ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Re: Dkt. No. 22
I. INTRODUCTION
“Thе use of child slave labor in the Ivory Coast is a humanitarian tragedy.” Doe I v. Nestle USA Inc.,
This is a putative class action in which Plaintiff Laura Dana claims that Defendants The Hershey Company and Hershey Chocolate & Confectionary .Corporation (collectively, “Hershey”) violated California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210), Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA,” Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750-1784), and False Advertising Law (“FAL,” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500-17509) by failing to disclose on the packaging of Hershey’s chocolate products that some of the cocoa used therein originated at farms in Cote d’Ivoire (also known as thе Ivory Coast) that use slave labor and the worst forms of
II. BACKGROUND
A. Allegations of the Complaint
Cote d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa beans, the raw ingredient for chocolate, and supplies 40% of global cocoa production and 47% of total imports to the United States. Compl. (dkt. 1) ¶¶ 19, 46. Slave labor and the worst forms of child labor are common in Ivorian cocoa production, as is well documented by United States government agencies, academic studies, nonprofit organizations, investigative journalists, and former laborers. Id. ¶¶5-8, 28-25, 32-42. Children are frequently injured in the course of dangerous work involving machetes, chemicals, and heavy loads, and workers (both children and adults) may be beaten, whipped, and locked in to prevent escape. Id. ¶¶ 23-25. The Ninth Circuit has also acknowledged the existence of such conditions. Id. ¶26; Doe I,
Hershey is one of the largest chocоlate companies in the United States and sells a number of popular chocolate products. Id. ¶ 3. In 2001, members if the United States chocolate industry including Hershey signed a voluntary protocol, negotiated by Representative Eliot Engel and Senator Tom Harkin, to develop standards for certifying chocolate produced without labor abuses. Id. ¶ 27. After failing to meet the initial 2005 deadline, the industry extended the self-imposed deadline to 2008, then to 2010, and then to 2020. Id. ¶¶ 29 - 31.
Despite adopting a “supplier code” that prohibits child labor and foreed labor, and a “Corporate Social Responsibility Report” stating that “Hershey has zero tolerance for the worst forms of child labor in its supply chain,” Hershey sources much of its chocolate' from Cóte d’Ivoire through a multi-level supply chain of independent growers, cooperatives, distributors, and other intermediaries. Id. ¶¶ 4,11, 20, 45, 47 51, 52. “Hershey acknowledges.. .the child and slave labor in its Ivorian supply chain,”
Dana “has purchased Hershey Chocolate Products at various retail stores including Target and Walmart in Brentwood and Antioch, California from 2011 through 2014.” Id. ¶ 13. Citing studies showing that consumers will pay a premium for ethically produced coffee, clothing, and seafood, id. ¶¶ 55-59, Dana alleges that she and other customers “would not have purchased Hershey Chocolate Products or paid as much for them” if Hershey had disclosed labor violations on the product labels. Id. ¶ 10, see also id. ¶¶ 60, 95,106.
The Complaint includes three claims, under the UCL, the CLRA, and the FAL, respectively. The UCL claim is based on three separate theories arising from Hershey’s failure to disclose labor abuses in its
B. Procedural History
Dana filed this action on September 28, 2015, seeking to represent herself and other similarly situated consumers who purchased Hershey chocolate products in the last four years. See generally Compl. Dana’s counsel also represents plaintiffs who filed similar actions аgainst two other large chocolate manufacturers, Mars and Nestlé. See Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-04450-RS (N.D.Cal.); McCoy v. Nestlé USA, Inc., No. 3:15-cv-04451 (N.D.Cal.). Defendants moved to dismiss in all three cases. Judge Seeborg granted the motion to dismiss in Hodsdon, as discussed in detail below. The undersigned heard argument on the motion in McCoy concurrently with Hershey’s motion in the present case.
