19 Conn. App. 65 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1989
The parties to this appeal were divorced in August, 1969. As part of the modified judgment of divorce, the court awarded the defendant’s interest in the income from several trust funds to the plaintiff, allocating one third as alimony and two thirds as support for the parties’ one minor child.
On February 2, 1988, after McLinden’s death, the plaintiff and her daughters filed a motion for execution of the terms of the judgment regarding the distribution of the trust principal. On March 16, 1988, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s motion and a motion to open and correct the original judgment for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court granted the plaintiff’s motion for execution and denied the defendant’s motions.
In response to the defendant’s motion for articulation of the basis for the denial of his motions, the trial court stated that the original court had subject matter jurisdiction when it rendered its judgment in 1969 in that it properly transferred to the plaintiff property already acquired by the defendant. The court determined that the defendant’s rights to the funds were vested at the time of the transfer, and that the case therefore was not controlled by Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987).
The defendant has framed his collateral attack on the 1969 judgment as a challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. “A court does not truly lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it.” Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185, 413 A.2d 819, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 801, 100 S. Ct. 20, 62 L. Ed. 2d 14 (1979); Connecticut Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Milano, 191 Conn. 555, 559,
This court is not convinced that we should “invariably characterize as an absence of . . . jurisdiction every failure of a trial court to observe every statutory limitation on its authority to act . . . .” Broaca v. Broaca, supra, 471, (Peters, J., dissenting). “Moreover, to give an expansive interpretation to the concept of ‘subject matter jurisdiction’ would be to ‘undermine significantly the doctrine of res judicata, and to eliminate the certainty and finality in the law and in litigation which the doctrine is designed to protect.’ Lacks v. Lacks, 41 N.Y.2d 71, 77, 359 N.E.2d 384 [390 N.Y.S.2d 875 (1976)].” Vogel v. Vogel, 178 Conn. 358, 363, 422 A.2d 271 (1979).
Our Supreme Court has found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction in dissolution cases in which trial courts have ordered postmajority child support without a written agreement of the parties to such an arrangement. Gallo v. Gallo, 184 Conn. 36, 46, 440 A.2d 782 (1981); see Arseniadis v. Arseniadis, 2 Conn. App. 239, 243, 477 A.2d 152 (1984). The basis of these decisions is that because the language of the child support statute allows an award of support only to “minor children,” a postmajority award exceeds the jurisdiction of the court as provided by statute. Broaca v. Broaca, supra, 466; Kennedy v. Kennedy, 177 Conn. 47, 49-50, 411 A.2d 25 (1979).
It is not clear that an award of a future inheritance as “part of the estate” of a spouse under General Statutes § 46b-81 or its predecessor, General Statutes (1958 Rev.) § 46-21, in effect at the time of the parties’
“Although we have held that a challenge to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction ‘can be raised at any time . . . and the lack thereof cannot be waived’; LaBow v. LaBow, 171 Conn. 433, 440, 370 A.2d 990 (1976) . . . Monroe v. Monroe, [supra 177]; we have also recognized that ‘[t]he modern law of civil procedure suggests that even litigation about subject matter jurisdiction should take into account the importance of the principle of the finality of judgments, particularly when the parties have had a full opportunity originally to contest the jurisdiction of the adjudicatory tribunal.’ Monroe v. Monroe, supra, 178; Connecticut Pharmaceutical Assn., Inc. v. Milano, [supra, 560]; Vogel v. Vogel, supra, 362-63; 1 Restatement (Second), Judgments § 12; James & Hazard, Civil Procedure (2d Ed. 1977) § 13.16.” Meinket v. Levinson, 193 Conn. 110, 114, 474 A.2d 454 (1984); Morris v. Irwin, 4 Conn. App. 431, 433, 494 A.2d 626 (1985). “ ‘Litigation about whether subject matter jurisdiction exists should take into account whether the litigation is a collateral or direct attack on the judgment, whether the parties consented to the jurisdiction originally, the age of the original judgment, whether the parties had an opportunity originally to contest jurisdiction, the prevention of a miscarriage of justice, whether the subject matter is so far
In the present case, we are confroiited with a collateral attack eighteen years after the original court rendered judgment. The defendant did not exercise his opportunity to appeal that judgment, and there are no facts before us to warrant a conclusion that there has been a miscarriage of justice. If, twenty years after the rendering of the questioned orders in this case, this court were to set aside the award of the principal of the trusts, we would be creating an unjust situation. As our Supreme Court has recently stated, “ ‘[w]hile an action for divorce or dissolution of marriage is a creature of statute, it is essentially equitable in its nature. Stoner v. Stoner, 163 Conn. 345, 356, 307 A.2d 146 [1972].’ Pasquariello v. Pasquariello, 168 Conn. 579, 584, 362 A.2d 835 (1975). ‘The power to act equitably is the keystone to the court’s ability to fashion relief in the infinite variety of circumstances which arise out of the dissolution of a marriage. . . .’ Id., 585.” Sunbury v. Sunbury, 210 Conn. 170, 174, 553 A.2d 612 (1989). “[I]ssues involving financial orders are entirely interwoven. ‘The rendering of a judgment in a complicated dissolution case is a carefully crafted mosaic, each element of which may be dependent on the other.’ ” Id., 175, quoting Ehrenkranz v. Ehrenkranz, 2 Conn. App. 416, 424, 479 A.2d 826 (1984); Weinstein v. Weinstein, 18 Conn. App. 622, 629, 561 A.2d 443 (1989). In Sunbury the court ordered that after this court found error in one part of a financial award, it was not proper to set aside only that portion of the award but was necessary to remand to the trial court for reconsideration of all of the financial orders.
Having examined the criteria for litigating the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that the need for finality of judgments and the circumstances of this case require that we not consider the merits of the defendant’s claim.
There is no error.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The court awarded no support for the parties’ other daughter who had reached majority during the divorce proceedings.
In Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987), the Supreme Court held that a mere expectancy of a future acquisition of property was not transferable in a dissolution action as either alimony or as a property award.
The court in Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 231, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987), spoke in terms of exceeding statutory authority, using the word “jurisdiction” only once in agreeing with the holding of a Delaware court in Beres v. Beres, 52 Del. 133, 154 A.2d 384 (1959).