This is an appeal from a preliminary injunction issued pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., prohibiting defendants-appellants Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Thomas Rapone, Secretary of Public Safety, and Francis McCauley, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Retirement Board, from enforcing the statutorily mandated retirement of members of the Department of State Police aged 55 or older. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
J.
Factual Background
In December 1991, the Massachusetts legislature enacted 1991 Mass.Acts ch. 412 (effective July 1, 1992), which called for, inter alia, the consolidation of the Commonwealth’s largest police force, the Division of State Police, with its three smaller forces, the Metropolitan District Commission Police (“MDC”), the Registry of Motor Vehicles Law Enforcement Division (“Registry”), and the Capitol Police. The newly consolidated police force is referred to as the “Department of State Police.” 1
Prior to the consolidation, officers of the MDC, Registry, and Capitol Police were subject to a mandatory retirement age of 65, and officers of the Division of State Police were subject to a mandatory retirement age of 50. Section 122 of Chapter 412 repealed those mandatory retirement ages and declared that all members of the Consolidated Department who reach their fifty-fifth birthday on or before December 31, 1992, shall retire by that date.
On December 21,1992, ten days before the effective date of the new mandatory retirement age, plaintiffs, members of the former MDC and Registry divisions,
2
commenced this action seeking injunctive relief on the grounds that the new mandatory retirement age violated the ADEA.
See
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). On December 30, 1992, after a hearing that same date, the district court issued an order granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
See Gately v. Massachusetts,
II.
The Preliminary Injunction Standard
In deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, a district court must weigh the following four factors: (1) the likelihood of the movant’s success on the merits; (2) the potential for irreparable harm to the movant; (3) a balancing of the relevant equities,
ie.,
“the hardship to the nonmovant if the restrainer issues as contrasted with the hardship to the movant if interim relief is withheld,”
Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Guilbert,
A party appealing a grant of a preliminary injunction bears the heavy burden of showing that the district court either committed a mistake of law or abused its discretion.
Guilbert,
Here, the district court weighed the four criteria recited above and held that the scales tipped in favor of an injunction.
See Gately,
On appeal, defendants generally challenge the court’s application of all four criteria. Having reviewed the district court’s opinion, however, it is clear to us that appellate elaboration is warranted only as to the first and second criteria. We therefore adopt the district court’s cogent and well-reasoned opinion insofar as it relates to the other two prongs of the preliminary injunction test and focus on whether the court correctly presaged (a) plaintiffs’ likelihood of success at trial, and (b) the potential for irreparable harm to plaintiffs in the absence of an injunction.
III.
Discussion
A. Plaintiffs’ Likelihood of Success
Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual’s age....” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA contains an “escape clause,” however, which allows employers some limited flexibility to take age into consideration in business decisions. Commonly referred to as the “BFOQ exception,” the clause allows employers “to take any action otherwise prohibited under [the statute] ... where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business....” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). As noted by the Supreme Court, this clause is “‘an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition’ of age discrimination contained in the ADEA.”
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,
In
Criswell,
the Court enunciated a two-pronged test for courts to use in discerning the width of the “extremely narrow” BFOQ exception.
Id.
at 412-20,
As support for their contention that the district court erred in determining plaintiffs’ likelihood of success under the ADEA, defendants make the following two arguments: (1) controlling precedent in this circuit forecloses plaintiffs’ claims,
see EEOC v. Trabucco,
1. Trabucco I and II
Defendants first contend that plaintiffs’ challenge to chapter 412 is precluded by the doctrine of
stare decisis.
In so doing, they rely upon a case in which we upheld a lower court’s finding that the Massachusetts State Police’s statutorily mandated retirement age of 50 was a BFOQ,
see Trabucco I,
The doctrine of
stare decisis
renders the ruling of
law
in a case binding in future eases before the same court or other courts owing obedience to the decision. “[UJnlike the doctrines of
res judicata
and collateral estoppel, [the doctrine of
stare decisis
] is not narrowly confined to parties and privies, and it does not draw its force from the policy protecting final judgments.”
