*1 386) (1983). (6) (312 SE2d Williams, Banke, J., P. part. part and reversed Judgment affirmed J., Carley, concur. 21, 1988 March Decided Rehearing 29, 1988 denied March Wages, appellant. for Nathaniel D. Bennett, Jr., III, Jay Stephenson, D. M. Lamb John E.
Rex appellee. RIVER, INC. SHINALL.
75211. DAN Judge. Carley, which arose out
Appellee-employee suffered a back As a appellant-employer. result employment the course of her injury, appellee began receiving this However, a bill for appellant. when income and medical benefits from appellee provided to alcohol detoxification treatment which had been expense, appel- payment submitted for as an authorized medical pay Appellee lant refused to then filed a claim with the State her alco- Compensation, Board of Workers’ wherein asserted that dependency hol had the direct need for detoxification accompanied the result of the which had com- (ALJ) pensable injury judge her back. administrative law finding appellee’s had resulted alcohol detoxification pay job-related injury appellant from her was ordered review, services. de Full Board made the Upon those its novo court, appellant’s appeal ALJ’s award its own. On Appellant’s application award of the Full Board for a was affirmed. discretionary appeal court from the court’s affirmance Full granted. Board’s award was controlling sets forth the definition “ compensable of a ‘personal injury’ purposes or of work- terms, ers’ compensation. By gen- its contains not statute eral “per- definition of or compensable “injury” what constitutes injury,” specifies but it also certain circumstances or conditions compensable “personal finding “injury” injury” wherein a of a will prohibi- not be authorized. mandates absolute injury” tion against finding compensable “injury” “personal of a “ shall not ‘personal injury’ under certain ‘Injury’ circumstances: third person include the willful act of a directed .” against personal employee. to such . . employee for reasons (Emphasis pro- conditional supplied.) provides The statuté also for a specified ‘Injury’ hibition as to certain diseases: disease, attack, . . jury’ shall not . heart heart the failure or include vessels, coronary occlusion of unless blood thrombosis *2 by is preponderance competent shown of and credible evidence that any of such performance conditions were to the of attributable work employment.” (Emphasis supplied.) usual of (4) following: 34-9-1 “Alcoholism or was amended to add the disabili- ties ‘injury’ ‘per- attributable thereto shall be deemed to be or injury’ by arising accident out of the course em- ployment. Drug resulting addiction or disabilities therefrom shall not by be deemed to be ‘personal injury’ or out of except the course of employment when such addiction was by caused the use of drugs prescribed or medicines for the treatment by initial injury physician.” (Emphasis supplied.) an authorized is It clear the legislative that intent of this 1973 to amendment is prohibition extend the against compensability absolute finding of a an “injury” “personal as injury” or ex- to cases alcoholism and to tend the prohibition conditional against finding such a to certain cases of drug addiction. issue Accordingly, the for resolution is what effect this prohibition absolute statutory as to alcoholism has in this case. Appellee urged superior and the OCGA court found that 34-9-1 §
(4) applicable only “injury” as “personal injury” initial or upon which employee ultimately an premises his claim for workers’ Thus, benefits. interpretation given under (4) by superior court, it only employee § who has asserted alcoholism initial work-related who would be barred recovering from benefits It as attributable thereto. is undis- puted appellee’s initial not alcoholism a com- pensable “injury” accidental to her and the evidence would au- finding thorize the that her alcoholism arose from by compensable her are, court found that the treating appellee costs of therefore, recoverable as an element of the medical benefits to which back injury her would entitle her.
