This is an interlocutory appeal from a decision of the Superior Court granting summary judgment to defendant on the ground that the negligence claims of plaintiff are barred by the economic loss doctrine. The question presented is whether the economic loss doctrine applies under Delaware law based on the presence or absence of privity. Having carefully considered the policy reasons advanced in support of and in opposition to the application of the economic loss doctrine and for the reasons stated below, the ruling of the Superior Court that the economic loss doctrine applies under Delaware law, notwithstanding the presence of privity of contract, is affirmed.
FACTS
Acorn Structures, Inc. (“Acorn”), appel-lee/defendant below, is a Massachusetts corporation engaged in selling building kits for houses. George Danforth (“Dan-forth”), appellant/plaintiff below, entered into a “Custom Design” contract with Acorn on August 13, 1979, whereby Acorn *1195 agreed, for a sum of $1000, to develop an architectural design plan for plaintiffs house. The contract provided that if Dan-forth was interested in the design plan, Danforth could submit a purchase order for the Acorn “building package” materials. Danforth eventually did so. The contract further provided that the Acorn building materials were subject to a 2-year limited warranty.
Acorn does not engage in the construction of the buildings it designs. Therefore, Danforth contracted with a local builder, recommended by Acorn, for the actual construction of the house. Acorn provided training and on-site supervision to the local builder. The builder is not a party to this litigation.
Construction of Danforth’s house was completed in 1981. Danforth contends that the design plan, which called for the use of %" insulation in the walls of the house, resulted in inadequate ventilation and allowed condensation to form within the walls of the house. In 1989, Danforth first discovered the resultant deterioration and rotting in and around the windows and door frames of the house and on the exteri- or siding of the house. Danforth sued Acorn, initially under a negligence theory of recovery, claiming damages in excess of $100,000 for corrective work and related repairs. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Acorn on the ground that the purely economic loss suffered by Danforth is not recoverable in a negligence action, absent either personal injury
or
damage to
other
property caused by accident, collision, or explosion, notwithstanding the presence of privity of contract between Danforth and Acorn.
Danforth v. Acorn Structures, Inc.,
Del.Super., C.A. No. 90C-JN-30, slip op. at 18-19,
Danforth immediately filed a motion for reargument claiming that Acorn’s negligence “in supplying defective plans that were utilized to construct the subsequently ordered building package” fell squarely within the exception to the economic loss doctrine recognized in
Guardian Construction Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson,
Del.Super.,
BACKGROUND
The economic loss doctrine is a judicially created doctrine that prohibits recovery in tort where a product has damaged only itself
(i.e.,
has not caused personal injury or damage to
other
property) and, the only losses suffered are economic in nature.
3
The rationale underlying the economic loss doctrine is best understood by considering the distinct functions served by tort law and contract law.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,
The seminal case that recognized and applied this distinction is the case of
Seely v. White Motor Co.,
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the “luck” of one plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products.. He can appropriately be held liable for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held for the level of performance of his products in the consumer’s business unless he agrees that the product was designed to meet the consumer’s demands. A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in actions for negligence, a manufacturer’s liability is limited to damages for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic loss alone.
Seely,
The United States Supreme Court has also considered the applicability of the economic loss doctrine in negligence actions brought pursuant to the Court’s admiralty jurisdiction in the case of
East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
At one end of the spectrum, the case that created the majority land-based approach, Seely v. White Motor Co.,63 Cal.2d 9 ,45 Cal.Rptr. 17 ,403 P.2d 145 (1965) (defective truck), held that preserving a proper role for the law of warranty precludes imposing tort liability if a defective product causes purely monetary harm. [Citations omitted]_
At the other end of the spectrum is the minority land-based approach, whose progenitor, Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc.,44 N.J. 52 , 66-67,207 A.2d 305 , 312-313 (1965) (marred carpeting), held that a manufacturer’s duty to make non-defective products encompassed injury to the product itself, whether or not the defect created an unreasonable risk of harm. [Citation omitted]_
Between the two poles fall a number of cases that would permit a products-liability action under certain circumstances when a product injures only itself. These cases attempt to differentiate between the “disappointed users ... and the endangered ones,” Russell v. Ford Motor Co.,281 Or. 587 , 595,575 P.2d 1383 , 1387 (1978), and permit only the latter to sue in tort....