Trabucco II,
The essential principles of stare decisis may be described as follows:
(1) an issue of law must have been heard and decided; (2) if an issue is not argued, or though argued is ignored by the court, or is reserved, the decision does not constitute a precedent to be followed; (3) a decision is stare decisis despite the contention that the court was not properly instructed by counsel on the legislative history, or that the argument was otherwise insufficient; (4) a decision may properly be overruled if seriously out of keeping with contemporary views or passed by in the development of the law or proved to be unworkable; and (5) there is a heavy presumption that settled issues of law will not be reexamined.
Trabucco II,
As
stare decisis
is concerned with rules of law, however, a decision dependent upon its underlying facts is not necessarily controlling precedent as to a subsequent analysis of the same question on different facts and a different record.
Complaint of Tug Helen B. Moran, Inc.,
A brief examination of the two cases relied upon by defendants reveals the inapplicability of the doctrine here. In
Trabucco I,
the district court had held that Mass. Gen.L. ch. 32, § 26(3)(a), which mandated retirement at age 50 for the Division of State Police, while a valid BFOQ for the Division generally, violated the ADEA as applied to the plaintiff, a state trooper who had a desk job. We reversed, holding that the age qualification applied to all members of the state police, regardless of whether they had field
*1227
or desk jobs.
Trabucco I,
After the district court ruling, but before our reversal, the EEOC brought an action challenging the very same mandatory retirement statute. The district court, relying upon
Tmbucco I,
held that the action was foreclosed by principles of
stare decisis.
On appeal, the EEOC contended that, because plaintiff Mahoney had offered no evidence at trial to rebut the Commonwealth’s BFOQ evidence, the decision lacked precedential value.
Trabucco II,
There are two compelling reasons why these cases do not foreclose the instant action. First, the question of whether a mandatory retirement age is a BFOQ is a fact-intensive inquiry.
See Criswell,
*1228
Second, not only are the underlying facts in this case different from those present in
Trabucco I and II,
but the legal landscape has been altered in critical respects as well. In
Trabucco I,
which was decided prior to the Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncements on the ADEA,
see supra
pp. 1225-26, this court applied a standard more lenient than that subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court to determine — under the first prong of the test — whether age was a BFOQ. In
Trabucco I,
we held that an employer must show that the age qualification is “reasonably related” to the operation of its business.
Trabucco I,
In light of
Criswell
and
Johnson,
we agree with the district court’s conclusion that
Trabucco I,
which was decided under the more lenient “reasonable relation” standard, and was based on less than the required “particularized, factual showing,” has been called into question.
See Gately,
In sum, therefore, this case involves a different set of facts, a newly crafted set of legal, rules, and, as such, legal issues of first impression for this court.. As a result, stare decisis does not provide a basis for avoiding a trial on the merits.
2. The 1986 Amendment to the ADEA
Defendants next urge the application of 29 U.S.C. § 623(j), a 1986 amendment to the ADEA which, they contend, forecloses plaintiffs’ claims. We disagree. 4
The task of statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute, and statutory language must be accorded its ordinary meaning.
See, e.g., Telematics Int’l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp.,
Firefighters and law enforcement officers attaining hiring or retiring age under State or local law on March 3, 1983[.]
