1 Parsons 37 | Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County | 1842
as follows:—
This case arises under a bill filed by the plaintiff against the defendant, to compel the specific execution of a contract for the sale of a house and lot of ground in the city of Philadelphia, entered into between the parties on the 8th of November, 1840. It is presented in the form of exceptions to the report of a master to whom it was referred, “ to inquire and report whether a good title could be made by the plaintiff to the defendant of the messuage and lot mentioned in the pleadings.” Before the master, various objections were made to the marketable quality of the plaintiff’s title, all of which were decided by him in favour of the plaintiff. These objections have been reiterated in the exceptions taken by the defendant to the report. On the hearing, in addition to the objections taken before the master, the defendant insisted, that this court possessed no jurisdiction to give the plaintiff the relief prayed for in Ms bill. The whole case has received from the Court long and anxious consideration. It is a case of the first impression in Pennsylvania; no analogous proceeding exists in any precedent, and we have delayed pronouncing judgment, until it was fully matured, since our decision is final and conclusive between the parties.
The jurisdiction of this Court in Equity, to compel the specific execution of contracts, arises from one of the provisions of the 13th section of the Act of the 16th June, 1836, “relating to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts.” This section among other things enacts, “ that the Supreme Court, when sitting in Banc in the city of Philadelphia, and the Court of Common Pleas for the said city and county, shall have the power and jurisdiction of Courts of Equity,” so far as relates “ to the affording specific relief when a recovery in damages would be an inadequate remedy.” It is from this section our authority in the premises is derived, or we do not possess it at all. It is truly said by the Supreme Court, in Gilder v. Merwin, 6 Wharton, 540, to the binding authority of which I unhesitatingly defer, “ that the legislature have by no means conferred on us an universal or even a general equity jurisdiction, as seems to have been conceived by some: on the contrary, equity jurisdiction has been dealt out to us at distant intervals, and in limited portions, and we cannot usurp a jurisdiction not granted, nor exceed the limits within which the legislature has thought proper to prescribe it.” Hence, unless the jurisdiction invoked is not plainly and clearly
Tbe whole question of jurisdiction resolves itself into this proposition: Is a recovery in damages in Pennsylvania an adequate remedy for tbe vendor of land where, as here, the cash payments by the vendee are to be made by instalments, and the property is sold subject to existing encumbrances ? I think it proper to state the precise case before us, rather than attempt the solution of the more entangled proposition, whether this Court can compel the specific performance by the vendee of a contract for the sale of land, on a bill filed by the vendor, where the object of the vendor is to compel the immediate payment of the money price of the land contracted to be sold in a gross amount. Because, if any doubt can exist as to the jurisdiction, under the head of specific relief, it must arise in this last case.
The principles and grounds on which Courts of Equity proceed in compelling the specific performance of real contracts, are well expounded by Sir John Leech, in Adderly v. Dixon, 1 Simons & Stewart, 607. “ Courts of Equity decree the specific performance of contracts, not upon any distinction between realty and personalty, but because damages at law may not, in the particular case, afford a complete remedy. Thus a Court of Equity decrees performance of a contract for land, not because of the real nature of the land, but because damages at law which must be calculated upon the general money value of the land, may not be a complete remedy to the purchaser, to whom the land may have a peculiar value. So a Court of Equity will not generally decree performance of a contract for the sale of stock or goods, not because of their personal nature, but because damages at law calculated upon the market price of the stock or goods, are as complete a remedy to the purchaser as the delivery of the stock contracted for ; inasmuch as with the damages, he may purchase the same quantity of the like stock or goods.” The clause of the Act of 16th of June, 1886, is therefore but declaratory of the settled principles on which Courts of Equity have long acted, in the administration of specific relief.
The distinction taken at the bar between the case of vendee and vendor, in which the jurisdiction was conceded as to the former but denied as to the latter, is not new. As clearly as May 1722, in the case of Armiger v. Clark, Bunbury Rep. 111, in the Exchequer, the Lord Chief Baron took the difference. “If,” says he, “a man comes for a specific performance as to land itself, a Court of Equity
We are thus brought to the consideration of the other reasons urged by the defendant why our decree should not go against him. As these mainly arise from exceptions to the plaintiff’s title to land, it becomes necessary to look into the principles on which Courts of
The specific execution of a contract in equity is not of absolute right in the party asking it, but of sound discretion in the Court. Hence it requires a much less, strength of case on the part of the defendant to resist a bill to perform a contract, than it does on the part of the plaintiff to maintain a bill to enforce a specific performance: 2 Story, 78, 79; White v. Damon, 7 Vesey, 85. In Clows v. Higginson, 1 Vesey & Beams, 526, it is said by the Yice Chancellor to be a plain and obvious principle, that a Court of Equity is not hound to interpose by specifically performing the contract. And although the subject and import of the written contract are clear, so that there is no necessity to resort to evidence for its construction, yet if the defendant can show any circumstances, dehors, independent of the writing, making it inequitable to interpose for the purpose of a specific performance, a Court of Equity having satisfactory information on the subject will not interpose. This discretion is not however arbitrary, but exercised in a judicial manner according to established rules: 3 Atk. 187; 18 Ves. 111.