C. Parties’ Arguments
Hershey argues that the case must be dismissed for several reasons, starting with the safe harbor doctrine, which provides that plaintiffs cannot use California’s consumer protection laws to pursue relief that is foreclosed by other, more specific statutes. Mot. (dkt. 22) at 6-9. According to Hershey, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act of 2010 (the “Supply Chains Act”) bars Dana’s claims because it regulates disclosures related to labor abuses in supply chains and does not require the disclosures Dana seeks. Id. Dana responds that the Supply Chains Act does not specifically permit Hershey’s omissions or bar Dana’s claims, and that the labor violations addressed by that statute (slavery and human trafficking) do not encompass all of the violations at issue here (which also includе dangerous but non-slave child labor). Opp’n' at 5 -10.
Turning to Dana’s specific claims, Hershey argues that Dana cannot proceed on a UCL claim for “unlawful” conduct because her CLRA claim is deficient, nor for “fraudulent” conduct because such a claim does not encompass omissions absent a duty to disclose. Mot. at 17-18. Dana responds that her CLRA claim is sufficient to support an “unlawful conduct” UCL claim, and the “fraudulent conduct” claim should survive because she contends that Hershey did have a duty to disclose. Opp’n at 17-18. As for “unfair” conduct, Hershey contends that Dana cannot succeed under any of- the tests that courts have used, because she has not identified a legislative policy against Hershey’s non-disclosure, the non-disclosure at issue is not inherently immoral or oppressive, and there is no substantial injury to consumers. Mot. at 18-21. Dana argues that the labor abuses in Hershey’s supply chain contravene legislatively declared policies in the form of United Nations prohibitions of forced labor and the worst forms of child labor that the United States has ratified, and that those abuses' are immoral and unethical. Opp’n at 18-19. She also contends that the harm of deceiving consumers outweighs the cost to Hershey of changings its product labeling. Id. at 19-20. Hershey notes in reply that the United Nаtions sources that Dana cites relate only to labor practices, not product labeling. Reply (dkt. 30) at 10.
Hershey argues that Dana’s CLRA claim fails because Hershey had no duty to disclose, and also because the omissions regarding labor abuses do not relate to the specific provisions of the statute Dana cites, which govern representations regarding attributes including the “source,” “characteristics,” and “standard” of goods. Mot. at 21-22. Dana contends that “Hershey’s failure to disclose that its supply chain is not child and slave free is likely to deceive a reasonable consumer regarding the chocolate’s source (from plantations using child and slave labor) and characteristics/standard (produced by child and slave labor).” Opp’n at 20. Hershey responds that the provisions at issue are intended “to target misrepresentations regarding the identity of the seller,...a product’s physical features or capabilities,... or its inherent level of quality or performance,” not the lаbor standards used to produce the product. Reply at 12.
Hershey does not address Dana’s RAL claim separately in detail, but contends in a footnote that the FAL only governs affirmative misrepresentations, not omissions. Mot. at 17 n.18. Dana disputes that proposition and argues that some cases have allowed FAL claims to proceed based on omissions. Opp’n at 17.
According to Hershey, Dana lacks both Article III and statutory standing to bring any of her claims because she cannot trace the cocoa used in the specific chocolate products she bought back to a specific plantation, and thus cannot know whether the products she bought were produced with slave or child labor. Mot. at 22-23. Hershey contends that without that knowl
Finally, Hershey argues that requiring the labeling Dana seeks would compel speech in violation of the First Amendment. Mot. at 23-25. Dana contends that laws against misleading advertising are constitutional, and that a mere rational basis is required to support laws compelling affirmative factual product labeling to avoid misleading consumers. Opp’n at 23-25 (citing, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
D. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc.
