Dana Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions et al.
No. 2018-246-Appeal. (PC 10-6627)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
November 14, 2019
Goldberg, J.
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at (401) 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
O P I N I O
Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on October 2, 2019, on appeal by the plaintiff, Dana Gallop (plaintiff or Gallop), from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendants, the Adult Correctional Institutions, the State of Rhode Island, Ian Rosado (Rosado), and Matthew Galligan (Galligan), following the entry of an order, after remand by this Court, that denied the plaintiff‘s motion to file a second
Facts and Travel
This case arises out of an incident that allegedly took place on or about April 26, 2010, while plaintiff was held in pretrial detention at the ACI while awaiting trial on numerous counts stemming from a fatal shooting in Providence in 2008. The plaintiff alleged that he was attacked by Rosado, a fellow inmate, and that he suffered lacerations and permanent facial scarring as a result. The plaintiff also alleged that the attack was made possible because, the day before the attack took place, Rosado told Galligan, a correctional officer, that he intended to carry out the attack. According to plaintiff, Galligan then informed various “John Doe” defendants of Rosado‘s planned attack.1 Finally, plaintiff alleged that Galligan had abandoned his post for eighteen minutes on April 26, 2010, to afford Rosado the opportunity to carry out the assault.
On May 12, 2010, plaintiff was convicted after a jury trial of first-degree murder, felony assault, using a firearm when committing a crime of violence, carrying a pistol without a license, and possession of arms by a person convicted of a crime of violence or who is a fugitive from justice. He was also declared a habitual offender. The trial justice sentenced plaintiff to two mandatory consecutive life sentences, plus an additional twenty-year sentence to be served consecutively to the second life sentence, and two ten-year sentences to run concurrently with the first life sentence. The plaintiff was also sentenced, as a habitual offender, to an additional twenty-five years, to be served after the sentences on the underlying conviction, without the possibility of parole. The plaintiff appealed, and this Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on May 2, 2014. State v. Gallop, 89 A.3d 795, 806 (R.I. 2014) (Gallop I).
On November 10, 2010, plaintiff filed a civil complaint in the present case, naming the ACI, the state, and various John Does as defendants, alleging negligence for failing to properly protect him. As part of that initial complaint, plaintiff also alleged several additional common law tort claims, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, conspiracy and joint enterprise resulting in assault and battery, implied breach of warranty, failure to maintain “protective responsibilities[,]” and a violation of plaintiff‘s civil rights.
On April 11, 2013, with the statute of limitations looming, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding Rosado and Galligan as named defendants, with additional allegations concerning the circumstances under which the alleged incident
The day before the trial‘s scheduled start date, the trial justice, sua sponte, raised the issue of
The plaintiff objected to the motion to dismiss and sought leave to file a second amended complaint. The proposed second amended complaint added a claim alleging violations by defendants under various statutory and constitutional provisions, including
Following a hearing on July 28, 2016, the trial justice granted defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the civil death statute, but she did not address plaintiff‘s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. The plaintiff appealed, arguing before this Court that
With respect to the civil death statute, this Court declared in Gallop II that the Superior Court had no authority to entertain plaintiff‘s action because plaintiff‘s civil rights were extinguished by operation of law once his criminal conviction was affirmed. Gallop II, 182 A.3d at 1141. We held that “[t]he statute unambiguously declares that a person such as plaintiff, who is serving a life sentence, is deemed civilly dead and thus does not possess most commonly recognized civil rights.” Id. We decided that the trial justice “prudently and accurately dismissed the case[,]” and we declined to read an exception into the statute for claims alleging a violation of a prisoner‘s civil rights. Id. at 1141, 1143.2 We also reiterated the commonly-understood principle that “[r]epeal is the province of the Legislature.” Id. at 1141.
