69 Md. 460 | Md. | 1888
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The 19th section of the Act of 1888, chapter 98, entitled an “Act to extend the limits of Baltimore City, by including therein parts of Baltimore County," provides: First, that until the year 1900, the rate of taxation for city purposes oji all taxable property within the districts to be annexed, shall not exceed the then existing tax-rate of such property in Baltimore County, and that until said year, no increase shall be made in the assessment of such property.
Second, that until the year 1900, the city of Baltimore shall expend, within the districts annexed, an amount equal to the revenue derived therefrom by taxation, in affording to the residents within such districts, the rights and privileges enjoyed by residents within the present limits of the city.
The Act further provides, that the question whether the several parts of Baltimore County, shall be annexed to the city, shall be submitted to the legal voters residing therein respectively.
The main questions arising upon the construction of this Act are: First, the constitutional power of the Legislature, to extend the limits of Baltimore City, by including therein parts of Baltimore County.
The power of the Legislature to extend the limits of a city, by including therein parts of the county adjoining, when the city itself is a part of the county, is not and cannot be questioned. It is contended, however, that Baltimore City being a separate and independent territorial division of the State, and not a part of Baltimore County, the Legislature has no power to change the lines of the county by annexing part of its territory to the city. And in support of this contention, the appellant relies entirely upon section 1, of Article 13, of the Constitution. After providing for the organization of new counties, and for locating county seats, this section further provides: “Nor shall the lines of any county be changed without the consent of a majority of the legal voters residing within the district, which, under said proposed change, would form a part of a county different from that to which it belonged prior to said change." It does not say, as has been argued, that the lines of a county shall not be changed except it be for the purpose of annexing parts 'of one county to another county. It merely provides that when the lines of a county are to be changed for this purpose, it must be done with the consent of a majority ■of the voters residing within the district to be annexed. The object, and sole object, of this provision of section 1, was to provide for the annexation of parts of one county to another. The entire section in fact, and the article in which it is to be found, deals exclusively with the Oorganizatidn of “new counties,” “the location of comity seats,” and the mode by which parts of one county may be annexed to another county, and the
Counties are political divisions of the State, organized with a view to the general policy of the State, and the functions and powers exercised by them have reference mainly to such policy. Besides, their representation in the General Assembly is fixed by the Constitution, and we can understand why it was deemed proper to make some provision in regard to the organization of counties, and the annexation of parts of one county to another. Towns and cities however are ordinarily chartered at the instance, and mainly with reference to the interest, convenience and advantage, of persons residing within the' particular locality incorporated. They are chartered by the Legislature, and their boundaries are fixed by it, and the power to extend them, whenever in its judgment the public interests require it, has been exercised by the Legislature from the earliest days of the colony, bio reason has been suggested why the Constitution should prohibit the exercise of this power, and it would seem strange, that it should provide for the annexation of parts of one county to another, and deny to the Legislature the power to extend the limits of a city, by including therein parts of an adjoining county, even though such county should be a separate and independent territorial division of the State, bio one knew better than the framers of the Constitution of 1867, that the time must come, and that not far distant, when the extension of the limits of a great city like Baltimore would be absolutely necessary to its proper growth and development. And if they meant to deny the exercise of this power by the Legislature, and to say that its limits as then defined by its charter, should for all time remain the same, it is but reasonable to presume that this intention would have been declared in plain
And this brings us "to the question as to the power of the Legislature to prescribe different rates of assessment and taxation for city purposes as between property within the districts annexed under the provisions of the Act, and property within the former limits of the city. "VVe cannot agree that the discrimination made in this respect hy the 19th section, is in itself inequitable or unjust. The larger part of the territory annexed under the Act of 1888, embraces vacant outlying lots and farming lands, and the plainest principles of justice would seem to require a qualified exemption of such property for a limited period at least, from the heavy burden of city taxation. It must he some time before such property can bé available for building or business purposes, or can enjoy the full benefits and privileges of the city government. And if local taxation is founded on, or in any manner qualified hy, the principle of local benefits, there ought to he in all fairness some apportionment in the rate of taxation between such property, and property more advantageously located. But the question, it is said, is not one of abstract justice, hut of constitutional power to make such apportionment. And'it is insisted that all property within the limits of a city, without regard to its location, or condition, w;hether improved or unimproved, must, under the Constitution of this State, he subject to the same rate of taxation for city purposes.
The same power was exercised by the Acts of 1823, chap. 185; 1827, chap. 88; 1830, chap. 139; 1838, chap.
