement in Gibbs that when the federal claims drop out before trial any pendent state law claims should be dismissed. The point is not that the statement is a dictum; it is; but it has provided the basis for many decisions in this and other circuits, and we have no doubt that it should be treated as authoritative. But there is no indication that the Supreme Court meant to establish an inflexible rule, one that would govern situations remote from the one before the Court in the Gibbs case and that might bring about results opposite to what the Court intended. Judicial economy, the essential policy behind the modern doctrine of pendent jurisdiction which Gibbs created, supports the retention of pendent jurisdiction in any case where substantial judicial resources have already been committed, so that sending the case to another court will
So by either route — federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or pendent jurisdiction — the district judge was authorized to decide whether Graf’s claim of wrongful discharge is barred by the Railway Labor Act; and we must now consider whether he decided correctly. The Railway Labor Act provides an exclusive remedy, arbitral in nature, for “minor” breaches of collective bargaining contracts in the railroad industry, of which the firing of an individual worker allegedly for cause is a classic illustration. Any worker who tries to litigate such a breach by bringing a suit under state contract law will therefore be met, and defeated, by the defense that the suit is barred by the Act. As an original matter one might have thought that a suit based on a theory of retaliatory discharge did not have its origin in the collective bargaining agreement and was not a breach of contract claim at all, since it would be unaffected if the discharged worker was an employee at will; indeed the principal domain of wrongful discharge is employment at will. But in Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
Admittedly the principle established by these cases interacts with the narrow scope of the federal tort of unfair representation in an unfortunate way. Through no fault of his, Graf finds himself with no remedy under either the Railway Labor Act or state tort law, the former because Evans, his “griever,” was merely negligent (our previous Graf decision), the latter because state law is preempted (Jackson). It is true that the Railway Labor Act unlike the National Labor Relations Act permits the worker to bypass the union and file his own grievance, but Graf had no reason to think this was necessary — till it was too late. Although Graf never tested the staunchness of the arbitrators’ adherence to the 60-day deadline by filing a late claim, arbitrators take deadlines in collective bargaining agreements seriously, see Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 148-49 (3d ed. 1973); Fairweather, Practice and Procedure in Labor Arbitration 101-10 (2d
The result is unsatisfactory, but as is often the case in life the alternatives are not necessarily better. Suits by workers against employers for wrongful discharge, invariably seeking punitive damages and dragging on for years, are not a happy method for resolving disputes over employment; nor are “grievance malpractice” suits against unions in federal court. Graf was fired almost a decade ago and his case has never come to trial. Maybe there is a lesson here. Maybe a better solution than litigation in court is to give workers and their representatives a strong incentive to make the arbitral process set up by the Railway Labor Act work; and maybe the present decision, in any event compelled by precedent, will strengthen that incentive— regrettable though its consequences are for Daniel Graf.
AFFIRMED.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
Once again the “forgotten” grievance— not actionable under our cases, see Graf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co.,
Notes
. I agree with the apparent view of the majority that as an original matter one might have had serious doubts about the theory underlying Jackson. See Jackson,