Dan Marius ANDREIU, Petitioner, v. John ASHCROFT, Attorney General, Respondent.
No. 99-70274.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
Argued and Submitted En Banc March 21, 2001. Filed June 18, 2001.
253 F.3d 477
* John Ashcroft is substituted for his predecessor, Janet Reno, as Attorney General of the United States. Fed. R.App. P. 43(c)(2).
Linton Joaquin (argued), National Immigration Law Center, Los Angeles, California, for the petitioner.
David M. McConnell (argued) and Linda S. Wernery, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.
Nadine K. Wettstein, American Immigration Law Foundation, Washington, DC, for the amici curiae.
Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, and HUG, PREGERSON, REINHARDT, BEEZER, FERNANDEZ, RYMER, HAWKINS, TASHIMA, RONALD M. GOULD, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS; Concurrence by Judge BEEZER
This case requires us to consider the application of certain 1996 amendments to the nation‘s immigration laws to an alien‘s motion for stay of removal proceedings pending the resolution of a petition for review. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS“) contends that
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dan Marius Andreiu is a native of Romania. According to his testimony, he was a member of the National Liberal Party, one of the primary political groups responsible for the overthrow of the Ceaucescu regime in Romania‘s 1989 revolution. On behalf of a group of young intellectuals, he attempted to open a radio station devoted to the views of the National Liberal Party in his hometown of Timisoara. In response to these activities, two individuals attempted to murder Andreiu in August of
Andreiu then fled Romania. He reached Paris, where he sent an insulting postcard to “Tarzan.” Andreiu subsequently came to the United States and was admitted on a six-month visa. He overstayed his visa, and he applied for asylum after the INS sent him a notice to appear on charges of remaining in the United States. Andreiu alleged that he feared political persecution in Romania based on the attempt on his life. He claimed that such individuals are still in power in Romania and are in a position to do him serious harm.
An immigration judge denied Andreiu‘s asylum claim on February 2, 1998, concluding that his testimony was implausible. Andreiu appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA“). The BIA concluded that the immigration judge improperly determined that Andreiu lacked credibility. Andreiu‘s testimony, the BIA stated, was “internally consistent with his application for asylum.” Nevertheless, the BIA affirmed the immigration judge‘s decision, on the basis that Andreiu had failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or a clear probability of persecution. The BIA concluded that Andreiu entered the United States for economic reasons and that conditions in Romania have substantially improved since the incidents Andreiu described. Andreiu was given fifteen days to leave the country voluntarily.
Andreiu then filed a petition for review with this court and requested a stay of his removal. We temporarily stayed Andreiu‘s removal pursuant to De Leon v. INS, 115 F.3d 643 (9th Cir.1997). The INS opposed Andreiu‘s stay request, arguing that under
On September 8, 2000, the three-judge panel agreed with the INS‘s interpretation of the statute and denied Andreiu‘s motion for stay. Andreiu v. Reno, 223 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.2000). Judge Thomas dissented, arguing that the majority disposition was “at odds with the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f), the structure of § 1252 as a whole and asylum theory.” Id. at 1119 (Thomas, J., dissenting). We subsequently granted en banc review. Andreiu v. Reno, 237 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.2000).
We now conclude that § 1252(f)(2) does not limit the power of federal courts to grant a stay of removal. On the merits, however, we conclude that Andreiu does not satisfy the traditional requirements for a stay set forth in Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513 (9th Cir.1998).
ANALYSIS
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA“), Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), which significantly revised portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Prior to passage of IIRIRA, an alien who appealed a decision of the BIA to a United States Court of Appeals was automatically entitled to a stay of removal, unless the court directed otherwise. See
This provision establishes that courts retain the power to stay an alien‘s removal pending a petition for review. The provision, however, does not specify what standards are applicable to an alien‘s motion for stay.