As a natural result of this doctrine, has .arisen that of marketable titles. A marketable title in equity is one in which there is no doubt involved either as to matter of law or fact; and such a title only will a purchaser be compelled to accept: Atkinson, 3. It seems that a Court of Equity has no power in suits for specific performance, except on the application and consent of all parties to direct an issue for the determination of a matter of fact; nor can it without such an application or consent direct a case or an action for the purpose of satisfying itself on a matter of law: Roake v. Kidd, 5 Ves. 647; Prebole v. Boghurst, 1 Swint. 320; Sharp v. Adcock, 4 Russ. 375. Hence, if doubts arise either as to fact or law involved in the title, and the purchaser be an unwilling one, as his consent cannot of course be had to an issue on the case, the Court is deprived of the'only competent means of informing its conscience, and is placed in the dilemma, either to take upon itself the decision of the fact or the law, which it would do at the hazard of what might be afterwards determined in a court of law, or to refuse to interfere on behalf of the vendor; an alternative it is entitled to choose on the principle that a bill for specific performance of a contract, is an application to the discretion of the Court, and a decree therefor cannot be claimed as a matter of right: Atkinson, 9. In
The doubts however which will operate on a Court of Equity are not doubts made up for the occasion; not based on captious, frivolous, and astute niceties ; but such as produce real bond fide hesitation in the mind of the Chancellor. The doubts must, in the language of Lord Eldon, be “ considerable and rational,” such as would and ought to induce a prudent man to pause and hesitate in the acceptance of a title affected by them.
Having thus ascertained the standard by which the objections to the plaintiff’s title in this case are to be weighed, let us as briefly as practicable examine them in detail.
The first objection arises under a supposed defect of the writ of alias levari facias, under which the interest of Augustus Willis and Mary his wife in the premises was sold; and the supposed incompetency of the District Court, from whence the writ issued, to amend the defect. This interest became vested in Robert Patterson, who was the purchaser at sheriff’s sale, through whom the plaintiff derived title to it. The defect consisted in the total absence of any description in the writ of the property sold, which was in this
Tbe second objection to tbe plaintiff’s title arises out of tbe marriage settlement of Mrs. Caroline Patterson, one of the parties through whom tbe plaintiff derives bis title. On tbe occasion of her marriage, tbe estate of Mrs. Patterson, then Miss Caroline Ell-maker, was conveyed to a trustee to hold for her separate use, with power inter alia to change and alter “tbe whole or any part of trust'1 estate by sales, transfers, purchase, or otherwise, and as often as tbe same should be done, that tbe moneys or other property purchased therewith should be immediately taken and held upon similar uses and trusts to those first declared.” Under this last power, the ground rent originally existing on tbe lot in question was extinguished by tbe trustee, Mrs. Patterson signifying her assent by joining in the deed.
Tbe settlement of Mrs. Patterson differs from settlements made by other married daughters of Mr. Ellmaker, in containing no express clause, exempting tbe purchaser from seeing to tbe application of tbe purchase-money. Tbe question under this exception is whether such liability exists.
To bold of a purchaser from a trustee who has power to sell, liable to tbe proper application of tbe purchase-money, has nothing to recommend it to the Courts of this country. Our policy is to
In this exception, according to my judgment, plaintiff has also failed.
