11 Tex. 579 | Tex. | 1854
The appellants allege, in their petition, that they are the owners of two leagues of land, granted by the Spanish Government, in 1807, to Feliciana Duran Cubier, under whom they deraign their title as heirs, and some of them by purchase. They set out in their petition, the two leagues claimed, by metes and bounds; that they are in possession of the land; they aver that the Paschals, two of the defendants, well knowing that the lands aforesaid belonged to the petitioners, had located, or caused to be located, upon a portion thereof land certificates, and had procured patents from the General Land Office, for a portion so located, and sold a part of the land to one Evans, another of the defendants; that they were cutting down the timber thereon growing, greatly to the damage of the petitioners ; that their locations and patents from the General Land Office are void ; but that they injure and throw a cloud upon the title of the petitioners; they pray judgment for the trespasses so committed by the defendants, and that the patents and locations be adjudged to be null and void. The Paschals jointly answer, acknowledging the loca
On the 7th of February, A. D., 1849, the plaintiffs amended their petition ; this amendment, however, presents nothing material to be considered, different from the original petition.
On the 15th November, A. D., 1852, by leave of the Court, the plaintiffs -again filed an amendment to their original petition, as follows: “ They allege that the plaintiffs and those, “ under whom they claim title, have had peaceable and quiet “ possesson of the land claimed and described in their original “ petition, for more than fifty years before the filing of this “ suit; and that the same has been thus held in good faith, by “ valid and good titles emanating from the competent author- “ ities.”
There was a jury empannelled ; and when the plaintiffs had gone through with their evidence, the defendants demurred to it, as not sufficient to support the plaintiffs’ action; and there was a joinder in demurrer; on which the Court gave judgment for the defendants.
There is found, transcribed in the record, a regular incipient title to two leagues of land, including the ranch previously, it seems, occupied by the grantee, to Feliciana Duran ; and every thing seems to have been done, required by law, to put her in possession, that could be done by the local authorities ; but incomplete as to perfect titles, until it had received the sanction of the Intendant General of the Intendency of San Luis Potosí. In fact, it was precisely in the condition of
It is clear that the plaintiffs rested their case solely and exclusively on the presumption, in law, of a valid title, arising from possession alone; and that they believed, (though why, is not perceived,) that the introduction of this documentary, incipient title would prejudice the presumption upon which they relied. Whether they were right in this or not, cannot now be questioned, because they certainly had a right to manage their own case, and withhold it, if they thought proper to do so. The appellees’ counsel contends that no evidence of the possession, under the last amendment to the petition, could have been received; because the amendment does nob set out the metes and bounds of the land claimed, and makes no averment that would let in evidence of the land claimed as property by the plaintiffs. He seems to suppose that the amendment must be considered as standing unconnected with the original petition, or as an abandonment thereof. In this he is clearly mistaken. The amendment is not an abandonment of the original petition; and it refers expressly, in setting up the possession, to the land described in the original petition. The defendants having demurred to the plaintiffs’ evidence, we must look to the plaintiffs’ evidence alone; and if under the issue joined, that evidence, with every reasonable deduction that a jury would have been permitted to draw from it, in favor of the plaintiffs’ right, would not sustain the action, the judgment of the Court below must stand.
I have examined the evidence in support of the plaintiffs’
If the incipient title to Dona Feliciana had been in evidence, it would have furnished evidence of the amount of land claimed ; and the diagram of the survey, accompanying the survey and act of possession, would have afforded evidence to some extent, if not conclusive, as to the particular land comprehended in the claim. It would have given a starting point, at least. Nor is it perceived in what way it could have impaired the presumption of a final title, arising from long, continued possession, by the introduction of such testimony.
In the case of Paschal v. Perez, there was no proof of such continued possession, as would raise the presumption that a final title had ever been issued, or of a non-existent grant; and this presumption of a non-existing grant, does not rest upon the hypothesis, that such grant had actually once existed, but it is the presumption of law, even if no such grant had ever existed, for the purpose of protecting a long, continued possession, with a claim of title. The aspect of the case of Paschal v. Perez would have been very materially changed, if it had been further supported by a long, continued possesion, with his claim of title. This presumption can never be invoked, in support of any claim of title, unless coupled with a long, continued occupancy and enjoyment; and when so coupled, it will always arise, unless it be shown that it never could have been granted, as in the case of the Forest of Dean, which, by Act of Parliament, was prohibited from
We have enlarged more upon this question than we other-ways should ; but we wished it distinctly understood how it is, that in Herndon v. Cassiano, and Paul v. Perez, long continued possession saved the land to Cassiano and to Perez, and it has failed to do the same in this. We wished to show, in what this case differed in proof from those ; and that in this we have not entrenched in the slightest degree on the principles decided in those cases; and finally, to show that we have no authority to decide a case, as the record possibly might have presented the facts of the case, but as it is really presented; that we have nothing to do in the presentation of the facts, but to decide upon them as presented. The judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Wheeleb, J. TheReporter will please note, that not having heard the argument, I did not participate in the decision.