In Hodsdon, Judge Seeborg granted a motion by chocolate manufacturer Mars, Inc. to dismiss claims very similar those in the case at hand. Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc.,
With respect to the FAL claim, the court reconciled cases holding that omissions were not actionable with others that allowed FAL claims based on omissions to proceed, ultimately determining that omissions accompanying misleading incomplete statements are actionable, but omissions with no corresponding statements are not. Id. at *4. Compare Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, No. 14-CV-00582-JD,
Next, the court turned to the plaintiffs CLRA claim and his claim under the “unlawful” prong of the UCL, which was based on the purported CLRA violation. Id. at *5-6. Noting the Ninth .Circuit’s holding that “California courts have generally rejected a broad obligation to disclose,” the court looked to whether Mars had any such obligation. Id. at *5. The court held that despite one case to the contrary, “the overwhelming majority of courts to consider the issue” have held that omissions are only actionable under the CLRA if they relate to product safety or defects. Id. at *5-6. Because the omissions at issue related instead to “admittedly horrific labor practices” in the supply chain, the court dismissed the plaintiffs CLRA claim and the “unlawful conduct” aspect of the UCL claim that derived from it. Id. at *6.
The plaintiff also brought UCL claims based on the “fraudulent” and “unfair” prongs of the statute. The court followed two California appellate decisions holding that omissions cannot satisfy the “fraudulent” prong unless there was a duty to disclose, and therefore dismissed that claim. Id. at *6 (citing Berryman v. Merit Prop. Mgmt., Inc.,
Because the plaintiff failed to state a claim for the reasons summarized above, the court did not reach Mars’s argument that the Supply Chains Act creates a safe harbor, but expressed doubt that any such harbor is as broad as Mars contended. Id. at *8-9. The court found that amendment would be futile and denied leave to amend. Id. at *9. Hodsdon’s appeal of. Judge See-borg’s decision is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which- relief can be granted under'Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n,
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint and takes “all allegations of material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington,
Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sets a heightened pleading standard for claims based on fraud. “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). The Ninth Circuit has held that in order to meet this standard, a “complaint must specify such facts as the times, dates, places, benefits received, and other details of the alleged fraudulent activity.” Neubronner v. Milken,
Hershey also moves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), appаrently on the basis that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Dana lacks Article III standing. See Mot. at ECF p. 2 (Notice of Motion identifying Rule 12(b)(1) as a basis for dismissal); id. at 22-23 (arguing that Dana lacks standing). Where, as here, a jurisdictional challenge is based on the allegations of a plaintiffs complaint rather than on extrinsic evidence, courts “assume [the plaintiffs] allegations to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Wolfe v. Strankman,
B. Standing
Hershey argues that Dana lacks Article III and statutory standing to pursue these claims because she does not and cannot allege that the specific products she purchased were made from cocoa produced with the labor abuses at issue in this case—slave labor or the worst forms of child labor—and therefore fails to allege an actual, particularized injury. Mot. at 22-23; Reply at 12-14. The parties agree that Hershey currently cannot trace the cocoa used in a particular Hershey chocolate рroduct to a specific plantation, and there is thus no way to know what labor
The issue of Article III standing is straightforward. “[W]hen, as here, ‘Plaintiffs contend that class members paid more for [a product] than they otherwise would have paid, or bought it when they otherwise would not have done so’ they have suffered an Article III injury in fact.” Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp.,
Dana also has standing under the California statutes at issue. The UCL and FAL require that private plaintiffs “ha[ve] suffered injury in fact and ha[ve] lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition” or false advertising. Hinojos,
In both Kwikset, where the defendant marketed locks as “Made in U.S.A.” despite some foreign components and assembly work, and Hinojos, where the defendant allegedly advertised its normal prices as “reduced,” plaintiffs who relied on those representation had standing to sue under the UCL and FAL. Id. at 1107; Kwikset,
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Birdsong v. Apple, Inc.,