Andreiu contends that the applicable standard is the one we have traditionally employed for discretionary stays of removal. In Abbassi v. INS, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998), we explained that “[w]e evaluate stay requests under the same standards employed by district courts in evaluating motions for preliminary injunctive relief.” That is, the petitioner must show “either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner‘s favor.” Id.
The INS contends, however, that Abbassi only interpreted IIRIRA‘s transitional rules, and that a different result obtains under the permanent rules. According to the INS, a court‘s decision to grant a motion for stay is governed by § 1252(f)(2). This section states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such an order is prohibited as a matter of law.
A. The Text and Structure of the Statute
Our analysis is governed by fundamental principles of statutory construction. A basic guide to the meaning of statutory language is the context of the statute as a whole. “[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987) (quotations and citations omitted). Similarly, “[s]tatutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect.” Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 209 (1997).
The provision immediately preceding § 1252(f)(2) states that no court other than the Supreme Court “shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of this subchapter....”
Section 1252(b)(3)(B), the only provision in the statute containing the term “stay,”
Moreover, if Congress had intended to limit courts’ power to stay deportation proceedings pending petitions for review, the most logical place to include that provision would have been in § 1252(b)(3)(B) itself, the provision governing stay orders. It would be quite strange to announce the abolition of automatic stay orders in § 1252(b)(3)(B), but announce the replacement standards in § 1252(f)(2). Indeed, if § 1252(f)(2) has the effect that the INS claims, all of § 1252(b)(3)(B) would be reduced to surplusage. If § 1252(f)(2) clearly means that courts can only issue stays of deportation upon a showing that the order was “prohibited as a matter of law,” there would be no need to state in § 1252(b)(3)(B) that stays are not automatic.
The heading of § 1252(f) is also instructive. This heading describes the purpose of the section as a “[l]imit on injunctive relief.” As the Supreme Court has explained, “By its plain terms, and even by its title, that provision is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. It prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 1221-1231, but specifies that this ban does not extend to individual cases.” Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999) (emphasis added). The clear concern of the section is limiting the power of courts to enjoin the operation of the immigration laws, not with stays of removal in individual asylum cases.1
This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court‘s analysis of IIRIRA in American-Arab, which addressed
Similarly, we will not lightly assume that Congress intended the term “enjoin” in § 1252(f) as shorthand for the term “stay.” Congress knew very well how to use the term “stay” when it wanted to, and it is not plausible that here, and only here, Congress meant “enjoin” to include the entire universe of court actions that have a prohibiting or restraining effect.
The INS suggests that construing § 1252(f)(2) in light of other provisions in the statute is contrary to the statute‘s command that § 1252(f)(2) applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” But this phrase cannot be sensibly read as foreclosing resort to other sections of the statute in an attempt to determine the meaning of the term “enjoin.” Rather, the phrase means that § 1252(f)(2)‘s standard for granting injunctive relief in removal proceedings trumps any contrary provision elsewhere in the law. It says nothing about what interpretive techniques are appropriate to determining whether a stay is included within this category of injunctive relief.
Finally, we note the Supreme Court‘s command that, when possible, we interpret statutes so as to preclude absurd results. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992). The INS‘s interpretation of § 1252(f)(2) would limit the courts’ ability to issue stays of deportation except when the petitioner has shown by “clear and convincing evidence” that the removal order is “prohibited as a matter of law.” However, the courts of appeal review the legal determinations of the BIA de novo. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir.1996) (en banc). In any case raising legal issues, INS‘s interpretation would require a more substantial showing for a stay of deportation than it would for a reversal on the merits. This would effectively require the automatic deportation of large numbers of people with meritorious claims, including every applicant who presented a case of first impression.