This legislative construction was known to the-framers of the present Constitution and to the people who adopted it, and we must presume they accepted it, as. the proper construction of the power of the Legislature under this Article of the Bill of Rights.
The same power, too, has been exercised by the Legislature in other States, under. Constitutions in which the principle of equality and uniformity of taxation is declared in explicit terms ; and its exercise has been sustained by the Courts in these States and by the Supreme Court of the United States. Serrill vs. Philadelphia, 38 Penn., 355 ; Gillette vs. City of Hartford, 31 Conn., 351; Gity of Henderson vs. Lambert, 8 Bush, 607; Benoist vs. St. Louis, 19 Mo., 179; United States vs. Memphis, 91 U. S., 292.
We do not rest, however, our 'decision upon these cases, entitled as they are to the highest consideration, hut upon what we understand to be the spirit and meaning of our own Constitution.
Whether the rate of taxation prescribed by the Act is to he construed as a contract and, therefore, binding-till the year 1900, orf a mere exemption or privilege which a subsequent Legislature may repeal, is a question in regard to which we express no opinion. If it cannot he sustained as a contract because the Legislature has no power to make such a contract with the voters of a county, or with a municipal corporation, or for any other reason, this would not affect the
One thing is clear, the rate of taxation prescribed by the 19th section is binding until it is repealed, and if it fails as a contract, it is by no means certain, the Legislature would not have passed the entire Act as it is, relying upon the good faith of the State not to repeal the qualified exemption granted under such circumstances. And so with the voters within the districts annexed. Whether it was a contract or a mere privilege rcpealable in the discretion of the law-making power was fully discussed, and the opinions of eminent counsel in regard thereto were published before the vote on the question of “extension” was taken; and for all we know to the contrary, the voters within the districts to be annexed 'may also have relied on the good faith of a subsequent Legislature not to revoke a pledge made in so formal and definite a manner. Be this as it may, we cannot say the Legislature would not have passed the “City Extension Act,” even though they knew it was within the power of a subsequent Legislature to repeal the qualified exemption granted by the 19th section. For these reasons the order below will be affirmed.
Order affirmed, and,
bill dismissed.
Concurrence Opinion
filed the following concurring opinion:
I think that the Act of the Legislature extending the limits of the City of Baltimore is constitutional and valid. But in my opinion, it would have-been unconstitutional, unless it had required the consent of a majority of the legal voters residing in the territory annexed to the city. As Baltimore City was entirely surrounded hy the county, its limits could not have been extended without changing the lines of the county. Now, the first section of the thirteenth Article of the Constitution, after stating that the General Assembly may provide hy law for organizing new counties, locating and removing county seats, and changing county lines, uses this language: “nor shall the lines of any county he changed without the consent of a majority of the legal voters residing within the district which, under said proposed change, would form a part of a county different from that to which it belonged prior to said change.” This section was intended to give constitutional security to local government. The people were not to he denied the privilege of living under county governments of their own choice. No portion of the population of a county were to he excluded from it, and transferred to another, unless their consent was given at the polls, through a majority of the voters of the district affected. The right of local government would he violated as much hy transferring them to the City of Baltimore without their consent, as it would he by annexing their territory to another county. The essential right of choice is denied in each case. Nor can we say, that in construing this section the City of Baltimore is not to he considered and treated as a county. It is a county in all legal and political respects. It has its own Courts, its own representation in the Legislature, and its own local government. It is a distinct political sub-division of the State; and so
filed the following opinion :
T do not desire to be understood as dissenting from the order appealed from, refusing the injunction on the' bill in this case. But I must dissent from the opinion of the majority of this Court, according to-which that order is affirmed. I dissent from the opinion because the practical'effect of it is to nullify that most valuable guaranty, found in the" Constitution of the State, designed. to restrain the power of unequal and arbitrary taxation.
