151 P. 514 | Nev. | 1915
Lead Opinion
By the Court,
This is an appeal from a judgment for costs in favor of defendants, respondents herein, following an order sustaining a general demurrer to appellant’s complaint.
The complaint alleges that during the year 1910 the Ramsey Comstock Mining Company, a foreign corporation, was engaged in mining in Lyon County, and became indebted to numerous persons. That on November 11, 1910, one John Topogna commenced an action in the district court of Lyon County to foreclose a mechanic’s
"I hereby certify that I received the within summons on the 12th day of November, A. D. 1910, at 4 o’clock p. m., and duly served the same by personally delivering a true copy thereof attached to a certified copy of the complaint to A. H. Mayne, manager of said Ramsey Comstock Mining Company, in Lyon County, on the 4th day of November, 1910, by delivering to him a true copy thereof, and by showing him this original. ”
It also appears from the complaint that notice was published, according to law, notifying all persons having liens upon the property against which said Topogna and Gardella liens were sought to be foreclosed to exhibit proof of same before the district court on December 17, 1910. The section of the statute requiring the notice is Rev. Laws, 2227, and reads:
" * * * And at the time of filing the complaint and issuing the summons the plaintiff shall cause a notice to be published at least once a week, for three successive weeks, in one newspaper published in the county, and if there is no newspaper published in the county, then in such mode as the court may determine, notifying all persons holding or claiming liens under the provisions of this act on said premises, to be and appear before said court on a day specified therein, and during a regular term of such court and to exhibit then and there the proof of their said liens. * * * ”
It also appears from the complaint that, notwithstanding the Topogna-Gardella suit, and the notice given in that case to lien claimants, on December 1,1910, one William Ross commenced a suit in the same court against the Ramsey Comstock Mining Company to foreclose certain labor liens, in which case service of summons was made upon the defendant company the same day, and that
It is further alleged that during the month of February, 1911, the sheriff of Lyon County sold the property in question under an order of sale in the case of Topogna et al. v. Ramsey Comstock Mining Company, and that the plaintiffs in the case were the purchasers, and that the. certificate of sale was assigned to the defendants, C. E. Mack and George Green, to whom it is alleged a sheriff’s deed issued conveying the property, and that the defendant, the Lahontan Mines Company, claimed to own the property in question, pursuant to a conveyance from Mack and Green. It is also alleged that by virtue of an order of sale made by the court in the case of Ross v. Ramsey Comstock Mining Company, the sheriff of Lyon County, on the 18th day of April, 1911, sold the property to William Ross, after having given due and legal notice of the sale, and on said last-named day issued to him a certificate of sale for said property; that on the 21st day of September, 1911, said C. E. Mack and George Green instituted an action in the district court of Lyon County against D. P. Randall, as sheriff of said county, to restrain him from issuing a sheriff’s deed to said William Ross to said property, pursuant to the certificate of sale last mentioned; and that thereafter judgment and decree was entered in favor of said Mack and Green, and against said Randall, as such sheriff, permanently enjoining him from issuing such deed. It is further alleged that appellant
"* * * A party may appeal upon the judgment roll alone, in which case only errors can be considered which appear upon the face of such judgment roll.”
Section 5273, Revised Laws, provides that the judgment roll shall consist of:
"1. * * * 2. * * * The pleadings, * * * and a copy of any order made on demurrer, * * * and a copy of the judgment. * * * ”
A judgment roll, properly certified to, has been filed in this court, together with a copy of the notice of appeal from the judgment. On the oral argument it was stated that appellant sought to appeal upon the judgment roll only, and since there is no contention that the purported judgment roll is defective, and since the statute expressly says that an appeal may be taken thereupon, it follows that the motion to dismiss the appeal must be denied.
Several grounds are urged why the judgment appealed from should be reversed, the ones most strongly urged being: (1) Because there was no court in session on the 17th day of December, 1910, the day fixed in the notice in the case of Topogna and Gardella v. Ramsey Comstock Mining Company for other lien claimants to exhibit the proof of their liens; (2) because, when the court convened on January 20, 1911, it refused to grant further time to William Ross in which to exhibit his lien; and (3) because the judgment in the case of Topogna and Gardella v. Ramsey Comstock Mining Company is void for the want of jurisdiction, for the reason that there was no proper service upon defendant, Ramsey Comstock Mining
The matters complained of under points 1 and 2, above stated, do not go to the jurisdiction of the court, and hence cannot be considered in this case.
"Every incorporated company or association created and existing under the laws of any other state, or territory, or foreign government, or the government of the United States, owning property or doing business in this state, shall appoint and keep in this state an agent upon whom all legal process may be served for such corporation or association. Such corporation shall file a certificate, properly authenticated by the proper officers of such company, with the secretary of state, specifying the full name and residence of such agent, which certificate*22 shall be renewed by such company as often as a change may be made in such appointment, or vacancy shall occur in such agency.”
The other was section 29 of "An act to regulate proceedings in civil cases in the courts of justice of this state, and to repeal all other acts in relation thereto,” approved March 8, 1869, being section 3124, Cutting’s Compiled Laws, which reads:
"* * * Second — If the suit be against a foreign corporation or a nonresident * * * stock company or association, doing business within this state, to an agent, cashier, or secretary, president, or other head thereof. ”
We will concede, at the very outset, that if the provision which we first quoted had provided an exclusive method of making service of summons against a foreign corporation, the service of the summons would not have given the court jurisdiction. (Karns v. State Bank & T. Co., 31 Nev. 170, 101 Pac. 564.) But the method therein provided was not exclusive, for it is expressly provided in section 3 of said act that "This act shall be [considered] as giving an additional mode and manner of serving process and as not affecting the validity of any service of process hereafter made, which would be valid under any statute now in force.” (Comp. Laws, sec. 901.)