The third objection arises from the defect in the power of attorney, executed by Robert Patterson and wife to William Patterson, dated June 13th, 1840, by which the latter was authorized to convey the right of General Patterson in this ground, as purchaser at sheriff’s sale of the interest of Augustus P. Willis and Mary E. his wife, late Mary E, Ellmaker. The defect consisted in the certificate of the
I agree in opinion with the master, that this defect is cured by the confirming act of the 16th of April, 1840. The language is broad: “ No grant, bargain and sale, feoffment, deed of conveyance, lease, release, assignment, or oilier assurance of any lands, &c., bond fide made and executed by husband and wife, and acknowledged by some judge and authorized by law, &c., executed before the first of January next — shall be held or adjudged invalid or defective, or insufficient in law, by reason of any informality or omission in setting forth the particulars of the acknowledgment, &c.” The only question under this law, is, whether a power of attorney from husband and wife authorizing a third person to sell and convey specified land belonging to the husband, is “ an instrument of conveyance” of land, of which, at this time of day, a doubt ought not to be entertained, if ever such a doubt would have been legitimate. Such has certainly been the received opinion and practice of the state, and a contrary doctrine could not fail to shake many titles and produce the most disastrous litigation. The question I consider too clear for argument.
The last objection made before the master, arises from the circumstance of the existence of an outstanding judgment against Elijah Yansyckel, the immediate owner of the property before the plaintiff, in favour of Abraham Piexoto, This was a judgment under an award of arbitrators for $1701.87J, and while it subsisted was an abiding lien on the property, and so far vitiated the title. Satisfaction was not entered on this judgment until the 26th of April, 1841, when it was released by Piexoto’s attorney. Of course, when the defendant Crawford refused to execute his contract, this judgment was in full operation, but it was satisfied before the hearing before the master. It is undoubtedly true that where an encumbrance is discovered, the vendor must discharge it before he can compel the payment of the purchase-money at law or equity. But here the refusal by the defendant to execute his contract was general, and without specification of the existence of this judgment as a cause of exception to the plaintiff’s title. From the evidence, it is more than probable that the existence of this judgment was an after discovery. For, according to the testimony of the defendant’s conveyancer, the objections made to the title arose from the supposed liability of the purchaser to look to the application of the purchase-money, under
Another and a most grave objection has been made on the hearing, which was not mooted before the master. This, according to equity practice, is irregular: 4 Madd. 111; Brooke, 5. In a case like this, however, arising in the infancy of our chancery jurisdiction, this strictness will not be adhered to; although its manifest convenience is such, that we shall expect it hereafter to be complied with.
The objection amounts to nothing less than that a married woman in Pennsylvania cannot sell her land or bar her dower by power of
The present is the first instance in which this question has been directly raised in the courts of this state, and is one which, if well founded, is calculated to shake many titles heretofore deemed good. It is true that in Sweigart v. Burk, 8 S. & R. 299, it was ruled that a power of attorney executed out of the state by husband and wife, and acknowledged before a justice of the peace, was not sufficient to authorize the attorney so named to convey the wife’s lands in Pennsylvania, by deed executed in pursuance of such power. But this decision was put not on the broad ground of the ineffieacy of a power of attorney by husband and wife to convey title to the wife’s land, but on the ground of the insufficiency of the acknowledgment under the Act of Assembly regulating the acknowledgments of powers of attorney for the conveyance of land in the state, but executed out of it. There is no intimation of a doubt by court or counsel, that if the power had been duly acknowledged by the wife, it would have been otherwise than sufficient. Sweigart v. Burk may therefore be fairly taken as an authority against the defendant’s position, impeaching a conveyance by an attorney duly constituted by husband and wife. Morgan v. Stell, 5 Binn. 305, is a case of the same character as Sweigart v. Burk. There the question was as to the validity of a deed executed by Nicholas Holliday, an attorney in fact of Mr. and Mrs. Turner Camac, of land belonging to Mrs. Camac, after a subsequent power had been given to him jointly with Thomas Law and Benjamin Chew. The case was ruled against Mrs. Camac, on the ground that the defendant was a bond fide purchaser without notice of the revocation of the first power. The case was argued by Hopkinson and Rawle for the plaintiff, and by Binney and Wallace for the defendant, and the opinions of Judges Tilghman, Yates, and Breckenridge, given seriatim. In neither the arguments made, nor opinions delivered by these eminent personages, is the idea started, .that Mrs. Camac’s power could not give authority to her attorney to execute a deed of her land. It is not likely that this omission would have been made by such counsel and such a Court, if an objection of this character had been esteemed to be of any force.