It Shall not be unlawful for an employer which is a State ... to discharge any individual because of such individual’s age if such action is taken—
(1) with respect to the employment of an individual ... as a law enforcement officer and the individual has attained the age of ... retirement in effect under applicable State or local law on March 3, 1983, and
(2) pursuant to a bona fide ... retirement plan that is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter. 5
This amendment, which took effect on January 1, 1987, and expires on December 31, 1993, gives states and local officials a seven-year transition period within which they can lawfully retire law enforcement officers pursuant to a retirement plan in effect on March 3, 1983. It was on that date that the Supreme Court decided, in the seminal case of
*1229
EEOC v. Wyoming,
According to defendants, this statute permits them to apply Chapter 412 to plaintiffs because (a) Mass.Gen.L. ch. 32, § 26(3)(a), in effect on March 3, 1983, mandated retirement at age 50 for the.members of the former Division of State Police; (b) although Chapter 32, § 26(3)(a) was not applicable to these specific plaintiffs on that date, it was applicable to the members of the former Division of State Police; and (c) the duties formerly assigned the Division of State Police have now been assumed by the members of the Consolidated Department. In effect, therefore, defendants contend that § 623(j) allows them to take a group of officers who, in 1983, were subject to retirement at age 65, give them a new title in 1992, and, in so doing, subtract 10 years from their retirement age.
The plain meaning of the statutory language simply does not support this result. Until its expiration on December. 31, 1993, the statute allows states to retire an individual law enforcement officer on the basis of age if “the individual has attained the age of ... retirement in effect under applicable state or local law on March 3, 1983....” 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(1) (emphasis added). On March 3, 1983, the statute applicable to plaintiffs required them to retire at age 65. Therefore, as plaintiffs have not “attained the age of ... retirement in effect under applicable state or local law on March 3, 1983,” § 623(j) does not give defendants the refuge they seek.
To be sure, the phraseology is not a model of clarity. Yet, in their effort to read a loophole into § 623(j), defendants ignore the word “individual,” which appears four times in the statute. When read as a whole, we believe that the language compels the conclusion that the word “applicable” means “applicable to the individual.” 6
Even if we were to construe the statute as being ambigúous, however, we do not believe that defendants’ interpretation is consistent with the statute’s purpose. As explained by Senator Wendell Ford of Kentucky, one of the primary architects of the final compromise version of this statute, Congress intended § 623(j) “to provide relief to those jurisdictions which were forced to respond to [EEOC v. Wyoming ], while at the same time ensuring that no lesser discrimination protection will be provided for these workers than what was in effect at the time [EEOC v. Wyoming] was decided.” 132 Cong.Rec. S16850-02 (daily ed. October 16, 1986) (emphasis added).
The statute, therefore, was enacted to give states a grace period of seven years during which time certain retirement plans for law enforcement officers would be exempted from the ADEA’s reach. Senator Ford explained that the statute froze pre-existing age caps but did not exempt from scrutiny stricter age caps subsequently enacted:
[T]his compromise establishes a floor for the hiring and retirement requirements which a State or local government can set. The hiring and retirement age requirements of a plan in effect as of March 3, 1983 become the floor for allowable plans.... If jurisdictions have raised or eliminated mandatory retirement ages after this date, they have the choice of either moving back to the plan requirements in effect on March 3, 1983, or remaining where they are. However, States and local governments would not be able to lower retirement age requirements below what was [sic] in effect as of March 3, 1983.
Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, in our view, neither the language of the statute nor its legislative history supports the position advanced by defendants. This statute was enacted to provide an exception, limited in both purpose and duration, to the ADEA’s prohibition on mandatory retirement. The Commonwealth’s reliance upon this limited exception to insulate from review its adoption of a new retirement policy which *1230 subtracts ten years from the retirement age statutorily applicable to plaintiffs on March 3, 1983, is therefore misplaced.
In a last ditch attempt, however, to persuade us of § 623(j)’s applicability, defendants alternatively argue that the statute is ambiguous, and, as such, any ambiguity must be resolved in the Commonwealth’s favor. In support of their position, defendants cite
Gregory v. Ashcroft,
— U.S. -,
We have recently discussed the limited scope of the Court’s holding in
Gregory. See EEOC v. Massachusetts,
We likewise reject defendants’ argument that
Gregory’s
“plain statement” rule bars plaintiffs’ cause of action. As discussed above, we find no ambiguities in the text of § 623(j) which give us pause as to its applicability here.