Since every presumption is indulged in favor of the validity of a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction, let us consider if the complaint in this case affirmatively shows that the court did not have jurisdiction in the case of Topogna and Gardella v. Ramsey Comstock Mining Company. The return of the sheriff shows that service was made by delivering a true copy of the summons and complaint to A. H. Mayne, manager of the Ramsey Comstock Mining Company. Since the statute said nothing about service being made on the "manager" of a corporation, the question is: Was the manager such an "agent” or "other head” of the company as contemplated by the statute? An "agent is one who has authority to act for another.” (1 Words and Phrases, 262.) Surely one who is
"In every case in which * * * liens are asserted against any property, the court, in the judgment, must declare the rank of each lien, or class of liens, which shall be in the following order, viz: First — Labor. Second— All persons other than original contractors and subcontractors. * * * ”
It is clear from this section that it is meant that in each particular case (suit) the court in the judgment (in that suit) must declare the rank of the lien. When Ross failed to exhibit his lien in the Topogna-Gardella case he waived his rights (sec. 2227, supra) so far as Topogna and Gardella and those who did exhibit their liens in that case are concerned. (Hunter v. Truckee Lodge, 14 Nev. 24.) See, also, Skyrme v. Occidental M. & M. Co., 8 Nev. 231;
For the reasons given, the judgment is affirmed.
Rehearing
On Rehearing
By the Court,
"In the preliminary discussion relative to the true nature of equity, emphasis was laid on its function as a corrective of proceedings at common law. But from this it must not be supposed that equity exercises a species of extraordinary jurisdiction, bounded by no certain limits or rules save those imposed by the individual conscience and natural sense of justice of the particular chancellor before whom a case is being tried. Doubtless, in the early history of English equity jurisprudence, there was much to justify the caustic criticism of the great Selden that 'Equity in law is the same that the spirit is in religion, what every one pleases to make it. ’ In the infancy of courts of equity, before their jurisdiction was settled, the chancellors themselves exercising*25 a delegated authority from the crown, as the fountain of administrative justice, whose rights, prerogatives, and duties on the subject were not well defined and whose decrees were not capable of being resisted, undoubtedly acted on principles of conscience and natural justice without much restraint of any sort. Today, however, the rules and maxims of a court of chancery are as fixed and certain as those which govern inferior jurisdiction; and. a court of equity has no more right than has a court of law to act on its own notions of what is right in a particular case, but must be guided by the established rules and precedents. Equity is flexible only as to circumstances in the modes of relief of which its forms render it capable; but otherwise the systems of jurisprudence in courts of law and equity are now equally artificial .systems, founded on the same principles of justice and positive law, and their office is not to oppose but each in its turn to be subservient to the other. The discretion exercisable by a chancellor will, therefore, in some cases follow the law implicitly, in others assist it, and advance the remedy; in others again, it may relieve, against the abuse, or possibly allay the rigor of it. But in no case does it contradict or overturn the ground or principles thereof, nor can a court of equity create new rights, not before existing at law, and then take jurisdiction to pass on and enforce them because the law affords no remedy. ”
"Plaintiff further avers on his information and belief*26 that at the said hour (January 20, 1911), and at the time said causes of John Topogna and M. G. Gardella were brought to be heard, on the ex parte motion of said Mack & Green, attorneys for said persons, and before the trial of said causes proceeded, John Lothrop, Esq., appeared as the attorney of record of said William Ross and said W. J. Gruss, and then and there objected to further proceedings being had in said cause, until such time as the said William Ross and said W. J. Gruss could appear and join in the foreclosure of the several liens of record held by them, and for grounds of delay in the trial of said ex parte action, the court was informed by said attorney that another suit was then and there pending for the foreclosure of the several liens represented by said attorney, and that at the proper time the said persons would appear and join in the foreclosure of the said liens, against the same property for which foreclosure was then and there requested by Mack & Green; that the judge of said court, to wit, the Honorable Frank P. Langan, the judge of said court, then and there refused to sustain said objection of the said attorney; whereupon the said attorney asked and was granted an exception to the ruling of the court in said cause, on the grounds that another suit was pending for the same cause in said court, and that said court had no jurisdiction to enter a decree in said cause alone, and without bringing in all parties plaintiff therein.”
The statute (section 2227, Rev. Laws, partly quoted in the former opinion) had fixed the manner of bringing in other lien claimants and the time within which they should exhibit their claims, and also provided " * * * and all liens not so exhibited shall be deemed to be waived in favor of those which are so exhibited. ” It is evident that the legislature had a purpose in providing this summary method of enabling lien claimants to become parties to an action, and for providing that all who did not exhibit their claims should be deemed to have waived them, so far as the plaintiff and those who did exhibit their claims were concerned.
Having reached the conclusion that the court had jurisdiction at every stage of the proceedings in the Topogna-Gardella case, it follows that we cannot reverse the judgment of the lower court in the case at bar without overturning well-established principles of law. If we reverse this case, it will be tantamount to saying that a judgment is of no substantial force and effect; it would be a waste of time and effort to undertake to depict the consequences.
Perceiving no error in the order and judgment appealed from, it is ordered that the same be affirmed.