The language of the declaratory act of the 24th of February,
In respect to the time of completing the contract, the modern doctrine in equity requires of a vendor asking its aid, to compel specific performance of a contract, to show himself ready, prompt, and eager; and that, therefore, time alone is a sufficient bar to the aid of the Court. Due diligence is necessary to call the Court into activity, and when it does not exist, a Court of equity will not lend its assistance. But the rule is mutual, and applies to both parties, and a purchaser will not be assisted when he has made frivolous objections to the title, and trifled or shown backwardness to perform his part of the agreement; especially if circumstances are altered: Sug. vol. 3, 501, 9th ed. Time, unquestionably, is regarded in equity as of the essence of the contract, where, from the nature of the estate, the uses to which it was intended to be applied by the purchaser, or from anything else, it is shown so to have been regarded in framing the contract. In this case it is to be remembered, that in the contract no time is specified when the title is to be completed. In such a case a reasonable time, having regard to all the circumstances, must be accorded. And if we consider the objection tenable to the form of the levari faeias, under which Mrs. Willis’s interest in the ground rent was sold (the only objection made by the conveyancer having, in my opinion, any plausibility), the time taken by the plaintiff to remove it was not unreasonable, even if Mr. Crawford intended an immediate occupation of the house as a residence. The question as to the materiality of time, can only arise in that class of cases in which legitimate objections are made to the plaintiff’s abstract of title, and the question occurs whether he has removed them in due season. But in my opinion there was no objection made that required amendment in this plaintiff’s title. The encumbrance was not mentioned, and could have been removed by the plaintiff. In this view of the case, the fact that the defendant purchased this house as a resi-
The last matter for consideration is, whether the defendant’s exceptions to the plaintiff’s title, taken in conjunction with the opinions of his scrivener and counsel, regarded separately or in the aggregate, exhibit one of those titles, which, though not positively bad, yet is of that doubtful character which a Court of Equity, in the exercise of a discretionary jurisdiction, will not force on an unwilling purchaser. For the purpose of this defence, it is sufficient that the latter title is doubtful.
The cases in which Courts of Equity have refused their aid to a vendor, where they have considered his title good, though disputable, are cases of real and serious difficulty, such as Moulin, 3 P. Wm. 198; Chapman v. Smith, 1 Brown, 75; Cooper v. Denn, 1 Ves. C. C. 165; Stapleton v. Smith, 11 Ves. 272. The doubt, to have this effect, must be what Lord Eldon, in Stapleton v. Scott, 11 Ves. 27, calls “ a considerable, a rational doubt.” The danger of lending too ready an ear to such objections are well observed upon by Lord Eldon in Yancover v. Bliss, 11 Ves. 465. Speaking of the practical working of the equity doctrine of doubtful titles, he observes: “ It is scarcely possible to represent the difficulties that have arisen from it; especially when persons under the description of land-jobbers, are going about looking for these things, and persons imprudently enter into contracts with them. Whenever a contract is made for the purchase of land, though no doubt has ever been entertained upon the title, no one thinking of disputing it, if the purchaser has a good bargain, he overlooks all these objections; but if he finds he cannot sell the estate as well as he wished, or cannot enjoy it to his satisfaction, the first thing is, that the abstract goes to some one, for the express purpose of finding out objections, and opinions are given on both sides. I feel great concern for the owners of this.sort of property. The consequence is not only the misery arising from the uncertainty whether that which they have been enjoying with happiness, and upon which their families are subsisting, is their property; but
The Court doth order and decree that the agreement on the pleadings mentioned, dated the third day of November, 1840, be specifically performed and carried into execution. And it is ordered that it be referred to Joseph A. Clay, Esq., as Master, to inquire and report what sums of money have been paid by the complainant for taxes and water rents of the premises in the said agreement mentioned, accruing since the said 3d of November, 1840, and for interest on the mortgage hereinafter mentioned, accruing since the said day, and for necessary repairs of the said premises since the said day. And upon the plaintiff executing and delivering to the defendant a proper conveyance of the estate and premises contained in the said agreement, subject to the encumbrances therein mentioned, to wit, a mortgage for $4700, dated May 1st, 1827, from James M’Olurg to William Chamberlain; and also a mortgage for $4300, dated July 31st, 1840, from the plaintiff to Elijah Yansyckel — such conveyance to be settled by the said Master if the parties differ about the same. — It is ordered that the defendant do pay the plaintiff the sum of $6000, the purchase-money, and what the Master shall report to be due to the plaintiff as aforesaid, on the amounts aforesaid, and the parties are to be at liberty to apply to the Court as they shall be advised.
Since this judgment was pronounced, I have been referred to the case of Fulweler v. Boughter, 15 S. & R. 45, 55, in which the Supreme Court has ruled that a wife can convey her interest in lands by power of attorney, executed by her after a separate examination.