Significantly, there was no timely constitutional challenge to the civil death statute, for negligence claims, raised in the Superior Court or this Court; instead, plaintiff‘s argument was confined to the federal civil rights actions. Gallop II, 182 A.3d at 1144. As a result, we concluded that the complaint had been properly dismissed. Id. at 1143. However, we decided that the “trial justice should have addressed the plaintiff‘s second amended complaint before granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.” Id. at 1144. We noted that “[t]his Court cannot review the trial justice‘s decision
On remand in the Superior Court, plaintiff presented his arguments in reverse order: He first asserted that, because
The defendants correctly pointed out that plaintiff‘s various federal and constitutional claims were raised for the first time in the proposed second amended complaint and were not properly before the trial justice. Although defendants acknowledged that
The trial justice ultimately denied plaintiff‘s motion to amend based on “the proximity to the trial, additional significant discovery, and other pleadings needed in lateness of filing the motion[.]” The trial justice determined that “[t]he delay of filing the second amended complaint would result in extreme prejudice to the defendant” because it was filed on the eve of trial, discovery had closed, trial strategy was developed, and witnesses were prepared. Finally, the trial justice determined that plaintiff “failed to establish a reasonable explanation for [his] delay in moving to amend the complaint.” Before this Court, plaintiff argues that the trial justice erred in failing to address plaintiff‘s argument that
This Court has consistently held that “the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint is within the sound discretion of the hearing justice[.]” Barrette v. Yakavonis, 966 A.2d 1231, 1236 (R.I. 2009). Therefore, we afford “great deference to the trial justice‘s ruling on a motion to amend.” Catucci v. Pacheco, 866 A.2d 509, 513 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Normandin v. Levine, 621 A.2d 713, 715 (R.I. 1993)). This Court “will not disturb [the] ruling unless the hearing justice committed an abuse of discretion.” Barrette, 966 A.2d at 1236.
Analysis
On appeal, plaintiff contends that his state law claims must be allowed to proceed because
Motion to Amend
We first address whether the trial justice properly denied plaintiff‘s motion to amend. After careful review of the record, we are satisfied that the trial justice did not abuse her discretion, and properly denied the motion to amend.
The standard of review to be applied in evaluating the decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint is well settled, and the focus is whether there was an abuse of discretion by the trial justice.
“A party may amend the party‘s pleading once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served * * *. Otherwise a party may amend the party‘s pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”
After a pleading has been amended once as a matter of course, “leave to amend a pleading lies within the sound discretion of a trial justice,” and
Factors that indicate substantial prejudice if a party were allowed to amend its claim include, but are not limited to, undue delay in seeking to amend the complaint without any reasonable explanation being given, or when the amendment would require a significant amount of new discovery. Faerber, 568 A.2d at 330 (“An addition of a new claim close to trial when
Again, it is well settled that this Court‘s review of a trial justice‘s decision to grant or deny a motion to amend a complaint is deferential, and we “will not disturb [the] ruling unless the hearing justice committed an abuse of discretion.” Barrette, 966 A.2d at 1236. However, the courts are not vested with limitless discretion. Hogan v. McAndrew, 131 A.3d 717, 722 (R.I. 2016) (noting that the abuse of discretion standard “does not suggest that this Court merely endorses the findings made by the lower court“).
Rather, “[a]buse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing them.” Id. at 722 (quoting Independent Oil and Chemical Workers of Quincy, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Manufacturing Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988)). In evaluating whether the trial justice abused her discretion, we carefully review the record to determine that all material factors have been properly acknowledged and weighed, that improper factors were not relied on, and, generally, that the record demonstrates the trial justice set forth some grounds that support her decision.
Our review of the record satisfies us that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial justice. The record reflects that she properly weighed all relevant factors without allocating weight to any improper factor, such as the constitutionality of the statute that was not before her, as discussed infra. There were more-than-adequate grounds to support her decision. The trial justice looked to our well-settled caselaw as the ruling standard for motions for leave to file an amended complaint, and properly applied the facts from the record to arrive at her decision.