Hershey argues, essentially, that a UCL claim based on misrepresentation of labor practices can only succeed where a plaintiff is certain that the objectionable practice was used to produce the specific item that the plaintiff purchased. See Reply at 12 -13. Stepping back from the fact pattern of this case, that argument would dictate that even if Hershey had—hypothetically—concealed Ivorian labor conditions from its customers, falsely labeled all of its chocolate as certified- to be free of child labor, and run a fraudulent national ad campaign touting its child-labor-free chocolate, a customer who relied on that false prоmotion would lack standing to sue for fraudulent business practices and false advertising so long as some fraction of Hershey’s cocoa met those descriptions and the customer was unable to tell what labor conditions produced the cocoa in the actual product he or she purchased. Such .a result would undermine the holding of Hinojos and Kimhset,
“ ‘For a significant-segment of the buying public, labor practices do matter in making consumer choices.’” Kwikset,
C. CLRA Claim
The CLRA prohibits certain enumerated “unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” Cal, Civ. Code § 1770(a). Dana argues that Hershey’s failure to disclose labor abuses on its packaging violates subsection (a)(2) by “[misrepresenting the source” of the chocolate, subsection (a)(5) by “[representing that goods .. .have.. .characteristics.. .'which they do not have,” and subsection (a)(7) by “[r]ep-resenting that goods.,. are of a particular standard.” Id. § 1770(a)(2), (5), (7); see Compl. ¶¶ 88 -91; Opp’n at 20. In her Opposition, Dana makes clear that these theories are based on “Hershey’s omission of known child and slave labor in its supply chain,” and that she “does not here contend that Hershey’s partial misrepresentations give rise to its duty to disclose.” Opp’n at 13 n.58.
“[Although a claim may be stated under the CLRA in terms constituting fraudulent omissions, to be actionable the omission must be contrary to a representation actually made by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was obliged to disclose.” Daugherty v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
At least one district court decision .has limited Wilson to cases where a product was covered by a warranty that expired before the defect became apparent. Stanwood v. Mary Kay, Inc.,
The Court agrees with Judge Seeborg’s conclusion that the weight of authority limits a duty-to disclose under the CLRA to issues of product safety, unless disclosure is necessary to counter an affirmative misrepresentation. See Hodsdon,
A duty to disclose under California law does not extend to all “information [that] may persuade a consumer to make different purchasing decisions.” Hodsdon,
Even if that were not’ so, the parties agree Dana would still need to show one of the following to support a duty to disclose: (1) a fiduciary relationship between Hershey and Dana; (2) that Hershey had “exclusive knowledge of material facts not known or reasonably accessible to” its customers; (3) that Hershey actively concealed a material fact; or (4) that Hershey had made misleading partial representations. Opp’n at 12 (quoting Doe v. SuccessfulMatch.com,
Further, even if Dana could adequately plead that Hershey had a duty to disclose the labor abuses in its supply chain on its product labels, it is far from clear that such information falls within the categories of representations governed by the CLRA. Dana invokes provisions barring misrepresentation of the “source,” “characteristics,” and “standard” of a product. Opp’n at-20 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(2), (5), (7)). While the CLRA provides that it “shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes” of consumer protection, Cal. Civ. Code § 1760, it-does not explicitly discuss representations regarding labor practices, see id. § 1770(a), and Dana cites no authority holding that any of the enumerated categories she relies on are so broad as to encompass labor abuses. Because the Court holds that Hershey did not have a duty to disclose labor abuses in its supply chain on its product labels, the Court declines to resolve whether misrep^ resentations regarding labor practices can fall within, the scope of the CLRA.
D.UCL Claim
California’s UCL prohibits unfair cоmpetition, defined as “any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. Dana brings her claim under each of these prongs, and Hershey argues that each must be dismissed.
The “fraudulent” prong fails for similar reasons. As Judge Seeborg noted in Hods-don, California courts have held that “ ‘[ajbsent a duty to disclose, the failure to do so does not support a claim under the fraudulent prong of the UCL,’ ” Hodsdon,
That leavеs the “unfair” prong, the test for which remains somewhat unsettled in the California courts. Courts previously held a practice to be “‘unfair’.. .when it offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers.” S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,
When a plaintiff who claims to have suffered injury from a direct competitor’s “unfair” act or practice invokes section 17200, the word “unfair” in that section means conduct that threatens an incipient violation of an antitrust law, or violates the policy or spirit of one of those laws because its effects are comparable to or the same as a violation of the law, or otherwise significantly threatens or harms сompetition.