We find the intermediate and minority land-based positions unsatisfactory, the intermediate positions, which essentially turn on the degree of risk, are too indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure their business behavior. Nor do we find persuasive a distinction that rests on the manner in which the product is injured. We realize that the damage may be qualitative, occurring through gradual deterioration or internal breakage. Or it may be calamitous. Compare Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc.,548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976), with Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co.,563 P.2d 248 , 251 (Alaska 1977). But either way, since by definition no person or other property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely economic. Even when the harm to the product itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of its bargain — traditionally the core concern of contract law. See E. Farnsworth, Contracts § 12.8, pp. 839-840 (1982).
East River,
The
East River
Court adopted an approach similar to
Seely
and ruled “that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a negligence or a strict products-liability theory to prevent a product from injuring itself.”
Id.
at 871,
Moreover, in
East River,
the Court recognized that a warranty action, unlike a tort products liability action, has built-in limitations on liability based upon the terms of the parties’ underlying contract and Code requirements of privity and foreseeability.
Id.
at 874,
Permitting recovery for all foreseeable claims for purely economic loss could *1198 make a manufacturer liable for vast sums. It would be difficult for a manufacturer to take into account the expectations of persons downstream who may encounter its product. In this case, if the charterers — already one step removed from the transaction — were permitted to recover for their economic losses, then the companies that subchartered the ships might claim their economic losses from the delays, and the charterers’ customers also might claim their economic losses, and so on. “The law does not spread its protection so far.” Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,275 U.S. 303 , 309,48 S.Ct. 134 , 135,72 L.Ed. 290 (1927).
East River,
ANALYSIS
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in the East River case and, for the additional reasons stated below, conclude that, under Delaware tort law, the economic loss doctrine is a complete bar to the recovery of economic loss caused by qualitatively defective products, notwithstanding the presence of privity of contract.
We begin by considering Delaware precedent which has addressed the narrow question presented by this interlocutory appeal: “whether the economic loss doctrine applies under Delaware law based on the presence or absence of privity.” The parties agree that the seminal Delaware case applying the economic loss doctrine is
Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Construction Co.,
Del.Super.,
The “leading case” cited in
Crowell
in support of the economic loss rule was
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,
... TWA would have a sufficiently pleaded cause of action either in negligence or breach of warranty, at its choice, because privity of contract does exist as to them.
Trans World Airlines,
After
Crowell,
but still in the 1970s, two decisions of this Court addressed the question whether economic loss is recoverable in construction cases. Danforth claims the first of these two decisions,
Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc.,
Del.Supr.,
The subcontractor moved for summary judgment on the owner’s breach of contract and negligence claims. As to the breach of contact claim, the trial court denied summary judgment on the ground that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the third-party creditor beneficiary status of the owner as to the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor. As to the negligence claim, while questioning the apparent preservation of the citadel of privity in the
Crowell
case, the trial court ruled that the owner had suffered more than mere economic loss because “arguably” there had been an “accident in the basic sense that there was in fact an immediate physical injury to the storage tanks not caused by normal wear and tear.”
Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc. v. Dorr-Oliver, Inc.,
Del.Super.,
On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the subcontractor was liable
in contract
to “any parties damaged” and that the owner was entitled to protection under the contract as a third-party creditor beneficiary.
Cannon,
Del. Supr.,
6. The decision as to [the owner’s] status and its privity of contract obviates the need to consider arguments of the parties relating to Crowell Corp. v. Topkis Construction Co., Del.Supr.,280 A.2d 730 (1971). In ruling against the maintenance of a tort action there, the Crowell court found no contractual relationship between owner and subcontractor. On remand the parties are free to argue a tortious basis for damages in any way that is not inconsistent with this opinion.