See Gregory,
— U.S. at -,
In any event, we think defendants give
Gregory
far too broad a reading. Plaintiffs, unlike the state judges at issue in
Gregory,
are not “constitutional officers” who “participate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy....”
Gregory,
— U.S. at -,
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion or mistake of law in the district court’s conclusion that there was a likelihood that plaintiff would succeed on the merits. We turn now to the question of irreparable harm.
B. The Potential for Irreparable Harm
Defendants also contend that plaintiffs failed to make the requisite showing of irreparable harm, and that the district court, therefore, abused its discretion in granting plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief. In so
*1231
doing, defendants rely principally upon
Sampson v. Murray,
In
Sampson,
the Supreme Court held that a probationary federal employee, who sought to enjoin her dismissal from employment pending an administrative appeal to the Civil Service Commission (“CSC”), had to make a particularly strong showing of irreparable harm to obtain preliminary relief.
Sampson,
The questions presented on appeal were twofold: (1) whether the district court had authority to issue the injunction, and (2) if so, whether the injunction was warranted. The Court stated early in its opinion that the two questions were analytically related and could not be neatly “bifurcated.”
Id.
at 68,
Although the Court ultimately answered the first question in the affirmative, it did so only after noting the multiple factors which weighed against a finding that the district court had authority to award the injunction at issue. Those factors included: (1) the fact that plaintiff was seeking relief prior to having exhausted her administrative remedies, and the concomitant “disruptive effect which the grant of the temporary relief ... was likely to have on the administrative process,”
id.
at 83,
Importantly, the Court then admonished district judges that, although the factors listed above did not render them “wholly bereft of the authority” to grant injunctive relief “in this class of cases,” they could not exercise that authority “without regard to those factors.” Id. Indeed, the Court declared that those factors “are entitled to great weight in the equitable balancing process which attends the grant of injunctive relief.” Id.
Before turning to the dispositive second question, i.e., whether injunctive relief was warranted, the Court again reiterated the close analytical relationship between the first and second questions:
Although we do not hold that Congress has wholly foreclosed the granting of preliminary injunctive relief in such cases, we do believe that [plaintiff] at the very least must make a showing of irreparable injury sufficient in kind and degree to override these factors cutting against the general availability of preliminary injunctions in Government personnel eases.
Id.
at 84,
In analyzing the second question, the Court first noted the complete absence in the
*1232
record, with the exception of certain statements in plaintiff’s unverified complaint, of any evidence of irreparable harm.
Id.
at 89-91,
First, the Court stated unequivocally that irreparable harm is a critical element of any injunctive relief in federal court.
Id.
at 88,
As for plaintiffs allegations of harm to reputation, the Court found them unpersuasive. It was difficult to imagine, according to the Court, how the agency’s failure to follow proper procedures in effectuating her discharge could cause harm to plaintiffs reputation, especially where any damage could be undone by an administrative determination in her favor.
The Court assumed, however, for the purposes of its opinion, that plaintiff had made a satisfactory showing of financial and reputa-tional hardship, and then held that such a showing “falls far short of the type of injury which is a necessary predicate to the issuance of a temporary injunction in this type of case.”
Id.
at 91-92,
We recognize that cases may arise in which the circumstances surrounding an employee’s discharge, together with the resultant effect on the employee, may so far depart from the normal situation that irreparable injury might be found. Such extraordinary cases are difficult to define in advance of their occurrence. We have held that an insufficiency of savings or difficulties in immediately obtaining other .employment — external factors common to most discharged employees and not attributable to any unusual actions relating to the discharge itself — will not support a finding of irreparable injury, however severely they may affect a particular individual. But we do not wish to be understood as foreclosing relief in the genuinely extraordinary situation. Use of the court’s injunctive power, however, when discharge of probationary employees is an issue, should be reserved for that situation rather than employed in the routine case.