If OCGA 34-9-1 recovery to the constitutes a bar benefits § only where alcoholism is initial then the 1973 amendment of that superfluous. statute was Prior our compensa- already tion law explicit contained prohibition recovery an by benefits employee prox- initial job-related injury whose 34-9-17; imate result Castleberry of his intoxication. See OCGA § Co., S. U. Fid. &c. More- over, if provide the intent of merely the 1973 amendment had “injury,” initial as an non-compensability of alcoholism for the in lan- intent expressed presumably have legislature would as to the employed contemporaneously to that which guage similar subse- specifies amendment issue of addiction. pre- or medicines drugs the use quent addiction which is caused injury is to be for the initial physician authorized scribed Thus, appel- if “personal injury.” compensable “injury” deemed drugs or prescribed such were attributable lee’s addiction would medicines, is no that the cost there doubt (4). However, legisla- compensable pursuant to OCGA 34-9-1 subsequent similarly specify ture did not the 1973 amendment alcoholism, com- injury, is to be deemed if attributable to the initial stated, contrary, legislature without condition pensable. To the limitation, compensa- “shall not be deemed” that alcoholism Thus, interpretation given “personal injury.” “injury” ble 1973 amendment court statutory at two construction. That contrary would be least rules of entirely amendment render the effect of the 1973 construction would alcohol, notwithstanding rule of superfluous issue body always be construction that should legislative ‘[a] by *3 act.’ Humthlett presumed something passage to mean the of an Reeves, 210, (2) (85 25) (1954). The v. 211 Ga. 219 construction SE2d ignore contemporaneous utilized the the court would also language statutory provision, entire the rule notwithstanding the the of a statute the must be legislative construction intent “[i]n determined from a consideration of it as a whole. The construc- [Cit.] part tion of used in be in language words one the statute must light legislative intent in statute a whole. as found Den, (104 Inc., v. Bear’s 230) Williams 214 Ga. 242 SE2d [Cit.]” applicable statutory applied, When the rules of construction are it is legislative clear that enactment was to intent of 1973 pre- address the compensability of claims addiction and to involving any and all claims recovery upon clude a for compensation based recovery compensation and to authorize the of claims for upon based Nothing addiction under limited circumstances. upon by appellee compels contrary is relied re- Having result. Bullington Court, v. Supreme versed in court’s this decision Co., 901) Aetna Cas. (178 &c. App. (1970), 122 Ga. 842 rev’d SE2d (181 495) (1971) fact, Ga. 485 precedential 227 SE2d no In has value. argument a strong could be made amendment to OCGA 1973 (4) that, Assembly’s envinces intent as to the the General compensability alcoholism, upon existing of claims based statu- tory compensation subject again law this State never Bullington. judicial Although in the workers’ construction reached
575 compensation claimant, liberally in law to be construed favor authority this court has ignore language no the clear a statute recovery legisla- and to allow of compensation benefits where the specified compensation ture has that it shall be denied. If for alcohol- ism, benefits, whether in it be the form of income or medical authorized in legislature it is for the to amend OCGA 34- (4) 9-1 provision. and not for this ignore court to in court erred affirming the erroneous award of the State Board of Workers’ Compensation.
Judgment J., Sognier, Birdsong, Pope Beasley, reversed. C. JJ., Deen, J., concur. P. specially. concurs and also concurs McMur- J., Banke, ray, J., Benham, P. J., P. dissent.
Deen, Presiding concurring specially. Judge, concurring fully While I majority opinion, with the offer the fol- lowing, additional relevant observations. simply and case law this do state not sanction Bullington claimant’s In v. claim this case. (178 Co.,
Aetna Cas. &c. 122 compen- Ga. 842 SE2d sability was employee’s not ruled on a having out claim based drunk himself to death because of This writer con- curred in then, that result acknowledges but now that view was (It erroneous. is the absurd man who State changes never mind. Holmes, (333 917) Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v.Co. SE2d (1985) (Deen, J., event, dissenting)). Bullington P. In does not support here, the claimant opin- because majority noted ion, Supreme (227 (181 495) Court reversed Ga. 485 SE2d (1971)), Bullington precedential no had first value place because it was a two-judge decision. Burch,
In Grimes (1968), (all Supreme justices Court seven concurring) policy settled the this state on so, doing voluntariness of alcoholism. the court upon relied the wisdom of Joseph Henry Lumpkin, Chief Justice which evidently is, repeating: depends bears ‘The responsibility fact — upon possession power of will not the over it. Nor does the *4 desperate most power will, drunkard lose the to control his but he loses the desire to deep degradation, control No matter how the his drunkard uses his will cup. pleas- whenever takes is he his It for the ure of of intellect, the relief the draught, that he takes it. His his appetite, will, and his work rationally, wisely, guilty all if not in his indulgence. you And were from responsibil- exonerate the inebriate ity, you would do violence both his his consciousness and to con- science; for only he self-prompted every not feels the rational use of power feels, also, involved in accountability, precisely but he what — this new philosophy denies his solemn wrongdoing, and actual the seriously greatest Converse indulgence. very act of — him, as to compose so just insanity side of actual drunkard this real- that he he will confess clear, experience, his constant reach A his crea- of conduct. responsibility guilt, izes the and therefore by responsibility, save God, by never loses responsible ture (1860). State, 31 Ga. 473-474 Choice insanity.’ sort some of Burger v. See also as a disease rejected on this court eight judges
wherein (If disease, is it charge drunkenness. type of defense to a counter.) sold over the legally disease can be bottled and state, drinker’s choice it It is clear that thus by the must borne drink, consequences drinking be and the claims, even compensation specific drinker. In context of workers’ provision dissenting opinion yields be thereto shall not deemed or disabilities attributable “[a]lcoholism in the arising of and ‘personal out ‘injury’ injury’ accident By reasoning that employment.” course a medical may compensable as claim for be alcoholic however, compensable, expense relative that was indirectly opinion a claimant to recover dissenting seeks allow per- directly, places upon no value what she could recover not responsibility. case, employee’s explanation accepting even the instant her obtain relief from the alcoholism resulted from her efforts to pain depression her under the law it are abusively consequences her choice to drink and the of that choice responsibility. upon a her law to bestow the indirect reward Were the by the dipsomania, claimant making the choice advocated dissenting may of a Pandora’s opinion, open this court as well lid py- consequential box for claims for various costs romania, mania, kleptomania, nymphomania, other dulgence may provide which some distraction from experienced injured employee.