Moreover, adherence to the rigid standard the INS urges would essentially duplicate the decision on the merits, requiring the petitioner to show a certainty of success. Such a standard would require full-scale briefing at the beginning of the appellate process, often before the petitioner has even received a copy of the administrative record. In those cases in which a motions panel grants the stay on the basis that the INS‘s order is clearly prohibited as a matter of law, the issue before the merits panel would be the same issue that a motions panel had previously resolved in favor of the petitioner. None of these results are at all sensible as a matter of judicial administration or of the detailed structure the statute establishes for review of BIA decisions. See
B. The Panel Decision
The panel majority‘s analysis concluded, based on Black‘s Law Dictionary, that the plain meaning of “enjoin” includes the grant of a “stay.” Andreiu, 223 F.3d at 1113. Of course, as Judge Learned Hand pointed out many years ago, “it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish.” Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.1945), aff‘d, 326 U.S. 404 (1945). But even if we were to accept
Black‘s defines “enjoin” as “[t]o legally prohibit or restrain by injunction.” Black‘s Law Dictionary 550 (7th ed.1999) (emphasis added). It defines “stay” as the “postponement or halting of a proceeding, judgment or the like.” Id. at 1425. These are very different definitions. “Enjoin” refers to prohibitions or restraints on conduct through the equitable mechanism of an injunction. A stay, by contrast, is a temporary halt to legal proceedings. Put simply, injunctions run against parties; stays run against courts and judgments. Nothing in Black‘s suggests that they amount to the same thing. Indeed, Black‘s definition of “injunction” contains a lengthy list of various types of injunctions; nowhere in this list does the term “stay” appear. See id. at 788.
Moreover, Supreme Court precedent forbids simply equating “enjoin” and “stay” on the basis of dictionary definitions. In Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271 (1988), the Court rejected the Enelow-Ettelson doctrine, under which, for reasons relating to the merger of law and equity, certain types of stay orders had been considered as injunctions. The Court stated, “An order by a federal court that relates only to conduct or progress of litigation before that court ordinarily is not considered an injunction....” Id. at 279. Any conclusion to the contrary could only be based on “sterile and antiquated doctrine.” Id. at 287. With the merger of law and equity, “the practice of describing these stays as injunctions lost all connection with the reality of the federal courts’ procedural system.” Id. at 283. Gulfstream thereby forecloses any automatic equation of the term “enjoin” with the term “stay.” The Court‘s decision does not necessarily mean that the two terms can never be related, but it does mean that courts must engage in a more probing analysis of the statute before assuming a linguistic identity.
APPLICATION
In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the en banc court concludes it should address the merits of the stay motion rather than remand the motion to the panel. Since under the permanent IIRIRA rules we retain discretion to grant stays although in fewer categories of cases than before, we hold that the standard to be applied under § 1252(f) is the discretionary stay standard in Abbassi. Under Abbassi, the petitioner must show “either (1) a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or (2) that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in the petitioner‘s favor.” Abbassi, 143 F.3d at 514 (enumeration added). “These standards represent the outer extremes of a continuum, with the relative hardships to the parties providing the critical element in determining at what point on the continuum a stay pending review is justified.” Id. We conclude that, even under the more generous Abbassi standard, the panel‘s conclusion that Andreiu is not entitled to a stay is correct.
As to the first Abbassi test, Andreiu has not demonstrated a probability of success on the merits. The BIA concluded that Andreiu had not established a well-founded fear of persecution. Andreiu presented evidence of a single 1991 attack by figures tenuously connected to the government, but presented no evidence demonstrating that the current Romanian government or its officials desire to do him harm. As such, we cannot find on this record that Andreiu has demonstrated a probability of success on the merits.
Ordinarily, the balance of hardships will weigh heavily in the applicant‘s favor, especially if it appears that the country of origin will not freely permit a return to the United States upon a grant of asylum. Other important factors include separation from family members, medical needs, and potential economic hardship.
