56 Md. 433 | Md. | 1881
delivered the opinion of the Court.
It appears from this record, that Joseph G-. Dance, on the 10th of January, 1814, conveyed to his son, Alexander Dance, certain real estate for $4000. The son paid $1000 in cash, and for the balance of the purchase money, gave his two promissory notes, one for $400 payable “ twelve months after date, with six per cent, interest,” and the ■other for $2600, payable “one year after” his mother’s death, “ with six per cent, interest.” The father died shortly after this deed was executed, .leaving a will, by which he appointed his son Milton Dance, his executor. On the 18th of March, 1819, Alexander Dance and wife mortgaged the property to Mrs. Sarah C. Brooks, to secure a debt of $2000, and on the 21st of the same month, the executor filed the hill in this case, in which he avers that part of the principal of the $400 note, and the interest on the $2600 note,' making in the aggregate the sum of ■$820.Y2, is now due, and he insists that this purchase money is a lien upon the land. The bill further charges that the mortgage to Mrs. Brooks, was a scheme and device mutually agreed upon between the parties thereto, to defraud and cheat the complainant, and the devisees of Joseph Gr. Dance, out of this unpaid purchase money, and that she took the mortgage with full 'knowledge of this lien. The prayer of the hill is that a decree may be passed for a sale of the land for payment of the purchase money, that Alexander Dance may he enjoined from selling or encumbering it, and that Mrs. Brooks may he enjoined from disposing of her mortgage, and from selling the property thereunder by any proceeding in equity or otherwise.
Alexander Dance in his answer, avers that he has paid the $400 noce in full, principal and interest, and that no part of the principal or interest of the $2600 is now due, as the same is made payable one year after the death of his mother, who is still living. He denies there is any
Upon the hearing, after testimony had been taken, the Court passed a decree dissolving the injunction that had been previously granted, and dismissing the bill. From that decree the complainant has appealed.
As between the vendor or his executor and the vendee, we have no doubt there was a lien upon this land for the unpaid purchase money. Equity recognizes and enforces a lien on the land as security for the unpaid purchase money, whether the legal estate has been conveyed or not; and this lien exists independent of any special agreement, as an incident to the contract of sale of real estate. It is not extinguished, even where the legal title has been conveyed, by the mere fact that the vendee gives his own individual note or obligation, without other security, for payment of the purchase money. Schwarz vs. Stein, 29 Md., 112; Hurley, vs. Hollyday, 35 Md., 472. Here, the purchaser simply gave his own notes without any other security. Beyond taking these notes, we find nothing in the case indicating an intention on the part of the vend'or to waive the lien. We find nothing in the provisions of the will to justify the presumption of such waiver.
But the executor insists he has the right to a decree for a sale of the property, subject to this mortgage, for the purpose of satisfying, to that extent, the vendor’s lien. But this depends upon the question, whether any part of the unpaid purchase money is now due. The proof satisfies us that the $400 note had been paid in full, principal and interest, before this hill was filed, and that the purchaser has also made some payments for which he is entitled to a credit on the $2600 note. By the terms of this latter note, neither the principal nor the interest upon it, is due or payable until one year after the death of his mother, who is still living. It is true, that some proof, (not however of a very satisfactory character,) was introduced, tending to show that when this note was executed, it was the understanding and agreement between the payee and the maker, that the latter should pay the interest on it “ annually,” but exception has been taken to the admissibility of this testimony, and we think it clear, it must be rejected. The effect of admitting it, would be
It follows that as no part of the purchase money is now due, the bill is premature. Nor can we discover any good reason for retaining it. If Mrs. Brooks proceeds to institute proceedings to sell the property under her mortgage, it will he competent for the executor, as a subsequent incumbrancer, to intervene in that case, and claim so much of the proceeds of sale as shall remain after satisfying the mortgage debt, and this, so far as we can perceive, is the only proceeding he can adopt before the maturity of the $2600 note.
Decree affirmed.