Cannon,
Del.Supr.,
The second decision by this Court which addressed the question presented in this case is
Seiler v. Levitz Furniture Co.,
Del.Supr.,
In our view, Seiler’s obligation to Levitz for defects in the air-conditioning system is more properly based upon third-party beneficiary principles than upon tort, see Cannon v. Dorr-Oliver, supra, but the result is the same. And there is evidence to support the Court’s rulings.
Id. at 1010. Since Seiler, like Cannon, also involved damage to other property, and not mere economic loss, the economic loss doctrine was not and could not properly be the basis for the recovery allowed. Therefore, although neither case is controlling on the question presented in this case, we note that both decisions are consistent with the rationale in East River since each involved other property damage.
We recognize that one benefit of a privity of contract standing requirement is that it acts as a limitation on the potential tort liability of a commercial seller. The number of persons to whom a commercial seller would owe a duty .to protect against the risk that its product, if defective, might damage itself, is reduced from a class of all foreseeable users of its products to a limited and knowable class of those users with whom the seller is in contractual privity. We are more persuaded, however, by the view that contract notions of privity are irrelevant to the question whether a commercial seller owes a duty to foreseeable users of its products, under tort law, to protect against the risk that its product, if defective, might damage only itself.
See Clark v. International Harvester Co.,
Rather, we find that the economic loss doctrine is especially suited to cases where privity of contract does exist. In such cases, it is presumed that the parties to the transaction have allocated the risk of product nonperformance through the bargaining process. In
Sullivan Industries, Inc. v. Double Seal Glass Co., Inc.,
The reliance on privity notions to ascertain whether tort or commercial law applies serves only to blur the distinction between, and the applicability of, commercial law and tort law to economic losses. Instead, a more logical and conceptually manageable approach is to determine the type of loss a plaintiff is alleging. Allegations of only economic loss do not implicate tort law concerns with safety, but do implicate commercial law concerns with economic expectations. Accordingly, the latter concerns must govern, and the law designed to define relationships among commercial persons and enacted by the legislature to create and limit liability between them, the Uniform Commercial Code, should be applied. In this situation, there is no rationale for the court to shift the loss between the parties by going outside the Code.
Id.
Finally, for essentially the same reasons, we are unable to accept Danforth’s contention that Delaware should recognize an exception to the economic loss doctrine by allowing individual consumers, as distinguished from commercial buyers, to recover for economic loss based upon the alleged inherently unequal bargaining power between individual consumers and commercial sellers. Such a rule would defeat the legislative intent of the General Assembly in enacting Article 2 of the Uniform Com
*1201
mercial Code, as codified at 6
Del. C.
2-101
et seq.,
as the complete framework of the rights and remedies available to parties to a sale of goods contract.
See Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland Inc.,
Del.Supr.,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that purely economic loss caused by qualitatively defective products is not recoverable in tort under Delaware law, notwithstanding the presence of privity of contract. 5 Therefore, the order of the Superior Court dated August 27, 1991, granting Acorn’s motion for summary judgment as to Danforth’s negligence claim is AFFIRMED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. In Guardian, the Superior Court recognized an exception to the economic loss doctrine in the surveyor error context under Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977), § 552 (Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others) by allowing recovery for purely economic loss even though there was no privity of contract.
. We do not address the merits of this ruling since it is beyond the scope of the question presented in this interlocutory appeal.
.Economic loss has been defined as "damages for inadequate value,
costs of repair and replacement of the defective product,
or consequent loss of profits — without any claim of personal injury or damage to
other
property,” as well as "the diminution in value of the product because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the general purposes for which it is manufactured and sold."
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co.,
. Under Delaware law, a seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty. 6 Del.C. § 2-318. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
. This decision is not intended to address, and does not extend to, the question whether the economic loss doctrine bars recovery of economic loss caused by professional malpractice in tort.