Simply put, the trial justice concluded that plaintiff‘s undue delay in seeking the amendment would create substantial prejudice to defendants. Discovery had closed at least eight months earlier, and the inclusion of the new claims would necessitate additional discovery because the statutory claims were different and more complex than the longstanding common law tort claims. Having observed that “the case would really have to start from square one[,]” the trial justice denied the motion “based upon the proximity to the trial, additional significant discovery, and other pleadings needed in lateness of filing the motion[.]” We discern no error.
The record establishes that there were ample grounds supporting the trial justice‘s decision. We agree that plaintiff‘s undue delay in bringing his new claims would create substantial prejudice for defendants, and that no reasonable explanation for the delay was ever provided by plaintiff. In Gallop II, we noted that the Superior Court failed to rule on plaintiff‘s motion for leave to amend his complaint for the second time, and held that “[w]e are of the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled, at the very least, to a reasoned decision on his motion for leave to file an amended complaint.” Gallop II, 182 A.3d at 1145. We have before us a well-reasoned decision, and we are satisfied that the motion to amend was properly denied.
Next, we address plaintiff‘s efforts to advance arguments that Rhode Island‘s civil death statute is unconstitutional on various grounds. In doing so, we do not reach the merits. Rather, we set forth the reasons that this issue is barred by this Court‘s so-called “raise-or-waive” rule and procedural law.
The raise-or-waive rule is a fundamental rule in this state that is “staunchly adhered to” by this Court. Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Rohena v. City of Providence, 154 A.3d 935, 938 (R.I. 2017)). “[I]t is well settled that a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal if it was not raised before the trial court.” Id. (quoting Rohena, 154 A.3d at 938).
However, “[w]e have recognized that an exception to the raise-or-waive rule arises when basic constitutional rights are involved[.]” Cusick, 210 A.3d at 1204 (quoting In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d 1216, 1223 (R.I. 2010)). For the exception to apply, “the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial.” Id. (quoting In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d at 1223); see State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1987) (providing that the exception may apply, for example, “when an intervening decision of this [C]ourt or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine” during the course of a trial).
Here, plaintiff seeks to challenge
The sequence of events in the present case is apparent from the record before us. Neither plaintiff nor defendants raised the issue of Rhode Island‘s civil death statute and the impact it might have on the case prior to trial. The trial justice raised the issue sua sponte, and she appropriately continued the matter to afford the parties an adequate opportunity to research, brief, and argue the statute‘s applicability. The defendants moved to dismiss, and plaintiff opposed that motion and moved to file a second amended complaint.
Before this Court in Gallop II, plaintiff argued that the civil death statute is invalid under the Supremacy Clause “to the extent it impairs a plaintiff‘s capacity to sue under
The raise-or-waive rule controls this issue, and the narrow exception for a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial is not applicable. Rhode Island‘s civil death statute has been on the books since it was enacted in 1909. The plaintiff‘s opportunity to argue that, under the Supremacy Clause, the federal civil rights claims are not barred by the state civil death statute would arise only if those claims were allowed in a second amended complaint. They were not.
Because the only issue before this Court is whether the trial justice abused her discretion when she denied plaintiff‘s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, we reject this assignment of
Conclusion
For the reasons articulated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The papers in this case may be remanded to the Superior Court.
MAUREEN MCKENNA GOLDBERG
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
Dana Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions et al.
No. 2018-246-Appeal. (PC 10-6627)
Supreme Court of Rhode Island
November 14, 2019
OPINION COVER SHEET
| Title of Case | Dana Gallop v. Adult Correctional Institutions et al. |
| Case Number | No. 2018-246-Appeal. (PC 10-6627) |
| Date Opinion Filed | November 14, 2019 |
| Justices | Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. |
| Written By | Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg |
| Source of Appeal | Providence County Superior Court |
| Judicial Officer From Lower Court | Associate Justice Sarah Taft-Carter |
| Attorney(s) on Appeal | For Plaintiff: Ronald J. Resmini, Esq. Adam J. Resmini, Esq. For Defendants: Michael W. Field Department of Attorney General |