Banke, Presiding Judge, dissenting. find- majority’s premised decision in this a factual case ing which the did make which the evidence of record board not — does not necessarily namely, warrant that the claimant was treated Additionally, even if the was treated for “alcoholism.” claimant “alcoholism,” expense not necessarily does follow that pursuant alcohol detoxification treatment must disallowed (4), did seek have her alcohol abuse problem, characterized, separate however it is treated as a course of injury’ by out [her] employment.”
577 on which this disabling The claimant sustained the back 11, July February 18,1984. to work on claim is based on She returned 1984, to again forced laminectomy, after lumbar undergoing 16, 1984, increasing low work on discontinue November due May continuing while injury. attributable to the In injury, receive for the back she temporary disability total benefits presented herself Pain Control Center. for treatment at Atlanta However, treatment, first she was prerequisite beginning as required at the undergo period a two-week of alcohol detoxification evidence, Georgia Baptist According Medical Center. medical her diagnosis at that time was “not one of chronic alcohol addiction .” pain. but acute . . . . . secondary alcohol abuse (4) specifies or disabilities at- § “[a]lcoholism tributable thereto shall not be deemed to be jury’ by employment.” out of the course beyond dispute evidence of record this case does not establish “alcoholism,” the claimant was treated cer- and the board tainly Moreover, no finding. terminology such regardless of the used to problem, clearly characterize the claimant’s alcohol abuse she problem did seek to separate injury have that treated as a or even a separate Rather, disability arising employment. from her she was merely seeking to recover the expense her detoxification treatment as a expense arising medical from (a),
Pursuant
employer
required
“furnish
employee
chapter
entitled
compen-
to benefits under this
sation for
medical, surgical,
hospital
costs
such
care and other
treatment,
items, and
prescribed by
phy-
services which are
a licensed
sician,
. . . which in
judgment
Board Workers’
State
Compensation
reasonably required
likely
shall be
appear
to effect
cure,
relief,
give
employee
employment.”
or restore the
to suitable
expressly
board has
determined
this case that
the claimant’s
problem
directly
alcohol abuse
to her back
attributable
impliedly
and has
determined that the
treatment which
was reasonably necessary
received
to afford her relief from the
pain she
experiencing
thereby
a result of that
restore her
employment.
to suitable
supports
The evidence of record
both these
principle
determinations.
accordance
the oft
stated
Compensation
liberally
Workers’
Act
so
should be
construed
as to
(see,
effecutate its
objectives
e.g.,
humane
U. S. Asbestos
Hammock,
(231
792) (1976)),
140
I
379
SE2d
would
therefore
affirm the
sustaining
order
court
the board’s
award in this case.
Boatwright,
Accord North Ga. Tech. &c. School v.
563) (1977).
Larson,
I am McMurray authorized to state Presiding Judge join in dissent. Judge Benham March Decided
Rehearing 29, denied March Woodson, appellant.
H. Clifton Greene, appellee. E. James *6 et v. THE STATE. COOP al.
75465. Judge.
Beasley, their mo- the denial of Coop appeal Coleman Co-defendants and for traf- and sentences following tion for new trial their convictions (c). ficking marijuana, in verdict, Rhodes uphold construed so as evidence (1) (308 the fol- showed Coop flew May 17,1986, Coleman and lowing. On Oklahoma residents Florida, Memphis, Tennes- Miami, in changing planes from Tulsa to At a.m. on one-way in 4:10 paid see. The tickets were cash. on May speeding car for Georgia trooper stopped a State Patrol a Coop County. driving in Coleman was Interstate 75 Whitfield car had indicated that passenger. agreement The car rental Lauderdale, Florida, by Phyl- a Ft. through agency been rented in in to use Florida twenty-four period lis Elias for a hour and limited by Elias. interdiction, experience training
Based on his the traffic trooper suspicious Coop during became Coleman vehicle, stop. search the requested give He that Coleman consent the written gave appeared and Coleman consent and to read verbal pro- search sign refused to it. The stating rights waiver form but shoes, from the t-shirt sandy jeans duced wet and tennis blue one-way flight floorboard, receipt backseat airline ticket in the name of “Louie change Memphis May Miami pounds what tested as Murphy,” sandy wet and bales of two trooper raised the marijuana. marijuana found when the backseat, marijuana, strong odor part bottom smelled a trunk, backseat, bag duffel in the eventually green saw removed opened failing erred in 1. the trial court Appellants maintain a) trooper’s stop their grant suppress their motion to because give them trooper’s motive was pretextual car was that the really subterfuge detain them warning speeding ticket