In this cause we consider the extent of the bar upon a legislator in contracting with the State or a county imposed by article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution. The court of appeals ruled that this provision imposed a lifetime restriction.
The petitioners in this action, County Judge John Damon of Brazoria County, the law firm of Heard, Goggan, Blair, Williams & Harrison, and each of its named partners individually, seek to uphold the validity of a contract entered into by Brazoria County with the law firm. The controversy centers around petitioner William Harrison’s service as a legislator in the 66th Legislature, which convened in January 1979. During his term the legislature codified various tax provisions into the Property Tax Code, pursuant to the statutory revision program managed by the Texas Legislative Council. See Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 323.007 (Vernon 1988). As part of this process, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 7335, originally enacted in 1923 to authorize counties to contract with private attorneys for collection of delinquent taxes, was codified along with Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 7335a, limiting the compensation payable under such contracts, into section 6.30 of the Property Tax Code. 1979 Tex.Gen. Laws 2217, 2231, ch. 841, § 1. The codified version added a requirement that the attorneys hired be recommended by the county tax collector. This addition was subsequently deleted by the 67th Legislature, of which Harrison was not a member. 1981 Tex.Gen. Laws 126,1st Called Sess., ch. 13, § L
Several years after both the effective date of the Property Tax Code and the departure of Harrison from the legislature, his law firm entered into a contract with Brazoria County to collect the county’s delinquent taxes. Respondent Cornett, the tax collector of Brazoria County charged with overseeing the process of delinquent tax collection, challenged this contract as void pursuant to article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution because of Harrison’s service in the 66th Legislature. The trial court disagreed, ruling against Cor-nett in his action for declaratory judgment and upholding the validity of the contract. The court of appeals reversed as to the validity of the contract but remanded for further consideration of Cornett’s claim for an accounting.
This cause requires a close examination of article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution, which provides:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the term for which he was elected, be eligible to (1) any civil office of profit under this State which shall have been created, or the emoluments of which may have been increased, during such term, or (2) any office or place, the appointment to which may be made, in whole or in part, by either branch of the Legislature; provided, however, the fact that the term of office of Senators and Representatives does not end precisely on the last day of December but extends a few days into January of the succeeding year shall be considered de minimis, and the ineligibility herein created shall terminate on the last day of December of the last full calendar year of the term for which he was elected. No member of either House shall vote for any other member for any office whatever, which may be filled by a vote of the Legislature, except in such eases as are in this Constitution provided, nor shall any member of the Legislature be interested, either directly or indirectly, in any contract with the State, or any county thereof, authorized by any law passed during the term for which he was elected.
Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 18 (1876, amended 1968) (emphasis added). The first clause of this provision was modeled after article I, *599 section 6, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution and first appeared in the Texas Constitution of 1845. Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 18, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984). The last clause, which is at issue here and is sometimes referred to as the “contracts clause,” was added during the Constitutional Convention of 1875. 1 There is no clear indication of what convinced the framers to include this clause but, evidently, widespread corruption following the Civil War prompted many constitutional delegates to be particularly mindful of possible legislative conflicts of interest. See Tex. Const, art. Ill, § 18, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).
Recently, when confronted with the task of interpreting our constitution, we concluded that, “[bjeeause of the difficulties inherent in determining the intent of voters over a century ago, we rely heavily on the literal text.”
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby,
This issue is truly one of first impression for our court. The court of appeals relied heavily on
Lillard v. Freestone County,
In construing article III, section 18, we bear in mind that the Texas Constitution “was ratified to function as an organic document to govern society and institutions as they evolve through time.”
Edgewood,
We acknowledge that the framers of article III, section 18 were attempting to prevent improper financial gain by members of the legislature. This court joins in that desire to ensure the highest standards of ethical conduct by public officials. We cannot agree with respondent, however, that the framers meant to place a lifetime “mark of Cain” on every citizen who is willing to benefit our state by serving in the legislature. While it is highly desirable to bar improper personal gain by former legislators, we believe that this concern can be more effectively addressed through appropriate legislation rather than an over-broad judicial interpretation of the constitution. 4
For the reasons stated above, we hold that the bar against contracting with the state or its counties contained in article III, section 18 of the Texas Constitution applies only to current and not to former members of the legislature. We thus hold that the contract between Brazoria County and the law firm of Heard, Goggan, Blair, Williams & Harrison, is not violative of the Texas Constitution. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm that of the trial court.
Notes
. Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Texas 156 (Sept. 20, 1875).
. To the extent that holding such offices could be considered a contract of employment, construing the contracts clause of article III, section 18 to encompass "former members” would also work to prohibit such employment.
. Similarly, the Texas Sunset Act calls for the review and revision of state agency enabling statutes. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 325.001 et seq. (Vernon 1988).
. The legislature has available to it several mechanisms better designed than a lifetime bar to prevent former legislators from privately benefiting from past public service. For example, the Public Utility Regulatory Act bars Public Utility Commissioners and commission employees from employment by a public utility for up to two years following termination of employment with the commission. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 1446c § 6(i) (Vernon Supp.1989). Similar legislation could prescribe certain conduct of retiring legislators in their dealings with the state and its subdivisions. Another mechanism, now applicable only to current members, is to require financial disclosure to assist in identifying possible unethical behavior. See Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 6252-9b (Vernon Supp.1989).