27 Mo. App. 202 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1887
delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff sued, before a justice of the peace, for damages caused by the defendant’s engine running over a wagon, team of mules, and set of harness, of the value of one hundred and fifty dollars. In the circuit court, on appeal, it appeared that, at the place where the injury occurred, the railroad and a public highway crossed each other at right angles, the railroad running north and south and the highway east and west. A locomotive and tender were running from north to south, while the plaintiff’s wagon, driven by George Ketney, was approaching the track from the east. A few extracts from the testimony will best show how the case was put to the jury.
Ketney testified: “I had been driving in a trot, and when I came close to the railroad, I slacked dowii to an ordinary walk. * * * As I came down to the
Jerry Youngblood, who was riding in the wagon with Ketney, testified : “ Just as the mule got on the track, the engine ran against him and killed him. % * * I saw the engine first when it was fifty or sixty feet away from us. No whistle was sounded, or bell rung ; or at least I never heard any. After I saw the engine, they gave the whistle two little jerks ; this was about a quarter of a minute or less, before we were struck. The train was running fast. The first I saw of the train was
The plaintiff testified: “Amanean see an engine on the track one hundred and fifty yards north of the crossing, when he arrives at a point on the wagon-road the same distance east of it. 'After he arrives within one hundred and fifty yards of the crossing, there is nothing to prevent him seeing one hundred and fifty. yards north of it, until he reaches the crossing. ® * * 'The first cut is about two hundred yards north of the road-crossing, and between this cut and the railroad-crossing there is a dump or fill. * * * The right of way is one hundred feet wide. It is fenced, and the fence is placed fifty feet on each side of the center of the track at this point. There were no buildings or trees upon the right of way. There was corn growing in the fields on both sides of the right of way.”
W. Algood testified: “I was on the wagon-road about forty yards east of the crossing, at the time the plaintiff ’ s team was struck by the train. * * * I stopped my horse when I heard the train, and waited until it struck the team. The engine was then a quarter of a mile north. I stopped as quick as I noticed the train, and it was then a quarter of a mile off.”
It is impossible to read this testimony without being strongly impressed by evidences of extreme negligence on the part of the driver of the team. He approached the railroad track from a side where, according to the concurrent statements, he must have been
There were some very remarkable developments in the special findings of the jury. These are some of the •questions put, with the answers given by the jury :
“ Did the person in charge of said team stop the -same for the purpose of listening for an approaching train? A. Yes.”
The record shows that neither of the occupants of the wagon was contradicted in his positive statement that no such stop occurred, until the mules were on the •.track.
“Did the person in charge of said team look for an .-approaching train ? A. Yes.”
The only testimony applicable to this question and .answer was given by the driver himself, who said: “I was about the length of the mules and wagon east of the track, when I looked off to the right, as I stated in my ■direct examination, and I will swear, positively, that I ■quit trotting and looked for the train, when I was that •distance from the track.”
“ Could the person in charge of said team, by the
So the jury declared, in effect, that for a driver to simply turn his head when within a few feet of the. railroad, but without stopping his team, which was still progressing and about to step upon the track, was a prudent and sufficient compliance with the cautionary duties implied in the questions, submitted, to justify their answers affirming due performance of those duties. We think that, referring to the testimony alone, the special findings show a palpable bias in the minds of the jury, which should entitle the unsuccessful party to a reversal of the judgment against him. That the court should have sustained the, defendant’s demurrer to the evidence is clear, at all events.
The judgment of the circuit court is, therefore, reversed.