The question, whether it be competent to the Legislature to authorize the extension of the limits of the City of Baltimore, by annexing thereto certain districts of an adjoining county, in the manner provided in sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, of the Act of 1888, ch. 98, I think may be answered in the affirmative. The City of Baltimore is one of the political territorial divisions of the State, and. I can perceive no substantial objection to construing the appellative city as synonymous with that of county; -and I think such construction, while it is not according to the literal reading of Art. 13, sec. 1, of the Constitution, is according to the spirit, and the general object and purpose of the constitutional provision. The Act provides for taking the sense of the people, as it should be expressed by a majority of the legal and qualified voters in the districts to be annexed, as required by
But it is the 19th section of the Act of 1888, ch. 98, providing for the extension of “the limits of Baltimore City, by including therein parts of Baltimore County, that gives rise to the question upon which I particularly dissent from the opinion of the majority of the Court. By that section it is provided, that, prior to the year 1900, the rate of taxation in the annexed district or districts shall not exceed the present rate of taxation of Baltimore County; and that, until the year 1900, there shall not be, for the purposes of city taxation, any increase in the present assessment of the property now assessed, nor of the property not now assessed, but which may be liable to assessment before the year 1900. It is conceded that the present rate of taxation of Baltimore County is but sixty cents in the $100, while in the City of Baltimore, as bounded before the extension, the rate of taxation is about one dollar and ninety cents’ in the $100, or more than three times the amount of the rate in Baltimore County. It is further provided, by this section, that, until the jear 1900, the City of Baltimore shall expend within the
On the part of the plaintiff, the appellant on this appeal, it is alleged and insisted that the provisions of this 19th section of the Annexation Act are grossly violative of both the letter and spirit of Article 15 of the Declaration of Rights of this State, which declares, that the levying of taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to he prohibited; that paupers ought not to be assessed for the support of the government: but every person in the State, or person holding property therein, ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of the government, according to his actual worth in real or personal property, yet, fines, duties or taxes may properly and justly be imposed or laid, with a political view for the good government and benefit of the community.” If is insisted by the plaintiff that not only the 19th section of the Act, but the whole statute, is rendered null and void, because of the obnoxious provisions contained in the 19th section before recited. This contention is strongly controverted by the defendants ; and the leading question on this appeal is that in respect to the proper construction and application of the 15th Article of the Declaration of Rights.
This 15th Article, as it now stands in the present Declaration of Rights, formed the 13th Article of the Declaration of Rights of 1776, and it has been incorporated in, every Declaration of Rights adopted in the Ktate since that time. And it has been repeatedly
The form of expression employed in the various Articles of the Declaration of Rights, such as we have in the 15th Article, imports a positive limitation of power. The verbal phrase ought means, or necessarily implies, obligation or duty ; and is equally imperative as would he the word shall, if used in the same connection. This is clearly shown by express decisions. In Crane vs. Meginnis, supra, where the 6th Article of the Declaration of Rights, which declares “ that the legislative, executive and judicial powers of government ought to he forever separate and distinct from each other,” was considered, it was held, that the terms of the Article operated as a positive limitation of power ; and because the provision of one of the sections of a statute was adjudged to be an attempted exercise of judicial power by the Legislature, that section was declared to he absolutely void, though the rest of the statute was held to he valid. And so in the important and leading case of The Regents vs. Williams, supra, involving the consideration of fundamental questions, the Court laid it down with emphasis, that “the division of the powers of the government proclaimed by the 6th Article of the Bill of Rights, and the 21st Article of the same instrument, declaring, ‘ that no freeman ought to be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, hut by the
In the argument at bar, as I understand it, it was conceded by counsel for the appellees, that the 15th Article of the Declaration of Rights does operate as a restraint or limitation upon the power of the Legislature in imposing general taxes upon the State at large, for State purposes, and that such taxes must be equal and-uniform. This concession might well he made; for it has been the established and received opinion, among the ablest of the profession, since the adoption of the Declaration of Rights, that every person ought to contribute to the support of government according to his actual worth, and that this was a fundamental principle embodied in the organic law, and not discretionary with the Legislature, but a binding rule, from which no lawful departure could be made by legislative design. The Tax Cases, VI G. & J., 134, 145. And the Courts, in many cases, have expressly held, and in other cases assumed it to be unquestionable, that the provision of the Declaration of Rights, embodied in the 15th Article, is a positive limitation upon the legislative power of taxation, requiring all general taxes to be equal and uniform, as near as possible. This is shown in the clearest manner, and beyond the cavil of a doubt, in the cases of Waters vs. The State, 1 Gill, 303, 308; Mayor & C. C. of Balto. vs. Balto. & Ohio Railroad Co., 6 Gill, 288; State vs. Sterling, 20 Md., 502, 516; Tyson vs. State, 28 Md., 577, 586, 587; State vs. Cumberland & Penn. Railroad Co., 40 Md., 28, 50; State vs. P. W. & B. Railroad Co., 45 Md., 361.
That the framers of the Declaration of Rights, by incorporating the 15th Article, intended to assert, and to give force and effect to, a just and valuable political maxim, founded in reason and the fundamental principles of the social compact, can admit of no reasonable doubt; and it is equally clear that they intended that this just and salutary principle should be observed iu the same large and beneficial sense in which it was maintained by writers of authority upon natural and political law. And as showing what was in the minds of the framers of the Declaration of Rights, it will not be amiss to refer to some few passages in the works of such writers of repute.