None of these factors are implicated in this case. As the BIA noted, Andreiu is the son of a wealthy land-owner and a member of an educated Romanian family. Unlike many asylum applicants, he is unlikely to face economic hardship if he were to return to Romania. Andreiu does not appear to have any family in the United States from whom he would be required to separate. Moreover, given the improvements in Romania since 1989, Andreiu‘s claims of possible persecution, by themselves, are insufficient to show genuine hardship. Cf. Lucacela v. Reno, 161 F.3d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir.1998) (denying stay of removal to Romanian asylum applicant and noting the substantial improvements in Romania). Finally, we note that during the time in which Andreiu alleged political persecution, he had visas to visit other countries and made up to eight trips outside of Romania between 1990 and 1991. As such, Andreiu cannot establish that he will be unable to return freely to the United States should his petition be successful.
Our decision to deny the stay, of course, is not a decision on the merits of Andreiu‘s petition for review, and nothing we hold today is meant to prejudice Andreiu‘s ability to advance any of the claims asserted for review in subsequent proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Section 1252(f)(2) does not limit our ability to stay the deportation of asylum seekers pending the resolution of their petitions for review. To hold otherwise, as Judge Thomas noted, would mean that “thousands of asylum seekers who fled their native lands based on well-founded fears of persecution will be forced to return to that danger under the fiction that they will be safe while waiting the slow wheels of American justice to grind to a halt.” Andreiu, 223 F.3d at 1127-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The statute cannot support such a reading, and we are convinced that Congress had no such intent in mind.
It is also clear, however, that Congress did not intend for courts to grant stays of removal every time an alien files a petition for review. See
MOTION FOR STAY DENIED.
I concur in the court‘s judgment, which is founded on a determination that Andreiu does not satisfy the requirements for a stay under Abbassi v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 143 F.3d 513, 514 (9th Cir.1998), and that Andreiu is not entitled to a stay of deportation pending appeal.
Abbassi requires the alien to “show either a probability of success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable injury, or that serious legal questions are raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in petitioner‘s favor.” Id. at 514.
This appeal goes beyond Abbassi and requires us to address an important issue of statutory construction affecting removal proceedings under the new rules enacted in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. This law requires a petitioner seeking review to meet a significantly higher standard before the court is authorized to grant a temporary stay of removal pending appeal from a final decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The court‘s opinion denies Andreiu a stay of deportation pending appeal. The opinion adopts the court-created Abbassi standard, which is less stringent than the statutory requirements for stays of deportation pending appeal. The opinion of the court rejects the statutory prescription of Congress as evidenced in the plain text of
I
The plain text of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act severely limits our power to stay an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals requiring removal of an alien. Section 1252(f)(2) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such an order is prohibited as a matter of law.
To determine whether subsection (f)(2) applies to stays, “we must first look to the statutory language: ‘The starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for if the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter.‘” United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir.1999) (quoting Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993)). Both the
Courts frequently turn to legal dictionaries when interpreting the clear language of a statute. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 531 U.S. 990, 121 S.Ct. 1753, 149 L.Ed.2d 787 (2001) (citing Black‘s Law Dictionary definition of “disclosure” in interpreting
Courts’ common use of the terms “enjoin” and “stay” also demonstrates that these terms are not mutually exclusive. Both the Supreme Court of the United States and our court use these terms interchangeably or otherwise indicate that “enjoin” encompasses “stay.”3 See, e.g., NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 139-41, 144 (1971) (holding that the NLRB‘s attempt to “enjoin” or “restrain” a state court injunction falls under the exception of
Further bolstering the conclusion that Congress intended the term “enjoin” to
The opinion of the court does not commence its analysis with the statutory language, as required by Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105, but rather ends with it, asserting that “enjoin” applies only to restraints on “parties,” but not to restraints on courts or legal proceedings. Slip op. at 7614. Not only is this approach disordered, it is incorrect on the merits. Nothing in subsection (f)(1) indicates that “restrain” applies exclusively to temporary orders against courts or legal proceedings or that “enjoin” refers only to permanent relief against parties.
II
The structure of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act also supports the conclusion that the law now limits the authority of the court to enter a stay order pending appeal from the Board of Immigration Appeals. It is not
Today, the court is required to look at a statute that says, “notwithstanding any other provision of law,” a plain and direct phrase. The court should give the congressional direction the respect and weight to which it is entitled.