Cel-Tech Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co.,
In the years since Cel-Tech, some courts have continued to use the South Bay test for cases brought by consumers, while others have followed Cel-Tech’s, lead and “require[d] that the unfairness be tied to a ‘legislatively declared’ policy,” Lozano v. AT & T Wireless Servs., Inc.,
The “legislative policies” on which Dana relies are the United Nations’ International Labor Convention No. 182 and the Unit
At the hearing, Dana’s counsel suggested for the first time that Dana could amend her UCL claim to tether the “unfair” prong to the Department of Labor’s listing of goods produced with child labor and forced labor, see 22 U.S.C. § 7112(b), and to California’s Supply Chains Act, which is discussed in more detail below in the context of Hershey’s safe harbor doctrine argument, see Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43. Although both statutes call for certain disclosures related to labor conditions, neither expresses any policy of disclosure on product labels. Amending Dana’s Complaint to reference those statutes would not remedy the defects of her UCL claim.
Turning to the South Bay balancing test, the distinction between the underlying labor practices and the failure to disclose once again undermines Dana’s claim. The slave labor and child labor , alleged in the Complaint would certainly qualify as “immoral, unethical, oppressive, [and] unscrupulous.” See S. Bay,
The harm at issue here is that Hodsdon may not have purchased Mars’s chocolate products at all, or would have- paid less for them, had he been aware of the prospect for child labor in Mars’s supply chain. Such information is, in fact, readily available to consumers on Mars’s website. Given that Hodsdon, like any other consumer, has access to information about the source of Mars’s cocoa beans, the absence of such information on the packaging is not “substantially injurious to consumers” or necеssarily immoral. Granting that the labor practices at issue are immoral, there remains an important distinction between them and the actual harm for which Hodsdon seeks to recover, namely his purchase of Mars’s chocolate products absent any disclosure. Mars’s failure to disclose information it had no duty to disclose in the first place is not substantially injurious, immoral, or unethical, and Hods-don’s UCL claim may therefore not adr vanee.
Hodsdon,
E. FAL Claim
The FAL makes it unlawful for any person “to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public. . .any statement.. .which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. The plain language of the statute—which prohibits making, disseminating, or causing the dissemination of false or misleading statements—does not encompass omissions. Several cases have therefore held that “[t]here can be no FAL claim where there is no ‘statement’ at all”—or in other words that an omission, even of material facts, does not violate the FAL. Norcia v. Samsung Telecomms. Am., LLC, No. 14-CV-00582-JD,
Dana cites four federal district court cases and two California appellate cases that purportedly held to the contrary, allowing FAL claims to proceed based on omissions. Opp’n at 17 nn. 89 & 91. One of those cases actually dismissed the plaintiffs FAL claim to the extent that it was based on affirmative misrepresentations, and did not address the FAL claim at all in its discussion of the plaintiffs fraudulent omission theory. Elias v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
Although neither Sony nor Tait cited the alleged misrepresentations as the reason for allowing the plaintiffs’ omissions claims to proceed, the Court agrees with Judge Seeborg’s conclusion that the outcome in both cases is consistent with a requirement that there be at least some affirmative misrepresentation to support a claim under the FAL. See Hodsdon,
F. Additional Defenses
In light of the holdings above that each of Dana’s claims must be dismissed, the Court need not reach the parties’ arguments regarding Hershey’s two additional defenses: that the California legislature has created a “safe harbor” against Dana’s claims by enacting the Supply Chains Act, see Mot. at 6-9; and that the relief Dana seeks would compel Hershey’s speech in violation of the First Amendment, id. at 23-26. Although this Order need not and does not resolve either of those issues, the Court briefly addresses the safe harbor argument.
