124 Wis. 144 | Wis. | 1905
The following opinion was filed December 13, 1904:
It is an uncontroverted fact upon the record before us that plaintiff’s premises do not front or abut upon Hadley street. A strip of land 5.80 feet in width lies between Hadley street and the portion of lot 6 owned by the plaintiff. This situation of her premises leaves them removed from the southerly margin of Hadley street by the width of this strip. The defendant’s charter (sec. 2, ch. YII) provides that “grading, graveling, and planking, macadamizing, or paving to the center of any street or alley . . . shall be chargeable to and payable by the lots fronting or abutting upon such street [or] alley, ... to the amount which . . . [it] . . . shall be adjudged ... to benefit such lots.” The city sought to charge upon plaintiff’s premises, as an abutting owner, a proportionate share of the cost of this improvement, under the power conferred by this section of its charter. Is plaintiff such an owner under these provisions ? An examination of these provisions and those on kindred subjects in the charter leads us to the opinion that it was intended to include within the phrase “lots fronting or abutting upoto. such ■street [or] alley” only the property which borders on the street or alley being improved. Jenkins v. Rock Co. 15 Wis. 11; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.) 224. Since plaintiff’s premises did not border on Hadley street, no liability could attach to charge her premises with part of the expense. Under these circumstances she was not an interested party to the proceeding for the improvement of this street and the payment of its cost by abutting owners, and she therefore cannot rely on any defect or irregularity in the proceeding as a ground for the recovery of damages for injury to her premises. The liability of abutting owners for a proportionate
It is argued that, if plaintiff has no cause of action upon this ground, she has a cause of action at common law for damages caused by the negligent and wrongful conduct of the city’s officers and agents in grading and excavating the street. She avers that the grading, excavating, and removing' of the material from that part of Iiadley street bordering on the strip of lot 6 lying between her premises and this street was carelessly and negligently done by removing the earth within the street, which laterally supported the border strip of lot 6, to the depth of from fifteen to twenty feet, causing this strip and the plaintiff’s premises adjoining it to subside and fall into the excavated street, and undermine the foundations of her house to an extent which necessitated its removal to prevent its destruction by falling. It is asserted that this conduct by the city’s representatives was an unlawful invasion of her property rights, and resulted in a taking of her property for public use, for which compensation should be made.
In respect to the rights of adjoining proprietors, the laying out of streets and the opening and preparing of them for
It is contended by respondent that this ease comes within the principle as ruled in Alexander v. Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247. The Alexander Case, however, differs widely in its facts from this one. That was an action to recover the damages resulting from the action of the water which it was alleged was driven onto complainant’s premises by the winds
“The case presents the simple .question whether appellant can recover for such consequential damages thus resulting to his property from the city making the harbor improvement, a work it was specially authorized to do> and done without any negligence and in a proper manner.”
It was held that no part of the premises, under the facts of the case, was taken for public use, and that no grounds of liability existed; but the court expressly declares that it does not wish “to be understood as asserting the doctrine that there must be an actual taking or appropriation of the property itself in order to entitle the owner to compensation for damages done him. The city might so build a bridge, or open a street, or excavate a canal along or upon a lot, only appropriating a small portion of it, or perhaps none of the land itself, and yet entirely destroy the value of the property for all purposes.” The instant case, in its facts, comes within the exception so distinguished by the court, and cannot be held to be ruled by the decision of that case.
As appears from the statement of facts, the defendant city did excavate Hadley street to the depth of from fifteen to twenty feet adjacent to plaintiffs premises, and this caused a considerable part of her land to subside and fall into the street. A municipality has the undoubted right to improve and grade its streets by filling up or excavating the natural surface of the ground within the street limits, but the exercise of this right is subject to the qualification that in the performance of this duty it cause no unnecessary damage tó an adjoining landowner, resulting from a want of ordinary care in making the improvement, or from a physical invasion of such owner’s property, thereby depriving him of it and devoting it to the public use. The removal of the lateral support of the soil of premises bordering on the limits of a high
Viewing the case in the light of plaintiff’s rights and the corresponding responsibilities of the city, it must follow that the acts of the city were a violation of her right by a physical invasion of her premises outside the limits of the street, and the injury suffered by her was the direct result of these unlawful acts, for which the city is liable in its corporate capacity. This result is in accord with the cases of Pettigrew v. Evansville, 25 Wis. 223, and Bunker v. Hudson, 122 Wis. 43, 99 N. W. 448. In the former case the city was held liable for invading plaintiff’s rights by causing the water collected in the street to be conducted onto his premises, as amounting to a taking of private property for public use. In the latter case the city invaded the property of plaintiffs by placing earth on the land bordering on the limits of the highway in constructing an embankment for the improvement of the street. In passing opinion on the question of the city’s liability under the circumstances it is said: “It is difficult to conceive a plainer case for corporate liability. In grading ihe street the city was doing one of the things which, as a
Our attention is directed to the fact that the case of Radcliff's Ex’rs v. Mayor, 4 N. Y. 195, has been referred to and approved by this court in its decisions, and that the doctrine of that case is in conflict with the rule holding the defendant liable in this case. ‘írue, the case is referred to and approved as supporting the decisions of the cases wherein it is cited, but these cases do not conflict with the principle applied to .the instant case. In so far as the Radcliff Case enunciates any rale in conflict therewith, it must be disregarded and disapproved. We are not unmindful that other jurisdictions hold that damages resulting from landslides caused by excavations on highways in the course of improving them for public use are purely consequential, and not recoverable by the owner. We find the doctrine of liability under such circumstances more consonant with reason and justice, and therefore follow it in this case.
The court submitted two questions in the special verdict, finding, in effect, that plaintiff was the assignee of the cause of action sued on, and assessing her damages at the sum of $687.50. After verdict and before judgment defendant moved to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, and also asked that further proceedings in the action be stayed and a reassessment be ordered. The court ordered a reassessment, directed the entry of an interlocutory judgment, and stayed all proceedings in court, and held in abeyance the motions to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. Since the judgment
By the Court. — It is so ordered.
Upon a motion for a rehearing there was a brief for the respondent by Carl Bunge, city attorney, and R. S. Witte, assistant city attorney, and a brief for the appellant by C. H. Hamilton.
The motion was denied Eebruary 21, 1905.