Id.
at 92 n. 68,
As we read
Sampson,
it teaches that a federal court cannot dispense with the irreparable harm requirement in affording injunctive relief; that temporary loss of income does not rise to the level of irreparable harm in the usual employee discharge case,
see, e.g., Levesque v. Maine,
In interpreting
Sampson,
however, numerous other courts have assumed that the “genuinely extraordinary” test for irreparable harm applies in all employee discharge cases, whatever the asserted basis for relief.
See, e.g., Stewart v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv.,
Such a conclusion is predicated, in our opinion, upon an overly broad, and faulty, interpretation of
Sampson’s
holding.
8
As the Court itself made clear early in its opinion, the questions of whether the district court had authority to issue the injunction and whether the irreparable harm finding was proper were not analytically distinct.
Sampson,
Needless to say, those factors are not present in all employee discharge cases. And, it makes little sense, in our opinion, to require a district court to weigh all discharged employees’ requests for injunctive relief as if they applied. Nothing in
Sampson
suggests that result. Rather, the Court repeatedly referred to the fact-bound nature of its holding. For instance, the Court stated that the plaintiffs showing “falls far short of the type of injury which is a necessary predicate to the issuance of a temporary injunction
in this type of case.” Id.
at 91-92,
The case before us differs from
Sampson
in several significant respects: (1) plaintiffs are not seeking interim injunctive relief pending the completion of an administrative appeals process; (2) the district court unquestionably had the authority to issue the
*1234
requested equitable relief,
see
29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b), (c); (3) plaintiffs’ allegations of irreparable harm go beyond temporary loss of pay or reputational injury; and (4) plaintiffs’ are not claiming that they are “entitled to additional procedural safeguards in effectuating the discharge.”
See Sampson,
The district court held below that plaintiffs had made a sufficient, although not overwhelming, showing of irreparable harm.
See Gately,
Like the district court, we view the irreparable harm question as a close call. The sole factor cutting against the district court’s authority to issue this injunction is the wide latitude traditionally granted the government in dispatching its own internal affairs.
See Sampson,
Mindful of the broad discretion afforded a district court in weighing irreparable harm,
see K-Mart Corp.,
IV.
Conclusion
In sum, we find the challenges leveled at the district court’s issuance of the preliminary injunction unpersuasive. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision. Affirmed. Costs to appellees.
Notes
. For purposes of clarity, however, throughout this opinion we refer to the new Department of State Police as the "Consolidated Department.”
. The complaint lists 45 officers, 30 of whom reached the age of 55 or older on December 31, 1992.
. In so doing, we observed that counsel for the EEOC
was not only aware of the [Trabucco /]' litigation, but could have intervened in the district court or could have filed an amicus brief on appeal. That it did neither was attributed to its assessment that the decision would not be given stare decisis effect and to certain practical problems, such as obtaining expert witnesses.
Trabucco II,
. Although the district court did not address the applicability of this amendment, it is purely a matter of statutory interpretation, and therefore a question of law which we can review in the first instance.
Cf. In re Erin Food Servs., Inc.,
. The term "law enforcement officer” is defined as:
[A]n employee, the duties of whose position are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of a State, including an employee engaged in this activity who is transferred to a supervisory or administrative position....
. We want to make clear, however, that we do not read § 623(j)(l) as allowing those officers who may have elected to transfer out of the MDC, Registry, or Capitol Police and into the Division of State Police to claim the retirement age applicable to them on March 3, 1983.
. This premise had particular force in a Civil Service case, the Court explained, because of the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1), which provides a wrongfully discharged Civil Service employee with full payment and benefits for the time period she was out of work. The Court noted that the Act's legislative history suggested that "Congress contemplated that it would be the usual, if not the exclusive, remedy for wrongful discharge.”
Id.
at 90-91,
. In those cases in which we have applied
Sampson’s
heightened standard, we have relied upon the plaintiff's failure to exhaust available administrative remedies.
See Chilcott,
. As support for this holding, the Court cited
Wettre,
. We recognize that the consolidation process had an anticipated completion date of June 30, 1993. On the basis of this record, however, we have no way of determining whether the process has, in fact, been completed.