Tu vol. 2, pt. 3, c. 5, sec. 14, of the treatise of Burlom-aqui on the Principles of Natural and Political Law, the translation of which was first published in Eng
In Rutherforth’s Institutes of Natural law, bk. 2, ch. 3, page 272, (published in 1754-1756,) it is laid down as. a fixed principle, that it is the business of the Legislature “to consider and direct what part of each man’s property it is worth to have the rest secured to him. The security which he has in view, depends upon the preservation and welfare of the public. And for this reason the legislative power, in settling what each person is to pay, should consider how much of each person’s property it would he worth to him to preserve the State and advance its welfare; because, whatever appears to the common understanding to he necessary for these purposes, is what every person who belongs to the State, is naturally presumed to he willing to part with. Upon this account the burden of those payments which are called taxes, or duties and customs upon goods, both moveable and immoveable, ought to be proportioned, as near as may he, to the value of each person’sproperty; because the more a man’s property is worth, the more he is naturally willing to pay for tlie security of it.”
And so Vattel in his treatise on the Law of Nations, bk. 1, ch. 20, sec. 240, page 111, (first published in English in 1760,) lays it down as an axiom in qiolitical administration, that.taxes “ought to he regulated in such a manner, that all the. citizens may pay their
Row, all taxes are imposed by the authority of the .State; and those imposed for county or municipal purposes are levied under authority delegated by the -State, and are in fact for State purposes; for the city of Baltimore and the several counties are but political territorial divisions of the State, maintaining separate organizations for and as subordinate parts of the State government. Hence, where a State clothed a city with .authority to tax persons and property within its limits, and that city passed ordinances assessing a tax upon bonds of the city, and thus diminishing the amount of interest which it had agreed to pay, the Supreme
In the Constitutions of most of the States of the Union, there is found a limitation upon the power of taxation similar, though expressed in varied terms, to that embodied in the 15th Article of .our Declaration of Rights. The same limitation is found in the Constitution of the United States, (Art. 1, sec. 8,) in respect to the power of Congress to levy duties, imposts and excise taxes; it being declared that such taxes “ shall be uniform throughout the United States.” In some of the State Constitutions the limitation upon the power is qualified or restricted in its application, as in the Constitution of Virginia, (before that of 1869,) West Virginia, Louisiana, Texas, California, and some others. In the Constitutions of those States the provision is, that “taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State;” and where such is the limitation,
In the case of Gilman vs. City of Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510, the Supreme Court of the United States, following with entire approval the repeated decisions of the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Wisconsin, held, that the levying of taxes by a public corporation, the city of Sheboygan, under the authority of a law of the State, to pay the debts of the city, was the exercise of the taxing power, just as much as the taxation of the citizens directly, for the support of the State Gfovernmeut. And as the Constitution of Wisconsin required the rate of taxation to be equal and uniform, it further held, that all kinds of property, not lawfully exempted, should be taxed alike, bk the same standard of valuation, equally with other taxable property, and cocxtensively with the territory to which it applied. And because by the statute authorizing the levy there was a discrimination made in favor of one species of property, the statute, and the levy under it, were declared tobe in conflict with the-Constitution of the State,
The text writers are equally explicit. In 2 Dillon on Municipal Corporations, sec. 140, (3d Ed.) it is laid down as established law upon this subject, that “In the absence of special constitutional restriction, the Legislature may confer the taxing power upon municipalities in such measure as it deems expedient; in other words, with such limitations as it sees fit, as to the rate of taxation, the purposes for which it is authorized, and the objects (that is, the property) which shall be subject to taxation; but it cannot, of course, confer any greater power than the State itself possesses, and must observe the restrictions and limitations of the organic law.”