The court‘s opinion holds that the structure of subsection (f) precludes the application of subsection (f)(2) to stays, because if Congress had intended to limit courts’ power to stay deportation proceedings pending petitions for review, the most logical place to include that provision would have been in § 1252(b)(3)(B) itself, the provision governing stay orders. ... [I]f § 1252(f)(2) has the effect that the INS claims, all of § 1252(b)(3)(B) would be reduced to surplusage. Slip op. at 481.
This construction is incorrect. Initially, I observe that subsection (f)(2) explicitly states that it applies “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.” Moreover, subsections (c) and (d) of § 1252 govern judicial treatment of petitions for review. The structure of § 1252, therefore, does not require that subsection (b) act as the sole provision related to petitions for review and does not gainsay the conclusion that subsection (f)(2) clearly applies to the grant of a temporary stay. Cf. Maldonado v. Fasano, 67 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1175 (S.D.Cal.1999) (observing that § 1252(f)(2) “appears to displace” the Abbassi, pre-Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, standard for grant of a stay).
The opinion of the court further reasons that because subsection (f)(1) addresses only collateral review for class actions,5 we should interpret subsection (f)(2) as limiting only collateral injunctive relief for individuals. Slip op. at 481. I disagree. Subsection (f)(2) limits a court‘s power to “enjoin the removal of any alien pursuant to a final order under this section.” A Board of Immigration Appeals decision is a “final order” of removal. See
III
The court‘s opinion concludes that subsection (f)(2) would improperly require a higher standard to obtain a stay of removal than to succeed on the merits of a petition for review. Slip op. at 482. Applying a higher standard to motions for a stay, however, is not improper. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994). Moreover, although the heightened standard in subsection (f)(2) may seem severe as applied to temporary stays, it is entirely consistent with the provisions and policy goals of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act. Congress has made clear its desire to expedite
The argument that applying subsection (f)(2) to stays inappropriately compels the court to engage in a full review of the merits is likewise unpersuasive. Slip op. at 482. Examination of the merits may be necessary under both the standard of subsection (f)(2) and the preliminary injunction standard that the court‘s opinion adopts.
For these reasons, I would hold that subsection (f)(2) applies to an alien‘s motion to stay a final removal order pending resolution of a petition for review.
IV
Under § 1252(f)(2), the Court of Appeals is not permitted to stay a final order of removal “unless the alien shows by clear and convincing evidence that the entry or execution of such an order is prohibited as a matter of law.” The court must address the impact of this standard as applied to both findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the Board of Immigration Appeals in support of its final order of removal.
I am unable to apply the “clear and convincing” standard to legal questions because “clear and convincing evidence” speaks only to factual issues. See, e.g., California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1981) (stating that standards of proof such as “clear and convincing” instruct “the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions“) (emphasis added); Black‘s Law Dictionary 555 (6th ed.1990) (defining “evidence” as something “offered in proof of an alleged fact“) (emphasis added). Subsection (f)(2)‘s imposition of a factual standard of proof requires a standard of review for legal issues that best reflects Congressional intent.
Congress‘s requirement of “clear and convincing evidence” that a removal order is “prohibited as a matter of law” is best satisfied, with regard to legal issues, by requiring an alien to establish that a removal order was “manifestly contrary to law.” Cf.
Although the phrase “manifestly contrary to law” is not well-established, its terms are familiar. “Manifest” describes something that is apparent, clear, indisputable, obvious or plain. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999) (stating that “manifest error,” “clear case of error” and “clearly wrong” are phrases that “might be thought to mean the same thing“); Webster‘s Third New International Dictionary 1375 (1993) (defining “manifest” as, inter
V
I would deny Andreiu‘s motion for a stay because he wholly failed by any measure of evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to show that the Board of Immigration Appeals order was based on an erroneous finding of fact or that it was manifestly contrary to law as required by