The facts in this case are not in dispute. On. September 12, 1945, Claude Coolman, then the husband of the plaintiff, suffered an accidental fatal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by defendant Contract Purchase Corporation. His sole dependent was the widow who was awarded compensation at the rate of $19 per week, for 400 weeks, for total dependency in accordance with pertinent provisions of the workmen’s compensation law in force at that time as amended by PA 1943, No 245 (CL 1948, § 412.5 [Stat Ann 1947 Cum Supp §17.155]).
In November, 1947, plaintiff petitioned the workmen’s compensation commission for an order authorizing a “lump-sum advance payment” to enable her to purchase certain equipment for the opеration of her home and farm and to cover specified items of personal expense. Defendants opposed the application but an order was entered on January 13, 1948, awarding plaintiff an advance payment of compensation for a period of 129 weeks in the aggregate amount of $2,035.47, the order being based on the provisions of part 2, § 22, of the workmen’s compensation law (CL 1948, § 412.22 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.172]). Said amount was paid to plaintiff and the weekly payments were continued until the 5th of March, 1950, when plaintiff remarried. Under section 6 (c) of part 2 of the law (CL 1948, § 412.6 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 17.156]) such remarriage *562 terminated plaintiff’s right to receive compensation payments. Notice of termination was given and defendants filed a petition with the compensation commission for a hearing to review the payments made and to determine the rights of .the parties. A hearing was had before a deputy commissioner of the department of labor and industry who found specifiсally that plaintiff had remarried and was not entitled to receive compensation benefits after March 5, 1950. He also determined, in accordance with the claims of the defendants, that the said sum of $2,-035.47 paid to plaintiff in 1948, pursuant to the ordеr of the commission of January 13, 1948, was an overpayment. On appeal the compensation commission sustained the finding of the deputy and directed plaintiff to refund to defendants the amount of such overpayment. On leave granted, plаintiff has appealed to this Court.
On behalf of appellant it is urged that defendants’ petition for review of payments and determination of rights was insufficient to authorize the deputy commissioner and the compensation commission to pаss on the question involved, that is, whether the advancement to plaintiff in 1948 constituted an overpayment to the return of which defendants are entitled. It does not appear, however, that any objection was made on such ground until after the dеputy had rendered his decision. While defendants did not specifically allege in their petition that they sought a determination on the issue of overpayment, we do not think that plaintiff or her counsel were misled thereby. The record indicates thаt the purpose of the hearing sought was clearly understood by the' parties concerned as well as by the deputy and the commission.
It is also contended that the order of the commission granting to plaintiff the advance payment of compensation for a period of 129 weeks was res *563 judicata, and that the commission was without authority to order a repayment, no question of actual fraud or bad faith being involved. In reaching its conclusion, as above indicated, the compensаtion commission said in part:-
“It is obvious that under our act where dependency compensation benefits to a widow terminate upon her remarriage that any payments covering a period beyond the date of her remarriage аre overpayments. In the instant case the widow was paid not only to March 5, 1950, the date of her remarriage, but for an additional 129 weeks. She was not entitled to the payment for the 129 weeks because section 6 of part 2 specificаlly provides that dependency payments stop when the widow remarries. Defendants’ liability for dependency compensation terminated on March 5, 1950.”
Attention was directed to the decision of this Court in
Samels
v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company,
“Nevertheless, wherе there has been no laches by the employer, the commission, when called upon by proper petition, should determine whether there has been an overpayment under the facts, as are presented in this case, and order the return of such overpayment either directly or by a credit on future payments. The act seeks just compensation, but not a penalty. If timely sought, retroactive awards have *564 frequently been made, and while as a rule in favor of the employee, also at times in favor of the employer. Ro manchuk v. Ford Motor Co.,290 Mich 673 , 677; Grycan v. Ford Motor Co.,291 Mich 241 ; Szczucki v. Cadillac Motor Co.,294 Mich 271 , in all of which cases the rule set forth in Kirchner v. Michigan Sugar Co.,206 Mich 459 , hereinbefore quoted, has been referred to with approval. Credit should be given to defendants for the overpayments, if any, they were obligated to make under Rule 8(a), supra, in order to present their present claims. * * *
“Plaintiff should be оrdered to repay to defendant employer the amount of overpayment, or in default thereof, it shall be deducted from the compensation hereafter accruing until it is paid.”
In
Kirchner
v.
Michigan Sugar Co.,
“The purpose of the compensation law is compensation at rates which the law itself, directly or indirectly, but certainly, fixes. Claimant is entitled to receive, and his employer is obligated to pay, no more and no less than the statute compensation. *565 "We are not called upon to decide whether an agreed but a too large or a too small compensation having-been paid by agreement аnd the period of payment having- ended and all payments having- been made, by commutation or otherwise, either party may have recourse against the other by action of the industrial accident board or otherwise. But so long as the matter is depending before the board we are of the opinion that in the due administration of the law it has power to so limit payments, by its orders, that the statute sum, no more, no less, shall be paid and received, and to make such an order as wаs made in this proceeding to bring- about, so far as possible, such desired and lawful result. The order reviewed in terms and in fact takes nothing from plaintiff in certiorari to which, under the law, he is entitled. It may leave him possessed of a larger sum than the onе to which he was entitled. If its effect shall be to give him no less than the compensation which the law has said he shall have, his rights, under the law, have been duly respected.”
In
Webster
v.
Rotary Electric Steel Company,
*566
Appellant cites and relies on
Meyers
v.
Iron County,
The order of the commission of January 13, 1948, granting to plaintiff a lump-sum advance payment of compensation for 129 weeks, determined as provided in the statute, is not in question. The commission was invested by the statute with discretionary authority, on a proper showing of facts, to direct such advance payment.
McMullen
v.
Gavette Construction Co.,
*567 The practical situation presented here is that the compensation commission, exercising its discretionary authority, permitted plaintiff to receive a certain portion of her compensation in advance of the dates of payment that otherwise would have obtained. It is apparent that such action was taken on the assumption that in due course of time plaintiff would become entitled to, and would receive, weekly payments in accordance with the originаl action taken under the statute. Such assumption was a wholly logical one on which the commission was entitled to rely. By her remarriage plaintiff terminated all right to receive further compensation arising from her status as a dependent оf her former husband. If the anticipatory order had not been made she would not, of course, have been entitled, following her remarriage, to the 129, weeks compensation covered by such order. The records of the commission, which have been duly certified to this Court, indicate that plaintiff received compensation at the rate of $19 per week for a total period of 233 weeks, aggregating $4,427, and that a burial allowance in the sum of $300 was also paid. Her right to further compensation under the statute was terminated by her. Under the facts presented here we are in accord with the holding of the compensation commission that under the statute, reasonably interpreted, the amount paid to her in antiсipation of future payments that it was assumed she would be entitled to receive must-be regarded as an overpayment. In ordering the return the commission did not exceed its authority.
The order of the compensation commission is affirmed, with costs to defendants.