In Judge Cooley’s work on Constitutional Limitations, page 612-13, the author says, what must be accepted as a plain political truth, that “it is of the very essence of taxation that it be levied with equality and uniform
And so Burroughs, in his very excellent work on Taxation, al page 380, ch. 19, sec. 130, states the result of the decisions, and the general principle, very clearly. He says: “The provisions in State Constitutions limiting the power of taxation, apply to counties, cities and other sub-divisions of the State, to which the power to tax is delegated. The provisions in the Constitutions of the State, requiring taxation to be equal and uniform, apply to all its sub-divisions, and a tax levied by a city in a State having such a provision, solely on the real estate of the city, is in conflict with
The broad contention of the appellees, if maintainable, goes to the full extent (and it was so conceded by them in the argument) of allowing the Legislature complete and unrestricted control over the subject of taxation for county and city purposes : That any discrimination it may think proper to make, as to what shall be taxed, or what shall not be taxed, or as to the rates of assessments, is, entirely within its discretion. And this would seem logically to follow, if it be true that the 15th Article of the Declaration of Rights does not operate as a restraint upon the exercise of such power. I cannot, however, for a moment entertain the opinion that such unrestricted power rests with the Legislature. But on the contrary, in my judgment, when it is declared that each person, holding property in this State, “ought to contribute his proportion of public taxes for the support of the government, according to his actual worth in real or personal property,” it is meant that his contribution should be made according to the value of his property, at a rate uniform with that imposed upon all other property within the territorial limits of the State, county, or city imposing the tax.
In the argument at bar much reliance was placed upon the cases of U. S. vs. Memphis, 97 U. S., 284, and Louisiana vs. Pilsbury, 105 U. S., 295, as tending to support the contention of the appellees. But the slightest examination of those cases will show that they have no application to this case whatever. In
In the second of the cases just mentioned, the tax was imposed for municipal purposes, hut it was under a Constitution which provided for equality and uniformity of taxation throughout the State, which, in the nature of things, could not he applied to the varied rates of taxation required to meet the wants of the many' counties and municipalities of the State. The Supreme Court of the United States, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the State, held, that the Article in the Constitution, hy its terms, applied to State, and not to municipal taxes. This surely can have no application to a case arising under the provision of our Declaration of Rights.
But, upon the assumption that the provision in the Declaration of Rights does apply to county and municipal taxes, it is insisted, and this seems to he the position most relied on hy the appellees, that it is competent to the Legislature to make special taxing-districts, even for the levying of general taxes, within
Can this contention be sustained upon any principle-of established law ? I am clearly of opinion it cannot.. The great object and purpose of the Act of 1888, ch. 98, is to effect an extension of the city limits, and to-incorporate into the city, as part and parcel thereof, the designated parts of Baltimore County', containing-a population of forty or fifty thousand jmople. All the jurisdiction and powers of the city corporation, as a municipal organization, are extended over the inhabitants and territory of the annexed district. Those inhabitants become corporators in common with all the rest of the inhabitants of the city. They are entitled to share equally with the other portions of the population, in all the -rights, privileges, property and improvements of the city, and are liable in common with the rést of the population for the debts and obligations of the city, and for the expenses of the city government. They, have a right to equal rejsresentation in the City Council, and thus to participate-in the making the laws and ordinances for the government of the whole city, and in imposing taxes and' raising revenue for all city purposes. It is not pretended that there is any separate municipal organization for the annexed district, or that it has any peculiar functions to perform, separate and distinct from those of the city at large, for which local taxes might be levied. The district has been annexed by popular
If the statute had simply provided for local assessments for local improvements, the question would be quite different from what it is. In such case, while the assessment is in one sense a tax, it is essentially different in its nature, and is levied upon a different principle from the levies made for general governmental purposes. The distinction is fully recognized in all the cases, and in none more fully than in our own. Mayor & C. C. of Balto. vs. Greenmount Cemetery, 7 Md., 517; Brooks vs. Mayor, &c., of Balto., 48 Md., 265. The general levy of taxes, says Judge Cooley, in his.work on Taxation, page 416, “ is understood to exact contributions in return for the general benefits of the government, and it promises nothing to the persons taxed, beyond w-hat may be anticipated from an administration of the laws for individual protection, and the general public good. Special assessments, on the other hand, are made up on the assumption that a portion of the community is to be specially and peculiarly benefited in the enhancement of the value of property, peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated expenditure of public funds ; and in addition to the general levy, they demand
But the question remains, is the whole Act a nullity and without effect, because the 19th section is unconstitutional and void? The Act, without the 19th section, is complete, and makes full provision for all
With respect to the further question made, whether the 19th section of the Extension Act is not void under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, because of the grossly excessive burden imposed upon one portion of the tax-payers of the city to the exoneration\or .excuse of another portion, in the raising of revenue for common benefit, I offer no opinion. With my views as to the effect of the 15th Article
It results from the views that I have expressed in regard to the Act of. 1888, and the unconstitutionality of the 19th section thereof, that, in my judgment, the order refusing the injunction ought to he affirmed.
(Filed 23d November, 1888.)