“[T]he reach of the UCL is broad, but it is not without limit and may not be used to invade ‘safe harbors’ provided by other statutes.” Loeffler v. Target Corp.,
A plaintiff may thus not “plead around” an “absolute bar to relief’ simply “by recasting the cause of action as one for unfair competition.” (Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995)10 Cal.4th 257 , 283,41 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 ,895 P.2d 56 .) The rule does not, however, prohibit an action under the unfair competition law merely because some other statute on the subject does not, itself, provide for the action or prohibit the challenged conduct. To forestall an action under the unfair competition law, another provision must actually “bar” the action or clearly permit the conduct.
Cel-Tech,
The Supply Chains Act requires certain large corporations to disclose off their websites their “efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from [their] direct supply ehain[s] for tangible goods offered for
The Ninth Circuit very recently addressed the safe harbor doctrine in Ebner v. Fresh, Inc., a case alleging deception where a cosmetic product label disclosed the net weight of the product contained in a tube but failed to disclose that “only 75% of that product is reasonably accessible.” Ebner,
The Court recognizes that recent district court decisions have held that the Supply Chains Act creates a safe harbor against claims based on non-disclosure of labor abuses in a supply chain. Wirth,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Dana’s claims under the CLRA, the UCL, and the FAL fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and are therefore DISMISSED. Dana has made clear that she
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. The Court also heard argument in McCoy v. Nestle USA, Inc., No. 15-cv-4451, which involves different parties but substantially similar claims and arguments. A separate order has been published concurrently in that case.
. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
. Dana’s allegations are taken as true in the context of á motion to dismiss.
. Certain Hershey products, sold under the brand names Bliss, Dagoba, and Scharffen Berger, are certified by the Rainforest Alliance (a nongovernmental organization) as using ethically produced cocoa and are not at issue in this case. Compl. ¶ 49.
. Four other cases based, on nondisclosure of supply chain labor violations, brought by plaintiffs who also share counsel with Dana, have been dismissed for failure to state a claim in the Central District of California. Wirth v. Mars Inc., No. SA CV 15-1470-DOC (KESx),
. The CLRA allows a consumer who has suffered "any damage” to sue, and "any plaintiff who has standing under the UCL’s and FAL’s lost money or property' requirement will, a fortiori, have suffered 'any damage' for purposes of establishing CLRA standing.” Hinojos,
. Hershey also cites a number of district court cases finding that plaintiff purchasers did not have standing merely because products were defective as to other purchasers. Mot. at 23 & n.21 (citing In re McNeil Consumer Healthcare, Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., No. MDL 2190,
, Similarly, to use some of the examples given in thоse cases, it would be a bizarre result if sellers advertising food as halal or kosher, diamonds as conflict-free, or products as union-made could knowingly mix compliant and non-compliant products with impunity so long as there was no way for a buyer to trace the specific item he or she purchased back to the source. The Eighth Circuit has nevertheless adopted that rule. See Wallace v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
. O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., No. CV 09-8063 PSG (CWx),
. Cirulli v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. SACV 08-0854 AG (MLGx),
. Wilson also acknowledges cases recognizing a broader duty of disclosure in the sale of services, rather than products. Wilson,
. While Dana does not argue in the context of the "unfair” prong that either the CLRA or the FAL constitutes such a policy, her arguments that those statutes compel the disclosure she seeks could perhaps be transposed to this claim. For the reasons discussed above and below in the context of Dana’s CLRA and FAL claims, the Court holds that neither statute represents a policy requiring the disclosure of labor abuses in a supply chain on product labels.
. Moreover, even if the FAL allowed claims based on omissions, Dana has not established any duty to disclose the information at issue, as discussed above in the context of her CLRA claim.
. Appeals of all of these cases are currently pending before the Ninth Circuit.